



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 30, 2025

Case No. FL-2023-00039

William Scolinos
America First Legal
611 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE #231
Washington, DC 20003

Dear Mr. Scolinos:

As we noted in our letter dated April 30, 2025, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department of State (“Department”) has identified an additional nine responsive records subject to the FOIA. We have determined that all nine records may be released in part.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each record. Where applicable, the Department has considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing these records and applying FOIA exemptions. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Assistant United States Attorney Jeremy Simon at Jeremy.Simon@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number, FL-2023-00036, and the civil action number, 23-cv-00419, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Avery Bullard".

Avery Bullard
Supervisory Government Information Specialist
Litigation and Appeals Office

Enclosures: As stated.

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) and Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

From: "Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To: Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>
CC: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Thank you
Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 14:08:18 +0000 **DeControlled**

Thanks. (b)(5) DPP That would be very helpful.

From: Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2022 7:52 AM
To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Thank you

Hady,

(b)(5) DPP

George

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2022 1:05 AM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
Mommott, Larry L <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Shrier, Jonathan <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Thank you

Jerusalem colleagues,

(b)(5) DPP

Thanks,
hady

From: Hashim H. Shawa <(b)(6)>
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2022 3:17 PM
To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Mahmoud Shawa <(b)(6)>; Kamel Hussein
<(b)(6)>
Subject: RE: Thank you

Dear Hady and George,

Thank you for the energy you both are devoting to ameliorate the challenges to economic stability in Palestine, and to regional security, emanating from the overt threats to BoP's Gaza operations and personnel from the de facto government there. Alongside those threats, BoP's ability to play an essential role in both humanitarian relief and economic recovery in the Westbank and Gaza continues to be undermined by the Israeli government's failure or unwillingness to resolve the surplus NIS cash issue confronting Bank of Palestine (and other Palestinian banks).

As I trust you appreciate, the United States Government has a vital role to play in resolving these challenges by using its good offices with key interlocutors in Israel and elsewhere in the region. Indeed, U.S. Government involvement has become all the more critical now that BoP has been dragged into a baseless new lawsuit in Israel as an apparent retaliation for BoP's willingness to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza by facilitating Qatari aid.

The New Lawsuit:

For many years, BoP has provided critical financial services to help UN agencies and other credible humanitarian institutions with aid distribution to poverty-stricken families in West Bank and Gaza, while adhering to strictest compliance measures. Lately, as you well know, BoP put itself at considerable legal and financial risk to facilitate humanitarian remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza that were funded by the Qatari government through the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) at the behest of Israeli and U.S. interlocutors and with Palestinian regulatory approvals. Now, in apparent retaliation, an Israeli "lawfare" group led by Nitsana Darshan-Leitner has filed a lawsuit in an Israeli court that includes BoP as a defendant alongside Qatar Charity, two leading Qatari banks, and others.

The lawsuit baselessly accuses BoP of facilitating transfers of money to Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) from Qatar Charity through two Qatari banks: Qatar National Bank; and Masraf Al Rayan (Bank). The lawsuit seeks NIS 1.3 Billion from BoP and the other defendants, and was brought on behalf of 132 Israelis.

It is very noteworthy that similar allegations against Qatar Charity, Qatar National Bank, and Masraf Al Rayan Bank are made in two U.S. lawsuits, but that no such allegations are made against BoP in those lawsuits. We reasonably suspect that the decision to include BoP in the Israeli lawsuit was politically motivated to deter BoP from continuing to

facilitate transfers of Qatari funds to needy Gazans. Neither of the Qatari banks have operations in Israel and Palestine.

We understand that the defendants in the U.S. lawsuits will very shortly be seeking dismissal. This may explain why the Israeli lawsuit was filed at this time. You know from our work on the UNWFP transfers that BoP is always exceptionally careful to comply with international AML and CTF standards and regulations, including Israeli and Palestine Monetary Authority sanctions lists and regulations, to ensure that payments go only to legitimate, non-sanctioned persons.

For that reason, BoP long ago began terminating its relationship with Qatar Charity. In addition, BoP has repeatedly rejected transactions that would involve Qatar Charity despite pressures to do so while we work against considerable risks and obstacles to continue providing much-needed banking services to the Gaza population.

In short, we think this lawsuit against BoP is collateral damage for our willingness to serve as a bridge for Qatari relief funds in Gaza. BoP emphatically denies any involvement in transferring funds to Hamas or PIJ, whether on behalf of Qatar Charity, any other Qatari institution, or anyone else. BoP is retaining Israeli counsel to defend the lawsuit, which will entail considerable expense to the Bank. We are also very concerned about how this will impact our correspondent banking relationships in Israel and the globe and any affect on customer and shareholder confidence.

A key issue in the Israeli lawsuit will be BoP's intent and state of mind. The United States Government can use its good offices with the Israeli and Qatari governments to help us show that the Bank has a strong record of acting only for humanitarian reasons in facilitating transfers of Qatari funds to address urgent needs in Gaza.

The Gaza Operating Challenges:

The existential threats to BoP's ability to serve beleaguered Gazans have only worsened since my December 2021 report. The Gaza government continues to harass our staff with threatened jail sentences because BoP refuses to acquiesce in unjustified duplicate tax-payment demands and related Gaza court orders.

BoP alone cannot fend off the power wielded by the Gaza government. High-level intervention by influential regional players, most notably the Qatari government, is urgently required. Surely the Qatari government understands and appreciates the key role BoP is playing in Gaza by indirectly supporting the proper distribution of aid from Qatar through the UN and WFP to help poverty alleviation for 100,000 families. Further, BoP has allocated US\$3 Million to support a social investment strategy in Gaza and throughout Palestine, and is active in Gaza supporting human development, health, education, sports, and entrepreneurship. BoP also is the largest lender to the Gaza economy and SME sector, and a facilitator of trade in and out of Gaza (especially as most imports are from Israel). BoP provides a key lifeline to the Gaza economy. The threatening behavior of the Gaza government could derail the Bank's ability to continue its operations in Gaza, causing a

major disruption to economic and social development in the strip. All of us should share the goal of avoiding that negative outcome.

Alongside the overt threats from the Gaza government, BoP faces the challenge of facilitating transactions in Gaza while adhering to its firm commitment to compliance with international AML and CTF regimes and sanctions. In that regard, the complaints BOP received from Qatari representatives in Gaza relating to Qatari organizations in Gaza, is illustrative. Our team in Gaza strictly applies compliance measures to ensure any transactions are properly investigated. As a result, our Gaza team did not process LCs and LGs for Qatar Charity Foundation—the same entity on which the new lawsuit focuses—because of lack of proper evidence concerning the nature of the business or project proposed for financing. Additionally, although the Qatar Charity Foundation is not on any U.S. or internationally recognized sanctions list, it is on the Israeli sanctions list, which poses a further compliance hurdle. As such, BoP long time ago began terminating its relationship with Qatar Charity in addition to our teams acting prudently as mentioned above more recently in reference to the LCs and LGs.

As these circumstances should indicate, there is no question about the Bank's commitment to Gaza, even at substantial risk to our business and to the safety of our personnel. But we simply cannot continue this struggle alone. We respectfully and urgently request that the United States Government use its good offices to support us as we seek to achieve a positive outcome for Gazans, for the Palestinian people as a whole, and for regional stability and growth. Not only is BoP the backbone of the Palestinian economy, with the Bank's stability affecting the financial stability of the country, but BoP also is providing an essential humanitarian lifeline to poverty-stricken families in both the West Bank and Gaza in partnership with credible international agencies.

NIS Cash Surplus:

On the positive side, we understand that a serious effort is underway in Israel involving COGAT, the Ministry of Finance, the Population and Immigration Authority, and the Bank of Israel to establish a digital platform to register Palestinian laborers, and match them with contractors, thereby avoiding middlemen in the wage-payment process. The goal, as we understand it, is to transfer the wage-payment process to the Israeli and Palestinian banking system, without physical cash payments. However, it will take several months for this process to be put in place and additional months to be enforced by the Israeli authorities. In the meantime, BoP (to a greater extent than other Palestinian banks, due to our size) continues to hold an enormous and growing volumes of NIS in cash—approximately NIS 2.5 Billion currently—which is forced to sit idle in our vaults. The Bank of Israel continues to restrict, via a crippling cash shipment quota, the ability of BoP and other Palestinian banks to deploy this massive hoard of cash for productive purposes. While we look forward to the new digital system, the cash surplus problem remains unresolved, constraining the ability of the Palestinian banking sector to energize the Palestinian economy for the benefit of the Palestinian people and regional stability.

We urgently require the United States Government intervention with the Bank of Israel and COGAT to have them double the quarterly NIS transfer quota from NIS 4 Billion to NIS 8 Billion, so that BoP and other Palestinian banks are not swamped by the NIS 2 Billion coming in every month from Palestinian laborers getting paid in cash, at least until the new digital-payment mechanism is implemented and is fully operational.

We highly appreciate your urgent attention and support to these fast evolving and highly sensitive issues. I am always available to discuss these issues with you in greater depth.

Regards,

Hashim Shawa

From: Amr, Hady A [mailto:(b)(6)@state.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, February 1, 2022 5:45 PM
To: Hashim H. Shawa <(b)(6)@state.gov> Noll, George (Jerusalem)
Cc: Mahmoud Shawa <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Kamel Hussein
Subject: RE: Thank you

Hi Hashim:

Good to talk briefly today about your general issues on the NIS transfers and your concerns in Gaza. I wonder if you could perhaps send an updated version of this following our conversation, to George and I.

I have dropped Yael to spare her the back and forth, but will keep her apprised of the situation.

Hady

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Hashim H. Shawa <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, December 24, 2021 4:37 AM
To: Lempert, Yael <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: Mahmoud Shawa <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Kamel Hussein
Subject: RE: Thank you

Dear Yael,

On behalf of Bank of Palestine ("BOP"), I write to request that the U.S. Government use its good offices to mitigate continuing threats to BOP's ability to provide vital banking services to beleaguered Palestinians living in Gaza. As you know, at the encouragement of the United Nations, the United States, Israel, Egypt and Qatar, and at great business risk to itself, BOP demonstrated its humanitarian commitment to the people of Gaza by helping transfer UN World Food Program funds to needy Gaza families. However, BOP's ability to continue helping Gazans is imperiled by recent improper pressures that the de facto government in Gaza has applied to the Bank, including:

- Demands for payment of taxes to the Gaza government in the amount of NIS 60 million. These demands put the Bank in an impossible position, given that BOP already pays its full tax obligation to the Palestinian National Authority in Ramallah. Nevertheless, the de facto Gaza government has initiated court cases against the Bank in Gaza to enforce these taxes.
- To gain leverage over the Bank in this dispute, the Gaza government also has imposed restrictions on our operations there: preventing access to equipment and machines for our digital operations; restricting travel by our board members and senior executives; and, most critically, preventing the Bank from securing land and car collateral for loans in Gaza through the different government agencies.
- The Gaza government also is insisting that the Bank open accounts for certain NGOs that do not meet the Bank's rigorous KYC requirements, while threatening to use the force of local law to compel the Bank to open such accounts.

These actions render BOP's operations in Gaza impossible, and create enormous business risks for BOP everywhere it operates. BOP remains strongly committed to compliance with international Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering Terror Financing (CTF) best practices, and refuses to deal with OFAC-sanctioned entities and individuals. BOP cannot and will not make an exception to its policies and practices at the behest of the Gaza government.

We urgently request that the U.S. Government reach out to all appropriate interlocutors to promote protections for the Bank that will end the interferences of the de facto Gaza government, including an end to all claims and lawsuits seeking tax payments to the Gaza government and all restrictions and infringements on the Bank's operations. Without such assistance, BOP will be forced into shutting its operations in Gaza, leaving the already vulnerable population there un-banked, and hastening the deterioration of the dire economic situation in Gaza. Whatever one's political views about the de facto government in Gaza, the overarching goal should be to protect ordinary Palestinians suffering in Gaza and to facilitate progress toward a lasting peace. BOP is committed to supporting these goals, but its ability to do so will be foreclosed if the current negative situation continues.

I thank you in advance for your assistance regarding the above, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Hashim

From: Lempert, Yael [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2021 8:40 AM
To: Hashim H. Shawa (b)(6)
Subject: Thank you

Hashim,

Great to see you yesterday after all this time, and thanks so much for so generously hosting me and my colleagues.

I'll engage as we discussed on that Gaza issue once you send me some further details.

Please reach out any time. And hang in there!

All my best,

Yael

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>



Survey Research Unit

15 June 2021

The **Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)** is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah



For further information, please contact

Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh
at the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Ramallah, Palestine
Telephone 02 296 4933
Fax 02 296 4934

e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org
<http://www.pcpsr.org>

Press Release

Public Opinion Poll No (80)

A semi-consensus that Hamas has won the May 2021 confrontation with Israel triggers a paradigm shift in public attitudes against the PA and its leadership and in favor of Hamas and armed struggle; moreover, a two-third majority rejects the PA decision to postpone the elections, 70% demand forcing legislative and presidential elections on Israel, and the majority says Hamas, not Fatah under Abbas, deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people

9-12 June 2021

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 June 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the decision by the PA president to postpone the holding of Palestinian elections that were scheduled to take place on 22 May 2021. It also witnessed the release of various Israeli decisions on an imminent expulsion of several Palestinian families from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah and the impositions of various restrictions regarding Muslim's access to al Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan. These developments led to popular non-violent confrontations with the Israeli police and settlers in East Jerusalem that escalated to rocket attacks carried out by Hamas against Israeli cities. Hamas claimed that the attacks came in defense of East Jerusalem. The ensuing war between Hamas and Israel lasted for 11 days and led to the death of more than 250 Palestinians, including 66 children, and more than 10 Israelis, including two children. The period also witnessed a PA campaign to vaccinate Palestinian adults in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against the coronavirus. The campaign led to a significant reduction in the daily rates of deaths and infections, particularly in the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2021 show significant changes in public attitudes toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership, Hamas, and relations with Israel. Two drivers seem to have triggered the change: the popular confrontations in East Jerusalem, the Israel-Hamas war, and their public perception of their outcomes on the one hand and the postponement of elections by the PA leadership on the other.

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The findings show a semi-public consensus that Hamas had won the confrontation with Israel and that Hamas' launching of rockets at Israeli cities has been motivated by its desire to defend al Aqsa Mosque and the Palestinian families in al Shaikh Jarrah. Findings also show widespread public discontent with the performance of the PA government and leadership as well as Fatah during the confrontations and the war. They also show a two-third majority rejection of Abbas' decision to postpone the elections. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas has postponed the elections because he was afraid of their outcome, not because Israel has prevented the holding of elections in East Jerusalem.

As a result, support for Hamas, and willingness to vote for it, increases dramatically while support for Fatah drops significantly. Moreover, Hamas' leader, Ismail Haniyyeh, manages to deliver an unprecedented victory over Abbas in a presidential election, if one is held today. Perhaps most importantly, a majority of the Palestinians think that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while a small percentage thinks Fatah under Abbas' leadership is the one who deserves to do that.

Findings also show that more than 70% want to hold legislative and presidential elections soon and a similar percentage wants the PA to impose elections in East Jerusalem despite Israeli objection, rather than wait for an Israeli approval. The poll results do not have good news for most of the newly created electoral lists that registered for the legislative elections as only nine out of 36 managed to cross the threshold of 1.5% required to win seats in the parliament.

The confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel did not have an impact on the level of support for the two-state solution, which remained unchanged. But they did greatly impact other matters related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For example, support for a return to armed confrontations and intifada rose sharply to 60%, and support for a resumption of negotiations with Israel and the belief that negotiation is the most effective means of ending occupation dropped. Moreover, the confrontations within Israel between the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Israeli police seem to have contributed to a significant reduction in support for the one-state solution, which declined from a third to a fifth in three months.

It is worth noticing however that the current findings are not fundamentally different from similar findings we obtained in the past immediately after similar Hamas-Israel confrontations. Therefore, they might be reflecting a temporary emotional reaction that might revert back to where things stood before the confrontations. The change from emotional to normal attitudes usually takes three to six months, as can be seen in our previous polls. But it should be pointed out that a return to "normal" attitudes has in the past been associated with a Hamas failure to maintain its gains and a success on the part of the PA to take measures that helped to pacify the public and win back its trust.

For the new Israeli government led by prime minister Naftali Bennett, about a fifth seems to think that it is better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu. Findings also show that while the largest percentage, but not the majority, is opposed to the participation of the Unified Arab List led by Mansour Abbas in the current coalition government, a similar percentage does support (or does not oppose or support) such participation.

(1) Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

- An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (77%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 1% think Israel came out a winner; 18% say no one came out a winner and 2% think both sides came out winners. Moreover, 65% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 26% think it did not.
- 72% think that Hamas' decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 9% think it came as a protest against the PA

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cancellation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 17% think Hamas' decision was motivated by these two drivers.

- In an evaluation of the performance of 10 local and regional actors during the Jerusalem confrontations and the ensuing war between Israel and Hamas, the overwhelming majority describes as excellent that of the residents of Jerusalem and its youth (89%) followed by that of Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel (86%), followed by that of Hamas (75%). About one fifth describes as excellent the performance of each of the following governments: Egypt's (22%), Turkey's (21%), Jordan's (21%), and Iran's (18%). Finally, only 13% describe as excellent the performance of Fatah, 11% the PA government, and 8% Abbas'.
- A majority of 64% views the residents of East Jerusalem as the group most willing to defend Jerusalem and its holy places, followed by Hamas at 29%, and the PA at 3%. In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, a majority of 53% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 14% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians.
- A majority of 60% thinks the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the recent confrontation was driven, first and foremost, by their desire to defend the holy sites, while 28% think it was driven by their desire to express rejection of integration in the Israeli society and their attachment to their national identity, and only 10% think it came as part of their struggle for equality and rejection of discrimination.
- If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 68% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 18% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 9% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
- When asked about their expectations from the PA under Abbas leadership in case Israel expelled the Shaikh Jarrah families, the largest percentage (38%) said the PA will do nothing; 24% said it will write a complaint to the UN and the ICC; 20% think it will end security coordination with Israel, and 14% think it will launch popular non-violent resistance.
- Public expectations from Hamas are very different: If Israel expels the Shaikh Jarrah families, 77% think Hamas will respond by launching rockets at Israeli cities; 10% think it will wage a non-violent campaign, 6% think it will issue protest statements, and only 5% think it will do nothing.
- A majority of 55% think Israel will not expel the Shaikh Jarrah families and 40% think it will.
- Two thirds of the public think there is a high or a medium chance that Hamas and Israel will reach a long-term truce that will ease the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 31% think the chances are slim.
- A majority of 52% think that the incident in al Aqsa Mosque in which chants were made against the Jerusalem PA-appointed Mufti during his Friday sermon in the aftermath of the ceasefire between Israel and the "resistance" forces does not reflect its views while 44% think it does reflect them.
- 94% say they are proud of the performance of the Gaza Strip during the May confrontation with Israel while 6% say they are not. When asked about the main reason for being proud, 39% said they are proud because Gaza has delivered a military and rocket strike in defense of Jerusalem that demonstrated the weakness of the Israeli army; another 39% said they were proud because Gaza has brought the Palestinian cause back to forefront of Arab and international politics; and 13% said the reason they are proud is because Gaza has sacrificed and endured all the death and destruction while expressing patience and dignity in defense of Jerusalem.

(2) The postponement of the legislative and presidential elections:

- 65% oppose and 25% support the decision of president Abbas to postpone legislative and presidential elections because Israel refuses to allow the holding of elections in East Jerusalem. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas postponed the elections because he was worried about the results while 25% think he postponed the elections because Israel refused to allow them in East Jerusalem.
- The largest percentage (43%) believes that there is no point in protesting Abbas' decision to postpone the elections and that we should therefore accept it. On the other hand, 31% think that there should be protests but they should be conducted through non-violent demonstrations; 17% think the protests should be expressed through the courts and the judicial system routes.
- 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank.
- 69% say we should not wait for an Israeli approval of elections in East Jerusalem and that we should impose these elections on Israel while 15% say it is better to wait for an Israeli approval. The majority (56%) of those who want the PA to hold elections without an Israeli approval demands holding elections immediately, 24% are in favor of holding the elections within three months, and 13% within a year or more. But about half of the Palestinians (49%) believes there will be no elections in the near future while 44% think elections will take place in the near future.
- If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 27% and the latter 59% of the votes (compared to 46% for Haniyeh and 47% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 60% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 25% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 59% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyeh, the former receives 26% and the latter 63%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 48% and Haniyeh 44%.
- In an open-ended question on the preferred president, in case Abbas is not nominated, 29% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 28% say Ismail Haniyeh, 6% Dahlan, 3% Yahia Sinwar, and 2% for each of the following: Khalid Mishaal, Mohammad Shtayyeh, Mustafa Barghouti, and Salam Fayyad. In a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas successors, 29% say they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 28% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (3% each), and Khalid Mishal (2%).
- If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, that participated in the 2006 elections, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 41% say they will vote for Hamas and 30% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 43%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 38% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 32% (compared to 53% three months ago).
- We also asked about the vote for the 36 electoral lists that registered to compete in the parliamentary elections that was scheduled for May 2021. Only nine lists managed to pass

the threshold of 1.5%; the largest percentage went to Hamas' list, "Jerusalem is Our Call" (36%) followed by Fatah's list with 19%, "the freedom list" led by Nasser al Qidwah (9%), "the Future List" of Dahlan (3%), the "National Initiative" 2%, and the following lists managed to pass the threshold: the PFLP, "Together" led by Salam Fayyad, the "Democratic Change" led by Ibrahim Abu Hijlah, and "Palestine for All" led by Mufeed al Hasayneh.

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

- Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%.
- Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 65% and in the West Bank at 60%.
- 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 42% and in the West Bank at 15%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 40% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
- Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 57% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
- 46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 52% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 19% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 50% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas' authorities without fear and 47% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 46% of Gazans said it was good or very good.
- The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 56% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 35% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 51% viewed the PA as a burden and 44% viewed it as an asset.
- 70% oppose and 26% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.
- 41% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 34%.
- Two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 65% expect failure; only 29% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one third of the public expects success and 60% expects failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 62% expects failure and 32% expects success.
- We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today (10%), Maan (7%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(4) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

- 23% (28% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 40% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 35% (37% in the

West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.

- 66% (81% in the Gaza Strip and 57% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 31% (18% in the Gaza Strip and 40% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied.
- A majority of 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 41% are dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 48% and in the Gaza Strip at 30%.
- The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at 49%.

(5) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

- Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.
- Support for the two-state solution increases to 41% and opposition drops to 56% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as being based on the 1967 lines and its capital as East Jerusalem. When the public is asked to pick a choice from among three, 46% pick the two-state solution based on the 1967 lines, 10% pick a Palestinian-Israeli confederation, and only 6% pick a one-state for Jews and Arabs.
- We asked the public about its support for the idea of making Jerusalem, both East and West, an open city, whereby the Eastern part would be the capital of the Palestinian state and Western part would be the capital of the state of Israel. Less than a quarter (23%) supported and 73% opposed the idea.
- A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 67% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 29% believe the chances to be medium or high.
- The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 26% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
- When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 49% chose armed struggle, 27% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 37% chose armed struggle and 36% chose negotiations.
- Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 19% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
- When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 58% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 60% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 20% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 43% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 42% supported dissolving the PA, and 33% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

- FL-2023-00039 A-00000620834 UNCLASSIFIED 5/30/2025 Page 14
- 54% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Moreover, 63% are opposed, and 29% are supportive of a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. Support for such negotiations stands at 38% under the leadership of the international Quartet and 55% are opposed. Moreover, 52% do not believe, and 38% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.
 - The largest percentage (45%) are opposed to the participation of Israeli Arab parties in the Israeli governmental coalitions while 26% say they support Mansour Abbas' decision to join the current coalition in Israel, and 21% say they neither support or oppose such participation.
 - About one fifth (19%) thinks that an Israeli government led by Naftali Bennett from the extreme right wing Yamina party will be better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu; a large majority of 69% disagree with that.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

- 47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 8% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
- In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (24%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 20% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip, 21% (27% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the spread of corruption, 20% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 17% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 14% (19% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 3% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.

From:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>;
To:	Memcott, Larry L <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Shrier, Jonathan <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Letter Protesting New Israel Government Directive Regarding Selection of International Scholars and Students to Teach and Study in Palestinian Universities
Date:	Tue, 5 Apr 2022 21:49:57 +0000

More incoming on the Israeli restrictions to teachers/students in the West Bank, this time from US educators...

From: Committee on Academic Freedom <caf@mesana.org>
Sent: Tuesday, April 5, 2022 3:19 PM
To: (b)(6)@knesset.gov.il; yifatsh@knesset.gov.il; sar@justice.gov.il; pm_eng@pmo.gov.il
Cc: eccp.brussels@gmail.com; mslynk@uwo.ca; ohchr-opt@ohchr.org; registry@ohchr.org; n.bawazir@unesco.org; dl.palestine@unesco-delegations.org; Viktor Almqvist, Press Officer <viktor.almqvist@europarl.europa.eu>; foreign-press@europarl.europa.eu; mbachelet@ohchr.org; defenders@ohchr.org; Maria Arena, Chair of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights <maria.arena@europarl.europa.eu>; Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks <commissioner@coe.int>; Stefano Montanari, Press contact Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights <Stefano.montanari@coe.int>; Kati Piri, Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament <kati.piri@europarl.europa.eu>; David Kaye #2 <freedex@ohchr.org>; Jerusalem, USPalestinianAffairsUnit (Jerusalem) <USPalestinianAffairsUnit@state.gov>; Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Le Mon, Christopher J <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Busby, Scott W <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Letter Protesting New Israel Government Directive Regarding Selection of International Scholars and Students to Teach and Study in Palestinian Universities

Please see our letter to Israeli authorities protesting the Government's proposed policy regarding the selection of international scholars and students to teach and study in Palestinian universities, giving the Israeli military the unilateral power to select and exclude scholars and students and limiting their numbers significantly, while censoring certain disciplines and foci of research. If implemented, the policy would undermine Palestinian universities' ability to recruit appropriate faculty and curtail Palestinians' academic freedom.

--

**Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA)**

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5 April 2022

Prime Minister Naftali Bennet

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Minister of Justice Gideon Sa'ar

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Brigadier-General Ghasan Alyan

Head of Civil Administration in the West Bank, Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)

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Chief Clerk Idit Malul

Supreme Court of the State of Israel

Fax: +972-2-6759648

Dear Prime Minister, Ministers, Brigadier-General, and Chief Clerk,

We write to you on behalf of the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA) to protest Israel's recently released directive, "Procedure for Entry and Residency of Foreigners in Judea and Samaria Region," scheduled to take effect as policy in May 2022. Released by COGAT (Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories), the policy vests the Israeli military with the unilateral power to select and exclude international faculty, academic researchers, and students who wish to teach, study, and conduct research at Palestinian universities. We regard this as both an attempt to isolate Palestinian scholars and students from the international scholarly community and a form of censorship aimed at constraining the freedom of speech and association of international academics and students by denying them access to and

engagement with Palestinian scholars and students, as well as professional and educational opportunities at Palestinian universities. We condemn this proposed policy in the strongest terms as a clear escalation of the persistent efforts of your government to deny Palestinians the right to education.

MESA was founded in 1966 to promote scholarship and teaching on the Middle East and North Africa. The preeminent organization in the field, MESA publishes the International Journal of Middle East Studies and has nearly 2800 members worldwide. MESA is committed to ensuring academic freedom of expression, both within the region and in connection with the study of the region in North America and elsewhere.

If the above directive becomes policy, written into law, it will limit the number of foreign instructors to 100 and foreign students to 150 annually for all institutions of higher education in the West Bank. The Israeli military will have the authority to determine the acceptability of the qualifications and fields of study of applicants. To quote the proposed policy, lecturers and researchers who excel in "necessary professions" will be approved "if it is proven, to the satisfaction of the authorized COGAT official" (32). It is unclear what, if any, expertise such an official would have to adjudicate qualifications of these academics and students, nor is a clear timeline given for this approval process. Moreover, if issued, a permit to teach or study at a Palestinian university would be valid for a period of one year and renewable for twenty-seven months, after which the scholar would have to depart the West Bank for nine months before applying for a permit again. The entire period of residence, even in this non-consecutive structure, cannot exceed five years. This policy will uproot faculty and students who do not hold residency permits (which are rarely granted) and constrain Palestinian universities' capacity for recruitment and intellectual exchange. It also imposes an unworkable timeframe on long-term research programs and initiative planning, undermines the accreditation, recruitment, appointment and promotion procedures already in place at Palestinian educational institutions, and further constrains existing projects and programs funded by donor states and institutions — including the European Union, US Department of Education, the British Council, and other international bodies.

We know that a state like Israel that values higher education and learning would not accept an occupying military force to act as an academic arbiter in its own institutions. Yet, this directive is but the most recent development in the ongoing constriction and violation of Palestinian academic freedom. A brief glimpse over the last months points to this long record. In fact, our committee has written to you numerous times about egregious and violent attacks on Palestinian university students and staff, and in particular those at Birzeit University (see our latest letters on 8 February 2022; 22 December 2021; 21 July 2021; 28 June 2021; and earlier on 11 April 2019.) These attacks, assaults, and detentions are grave violations of basic rights to education and academic freedom. Specifically, these are clear violations of the right to education enshrined in Article 26 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 13 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Israel is a party to the UDHR and a signatory to the ICESCR and is therefore obligated to uphold them.

We call upon you to reject these proposed policies and prevent their becoming law.

We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Eve Troutt Powell
MESA President
Professor, University of Pennsylvania

Laurie Brand
Chair, Committee on Academic Freedom
Professor Emerita, University of Southern California

cc:

European Coordination of Committees and Associations for Palestine (ECCP)
Michael Lynk, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian territories
James Heenan, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ramallah
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, MENA section
Noha Bawazir, Head of Office and UNESCO Representative, UNESCO Liaison Office, Ramallah,
Palestinian delegation to UNESCO
Viktor Almquist, Press Officer - Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), European Parliament
The Honorable Veronica Michelle Bachelet Jeria, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
The Honorable Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
Maria Arena, Chair of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights
Dunja Mijatovic, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
Kato Piri, Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament
Irene Khan, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression
Hady Amr, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Israel and Palestinian Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Christopher Le Mon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State
Scott Busby, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State
George Noll, Palestinian Affairs Unit Chief, U.S. Embassy, Israel

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Memmott, Larry L <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Shrier, Jonathan <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>



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FL-2023-00039 A-00000619536
5 April 2022

"UNCLASSIFIED"

5/30/2025 Page 19

Prime Minister Naftali Bennet
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


satisfaction of the authorized COGAT official" (32). It is unclear what, if any, expertise such an official would have to adjudicate qualifications of these academics and students, nor is a clear timeline given for this approval process. Moreover, if issued, a permit to teach or study at a Palestinian university would be valid for a period of one year and renewable for twenty-seven months, after which the scholar would have to depart the West Bank for nine months before applying for a permit again. The entire period of residence, even in this non-consecutive structure, cannot exceed five years. This policy will uproot faculty and students who do not hold residency permits (which are rarely granted) and constrain Palestinian universities' capacity for recruitment and intellectual exchange. It also imposes an unworkable timeframe on long-term research programs and initiative planning, undermines the accreditation, recruitment, appointment and promotion procedures already in place at Palestinian educational institutions, and further constrains existing projects and programs funded by donor states and institutions — including the European Union, US Department of Education, the British Council, and other international bodies.

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Sincerely,



Eve Troutt Powell
MESA President

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Chair, Committee on Academic Freedom
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cc:

European Coordination of Committees and Associations for Palestine (ECCP)
Michael Lynk, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Palestinian territories

James Heenan, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Ramallah

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, MENA section
Noha Bawazir, Head of Office and UNESCO Representative, UNESCO Liaison
Office, Ramallah, Palestinian delegation to UNESCO

Viktor Almqvist, Press Officer - Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and
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The Honorable Veronica Michelle Bachelet Jeria, UN High Commissioner for
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Kato Piri, Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament

Irene Khan, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression

Hady Amr, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Christopher Le Mon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State

Scott Busby, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State

George Noll, Palestinian Affairs Unit Chief, U.S. Embassy, Israel

From:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	NEA-IPA-DL <NEA-IPA-DL@state.gov>; Miller, Andrew P <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Hallett, Stephanie L <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(5)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Analysis of coalition agreement
Date:	Thu, 15 Dec 2022 19:35:17 +0000 DeControlled

Not sure if anyone has reviewed but this was just sent to me.

(b)(5) DPP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	NEA-IPA-DL <NEA-IPA-DL@state.gov>; Miller, Andrew P <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Analysis of the appendices to the coalition agreements signed between the Likud and Religious Zionism (updated 15.12.2022)

Reading and analysing the appendices to the coalition agreements signed during the past weeks between the Likud and Religious Zionism (Religious Zionism party headed by Bezalel Smotrich and Otzma Yehudit party headed by Itamar Ben Gvir) reveal the ideology of the government Netanyahu is forming and the type of changes it seeks to promote. At this stage, before the government is sworn in, it is still unclear how, and to what extent, the actions that have been agreed upon will be applied in practice. This working document focuses on analysing the appendices to the agreements as published. Whether these agreements are applied in full or not, we view the agreements signed as a declaration of intent to apply far-reaching changes to the structure of the regime in Israel and to the nature of control over the West Bank, and therefore we believe it is important to present them and analyse the anticipated consequences on the lives and futures of millions of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Like the public declarations of future government members, the agreements also reflect that changing the system of governance will substantially weaken the branches, bodies and authorities responsible for the checks and balances over the executive branch of the government. Legislation of the Supreme Court Override Clause¹ will greatly reduce judicial review over the government. The plan to turn the office of legal advisor into a political appointment by elected officials - thus beholdng the advisor to these same elected officials - instead of a professional appointment made through tenders issued by the relevant ministry, as is current practice, also significantly weakens review of the government and fundamentally alters the checks and balances essential to Israel's system of governance. However, this document does not address these changes, but rather focuses on the fundamental changes to Israeli control in the occupied Palestinian territory as they appear in the appendices to the coalition agreements signed with Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties.

¹ "Supreme Court Override Clause", which would allow the Knesset to preclude any law from judicial review, or to retroactively re-enact a law that the Supreme Court struck down.

These are the key changes we identified in the coalition agreements which have already been signed:

- 1- An overhaul of Israeli mechanisms for controlling the occupied Palestinian territories led by initiating a process of transferring the powers of the current civilian government in the West Bank from the military directly to the Israeli civil government, under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. This change is expected to ramp up the process of solidifying Israeli civil control of the West Bank and to institutionalize the blurring of the distinction between legislative and control mechanisms in sovereign Israel with the mechanisms of the military regime in the occupied territories.
 - Systemic expansion of the application of Israeli law to individual Israelis residing in the West Bank by way of military ordinances issued by the Military Commander.
 - Removing the legal advisor to the military government from the military's own authority and transferring it to a new administration which will be established within the Ministry of Defense. This will impair the autonomy of the legal advisor, who will be directly subordinate to the political ranks, and accelerate the process of transferring control over the West Bank from the army to Israeli civilian government officials. This step has critical and far-reaching implications, as it creates a situation in which the legal advisor's primary loyalty and obligation is to Israeli civilians and not to the local population in the occupied territory, as is stipulated in international law.
- 2- Religious Zionism receives and amasses sweeping powers in the executive and judiciary branches, which will greatly facilitate extending official control over Area C as well as the ability to strengthen and promote annexation processes - such as, retroactive authorization of illegal outposts, theft of Palestinian land, increasing and expediting demolitions of Palestinian structures.
 - In the executive branch - according to the agreements, a minister from Religious Zionism will serve as an additional minister in the Ministry of Defense. This minister will share the authority to approve, or not, of all issues which currently require approval from the Minister of Defense, and the administration of the most critical issues affecting the daily lives of Palestinians, such as: the approval of master plans, the permit regime, allocations of resources such as land, water and infrastructure, demolition of Palestinian homes, as well as construction permits for Israeli settlements.

In addition, the expanded powers of the additional minister in the Ministry of Defense includes the authority to appoint the head of the Civil Administration and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. This minister will also wield authority to approve the State's responses to the High Court of Justice in petitions concerning his/her areas of work, which will likely limit the ability of the professional ranks in government to voice a position contrary to that of the minister.

- In the legislative branch, Religious-Zionism will head the parliamentary "Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. This position is particularly significant, as this parliamentary committee hears and debates most proposed legislation, and also heads the Subcommittee for Judea and Samaria and the Seam Zone within the Ministry of Defense. This appointment has a multiplying effect on the power of the Right to permeate its ideology and annexation aspirations.

3- Increasing budgets and State authorities' direct involvement in promoting de facto annexation

- The Israel Antiquities Authority and the Council for the Preservation of Israel Heritage Sites will be transferred to the authority of the Minister of Heritage from Otzma Yehudit and used to reinforce the Jewish-Zionist narrative, while erasing Palestinian identity from the area.
- Ministers from Otzma Yehudit will be granted authority over the Planning and Agricultural and Settlement Development Authority, the Green Patrol and the National Unit for Enforcing Planning and Construction Laws - bodies that greatly influence settlement and outpost expansion and restrict Palestinian construction in the West Bank.

4- Expanding the authorities of the Ministry of Public Security and transforming it into the Ministry of National Security

- Grouping of enforcement authorities, who have direct influence over the control of the space, under the purview of one ministry. All these bodies have authority to operate in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
- Limiting the autonomy of the Israel Police by subordinating it to the Minister of National Security, who will dictate policy on law enforcement. This could lead to political interference and extraneous considerations in the police's work. The Israeli police is responsible for enforcing law and order upon all citizens and residents of Israel and East Jerusalem, as well as upon Israeli settlers who reside in the West Bank, including addressing the phenomenon of settler violence against Palestinians.

* The disclaimer, clearly an attempt at appeasement, which appears throughout these agreements and is repeated in declarations made by Netanyahu and his allies, that every new measure is subject to the approval of the Prime Minister, appears to be nothing more than lip service. If Netanyahu had the will or political power to prevent the moves mentioned above, he would have done so before signing the agreements.

Appendix to the coalition agreement between the Likud and Religious Zionism (signed December 1, 2022)

Clause number	Issue	Quote/Details	Significance/Comments
6.3	Appointment: A Minister of Settlement Affairs from Religious Zionism; this ministry will be renamed the Ministry of National Missions; and expansion of the Ministry's authorities and areas of operation	Establishing the Ministry of National Missions instead of the Ministry of Settlement Affairs, and transferring six departments from other ministries to it, while significantly expanding the Ministry's powers and budget.	<p>The issues this ministry addresses will position it as a ministry that promotes settlement and establishes Jewish supremacy in areas with high rates of Palestinian residents inside Israel and in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. "National Missions" could include promoting initiatives in the occupied territories such as developing road networks, infrastructure, water, public transit, etc. This ministry will also control the list of areas of national priority, which includes West Bank settlements.</p> <p>Currently, the <u>Settlement Division</u> operates subject to the Ministry of Settlement Affairs, the body responsible, among other things, for establishing settlements and outposts. In addition, mission-driven groups (<i>gar'inim messimati'im</i>), pre-military preparatory schools and National Service operate subject to the Ministry. These are used, inter alia, to channel funding to settlements.</p> <p>The significance of expanding authorities and areas of operation is deepening the policy of distinctly preferring the Jewish population, halting Palestinian development, segregating the two populations – Jewish and Palestinian – and connecting Israel and the West Bank.</p> <p>[Clauses 13-16 detail the Ministry's authority in matters of Jewish identity and relevant to issues of religious freedom. Clause 16 addresses establishing an administration for community missions that will oversee the mission-driven groups. These groups currently are a substantial base and</p>

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290	"UNCLASSIFIED"	5/30/2025, Page 27 provide human resources for establishing farming outposts and taking control over land and Palestinian assets in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.].
6.4	Appointment: A minister from Religious Zionism in the Ministry of Defense	Responsible for the Civil Administration and Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories' (COGAT) operations	Annexing the West Bank to Israel and strengthening the apartheid regime in the West Bank. According to Israeli media publications, Smotrich intends to dismantle the Civil Administration (at least the aspects concerning the Jewish population in the	

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290	"UNCLASSIFIED"	<p>5/30/2025 Page 28 West Bank) by 2024.²</p> <p>Creating a divide in the Ministry of Defense and appointing an additional minister in this Ministry is designed to preserve the Ministry of Defense's authority over the Civil Administration, and in doing so, evade claims of annexing the West Bank to Israel. In practice, this is just a façade and removes substantial powers from the hands of the Military Commander (GOC Central Command).</p> <p>Currently the Civil Administration is the executive branch subordinate to COGAT, which in turn is subordinate to the Minister of Defense, the party responsible for applying policy on civilians in the West Bank – Palestinians and Jews.</p> <p>The areas the Civil Administration is responsible for are divided by staff officers, who oversee a range of matters – from planning, electricity and energy to transportation and environmental protection. Each staff officer is in practice the professional executive branch in the West Bank (the Civil Administration serves as an executive branch of sorts on behalf of the military commander in the occupied territory).</p> <p>The additional minister in the Ministry of Defense will oversee the settlers as well as administering Palestinians' daily lives in most areas affecting them. For example, the</p>
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²Hanan Greenwood, "[The appointment of select officials instead of the Minister of Defense: These are the authorities Smotrich will receive](#)" (**Hebrew**), Israel Hayom, 4.12.2022; Hodaya Karash-Hazony, Atara German, Shila Fried, "[After the agreement with Smotrich: Will the Civil Administration in fact be dismantled](#)"? (**Hebrew**), Makor Rishon, 4.12.2022.

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290	"UNCLASSIFIED"	<p>5/30/2025 Page 29 permit regime, allocating resources such as land, water and infrastructure, demolition of Palestinian homes, and more.</p> <p>However, according to media reports and our knowledge of Smotrich's intentions, his goal is to dissolve the Civil Administration's authority over the Jewish population in the West Bank and transfer administration of Jewish residents' requests to government officers and the Israeli authorities. District Coordination and Liaison Centers (DCL) throughout the West Bank will continue to address Palestinians' requests.</p> <p>It is important to note that there are already matters – such as environmental affairs, archaeology and certain areas of property affairs, among others, in which the staff officers are professionally subordinate to the Israeli ministries and authorities. Also, in some areas (such as education) local and regional authorities (settlements) operate directly with government offices. The change is expected to intensify the process of unifying executive authority within the relevant Israeli governmental ministry thus civilizing control in the area, as well as over Israelis who reside in the West Bank and Palestinians of area C.</p> <p>The Minister of Defense will maintain security issues such as: operational activity, invasion of homes, arrests, closing areas and more. In other words, matters currently subject to the Central Command will continue as such.</p> <p>Significance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning in area C will be subject to the new minister's policies. - The Civil Administration and COGAT will operate subject to considerations that account only for Israel and the
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	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290	"UNCLASSIFIED"	<p>5/30/2025 Page 30</p> <p>Minister's interests, and not with the occupied population's best interests in mind.</p> <p>- A significant step of annexing the West Bank and normalizing Israeli control in the West Bank – a broad transfer of powers to Israeli ministries and Israeli authorities, and discharging Israel's responsibility to administer a temporary regime of occupation according to its obligations as trustee.</p> <p>- Deepening the apartheid regime in the West Bank: Establishing and strengthening Jewish supremacy by creating a reality of systemic discrimination between the two populations living there – Jewish and Palestinian. Transforming dispossession of Palestinians into a declared and broad policy. Intensifying the discriminatory framework by which Palestinians are subject to the military regime while the settlers are subject to a civil regime and are over-privileged.</p> <p>Additional implications:</p> <p>- The appointed Minister's agenda does not support the activities and presence of foreign organizations in the field, and therefore there are concerns that bodies such as the Red Cross, diplomats, various UN bodies including UN rapporteurs, humanitarian aid organizations, etc. will be denied entry permits.</p> <p>- Harming GOC Central Command's operational priorities and further division among the parties operating on the ground. This could lead to clashes in the field and exacerbate existing problems in coordinating among the various parties.</p>
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7	Cabinet membership	FL-2023-00039 A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED" Chair of Religious Zionism, Bezalel Smotrich, is a member of the political-security cabinet	5/30/2025 Page 31
8.1	Appointment: Chair of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee		This is a very powerful appointment as this is an important and central Knesset committee. Most legislation is debated in this committee, including legislation concerning the status of legal advisors. The chair can determine the speed at which legislation is advanced, and expedite legislation at will.
8.2	Appointment: Chair of the Committee on Special National Infrastructure Projects and Jewish Religious Services		<p>The party will receive both the Ministry of National Missions and control over the Committee. The combination creates almost unrestricted power and control over significant budgets.</p> <p>Significance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ability to promote national initiatives in the West Bank and Jerusalem and control the list of areas of national priority. Initiatives could include – developing road networks, infrastructure, water, public transit and more. There are also concerns that the occupied territory's resources will be used to bury garbage and parts of the West Bank will be transformed into the State of Israel's garbage dump. - A significant acceleration of existing policy is expected, including national infrastructure initiatives which are mainly designed for the use of the Jewish population and improving settlers' quality of life, for segregating the populations, for preventing Palestinian development and connecting Israel to the West Bank for the benefit of the settler population while blurring the Green Line.

9	Membership in the Ministerial Committee on Settlement Affairs	FL-2023-00039 A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED" Smotrich is the only deputy committee chair (to the Prime Minister)	5/30/2025 Page 32 See Clause 6 of the analysis of the agreement with Otzma Yehudit party.
11	The Arrangements Law	Before bringing the Arrangements Law for approval, it will be brought to the Prime Minister (PM), the chair of the Religious Zionism party and the Shas party for approval.	<p>The Economic Arrangements Law incorporates broad legislation on a variety of issues and has immense influence on the state budget and economic reforms. This is a massive law approved by the Knesset as a single unit.</p> <p>Approval by sectarian party heads raises concerns of prioritizing certain groups in society. The chair of Religious Zionism represents the population of settlers and its narrow interests.</p> <p>Additionally, due to its nature, the law enables concealing channelling budgets and intentions to undertake reforms while approving them under the public's radar.</p>
12	Chair of the Subcommittee for Judea and Samaria and the Seam Zone	A Knesset member on behalf of National Zionism chairs the Subcommittee for Judea and Samaria and the Seam Zone at the Ministry of Defense	<p>The Subcommittee for Judea and Samaria and the Seam Zone shapes policy on civil affairs in the West Bank.</p> <p>The party will receive both a minister in the Ministry of Defense and control over the Subcommittee for Judea and Samaria and the Seam Zone. The combination doubles the power over shaping Israeli policy in the West Bank.</p> <p>The subcommittee already has considerable power over shaping policy in the West Bank, expressed through the rise of the narrative regarding the battle for Area C. For example, almost all new legislation in the West Bank addressing Palestinian construction has resulted from the Subcommittee's work. As a result of its work, an ordinance concerning removal of a new structure and an ordinance concerning transporting goods (mobile structures) were</p>

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"	5/30/2025 Page 33 legislated, among others. While the subcommittee lacks official authority to instruct the GOC Central Command to legislate an ordinance, its enforcement, follow up and ability to demand reports on executing policy significantly affect actions on the ground.
15	Legal Advisor to the Ministry of National Missions	A legal advisor and two legal aides in the Ministry of National Missions	<p>This clause should be viewed as part of the expected reform on legal advisors – political appointment of legal advisors loyal to the Minister and the policy they wish to promote. Legal counsel is meant to create checks and balances, but since this position will apparently become a political appointment, rather than independent counsel, counsel will be designed to execute the Minister’s policy and eliminate obstacles. The position will transform legal advisors from gatekeepers into legalizers of any policy the Minister seeks to advance.</p> <p>In terms of promoting national missions in the West Bank, these legal advisors are exclusively committed to the State of Israel’s interests, in contrast to advisors who are subordinate to the military commander and obligated to also consider the interests of the population in the occupied territory and operate according to additional obligations incumbent on the occupying force under international law.</p>
17	A representative of the Ministry of National Missions will be a member of the Israel Land Council	A representative of the Ministry of National Missions will be a member of the Israel Land Council on the National Council for Planning and Building, and on district committees for planning and building in areas of national priority. There will be further	<p>In addition to controlling the Ministry of National Missions and the Knesset committee, ministry representatives will be included in all significant planning and allocation bodies in a way that enables the party to control promoting plans and approving them, as well as granting permits and land.</p> <p>The insertion of representatives from a ministry with this particular goal, along with the specific policies it seeks to promote, into all significant planning and allocation bodies raises concerns regarding the interests that will be promoted</p>

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED" amendment of legislation in order to appoint a ministry representative to some of the aforementioned bodies.	5/30/2025 Page 34 and the direct influence on the priorities of these bodies. This move will allow for obstacles to be removed and to expedite the implementation of plans and projects.
18	National Infrastructure Staff at the Ministry of Finance	Will be re-established in coordination with the Minister of the Interior, to remove obstacles and expedite implementing national missions.	Another means to enable promoting the Ministry of National Missions' plans in terms of finances – budgeting and removing bureaucratic and other obstacles.
20	Enforcement in property matters	Transferring the authority for property enforcement from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of National Security.	See Clause 5.16 of the analysis of the agreement with Otzma Yehudit party.
21	Appointment of an additional minister in the Ministry of Defense		
	21.1 - Amendment of a basic law for the sake of this appointment	Amending legislation – in the ministry where the Minister is appointed, an additional minister may be appointed, responsible for certain areas subject to the Minister in charge of the ministry	It should be noted that this is not a deputy minister or a minister in a separate ministry but appointment of a minister with parallel authority who, according to the agreement, does not answer to the Minister of Defense. As stated, this move is designed to preserve a semblance of leaving control and authority over the West Bank under the Ministry of Defense and the military commander in order to avoid international criticism for violating international law and annexation. See Clause 6.4
	21.2 - Powers for appointing head of the Civil Administration	The Minister of Defense's powers concerning	This new minister gains the authority to appoint the most important roles in the civilian mechanism in the West Bank.

	and COGAT	FL-2023-00039 A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED" appointing the head of the Civil Administration and COGAT will be transferred to the additional minister in the Ministry of Defense in coordination with the PM.	<p>5/30/2025 Page 35</p> <p>This power to appoint will therefore allow control over the work of these bodies and ability to dictate their priorities. These bodies are responsible for most aspects of civilian life in the West Bank, including planning and infrastructure and movement permit regimes, such as permits to enter the seam zone or exit the Gaza Strip. They are also entrusted with civilian and security coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and international bodies.</p> <p>Currently, heads of the Civil Administration and COGAT are appointed by the Chief of Staff in coordination with the Minister of Defense. The change will lead to politicizing these appointments, which have insofar been professional-military.</p> <p>As stated, in Clause 6.4 Smotrich's final vision is to bring to dismantling the Civil Administration for the Israeli population residing in the West Bank.</p>
	21.3 - Legal counsel to the Civil Administration and COGAT	The Civil Administration and COGAT will receive legal counsel from the Department of the Legal Advisor in the Ministry of Defense for all work they perform.	<p>Revoking legal counsel's independent status concerning the occupied territory in the Military Advocate General Corps and in the State Attorney's Office and directly subordinating it to the political ranks.</p> <p>While the legal advisor's current commitment to protecting the rights of the Palestinian population is questionable, until now, at least from the official standpoint, this obligation has served as its point of departure.</p> <p>This is a profound structural change – a revolution in no uncertain terms – which transforms legal counsel from professional and independent to political, subject to the Minister's desire and the State of Israel's interests,</p>

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290	"UNCLASSIFIED"	<p>5/30/2025 Page 36</p> <p>without considering the laws of occupation – including the obligation to operate in a regime of trusteeship, the principle of a temporary occupation and consideration of the occupied population’s interests – which the political ranks do not view themselves committed to.</p> <p>This step should be regarded as part of a much broader process of unifying authorities in Israel with the authorities operating currently in the West Bank under the Military Commander and in the framework of obligations and restrictions dictated by international law. This is a significant step towards annexation and towards consolidating Israel’s apartheid regime in the West Bank. Palestinian residents of the West Bank do not partake in elections in Israel and cannot be elected or elect the representatives who will determine their fate without any obligation to consider their needs and wishes.</p> <p>At present the Legal Advisor to the West Bank Area is a military officer who provides counsel on legislative issues, assists in formulating the Military Commander’s ordinances, accompanies the army and the Civil Administration’s every activity and advises on all legal aspects of military activity in the occupied territory, all under a declared commitment to conform with international law that applies to the Area.</p> <p>As the planned reform is carried out and the legal advisor positions and legal counsel will become political appointments, the issues mentioned above will worsen. The change is expected to be dramatic: Legal counsel will become private counsel in practice, designed to legalize the Minister’s agenda without taking into r consideration Israel’s duties vis-a-vis the Palestinians according to</p>
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	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"	5/30/2025 Page 37 international law.
	21.4 - The State's responses to the High Court of Justice in matters under its purview	The State's responses submitted to the High Court of Justice by the State Attorney's Office regarding matters the secondary Minister is responsible for will be approved by the Minister him or herself in coordination with the Minister of Defense, and in coordination and with the agreement of the PM	<p>Granting authority to a minister in the Ministry of Defense to approve the State's response effectively prohibits the professional ranks within the government from expressing a position that contradicts the Minister's position.</p> <p>The High Court of Justice Department at the Office of the State Attorney is responsible for drafting the State's responses to the High Court. This change will enable and reinforce the Minister's interference in their professional work. It is important to note that this refers to a Minister of Defense and not to the Minister of Justice as was the practice in the past. (Procedurally, during the period Ayelet Shaked served as the Minister of Justice she appointed an external advisor who worked under her and carried out this function on her behalf as Minister).</p>
	21.5 - Aide to the Minister of Defense on Settlement Affairs	Aide to the Minister of Defence on Settlement Affairs will continue to serve with the Minister of Defence and operate only in the areas for which the Minister of Defence is responsible	Given the expected division in the Ministry of Defence, the Aide to the Minister of Defence will be responsible for aspects of the settlement enterprise' security needs, such as emergency and protection arrangements for the outposts and settlements
	21.6	Continuing the project of issuing military ordinances on behalf of GOC Central Command to adapt the security legislation the applies to Judea and Samaria. The minister from Religious Zionism in the	<p>Deepening apartheid and establishing the existence of two legal systems – one civilian that applies to the settlers, and the other military – applying to Palestinians.</p> <p>The project addresses applying Israeli law on Israelis residing in the West Bank (settlers) by way of military orders. The significance is that any law legislated in the</p>

	FL-2023-00039	<p>A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"</p> <p>Ministry of Defense will be responsible for this project, and three legal advisor positions will be allocated through the settlement administration for this project</p>	<p>5/30/2025 Page 38</p> <p>Knesset will also be legislated in the West Bank by way of military order so that it also applies to the Israeli settlers.</p> <p>In the past, the “Norms Law” bill was promoted in the Knesset, which sought an identical outcome by way of primary Knesset legislation. Now, in order to avoid criticism for annexation and direct legislation by the Knesset on the occupied territory, legislation will be undertaken via military orders signed by GOC Central Command without requiring this in legislation.</p> <p>Jurists in Israel believe this project is for personal and selective application of the Knesset’s legislation in the West Bank through a formal mechanism of military orders issued by the GOC Central Command. While the military commander will sign the orders, it is the minister in the Ministry of Defense who will instruct the orders be legislated according to the work of the settlement administration which operates under him. “In this way, the substantive power to legislate in the Area will be entirely in the hands of the political-executive branch: Not subject to the military commander or the Knesset will laws be legislated in the Area. Meaning applying primary government legislation directly without a parliament, based on the sole discretion of the body in charge of Jewish settlement affairs.”³</p>
	21.7	All authority for the Minister of Defense’s approval of the issues mentioned in the coalition	<p>Granting broad powers that will enable considerably expediting all matters pertaining to construction permits, promoting plans, allocating land, movement permits and in other areas. The anticipated outcome on</p>

³ From the article by Ronit Levine-Schnur, Yael Barda, Tamar Megiddo and Itamar Mann, [The Annexation Hides In the Four Pages of the Agreement](#), Haaretz, December 5, 2022 (Hebrew).

	FL-2023-00039	<p>A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"</p> <p>agreement will be the responsibility of the minister from Religious Zionism in the Ministry of Defense. This authority will be applied in coordination and with the approval of the PM.</p> <p>The agreement gives the example of the powers determined in Government Resolution 150, which addresses the need for a government decision in order to establish a new settlement and the Minister of Defense's approval in order to promote and approve construction plans in the West Bank or allocate land for construction.</p>	<p>5/30/2025 Page 39</p> <p>the ground is speedy approval of plans, significant increase in construction and expansion of the settlement enterprise.</p> <p>According to media publications, it was also agreed that convening the planning bodies in the West Bank will no longer require the Minister of Defense's approval. From now on, the minister on behalf of Religious Zionism in the Ministry of Defense will be able to order these bodies to convene, and will work directly with Netanyahu.</p>
	21.8	<p>Establishing an administration within the Ministry of Defense subordinate to the minister in the Ministry of Defense. The administration will be allocated 12 positions, including a director-general, which will be a political appointment.</p>	<p>Establishing the "Ministry of Occupation" in the Ministry of Defense.</p> <p>Division within the Ministry of Defense, and granting all authority concerning civilian matters in the West Bank to the minister and the administration operating under his or her purview. This move will grant the minister the independence to set priorities, expedite processes and implement the policy, and will preclude the possibility of officials inside the Ministry of Defense being able to challenge implementing the new policy.</p>

Appendix to the coalition agreement between the Likud and Otzma Yehudit party (signed November 25, 2022)

Clause number	Issue	Quote/Details	Significance/Comments
5	Appointment: Minister of National Security		
5.1	The Minister of Public Security, whose ministry will be called the Ministry of National Security	Expanding the Ministry's authority	Renaming the Ministry is not semantic but substantive: It reflects who will receive security and defines the area the Minister and Ministry will have authority over. Ben-Gvir regards himself as responsible not only for Israel and the safety of Israelis inside Israel proper, but also nationally responsible in the area that includes the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The name change is declarative and is accompanied by significant expansion of the Minister's and the Ministry's powers.
	5.1.1	Amending the Police Ordinance so that the relationship between the Minister of National Security and the Police Commissioner will be similar to that of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff. The minister will be responsible for the police's budget.	Transforming the minister into the highest police commander, similar to the Minister of Defense's role vis-à-vis the army. According to the proposed bill, the police will be subordinate to the Minister of National Security, and he will dictate policy on law enforcement. According to the agreement, the police will cease to be an independent body but rather a body that carries out the minister's policy, in other words, a political body. The bill proposed following the coalition agreement reflects that the new government is invalidating the most fundamental principle of law enforcement – equality before the law and police impartiality in enforcing the law. In this, the police becomes a means for the regime to carry out a political ideology.

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				<p>The agreement seeks to revoke the police's relative independence, lead to the minister's involvement in its work, and to transform the police into a tool in the service of a politician.</p> <p>In addition to the substantive issue, there is also a personal issue. The intended minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, openly declares his desire to remove obstacles preventing security forces' use of force, his wish to change the status quo on the Temple Mount, and apply additional measures that could lead to escalation in the entire region.</p> <p>Also, the Minister of National Security – with extended powers – will be the minister responsible for the Judea and Samaria District Police, whose role it is to enforce the law upon Israeli citizens, including enforcement and addressing settler violence. Currently, Israel's policy is to grant near immunity to Israeli citizens who harm Palestinians. There is concern that this policy will only expand and become open and declarative, allowing full immunity, which could lead to further exacerbation of settler violence and harm to Palestinians and their property.</p>
	5.1.5	Establishing a national guard and expanding Border Police reserves forces		<p>Apparently, the intention is to transform the Border Police into a national guard that will operate inside mixed cities in Israel and Jerusalem.⁴</p> <p>In the context of the occupied territory, this change will affect the policing presence in Jerusalem. The current Minister of Defense, Benny Gantz, noted that he views this step as establishing "a private militia for Ben-Gvir".</p>

⁴Moshe Nussbaum, The new plan for the Border Police: The unit will become the national guard in mixed cities (Hebrew), N12. 14.12.2022.

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"	5/30/2025 Page 42 The significance is transforming an operational force designed to guard state borders from external enemies into a force that operates within the civilian population inside the state. This reflects a profound process taking place in Israel – marking parts of Israel’s population as enemies.
		<p>The following units will move to the Ministry of National Security:</p> <p>5.1.6.1 The Israel Authority for Prevention of Violence, Alcohol and Drug Abuse (among other things, powers to use surveillance technology)</p> <p>5.1.6.2 National Unit for Enforcing Planning and Construction Laws</p> <p>5.1.6.3 The Green Patrol (also operates in the occupied territory)</p> <p>5.1.6.4 The Green Police (also operates in the occupied territory)</p> <p>5.1.6.5 The West Bank Border Police will be brought under the Israel Police pending completion of structural change</p>	<p>Concentrating enforcement bodies that have a bearing on matters of control over the physical space under one ministry. All these bodies have powers to operate in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.</p> <p>Concentrating powers that can be used against civilians in aspects related to personal and physical space such as: surveillance technologies in public areas, construction of fences and gates, enforcement of illegal construction, monitoring and enforcement of environmental issues, nature reserves, national sites, arrest powers and more.</p> <p>Even now, enforcement action taken by these bodies often target minorities in a discriminatory manner. However, the combination of concentrated enforcement powers with the political ideology of the appointed minister will result in enforcement in these fields being used as a tool or a means for ensuring Jewish supremacy and dispossessing minorities and Palestinians in particular.</p> <p>The various enforcement powers may be used to persecute Palestinians in Area C (as well as the Palestinian minority within Israel) under the pretext of the rule of law in the criminal, planning, administrative and other fields.</p>
5.2	Appointment: Minister for Development of the Negev and the Galilee, renamed the Ministry for Development of the Negev,		

	the Galilee and National Resilience	FL:2023-00039 A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"	5/30/2025 Page 43
	5.2.1.2	Powers and areas of operation will be expanded as part of a national project to carry out missions designed to strengthen Israeli society in the field of quality of life, sustainability and resilience.	<p>The Ministry's new name is a statement of intent regarding the role of the minister, his powers and the population to which he is committed.</p> <p>The project will be implemented in local authorities and localities defined in Government Resolution No. 1453 and Government Resolution No. 1371.⁵</p> <p>The list of localities included in these government resolutions include the settlements in the West Bank both as areas of national priority and as at-risk communities.⁶ The significance: More options to funnel funding to settlements and give benefits to Israeli citizens living in them.</p>
	5.2.1.5.1	The following units will be transferred to the Ministry for Development of the Negev, the Galilee and National Resilience: 5.2.1.5.1 The Planning and Agricultural and Settlement Development Authority	<p>The Authority will be entrusted with retroactively authorizing outposts. The agreement defines it as the body responsible for implementing the Ministerial Outpost Regularization Team headed by the PM.</p> <p>See: Clause 6 of the coalition agreement with Otzma Yehudit.</p>
5.3	Appointment: Minister of Heritage Affairs		

⁵Government Resolution No. 1453 and Government Resolution No. 1371.

⁶List of local authorities and towns included in the "social periphery" of Israel according to Government Resolution No. 1453, updated March 2022; List of geographical areas of national priority and threatened communities (beginning pg. 39).

	5.3.2	FL-2023-00039 A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"	<p>Management of national heritage assets and instilling Jewish Zionist heritage. The Ministry will work on tangible and intangible heritage.</p> <p>The Ministry's purpose is to emphasize the Jewish-Zionist heritage as the Minister understands it, and to erase Palestinian identity from the area. Creating a uniform narrative about Jewish-Zionist heritage.</p> <p>Experience in the West Bank and East Jerusalem shows that Israeli authorities take over Palestinian properties and lands under the guise of preserving heritage, and that under the pretext of heritage preservation, historical sites are exclusively associated with Jewish history and tradition, without mention of any other heritage, history or culture.</p>
	5.3.4	<p>The following units will move to the Ministry of Heritage:</p> <p>5.3.4.1 The Israel Antiquities Authority</p> <p>5.3.4.2 Regulations supporting associations and public institutions engaging in heritage development</p> <p>5.3.4.3. The Council for the Preservation of Israel Heritage Sites</p>	<p>The Israel Antiquities Authority: The Civil Administration Archeology Staff Officer is already professionally subordinate to the Israel Antiquities Authority</p> <p>Placing the entire field of archeology in the West Bank under the purview of the Ministry of Heritage, led by a minister from Otzma Yehudit will deepen Israel's policy of using archeological sites in the West Bank to entrench and justify Israeli control over the territory. The foothold gained by these political parties will impact how the historical narrative in the region is shaped. Palestinians will be denied access to archaeological and historical sites; antiquities will be removed from the occupied territory in violation of international law; Palestinian communities will be expelled. They will set the agenda for archeology policy in the West Bank, such as which sites to excavate and develop into sites that are accessible to the public, and which sites not to develop, whether to grant excavation licenses and more.⁷</p> <p>In East Jerusalem, the Israel Antiquities Authority already</p>

⁷For more on Israel's current archaeological practices in sites in the West Bank, see: [Appropriating the Past – Israel's Archaeological Practices in the West Bank](#), Yesh Din & Emek Shaveh, 2018.

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"	<p>5/30/2025 Page 45. supports projects such City of David, run by the Elad association, which promotes overtaking Palestinian assets and areas under the pretext of preserving Jewish heritage.</p> <p>Regulations supporting associations and public institutions engaging in heritage development: Establishing funding tests that dictate which associations and institutions receive funding and for what.</p> <p>The Council for the Preservation of Israel Heritage Sites: Relevant to Jerusalem (not the West Bank). Responsible for site preservation.</p>
6	Ben Gvir will be a member of the Ministerial Outpost Regulation Team	<p>The Minister of National Security will be a member of the Ministerial Team for the Regulation of Young Settlement in Judea and Samaria, headed by the Prime Minister.</p> <p>The decisions made by the ministerial team will be implemented by the Planning and Agricultural and Settlement Development Authority at the Ministry for Development of the Negev, the Galilee and National Resilience Ministry with the Prime Minister's approval.</p>	<p>Significance: Retroactive authorization of unauthorized outposts. A significant step toward de facto and de jure annexing the West Bank and cementing Israeli control in the West Bank.</p> <p>While the international community and international law consider all Israeli settlements in the occupied territory to be illegal, Israeli law distinguishes between settlements established following a government resolution, which it considers to be legal and outposts that were established without a government resolution and which are considered illegal (unauthorized).</p> <p>Along with the fact that retroactively approving outposts is a blatant violation of international law, which prohibits the establishment of settlements in the occupied territory, it is an annexation measure that will solidify and perpetuate an additional 100 settlements in the West Bank and enable their future growth and development. Since there are no plans to authorize Palestinian settlements in the West Bank, this step is another feature of systematic discrimination and the deepening of apartheid rule.</p>

	FL-2023-00039	A-00000619290 "UNCLASSIFIED"	5/30/2025 Page 46 There may be a duplication of powers with the Minister in the Ministry of Defense who was also given powers in the area of retroactively approving outposts. Even if it is not entirely clear who will lead the process of outpost regularization and exactly how they will be regularized - there is clearly an express policy and full intent to retroactively authorize unauthorized outposts.
8	Chairman of the Public Security Committee		Power doubled: The Otzma Yehudit party will have both the ministry and the committee. The Committee Chair has broad discretion to set priorities and topics for discussion, including summoning the relevant professionals to report to the committee. In addition, the committee is tasked with overseeing the Minister's work, while its chair is a member of the same party.

From:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>	
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>	
CC:	(b)(6)@state.gov>	DeControlled
Subject:	RE: Update / Civil Society Round Table	
Date:	Sun, 23 May 2021 13:44:33 +0000	

(b)(5) DPP

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 4:34 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Amr, Hady A (b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Hi Hady, see below for some background on organizations that have spoken out in defense of Issa Amro.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

The UN, European Union, foreign diplomats, Israeli and Palestinian rights groups and civil society organizations, and Jewish American advocacy organizations have spoken out in support of Issa Amro, specifically regarding his recent cases in Israeli military and Palestinian Authority (PA) courts. In February, the EU heads of missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah called on both Israel and the PA to drop the "politically motivated charges" against Amro. The UN said Amro's case was "emblematic of the sophisticated array of obstacles faced by Palestinian human rights defenders who engage in non-violent activities."

(b)(6) Human Rights & Gender Affairs
Palestinian Affairs Unit | U.S. Embassy, Jerusalem

(b)(6)

✉: (b)(6)@state.gov

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 3:23:14 PM
To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Will do, thanks.

(b)(6)

From: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 3:11:50 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Great. Put me on the schedule...

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 3:08 PM
To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Re: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Hady,

I understand from (b)(6) you plan to moderate. That is great!

I can pass on fuller bios of the participants if helpful. Just let me know.

I will be at the site to welcome guests and we will all be pre-set for your arrival with S. (b)

(b)(5) DPP

Best,

(b)(6)

From: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 1:10 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: RE: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Great.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 1:03 PM

To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Update / Civil Society Round Table

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

They have a large conference room that will work.

From: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 12:59 PM

To: Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Update / Civil Society Round Table

(b)(5) DPP

From: Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 12:52 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Probably too late but I just got a call from (b)(5) DPP; (b)(6)

(b)(5) DPP

I told him I would pass this on.

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On 23 May 2021 at 12:39:32 GMT+3, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Thank you, both.

We will reach out to (b)(6) I'm talking to all of the participants individually tonight and will reinforce the need for short (2 min) intros need to keep remarks brief during the discussion.

(b)(5) DPP

(b)(6)

From: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 12:18 PM

To: Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: Barrios, Stacy M <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Understood:

(b)(5) DPP

Needs to be explained to all participants that they have only 2-3 minutes to speak.

I am willing to ask for an additional 15 minutes for this.

(b)(5) DPP

Feel free to call me. I am at CG's desk for coming hours. We should talk about the Abbas meeting and if it's to be press before or after beror the next call with DC.

From: Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2021 12:11 PM

To: (b)(6)@state.gov>; Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Update / Civil Society Round Table

Hady

(b)(5) DPP

George

Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

On 23 May 2021 at 11:59:58 GMT+3, (b)(6)@state.gov> wrote:

Hi Hady,

I wanted to update you on the Civil Society roundtable and get some feedback as we finalize the event. The following participants have confirmed their participation and are okay with taking a photo and having their names released. Note that Hadeel lives in Ramallah now, but is from Gaza so that perspective will be represented.

Dalal Iriqat, Assistant Professor and Vice President, Arab American University Palestine

Aref Hussein, Chairman, Al-Nayzak Organization

Hadeel Qazzaz, Regional Gender Justice Coordinator, Oxfam

Issa Amro, Co-Founder Youth Against Settlements

Ehab Al-Jariri, Founder 24 FM Radio and News Website

Miriam Barghouthi, Freelance Journalist and Researcher

In addition, I understand you would like to add some participants to from the business community. (b)(5) DPP

(b)(5) DPP

On the press posture for this event, I understand there is a preference for a camera spray at the top of the meeting with the discussion being closed to press. Amideast is in the process of clearing that with their HQ in DC. All have agreed to photos, so the outstanding question is if it will be open to journalists to take photos or only our official photographer.

As soon as you let us know what you think of the suggestions above to add 1-2 participants with a business background and we can reach out with the invitations. (b)(6) is also working on

getting you the points you requested on Issa Amro and will follow up with that today. Please let us know if there is anything else you need.

Best,

(b)(6)

Cultural Affairs Officer

Palestinian Affairs Unit | U.S. Embassy Jerusalem

(b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender: "Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>

Recipient:

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>;

Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>;

(b)(6)@state.gov>

From:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Petition - Palestinian Elections in Jerusalem
Date:	Sat, 17 Apr 2021 14:11:34 +0000

Just sharing... I did not reply.

DeControlled

Dear Mr. Hady Amr,

We hope this finds you well. On behalf of the Palestine Academic Group (Pal-Ac), I am submitting the attached petition regarding the Palestinian elections in Jerusalem to your kind consideration.

Pal-Ac and other signatories on this petition, academics and intellectuals, are very hopeful that the U.S. Government will intervene to ensure that the Palestinian people in Jerusalem will be able to exercise their natural right of participating in the upcoming Palestinian elections in May.

We thank you for your kind attention and look forward to hearing from you soon.

Very best wishes,

Ibrahim Fraihat,
On behalf of the Palestine Academic Group

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
----------------	----------------------------------

Recipient:

(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Noll, George A <(b)(6)@state.gov>;
(b)(6)@state.gov>



April 17, 2021

Mr. Hady Amr
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Participation of the Palestinian People in Jerusalem in the Coming General Elections

The Palestine Academic Group (Pal-Ac) sends its best regards and urgently requests the swift and effective intervention of the American Government to enable the Palestinian people in Jerusalem to exercise their natural right to vote and run for office in next month's Palestinian elections.

It has been fifteen years since the last presidential and legislative elections in Palestine. All political parties now agree to look to the coming general elections to decide on the political legitimacy of their presence within the official institutions of the Palestinian Authority. This is a historic moment. If successful, it is likely to have a significant impact on strengthening participatory democracy in Palestine and in contributing to ending the Israeli occupation in accordance with international law and resolutions of the United Nations. To ensure free, fair and effective elections, the rights of the Palestinian people in Jerusalem to vote and to run for office must be protected and respected.

We, the undersigned, are Palestinian academics who are committed to advancing the democratic experience in Palestine. We believe that Palestinian leadership must obtain its legitimacy, first and foremost, through the ballot box. We call on you to fulfil your responsibility by supporting the democratic experience in Palestine and by placing pressure on Israel to allow 210,000 Jerusalemite citizens over the age of 18 to exercise their legitimate rights to run for office and to vote in these elections.

We are greatly concerned that Israel has not yet announced its position concerning electoral participation of the Palestinian people in Jerusalem. We view this situation with suspicion, especially in the wake of the recent statement by Kamil Abu Rukun, military coordinator of the Israeli government in Palestine, that 'Israel should prevent the Palestinian elections from being held in East Jerusalem'.

We therefore urgently call on you to support the democratic process in Palestine, especially by:

1. pressuring Israel to adhere to previously signed agreements that allow the Palestinian people in Jerusalem to vote and run for election;
2. ensuring that the Palestinian Central Elections Committee can carry out its duties in Jerusalem freely, professionally and responsibly;
3. sending American delegations to monitor the elections and to support the role of local monitors from Palestinian civil society;
4. ensuring that candidates are able to campaign freely.

Preventing the Palestinian people in East Jerusalem from participating in the elections may lead to the collapse of the electoral process and, subsequently, to a troubled democratic

experience in Palestine. Pal-Ac calls on the American Government to persuade and, if necessary, to push Israel to adhere to international law and universal democratic values. Without a clear and firm position on the part of the American Government towards Jerusalem, Israel may not respect participation of Jerusalemites in the elections. Furthermore, it may prevent the elections altogether. Silence on violations of Jerusalemites' natural rights to vote and to run will encourage the occupation authorities to commit more violations. In this sense, silence may become an indirect endorsement of such egregious violations.

We have great hope that you will not fail Jerusalemites by promoting their rights to vote and to run in this election, and that you will support the democratic process in Palestine. We look forward to seeing your clear and effective position—one that will be translated into actions, rather than just political statements or denunciations.

With our sincere appreciation and respect for your non-compromising stance to respect human beings and their rights not only in Jerusalem, but everywhere in the world.

The Palestine Academic Group (Pal-Ac)

Email: PalestineAcademic@gmail.com

The Signatories

Ghassan Khatib – Birzeit University
Jacob Høigilt – University of Oslo
Noah Bassil, Macquarie University, Australia
Gilbert Achcar - SOAS, University of London
Nadim Rouhana – Tufts University
Khaled Hroub – Northwestern University
Nadia Nasser-Najjab - University of Exeter
Izzat Darwazeh – University college London
Ibrahim Fraihat – Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Rami Khouri – American University of Beirut & Harvard University
Abeer Al-Najjar – American University of Sharjah
Basem Ezbidid – Birzeit University
Mkhaimar Abu-Sada – Al-Azhar University, Gaza
Shafeeq Al-Ghabra – Kuwait University
Ahmed Jamil Azem – Birzeit University
Sari Hanafi – American University of Beirut
Emilio Dabed – York University, Toronto
Ruba Salih – SOAS, University of London
Alma Jadallah – George Mason University
Aber Thabet – Al-Azhar University
Mohammed Alsaftawi – Ghent University
George Giacman – Birzeit University
As'ad Ghanem – University of Hafia
Razan Shawamreh – Eastern Mediterranean University
Ahmad Natour – Hebrew University
Bilal M. Ayyub – University of Maryland
Nargis Morkos – University of St. Petersburg
Waleed ABu-Tayeh – Hebrew University

Ibrahim Gerjes – Haifa University
Omaya Najami - Birmingham University
Nael Saleh – University of Texas El Paso
Aziz Al-Azmeh - Central European University
Bahgat Korany – American University of Cairo
Rasim kanawat - Ben Gorion university
Moss sagher – Haifa University
Wissam Mokatren – Haifa University
Abed elmonem azaize - University of medicine ovidius constanta-Romania
Fakhira Halloun – George Mason University
A Alassade – Journalist
Walid Salem – Al Quds University
Mohsen Abu Ramadan – Witer and political analyst
Majed Kayali – Political analyst
Jaber Suleiman – Common Space Initiative
Abdallh Kisswani – Political Activist
Ruwaida Abu Rass – Beit Berl College
Riad A. El Aila – Al Azhar University
Nabil Abdelrazek – Medical Doctor
Salah Zuheika – Alquds Madinati
Mohamed Rabie – Retired distinguished Professor
Baqlly Khalil – St. Petersburg University
Ziad AbuZayyad - Lawyer
Mai m khalalfawi – Alfateh University, Libya
Hadi Enayat - Aga Khan University, London
Atef Alshaer - University of Westminster
Abdel Razzaq Takriti - University of Houston
Mutas Sayed – Alnajah University
Islam Aladi – Arab American University
Feyzi Ismail – SOAS University of London
Khaled Khawaja – The Open Univeristy, UK
Bashir Abu-Manneh – University of Kent
Soleman Abu-Bader – Howard University
Cinzia Nachira - Università di Firenze
Wajjeh abuzarefah - PCDDPD
Abid Mahameed – Al Taybeh Society
Walid Naser – Birzeit University
Rafik Al Masri – Al Aqsa University
Rawan Dajani – Jerusalem
Amaney ELkirim – Political Writer
Dalal Iriqat – Arab American University
Ibdah Muhammad – Sakhnin College
Nisreen Morqus – Oranim College
Samir Khatib - Medicine university in sanktpeterburg - Russia
Areen Awieda Awwaf – Women movement in Israel
Jamal Al-Fadi – Political Researcher
Jaber khoury – Medical Doctor
Faten Ghattas – Sofia University
ALeef SAbbagh – Journalist
Taysir Diab – Gaza Community Health Program

Salem Suliman – Beer Sheva
Saba Fayez – Palestinian Union
Mohammed Alazaiza - Palestine Technical College
Farid Murra – Qou
Riyad Awad – MoH
Yasmin Al-Azayzeh – Palestine Technical College
Basel Mansour – Al Quds Open University, Nablus
Lily Habash – Researcher
Zuhair jouda – Public Health
Asaad samaan – Medical Doctor
Ghassan Inibtawi – Retired Doctor
Hassan Obaid – Architecture, Madrid
Ismail Elbozom – Artist
Tamim Abukhait – Journalist
Ata Abu Rizq – Public sector employee
Thayer Hastings - CUNY Graduate Center
Jamal Juma – Land defense coalition
Hisham S. Al-Zu'abi – Alnajah National University
Mohamed Issa – retired academic
Abdulrahman Awadallah – Cairo
Rida Awadallah - Cairo
Ahdaf Soueif – Writer
Mohamed Aljazzar – Almanoufiya University

From:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: RE: Us-Pal dialogue
Date:	Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:12:19 +0000 DeControlled

George: Good talking. Here are some materials from the prior US-Pal strategic dialogue.

I am ready for us to move forward in developing a concept and seeking to do this sooner rather than later.

And I think doing so sooner rather than later would be better. If we can't develop a political horizon with Israel, at least we can deepen the US-Palestinian relationship both actually and visibly.

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Date: September 19, 2022 at 13:00:36 EDT
Subject: RE: Us-Pal dialogue
To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)@state.gov>
 (b)(6)@state.gov>

Hady,

Attaching what I was able to find. Sharing some topline below.

2016 Dialogue Themes/Focus:

- Broke discussion in to regional and bilateral issues
- Regional issues: Syria, Turkey, D-ISIS, refugees
- Bilateral – CVE, US visa issuance to Palestinians, US travel policies, refugee assistance
- DHS joined conversations
- PA raised UNRWA budget deficits, sought US advocacy with Congress to repeal PLO provisions, requested a strategic dialogue, sought greater support for PASF, highlighted concern over youth unemployment, emphasized need to focus on education and building civil society.
- PA highlighted importance of civil society and youth in Palestinian society
- US announced 5 year visas, educational grants, also explained travel policies, sought greater support from PA on removals of Palestinian criminals.

Seems IPA also drew inspiration from the EU Joint dialogue -- that focused on human rights, good governance, rule of law, trade, internal markets, agriculture, education, culture, social affairs, and energy and water issues -- and the German dialogue -- that focused on rule of law, criminal justice, training for a diplomatic corps.

From: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2022 1:30 PM
To: (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov
Cc: Harrington, Kimberly D. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>
Subject: Fwd: Us-Pal dialogue

Can someone look up on Monday the files of the US Palestinian dialogue we held in 2016 (b)(5) DPP
 (b)(5) DPP

 Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer

----- Forwarded message -----

From: hady.a.amr (b)(6)
Date: September 17, 2022 at 13:27:05 EDT
Subject: Us-Pal dialogue
To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/265183.htm>

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Sender:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov; Noll, George (Jerusalem) (b)(6)@state.gov

Opening Remarks by Ambassador Stu Jones

The U.S.-Palestinian Political Dialogue, Washington, DC

Monday, December 12, 2016, 10:30-10:45

Welcome to the State Department, and thank you for coming here today for what I hope will be a productive day discussing our strong relationship and issues important to all of us, both in the region and between the United States and the Palestinians. I want to particularly thank you for taking the time to travel to Washington so soon after the Fatah General Congress.

This is the first such dialogue in many years and is intended to build on the success of other recent bilateral consultations, such as the May U.S.-Palestinian Economic Dialogue and the inaugural dialogue on Higher Education in October.

Our relationship has evolved over the last 20 years. In Ramallah, we renewed our economic dialogue for the first time in 12 years. The Dialogue provided a useful forum for both sides to bring high-level, interagency teams together to exchange best practices on those substantive issues that underpin all flourishing economies, to include intellectual property rights, international trade,

standards, renewable energy and telecommunications. This feeds directly into our joint efforts to create an enabling environment for the Palestinian private sector to flourish, and to enhance the capabilities of Palestinian civil society. We have collaborated bilaterally and multilaterally to build infrastructure in the realm of water, electricity, and transportation, to develop more effective justice sector institutions, and to help prepare youth to enter the labor force and contribute to their communities.

In addition to the dialogue, we have worked together to improve Palestinian anti-money laundering practices, which resulted in a Presidential Decree and has become a model for the region. We also commend the PA on reaching a historic deal on electricity with Israel and will support its implementation and greater Palestinian independence over essential resources such as energy.

We held our first-ever Higher Education Dialogue here in Washington to build bridges between Palestinian and American institutions of higher learning and discuss education reform. Both sides discussed the role of the private sector and research in preparing Palestinian graduates for the global economy, and we announced a \$342,000 partnership with An Najah University and Northwestern to build a new IT curriculum and apprenticeship model with Palestinian businesses.

We also announced a \$352,000 initiative with Atlas Corps which will provide a dozen one-year internships at American companies for Palestinian businessmen and women. Our discussions highlighted accreditation and fundraising as tools to foster world-class learning at Palestinian universities. Following the Dialogue, we are pursuing a detailed follow-up plan with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and university presidents to keep this momentum going. In addition to the dialogue, the textbooks we helped develop with the PA Ministry of Education are widely respected, and are in use throughout West Bank and East Jerusalem schools.

On security, our efforts to support the reform and strengthening of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces over the last decade have paid dividends for the Palestinian people and have broad support here in Washington. We commend the Palestinian Authority Security Forces' continued efforts to prevent attacks and confront violent criminal activity despite the challenging circumstances in which they operate and the losses they have endured. We also laud the Palestinian security services' enduring and robust commitment to security coordination with their Israeli counterparts. Due to the bravery and commitment of these Palestinian men and women, West Bank streets are safer and more secure.

These are just a few of the tangible U.S. commitments to our shared interest in building stronger ties not only between our leaders, but between our peoples as well.

Today's dialogue will have two sessions: a discussion of the region at large, and a more focused discussion on issues of shared importance. I've been in the Foreign Service for 28 years, and I've spent about half that time working on the Middle East. I have to say that the challenges we face in the region today are some of the toughest I've seen in my career.

The U.S. government experts here today are prepared to brief you on topics ranging from our counter ISIL efforts to youth issues, and to respond to questions. Starting with the former, we know you both are leading Palestinian efforts to prevent the spread of ISIL's influence in the West Bank. I hope that this will be a productive back-and-forth dialogue, where we can openly share our perspectives and learn from each other. This dialogue is meant to be a useful forum in which to discuss challenging issues and how we can work together to address them. I believe that dialogues such as this will help us move our relationship "beyond aid" and enable us to identify areas where we can deepen our cooperation and advance our shared interest in a prosperous and peaceful Middle East. We also hope that our dialogue will continue beyond today, and help to drive policy innovation and

to strengthen institutional capabilities. We face uncertain times, even here in Washington, and there is no doubt that 2017 will be a busy year.

With that, I turn it over to Saeb for a few words.

Approved: NEA/FO – PDAS Jones

Drafted: NEA/IPA – (b)(6)

Cleared: NEA/FO – (b)(6) (ok)
NEA/IPA – (b)(6) (ok)
NEA/PPD – (b)(6) (ok)
SEIPN – (b)(6) (ok)
INL/ANE – (b)(6) (ok)
Jerusalem – (b)(6) (ok)
L/AN – (b)(6) (ok)

U.S.-Palestinian Political Dialogue
December 12, 2016
Marshall Center Room 1499
U.S. Department of State

- 1045-1100: Opening Statement by NEA PDAS Jones
- 1100-1115: Opening Statement by Saeb Erakat

Session 1 – Regional Issues (1115-1230)

- 1115-1150: ISIL and Syria/Lebanon/Jordan

U.S. Leads

(b)(6)
NEA A/DAS (b)(6)

Palestinian Lead

Majed Faraj

- 1155-1230: Refugees and Turkey

U.S. Leads

PRM DAS Mark Storella
EUR DAS Jonathan Cohen

Palestinian Leads

Saeb Erakat
Azem Bishara

- **1245-1400: Lunch**

Session 2 – Other Issues (1430-1530)

- 1430-1500: Civil Society/Youth/CVE

U.S. Lead

NEA DAS Larry Schwartz

Palestinian Leads

Saeb Erakat
Husam Zomlot

- 1505-1530: Travel Issues

U.S. Leads

DHS U/S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
CA DAS Edward Ramotowski

Palestinian Leads

Maen Areikat
Majed Bamya

Joint Statement From the U.S.-Palestinian Political Dialogue

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Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

December 12, 2016

Delegations headed by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive Committee Secretary General Saeb Erakat and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Stuart E. Jones met today in Washington for the U.S.-Palestinian Political Dialogue. The Dialogue offered an opportunity for the Delegations to discuss a range of issues of concern at a senior level, including regional matters.

Both delegations strongly condemned terrorism and its supporters in the region and worldwide. The delegations agreed on the threat presented by ISIL, sharing the deep concern that ISIL has dramatically undermined regional stability, particularly in Iraq and Syria, and continues to commit gross, systemic abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law.

Both delegations also discussed the significance of the PLO's long-standing commitment to non-violence and reiterated their commitment to a negotiated two-state outcome, which is the only way to achieve an enduring peace that meets Israeli and Palestinian security needs and Palestinian aspirations for statehood and sovereignty, end the occupation that began in 1967, and resolve all permanent status issues. They also agreed on the crucial role of civil society, and the need to create economic and political opportunity for the next generation of Palestinians, noting the relevance of last May's Economic Dialogue in Ramallah and last October's Higher Education Dialogue in Washington to these issues.

Both delegations affirmed that the dialogue underscored the strength of the U.S.-Palestinian relationship and look forward to continuing the Political Dialogue in 2017, as an important forum to study and address the serious issues facing the United States, the Palestinians, and the region, including in the fields of trade, investment, youth, women's rights, human rights, religion, agriculture, sports, and more.

~~(SBU)~~ **PDAS Jones's Participation in the U.S.-Palestinian Political Dialogue**
Monday, December 12, 2016, 10:40 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.

CONTEXT

(SBU) You will host the U.S.-Palestinian Political Dialogue, which is intended to be a first effort at institutionalizing an annual forum to broaden the bilateral discussion beyond Middle East Peace and the Palestinians' relationship with Israel. The half day will include a discussion that will touch on a number of shared interests: USG counter-ISIL efforts, the Levant, Turkey, visa/travel issues, and countering violent extremism. You will chair the Dialogue, including a lunch in the middle of the schedule. The Palestinians raised two issues which they agreed could be discussed at lunch: the status of the PLO Office in Washington and a proposal for a broader strategic dialogue. Points for these issues, as well as Red-Dead and the recent Fatah General Congress, as needed, are attached. The full day consists of a Secretary bilat meeting with the Palestinian delegation heads, opening remarks by you and PLO Executive Committee Secretary General Saeb Erekat, two substantive sessions, and a lunch. We will also issue a joint statement.

SCENARIO

- You will welcome the Palestinian delegation in the Marshall Center at 10:40 a.m.
- Saeb Erekat and Majed Faraj arrive from the S bilat.
- You will proceed to give opening remarks.
- Saeb Erekat will then deliver his opening remarks.
- You will introduce the USG Session 1 participants.
- At 12:30 p.m., you will escort the Palestinian delegation and invited USG participants to the 8th Floor Dining Room for a buffet lunch.
- At 2:00 p.m., you will escort the lunch participants back to the Marshall Center.
- At 2:30 pm., Session 2 will begin.

- At 3:30 p.m., you will close the Dialogue.

Attachment:


- Tab 1: Biographic Information of Palestinian Delegation
- Tab 2: Lunch Participant List
- Tab 3: Draft Opening Remarks
- Tab 4: Red-Dead Points for Lunch
- Tab 5: PLO Office Points for Lunch
- Tab 6: Strategic Dialogue Points for Lunch
- Tab 7: Fatah General Congress Points for Lunch
- Tab 8: Draft Schedule

Approved: NEA – PDAS Stu Jones


Drafter: NEA/IPA – (b)(6)

Cleared: NEA/FO – (b)(6) (ok)
NEA/IPA – (b)(6) (ok)


(b)(5) DPP




(b)(5) DPP



(b)(5) DPP




(b)(5) DPP



Points on Strategic Dialogue Concept Paper

(b)(5) DPP



From:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
To:	Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>
Subject:	FW: Priority Strategic Project in Water Sector
Date:	Thu, 26 Aug 2021 21:53:42 +0000

DeControlled

Just digging out some emails that came in during my vacation... Perhaps of value.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Mazen Ghunaim <(b)(6)>
Sent: Thursday, July 29, 2021 7:16 AM
To: Amr, Hady A <(b)(6)@state.gov>
Cc: rawan_isseed <(b)(6)>
Subject: Priority Strategic Project in Water Sector

Dear Mr. Amr,

We would like to share with you priority strategic projects for the Water Sector considering our recent discussion, to improve the water and wastewater service provision.

Sincerely yours,

Minister, Mazen Ghunaim

Head of Palestinian Water Authority

Sender:	"Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
	(b)(6)@state.gov>;
Recipient:	Noll, George (Jerusalem) <(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>

Water and Wastewater Priority Projects in West Bank and Gaza

The following table shows water and wastewater priority projects according to PWA Strategic plan for the next three years:

	Project	Area	Direct Benefices	Investment needed (Million US \$)	Period	Aim of the Project
1	North East Jenin Water Supply System	North East Jenin	25,000	16	2 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improving the efficiency of the use of water resources and supplies Achieving fairness in the distribution of water services
2	North East Ramallah Wastewater Project	North East Ramallah	50,000	35	3 Years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of wastewater systems including collection, transportation, treatment Protect water sources from pollution and depletion
3	Al-Bireh reuse scheme (and trunk-line to Al-Auja)	Al Bireh- Jericho	200,000	9	2 Years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of Wastewater systems including transportation of WWTP effluent and reuse scheme. Protect water sources from pollution and depletion Improving the efficiency of the use of water resources and supply.
4	Dura Sewage system – phase 1	Dura	25,000	4.5	1.5 Years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of wastewater systems including collection, transportation, treatment and reuse. Protect water resources from pollution and depletion

5	Connection points – Jenin phase 2	Jenin	200,000	16	3years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving the efficiency of the use of water resources and supply • Achieving fairness in water supply
6	Hebron WWTP reuse scheme	Hebron	200,000	11	2 Years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of wastewater systems including reuse • Protect water sources from pollution and depletion • Reduction of transboundary wastewater
7	Upgrade of Rafah WWTP- phase 1	Rafah	260,000	15	2 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Address the amount of the current wastewater collected. • Improve the quality of the treatment process to allow reuse of effluent through direct irrigation or aquifer recharge
8	East Khan Younis Villages Wastewater Collection and Treatment	Eastern Khan Younis- Fukhari area	150,000	16	2 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of wastewater systems including collection, • Protect aquifer from pollution
9	Effluent recovery and reuse scheme	Khan Younis- Al Fukhary Area	1000 hectares	25	2 Years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce the excessive depletion of the aquifer • Maximizing the benefits of irrigation



North East Jenin Villages Water Supply

Project Type

Water Infrastructure

Investment Funding

16 M US \$

Project Duration

2 years

Cross cutting fields

***Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
*Technical Support *Gender
mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform**

Beneficiaries

25,000 Inhabitants

Objectives

- **Improving the efficiency of the use of water resources and supplies**


7 communities with total population of 25000 capita still without water networks and still rely on non-secured traditional water resources to cover their domestic needs.

- **Achieving fairness in the distribution of water services**

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA and MoF

Local communities: all local communities

Project Area: Jenin Governorate

Project Components

- The project shall include:
 - Transmission lines
 - Local reservoirs
 - Pumps stations
 - House connections
 - Pre-paid water meters

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services

Improved quality and reliability of water supply services as ensuring fair water distribution

Indicator: : Percentage of households connected to a public water network. Percentage of non-revenue water

Pillar Of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar Of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water And Energy Services

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Feasibility study is completed in 2019.
- Funding is needed for the detailed design and construction
- JICA approval for Area is required

For more details please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
Box: 1394

Tell: +970 2 2987665, Fax: +970 2 2987336
email: nujoudabdo@hotmail.com
web site: www.pwa.ps



North East Ramallah Villages Wastewater Collection and Treatment

Project Type

Waste Water Infrastructure

Investment Funding

35 M US 4

Project Duration

3 years

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
 *Technical Support *Gender mainstreaming
 *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

50,000 Inhabitants

Objectives

- **Development of wastewater systems including collection, transportation, treatment**

Only about 18.2 % of the total population of the project area is connected to a sewage collection system.

- **Protect water sources from pollution and depletion:**


The collected sewage is not treated and flows to the Wadi at Ein Siniya. Because of this effluent to the open Wadi, the area suffers from odorous nuisance and the sewage infiltrates into the ground along the Wadi.

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA, JWU and MoF

Local communities: 14 Villages: Birzeit, Jifna, Yabroud, Silwad, EinSiniya, Jalazon Ref Camp etc.

Project Area: Ramallah & Al-Bireh Governorate



Project Components

- **The project shall include:**
 - **Studies and Design: Accompanying Actions**
 - **Trunk lines**
 - **Sewage Network Construction**
 - **WWTP construction**

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services

Indicator: Percentage of households connected to a wastewater system

Pillar of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water and Energy Services

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Feasibility study funded by EIB is completed.
- Funding is needed for the detailed design and construction of a sewage network, WWTP.
- For the plant and the trunk lines . ICA approval for Area C components ok
- Land accusation for the plant is needed

For more details please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
 Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
 Box: 1394

Tell: +970 2 2987665, Fax: +970 2 2987336
 email: nujoudabdo@hotmail.com
 web site: www.pwa.ps



Al-Bireh Reuse Scheme (Trunk Line to Al-Auja)

Project Type

Wastewater Infrastructure

Investment Funding

9 M US \$

Project Duration

2 years

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
*Technical Support *Gender mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

100,000 Inhabitants
200 Farmers , 6000 Dunum

Objectives

- Development of Wastewater systems including transportation of WWTP effluent and reuse scheme.
- Protect water sources from pollution and depletion
- Improving the efficiency of the use of water resources and supply.

The effluent of the Al-Berih WWTP flows to the Wadi. Because of this effluent to the open Wadi, the area suffers from odorous nuisance and the sewage infiltrates into the ground along the Wadi.

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA, MoA and MoF.


Local communities: Al-Berih Municipality, local communities in Jericho Governorate (Aujh area), and Farmers (Water User Association).

For more details please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
Box: 1394

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email: nujoudabdo@hotmail.com
web site: www.nwa.ps

Project Area: Ramallah & Al-Bireh and Jericho Governorates



Project Components

- The project shall include:
 - Studies and Accompanying Actions, Creation of WUA
 - Transmission line & Reservoir
 - Disinfection Unit
 - Reuse scheme and Farming system
 - Public Awareness

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services. Ensured financial sustainability of water and wastewater utilities and service providers.

Indicator: Percentage of non-conventional water resources (reuse water)

Pillar of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water and Energy Services.

RoF Indicator: IOC3.2 : Area of Agriculture Land irrigated with treated water (dunums).

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Detailed Feasibility study was done by EU.
- Funding is needed for the detailed design and construction of conveyance line, and reuse scheme including other project components.
- Land Acquisitions for reservoir
- ICA approval for Area C components (Initial approval from CoGAT 2015)



Dura Sewage System Phase I

Project Type

Waste Water Infrastructure

Investment Funding

4.5 M US \$

Project Duration

1.5 Year

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
 *Technical Support *Gender
 mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

25,000 Inhabitants

Objectives

- **Development of wastewater systems including collection, transportation, treatment and reuse**

At this project, expand the sewage system to collect wastewater within Dura area.

- **Protect water resources from pollution and depletion**

Collection system of 8 km was implemented but not connected by house connection.


Wastewater is collected and dumped into open wadi. The area suffers from odorous nuisance and the sewage infiltrates into the ground along the Wadi.

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA, MoA and MoF

Local communities: Dura Municipality, Local communities and farmers.

Project Area: Hebron Governorate – Dura Municipality



Project Components

- The project shall include:
 - Accompanying Actions (Studies and Design)
 - Sewage Network Construction
 - Local (mobile - compact) WWTP
 - Reuse scheme

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services.

Indicator: Percentage of households connected to a wastewater system

Pillar of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water And Energy Services

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Funding is needed for the detailed design and construction of a sewage network, WWTP, and reuse scheme.
- ICA approval for area C components is obtained.
- Dura Municipality will operate
- Land is secured

For more details please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
 Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
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 email: nujoudabdo@hotmail.com
 web site: www.pwa.ps



Water Connection Points Phase II: Jenin Water System

Project Type

Water Infrastructure

Investment Funding

16 M US \$

Project Duration

3 years

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
*Technical Support *Gender
mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

200,000 Inhabitants

Objectives

- **Improving the efficiency of the use of water resources and supply**

The project aims to build an infrastructure (complete water system) for the Jalameh and Salem connections to accommodate the additional water quantities.

It will also include equipping Janzour well to include in the water budget for the area

- **Achieving fairness in water supply**


The design shall take into account the same consumption rate for all localities

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA and MoF

Local communities: Jenin Municipality and North East Jenin Villages

Project Area: Jenin Governorate



Project Components

- **An Bulk water system that includes:**
 - Water sources, Janzour well equipping
 - Transmission lines,
 - Regional and Balance Tanks,
 - Pumping stations,
 - SCADA system
 - Technical Assistance

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services

Indicator: Percentage of households connected to public water network. Percentage of non-revenue water.

Pillar of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water and Energy Services

Prerequisite and Approvals

- The design and tender documents are expected by the mid of 2021 through the ongoing consultancy contract part of the phase I funded by AFD
- Funding is needed to fill the gap of 15 MEUR, AFD has committed 10 MEUR for the project.
- For the Transmission lines area. ICA approval for Area C components ok
- Additional water quantities are agreed on with Israel side. Ok

For more details please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
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Hebron WWTP Reuse Scheme

Project Type

Waste Water Infrastructure

Investment Funding

11 M US \$

Project Duration

2 years

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
*Technical Support *Gender mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

**100,000 Inhabitants
500 farmers**

Objectives

• Development of wastewater systems including reuse

The effluent from the HWWTP shall be transmitted to Reuse scheme

• Protect water sources from pollution and depletion:

The collected sewage is not treated and flows to the Wadi Al-smain. Because of this effluent to the open Wadi, the area suffers from odorous nuisance and the sewage infiltrates into the ground along the Wadi.

• Reduction of transboundary wastewater


Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA, MoA and MoF

Local communities: Hebron governorate Municipalities, Farmers associations, local communities

For more details please contact

Project Area: Hebron Governorate



Project Components

- The project shall include:
 - Studies and Accompanying Actions
 - Transmission lines Construction
 - Reuse scheme

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services . Additional water for Agriculture – new source
Indicator: Percentage of non-conventional water resources (reuse water). Percentage / volume of treated water reused. Additional water volumes

Pillar of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water And Energy Services

RoF Indicator: IOC3.2 : Area of Agriculture Land irrigated with treated water (dunums).

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Feasibility study was done in 2013 .
- Consultancy services for the design and tendering doc. is expected to be conducted through the ongoing Hebron regional project funded by AFD.
- Hebron WWTP is under construction.
- Land accusation for reservoirs is needed.
- ICA approval is obtained for area C. Area A and B no need for approvals.



Upgrade of Rafah WWTP- phase 1

Project Type

Wastewater Infrastructure

Investment Funding

15M US \$

Project Duration

2 years

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
 *Technical Support *Gender
 mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

260,000 Inhabitants

Objectives

- **Improve the quality of wastewater treatment to meet the PA and international standers.**
 Increase the carbon reduction and Introduce nitrogen pollution treatment
- **Increase the capacity of the existing plant to handle the amount of the current wastewater received.**
- **Protect the aquifer from pollution and excessive depletion.**
- **Maximizing the benefits of irrigation**

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA and MoF

Local communities: all local communities

Project Area: Rafah Governorate



Project Components

- The project shall include:
 - **Construction of Activated sludge system including biological tanks, clarifiers**
 - **Expansion of the terminal Construction of Sludge treatment System including Thickeners, digesters and sludge drying beds.**
 - **construction of the infiltration basins.**

Results Oriented Framework

- **Results:** Improved access and sustainable management of sanitation services. reduction of pollution and excessive depletion of the aquifer

Indicator: % of sewer water that is treated in a WWTP
 WWTP average efficiency regarding BOD, COD, TSS and nitrogen
 % of treated wastewater that is reused for irrigation

Pillar Of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar Of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water And Energy Services

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Feasibility study
- Funding is needed for the detailed design and construction

For more details please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
 Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
 Box: 1394

Tell: +970 2 2987665, Fax: +970 2 2987336
 email: nujoudabdo@hotmail.com
 web site: www.pwa.ps



East Khan Younis Villages Wastewater Collection and Treatment

Project Type

Waste Water Infrastructure

Investment Funding

16M US \$

Project Duration

2 years

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
*Technical Support *Gender mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

150,000 Inhabitants

Objectives

- **Development of wastewater systems including collection, transportation, treatment**

6 villages with total 150,000 capita are not connected to a sewage collection system.

- **Protect the aquifer from pollution**


The people rely on on-site sanitation systems (septic tanks, cesspits, pit latrines, etc.). and the sewage infiltrates into the aquifer.

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA, and MoF

Local communities: 6 Villages: Bani Suhila, Abasan kabera, Abasan Jadeda ,Kuzaa Fuhari and Qarara.

Project Area: Khan Younis Governorate



Project Components

- **The project shall include:**
 - Update Studies and Design: Accompanying Actions
 - Trunk lines 11km
 - Sewage Network Construction around 140km
 - Construction of 4 pumping stations
 - Closing septic tanks

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services

Indicator: Percentage of households connected to a wastewater system

Pillar of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water and Energy Services

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Feasibility study
- Funding is needed for the detailed design and construction

For more details, please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
Box: 1394

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email: nujoudabdo@hotmail.com
web site: www.pwa.ps



Effluent Recovery and Reuse Scheme Al Fukhary Area

Project Type

Waste Water Infrastructure

Investment Funding

25 M US 4

Project Duration

2 years

Cross cutting fields

*Awareness Campaigns *Civil Engagement
*Technical Support *Gender
mainstreaming *Institutional and Reform

Beneficiaries

1000 hectares


Objectives

- Reduce the excessive depletion of the aquifer
- Maximizing the benefits of irrigation

Stakeholders

Ministries: MOLG, EQA, MOA and MoF
Local communities: Al Fukari area.

Project Area: Khan Younis Governorate



Project Components

- The project shall include:
 - **Update Studies and Design: Accompanying Actions**
 - **12 recovery wells**
 - **2 Booster pumping stations**
 - **Irrigation network**

Results Oriented Framework

Results: Improved access and sustainable management of water and sanitation services

Indicator: % of treated wastewater that is reused for irrigation

Pillar of National Policy Agenda: 3 - Sustainable Development

National Priority: 10 - Resilient Communities

Pillar of European Joint Strategy: 4 - Self-Sufficient Water and Energy Services

Prerequisite and Approvals

- Feasibility study
- Funding is needed for the detailed design and construction

For more details, please contact

Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), Palestinian water Authority (PWA)
Ramallah, Al-Ersal, Kamal Nasser St.
Box: 1394

Tell: +970 2 2987665, Fax: +970 2 2987336
email: nujoudabdo@hotmail.com
web site: www.pwa.ps

From: "Amr, Hady A" <(b)(6)@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)@state.gov;
 (b)(6)@state.gov
Subject: Fwd: Guidance on Black History Month 2023
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 08:03:59 +0000

(b)(5) DPP

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From: SMART Core <svcSmartBtsEwsSPrec@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2023 10:51:19 PM

Cc: (b)(6)@state.gov; Leaf, Barbara A (b)(6)@state.gov; (b)(6)@state.gov;
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Subject: Guidance on Black History Month 2023

UNCLASSIFIED



Info Office: STAFF_ASSISTANTS, DAS_BAG_ALG, ALDAC, DIR, DAS_BAG_ALG,
 STAFF_ASSISTANTS, DAS_IRAQ, STAFF_ASSISTANTS, ALDAC,
 STAFF_ASSISTANTS, STAFF_ASSISTANTS, ALDAC, ALDAC,
 DAS_IRAQ, DAS_BAG_ALG, DAS_PUBLIC_DIPLOMACY_NEA,
 STAFF_ASSISTANTS, ALDAC, STAFF_ASSISTANTS, DIR, DIR,
 DAS_IRAQ

MRN: 23 STATE 9820
Date/DTG: Jan 31, 2023 / 312038Z JAN 23
From: SECSTATE WASHDC
Action: ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: AMGT, APER, EAID, OGPA, TDTA, KDNI, KLES, KDIS, KPAO
Reference: A) 21 STATE 53304
 B) 21 STATE 47544
 C) 21 STATE 119158
 D) 22 STATE 30966
Subject: Guidance on Black History Month 2023

1. Posts are encouraged to commemorate the upcoming Black History Month (BHM) in February using content and materials deemed appropriate by the Chief of Mission (COM), considering local conditions. BHM activities should be celebratory and focus on the positive contributions that people of African descent have made throughout history. Posts may wish to consult the below list for BHM information and resources. [Additional resources can be found on commons.america.gov.](#)

- [ShareAmerica: Black History Month library](#)
- [ShareAmerica: Martin Luther King, Jr.](#)
- [ShareAmerica: African Americans](#)
- [GPA Photo Archive: Black History Month](#)
- [External Site: Library of Congress Black History Month and Black History Month for Teachers](#)
- [External Site: National Museum of African American History and Culture](#)
- [External Site: National Gallery of Art Uncovering America – Civil Rights Movement](#)
- [External Site: Smithsonian Institution – Traveling Poster Exhibit on African American History](#)
- [External Site: National Education Association Black History Month Lessons & Resources](#)
- [External Site: National Urban League](#)

2. The Department encourages posts and bureaus to share BHM programming for internal amplification to the workforce via the Knowledge Portal (the Department's front internal page). Please send your request to the Bureau of the Global Public Affairs' Employee Communications team at GPA_EmployeeComms@state.gov.

3. We have received queries from posts asking about using the Black Lives Matter (BLM) banner and material during BHM. This cable constitutes authorization by the Under Secretary for Management to use the BLM banner and material, per guidance in reftel A, during Black History Month 2023 and any other appropriate U.S. or host country commemoration days/periods throughout the year. Since heritage months and commemorative days are not always at the same time in host countries as in the United States, posts may, at the discretion of the COM, do commemorations at the time they judge most effective to achieve public diplomacy goals. This guidance will remain in place until rescinded by the Department through front channel cable.

4. On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13985 on *Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities* (reftels B and D). On June 25, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 14035 on *Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) in the Federal Workforce* that established policy to remove barriers to equal opportunity within the federal workforce; hire, develop, promote, and retain a federal workforce that represents the full diversity of our nation; and ensure all federal employees are treated with dignity and respect. BHM is an opportunity for our missions to show to our workforce and to all who see and visit our missions overseas that we value the diversity of our workforce and the contributions that black diplomats have made to the Department. It also should spotlight our efforts to advance racial equity and access to justice worldwide.

5. Regarding our equity work on E.O. 13985, on April 14, 2022, Secretary Blinken released the Department's Equity Action Plan (see Attachment 1), outlining priorities, including establishment of the Department's first Joint Strategic Plan Agency Priority Goal to advance equity in U.S. foreign policies, programs, and processes. The Secretary appointed the Department's first Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice (SRREJ), Desiree Cormier Smith, in June 2022, with the mandate to ensure Department-wide integration of equity and advance the human rights of members of marginalized racial, ethnic, and Indigenous communities, including people of African descent, and combat systemic racism, discrimination, violence, and xenophobia globally.

6. We are now beginning implementation of the Equity Action Plan, led by the Department Equity Council. The plan focuses on furthering equity and support for underserved communities through foreign policy development and implementation, foreign assistance and programming, public diplomacy and public affairs, consular services, and procurement and contracting. Racial justice and equity is one aspect of our broader equity work, which also includes support for women and girls, persons with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, members of marginalized racial and ethnic communities, refugees and internally displaced persons, members of religious minorities, LGBTQI+ persons, rural residents, migrants, those adversely impacted by environmental inequities, and those adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality.

7. E.O. 14035 and E.O. 13985 are top priorities for the Administration, and the Department encourages posts to use Black History Month to consider new, innovative ways to advance DEIA in our internal workforce and racial equity and

support for underserved communities overseas (for the latter, see guidance in reftels C and D). The Department encourages posts to report on Black History Month activities using the KDNI (Diversity and Inclusion) tag. The Under Secretary for Management, Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice, Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, and regional bureaus will use posts' input in reporting to the White House on our E.O. 14035 and E.O. 13985 efforts.

Signature: Blinken

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D: (b)(6)

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M: (b)(6)

P: (b)(6)

S/P: (b)(6)

GPA: (b)(6)

J: (b)(6)

L/EMP: (b)(6)

GTM/PC: (b)(6)

DRL/FO: (b)(6)

DRL/MLGA: (b)(6)

A/FO: (b)(6)

CA/PPT/AT: (b)(6)

DS/DSS: (b)(6)

AF/FO: (b)(6)

AF/EX:

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EAP/EX: (b)(6)

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EUR-IO/EX/PMO: (b)(6)

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WHA/EX: (b)(6)

WHA/EX:

WHA/PD:

SES: (b)(6)

Released By: POEMS_S_ODI (b)(6)

XMT: BASRAH, AMCONSUL; CARACAS, AMEMBASSY; CHENGDU, AMCONSUL; KABUL, AMEMBASSY; MINSK, AMEMBASSY; SANAA,

AMEMBASSY; ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL; VLADIVOSTOK,
AMCONSUL; YEKATERINBURG, AMCONSUL; UKRAINE AFFAIRS
UNIT, USOFFICE

Attachments:

State Department Equity Action Plan-04132022.pdf

Action Post:

NONE

Dissemination Rule:

FO, ALDACS, R_FO, AID, SE_CYPRUS, ECON, PRINCIPALS,
COS_LSS, EXEC, CI_Abductions, ELA, USAU, NOG_NMD_NOC,
ALDAC, HR_LES_INFO, CONGEN, DAO, AM_EUR, PDC_NEA_SCA,
TC_TAIWAN, UNESCO_ALL, MGT, ALDACs, HR, PAS, P_ALDACs,
Sports_Diplomacy, SMS, LES_DOS, ECON_LES_INFO, HHS, DOTE,
PMO_AF_PAK_PMO, VISA, AID_LES_INFO, SCA, MLO, NOG,
AID_EXEC, FMO, BRS, CID, MGT_LES_INFO, COLOMBIA, DEAV,
BSC, AM_NEA_SCA, AC_GENERAL, DEP_DIR, MTS_INDONESIA,
HIRT_ALDACs, POL_INFO, Cleared_DoS, UNP_FAO_HOST,
POEMS_D_EUR, HUM_RIG, NB_DENMARK, ECON_OFF_WHA_2,
POL, M_AMGT_KREC_TAGS, INDIA, CAN, PMO_ELA_IPA_POSTS,
DAO_INFO, PD, SCA_EX_DEPUTY_DIRECTOR, RSO, WE_IRELAND,
S_ES_EX_ALDACs, HR_FSP_PRIN, STAFF_HD,
MPR_COORDINATION, PDA, INL, MGT_American, STAFF,
GUATEMALA, GRANTS, DEPREP, J_GCJ_Main, SUB_TAGS, MERIDA,
ITC, AVC_FO_SA, HSMA_D_DIR, PRF_AF, RIGHTSIZING_NSDD38,
E_DIR, STRATEGIC_ANALYSIS, SES_O_Watch, L, FINICIAL_ECON,
WE_PORTUGAL, CM_CHINA_MONGOLIA, ACS_EAP,
DESK_OFFICER, DO_PARA, POEMS_D_ALDACs, AID_INFO,
BOLIVIA, MCC_AMADS, ACS_EUR, ODC, ESA, DCM,
GITM_ENG_CHIEF, CLEARED_DOS_DISSEM, RSC,
POEMS_S_ES_IRM_MC, PSP, SESS_ALDACs, EX_PMO, DIS_ECO,
FMO_Vouchering, ITC_UNC, GS_OTHER_ENV_ORG, NEA_ALL, GSO,
SCE_ALBANIA, P_E, DEIC, ECON_LES, HS_HUMAN_SECURITY,
DIR_HAMILTON, POLE, ECON_INFO, PAS_LES_INFO,
SPECIAL_AGENT_1, EC_STAFF, DS_TRAINING, WEST,
STAFF_ASSISTANTS, PRF_ALL, FRAUD, JEX_PMO,
JEX_FM_DCP_DOM, WHA, DIR, BURUNDI, CI, JEX_HR_FSA,
PPL_UN_Multilateral, DCHA_OFDA, Corona_Virus, PDPA, CMP,
OBO_TT, BHA_Information_Officer, PA, LES_SENSITIVE,
DAS_BAG_ALG, GSEC_SCA, FCS, Cleared_contractor_DoS,
Africa_Food_Crisis, DISP_ALDACs, MGT_INFO, POL_American,
EUR_WHA, ALUMNI, Research, S_CCI_ALDACs, IMO_INFO, RIMC,
FORESTS, ESO, TAG_TDTA, BRS_PIT, Cleared_Other, PD_ANP,
FMO_LES_INFO, BRS_CRT, E_OCE_Main, SSO_WHA,
RID_OPMMOI_INF, AMB, YEMEN, DAS, S_GWI_Womens_Issues,
AIDEX_INFO, DDI_DRG, Special_Advisor, ECONOMICS,
PPR_PD_PAO, EAP_ANP_FAO_2, CLO, OES_FAO, _DAA, ACS_AF,
START_PAO, START_MGT, s_p_aldacs, CI_Adoptions,
SCRHS_ALDACs, CPS_OTI_West_Central_Africa, PPD_DIR,
STAS_STATE, RID_GSO_ACT, SPL, UC, EX_HRU,
SES_IRM_ALDACs, IA, INSB, IM, DSS_PDAS, EPPD_PD, DJIBOUTI,
PMO_C, AM_DIR, PASS_TCATLIN, 1_CA, EXEC_INFO, INL_SCA,
FMM, EUR_USEU, HR_FSP_Staff, NEA_EX_DEPUTY_DIRECTOR,
USUN_FELLOW, S_GWI_NEA_WOMENS_ISSUES, CAR_DAS,
DIRECTOR, FMM_INFO, CCA, IMO, IDO, SR_CONG_ADV_3,
EX_FM_OVERSEAS, HSC, DO_KUWAIT, INL_DAS, PGI_HRRF,
DIS_ALL_POLADS, CARC_OMS, FAO_3, CONS, DGHR,
JEX_HR_MGT, PO_AFRICA, K_DPRK, PRIN, UMB_UKRAINE,

tags_ees, SCIENCE, Disability_Rights, SPECIAL_AGENT,
DO_JORDAN, SCE_MONTENEGRO, ECON_UNIT_CHIEF, ANP_PRIN,
USTR, ITCOM, PLNG_REPT, ACS_WHA, DTSP0, ECON_EXPANDED,
CENT, PRF_EUR, SCE_PRIN, NOG_IMD, POLICY, R_PD_PAO, FAA,
AID_MGT, MARCENT_FWD_POLAD, OIA_ECONOMIST,
WHA_AFFAIRS, Korea, HR_INFO, AF_RSA_FAO, RAP_REG_ADV1,
PAS_American, PAS_INFO, ME_MEA, _Cleared_American_DoS,
PMO_RJD, NEA_AC_FAO, ANGOLA, _APPO_CHS, CD, DIR_P_TAGS,
CWDEL, DEPUTY_EX_DIR, BAHJAM, POEMS_C_ALDACS, API_2,
D_MR_ALDACS, DIR_1, PLAN, SE_TURKEY, PE_Staff, BRS_BMT,
SUPERVISOR, AF_Region, EX, J_ECON_POLICY, P_PRESS,
HR_FSP_SCA, CDC, AFR_EA_Country_Desk_Officer, MGMT, MILG,
HR_LES, POL_ECON, EP_APEC, Z_ALL, OCRD_EEO_Programs,
BHA_ALAC, ECON_American, IPC, EURASIA, EE_Program_Office,
AMB_ALL, DS_T_SEC, PO_State_1, SRILANKA_MALDIVES,
RUS_BILAT_AFFAIRS, Staff, CIO, Tigray_RMT, OSD, BHA_OFDA,
HEALTH, PC_SBU, CT_RAP_DIRECTOR, DIS_ALL_POLAD,
EAP_ANP_FAO, EUR_TURKEY, ECON_AID, ESC_INFO, AF_LCO,
DCHA_Front_Office, GEC_CSD_OFF_1, FO_STAFF, PACO,
VISIT_STAFF, CEN, FM_STAFF, DIV_CHIEF, CST_LD_OB,
S_ODI_CORE, EL_SALVADOR, ATD, EX_IRAQ_PMO, econ_af,
UMB_MOLDOVA, FSI_STUDENT, S_ODI_ALDACS, TRA_AN_DAS,
CSO_DSD, PMO_NEA, E_Main, POL_MIL, RID_PAO_INF,
Cleared_DOS, AM_EAP, TEL_JER, Latin_Caribbean_America,
LES_DOS_DISSEM, SSO_BRANCH_CHIEF, NEA, HR_FSP,
SES_O_ALDACS, BUDG, ACS_NESCA, WEB_MANAGE, DS_PO,
WHA_POSTS, AFGHAN_PAKI, BELARUS, MARFORPAC_POLAD,
Alan_Treat, S_Reporting_Cables, ASU, PRF_ASIA, FAO_INTERESTS,
PMO_Kuwait, PSD_PCB, IRO_EAP, BULGARIA_DSK_OFF, ADMIN,
DAS_ALM, EEI_Climate, OBO, REG_IMO_OFF, CS, GSEC_SPDA,
OCS_PROTECTED, S_SC_ALDACS, DRC, ANP_PACIFIC_ISLES,
POLMIL_RA, RSP_SPU, ECAR, UMB_BELARUS, DIR_RUS,
PROG_OFFICER, DTS, CAR_P, POL_Econ_LES_INFO,
PDAS_PERS_ASST, HQ_J5_DEP, BELIZE, S_O_General_Profile,
WHA_STATE, SPA, OAS, Monrovia, STAFF_IP, PAO_DEP_DIR, P,
ACS_CRISIS_MGMT, CI_WHA_Abductions, EX_IRAQ_HR, s_ocr_main,
CAR, MANAGEMENT_ANALYST, AF_POSTS, PPO_AF,
EMIN_ECON_OFF, DO_UAE, TSA, RMA, SA_OPE,
_LOC_UNCLASS_EMAIL, ECON_ASST_DO, PUBLIC_AFFAIRS, FAS,
S_ES_ALDACS, ID, ARG, ORSC, POL_ECON_LES_INFO,
SCIENCE_BSB, TAGS_SEL, SCO, A, PROGRAM_ANALYST, USSS,
ANP_OFFICE, IRAQ, LES_ALL, X, ORA, PEPFAR, SWISS,
J_GCJ_IRAQ, HR_Americans, OIG_ISP_CI, OIG_ISP2, STAS_COLL,
PCC_STAFF, MLS_BURMA, DAS_IRAQ, MED, SPEC_ASST_AF,
CTRY_COORDNTOR, FAO, PO_EDUCATION, R_ALDACS,
SCE_SEN_ADV, WATCH_20, MEEA, MTS_PRIN, NFD, DO_IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, SES_S_Economic_Reporting, Tunis, RAO, KDNI, AFR,
FDA, ATT_ADV, LAC_Migration, OECD, CLO_Cleared, KUSLO,
MLS_LWR_MEKONG, Economics, BHA_Africa_East,
EUR_FO_CARC_SE, EUCOM_SOCEUR, DUSSELDORF_ALL,
NEA_SCA, EconPOL, DCM_ALL, TandI, ANTI_SEMI, SUDAN, EAP,
SE_PRIN, OIG_PRM, PROG_OFF_GUATEMALA, OM, IT_SPEC,
EX_FM_GRANTS, PROG_OFF2, WHA_FAO, ALUMNI2, ASIA_3,
DDI_Built_Environment, ESBX_PROG_MGR, BHA_EAP, BHA_Sudans,
JOINT_STAFF_J5_POLAD2, Asia_PK, F_WHA_CTRY_COORD,
RANGOON, FMO_Accounting, FMO_Cashiering, MSD, INSPECTOR,

ERA_DIR, PDAS_SW, ERA_POL_USEU_DESK_1, PRINCIPALS_FAO, STAFF3, AFR_ADDIS_ABABA_AU1, PRO_MAN_JER, FMO_LEStaff, SCIENCE_INFO, LAD, FMO_INFO, DS_LNO, AID_HR, AFR_AMS, PAPD, DEIA, NAP_LAW_ENFORCEMENT, J_ECON, PMA, CM_TAIWAN, PRF_MIDDLE_EAST, GSO_LES_PROPERTY_INFO, REDC, PPR_EMU, DIR_OMS, EB_FOREIGN_AFF_OFF, JEX_HR_SPEC, ECON_WHA, WHA_ONLY, INDIA_DESK, Pol_Director, DIVISION_CHIEF, LISBON, DIV_CHF, PO_SEL_P, EG_PED_CTEB, LM_SYS_DL, BHA_DRC, S_PGII_ALDACS, CSO_KPAO, ASIA_EAA, EUR, OTI_West_Africa_Littorals, UK_DO, AMB_INFO, FIN_MGT_OFF, OIG_ISP_3, PAO_CONG_AFF, EXEC_DIR, YOUTH_PROGRAM, WHA_SCI_TECH, S_ALDACS, AF_FMO, API, EPAP_PRO_MGR, EX_ADM_GSO, EX_RPM, CG1, PDAS, EB_Senegal, AIT_ADMIN, SCE_BOSNIA, POL_ADV, NORAD_DEP_POLAD, EX_IRAQ_FINANCE, SBO_Barks_Ruggles, TAB_EMPLOYEE, TAGS, EX_IRAQ_EXEC, ATTY_ADV_2, RGF_TAGS, FO_YEMEN_AFF, AFGHAN, FMO_Cleared, CTRY_COORD, South_Asia_Desk_Officer, DCHA_Disability_Coordinator, DDAS, PAS_Americans, HR_American, PO_BEIRUT, JEX_FM_REP_OS, COVID_TAGS, VISIT_STAFF_MEXICO, PROG_MGR, DEP_DIRECTOR, DIV_INCLUSION, OIG_Management, DAS_PUBLIC_DIPLOMACY_NEA, HR_RES_REC, CPS_SOCCENT, BUDGET, OFF_FRGN_IRAQ, PAO_PUB_AFF, FAO_SCEP, ME_REM, SES_O_Iraq, Command_Center, PDC_KUWAIT, FCR, Spec_Adv, OMS, ECON_OFF_NEA, P_AF, AO, EX_HR, PSS_EUR, WE_PD, ECON_OFC, DO_HTP, DUBLIN, BUD_ANL, PDC_PA_DIR, CT_HS, POL_MIL_NEA, RPA_FAO, Jennifer_Goodyear, PMF, AF, Iraq_Desk, MCC, PPO_EAP, PROG_ANA, FAO_1, VBR, AF_REG_COORD, OBO_SALCEDO, NEA_OFFICE, C_SPEC_ASST, BANGLADESH, AF_post_1, PO_PSS, Special_Assistant, CANMEX_DAS, INL_INFO, ECA_ASL, M_MS_OMD, PROG_OFF_EUR, EE_AA, POEMS_D_AF, CPS_OTI_Niger, LES_DIP_Notes, DOD_MGT, ECON_ENR_OFF, CECAS_ANA, BHA_CVE, WE_GERMANY, BHA_Iraq, HR_Human_Rights, OTI_BullPin, EAP_OFFICE, S_ES_EAP, HR_ISPO_PASO_EMPL, ADVISOR, P_NEA, P_WHA, HQ_J3_POLAD, ASST_SEC, NAVCENT_POLAD, M_ALDACS, DEP_POLAD, CPS_West_Africa, AFR_DP_Director, BA_SP, DIR_CHINA_MONGOLIA, DIR_ASIA, DIR_NEA, DIR_LA_CAR_MEX_CAN, PAKISTAN, GH_Multilateral, FAS_ATO_CARIBBEAN_SBU, Desk_Officer_UMB, RFS_PO_SP, FAS_ATO_CARIBBEAN_UNC, CDC_SBU, INTERIOR_UNC, AFR_WA, CVP_Religious_Freedom, DCHA_FFP, BHA_MENAE, SNKP, DCHA_OCR, ME_SPO, VENEZUELA, EML_MC, CE_EUR, PERU, RID_HRO_ACT, SOCOM_POLAD, Asia_PSP_SCA, NIGERIA, SAUDI_ARABIA, STAFF_ASST, Latin, NatSec_1, UNESCO, BHA_ALAC_2, Africa_Gomez_Martinez, CA, DS_FLD_DET

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

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Recipient:

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Noll, George (Jerusalem) (b)(6) @state.gov>



EQUITY ACTION PLAN

U.S. DEPARTMENT *of* STATE



Executive Summary

Addressing systemic racism and strengthening democracy worldwide is a core tenet of President Biden's foreign policy. The U.S. Department of State ("State Department") is the lead foreign affairs agency within the Executive Branch for conducting diplomacy. On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13985, mandating all federal agencies ensure their missions advance racial equity and support for underserved communities. The State Department established an Agency Equity Team in response to this executive action. The Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, Brian P. McKeon, leads the Agency Equity Team to assess how the State Department advances racial equity and support for underserved communities.

The Agency Equity Team outlined five key priorities for integrating E.O. 13985 into the State Department's foreign affairs work: (1) foreign assistance, (2) foreign policy development and implementation, (3) public diplomacy, (4) consular services, and (5) procurement, contracts, and grants. Using these priorities, the Agency Equity Team established working groups with representatives from across the State Department's workforce, including the civil service, foreign service, contracted employees, and political appointees. In the 200-day equity assessment submitted in August 2021, the State Department evaluated its current efforts, identified gaps, and determined targets of opportunity. This assessment informed the State Department's Agency Equity Action Plan, as called for in E.O. 13985, which prescribes "a comprehensive approach to advancing equity for all."

This Agency Equity Action Plan outlines specific actions, metrics, and accountability efforts to improve the State Department's efficiency and effectiveness for successfully integrating E.O. 13985 into all aspects of its foreign affairs mission.

The State Department will engage high-level diplomatic partners and individuals worldwide from underserved racial and ethnic groups and other underserved communities to better assess and embed equity into U.S. foreign policies. Using a three-part strategic framework, the State Department will track progress and work with local stakeholders to reduce barriers hindering racial equity and support for underserved communities. In foreign assistance, the State Department will establish key reporting requirements and equity analysis tools to align priorities and operations around advancing racial equity and supporting underserved communities through international aid. Using these tools, the State Department will work with agency stakeholders to inform data-driven operations and



programming that integrate racial equity and support for underserved communities into U.S. foreign assistance.

The State Department will embed intersectional equity principles into diversifying public diplomacy and communications strategies and expand recruitment for programming and exchange opportunities to focus on underserved communities. The State Department will also increase inclusive, equitable messaging to combat disinformation, which can sow discord among communities and undermine democratic norms. Using equity assessment tools to track progress, the State Department will build global support for the advancement of racial equity and support for underserved communities through partnerships and public diplomacy.

In consular services, the State Department will offer U.S. citizenship products with inclusive gender markers as well as reform and reorganize resources to provide more equitable, accessible consular services to U.S. citizens. Using ongoing strategic plans and product management tools, the State Department will monitor the status of updates to citizenship products and dedicate personnel and resources to operationalizing equity and support for underserved communities in consular services.

In procurement, contracting, and grants processes, the State Department will require new reviews under current federal contracting processes to provide greater, more equitable access to underserved and small business partners. The State Department will grow the industrial supply base by incorporating racial equity and support for underserved communities into agency contracting partnerships and the federal marketplace. The State Department will achieve this goal by using a data-informed methodology in concert with market research, internal business scorecards, and consultations with stakeholders.

The State Department is also coordinating integration of E.O. 13985 with other lines of effort on equity, inclusion, and accessibility, including the implementation of E.O. 14020 Gender Equity and Equality, Presidential Memorandum on Advancing the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons around the World, E.O. 13988 on Preventing and Combatting Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation, E.O. 14035 on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce, the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and the Americans with Disability Act (ADA).



Summary of Early Accomplishments

The State Department continues to make progress on integrating equity into its foreign affairs work.

Key U.S. High-level Diplomatic Engagements: The Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, released February 23, 2021, lays out an active bilateral agenda that includes support for underserved communities and advancing diversity and inclusion. During an October 2021 High-Level Dialogue, the United States and Colombia agreed to resume their dialogue on the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan for Racial and Ethnic Equality (CAPREE), in conjunction with our civil societies. The United States and Colombia also committed to scheduling a steering committee meeting for 2022 to examine efforts by both governments towards the inclusion of Afro-Colombian, indigenous, and other underserved communities.

Gender Equity and Equality: The first-ever National Gender Strategy, released October 22, 2021, advances the empowerment of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, in all their diversity, in the United States and globally. The State Department is developing an Action Plan to guide the implementation of the Strategy into U.S. foreign affairs and apply an intersectional approach that addresses the discrimination, systemic barriers, and human rights abuses and violations that impede equity.

Human Rights and Racial Equity: The Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) has dedicated funding to establish programming specifically for individuals from marginalized racial and ethnic groups. For the first time, DRL integrated racial equity and justice in a “notice of funding opportunity” template and proposal submission instructions for all foreign assistance solicitations in FY 2021 – 2022. Since FY 2021, DRL has requested racial equity disaggregation, analysis, and consideration in programming.

Addressing Vulnerability to Human Trafficking: The State Department has expanded data collection on racial equity and underserved communities for the 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report. The State Department also funded a Human Trafficking Expert Consultant Network project to examine how institutional racism relates to trafficking and is working with other cabinet agencies to integrate an equity-based approach into U.S. anti-trafficking work.



U.S. Support for New UN Body: On August 2, 2021, the United Nations General Assembly, with the full support of the United States, approved a historic resolution establishing the Permanent Forum on People of African Descent (PFPAD). The PFPAD provides expertise on addressing the challenges of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and intolerance facing people of African descent. The State Department nominated Howard University School of Law Professor Justin Hansford as an independent expert to the body; he was elected on December 16, 2021. His nomination and election further demonstrate U.S. commitment to addressing issues of racial justice on a global scale.

Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) and U.S. Citizenship: On May 18, 2021, the State Department updated its interpretation of Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, the law which governs acquisition of U.S. citizenship. Children born abroad to married parents, including those conceived using ART, who have a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of the married parents, and meet the INA's other requirements, can make a claim to U.S. citizenship at birth through the U.S. citizen parent.

Communication on Consular Affairs Website: The State Department continues to review and update its flagship website: travel.state.gov. Revising the website, including the Spanish language pages, with more precise and inclusive language will increase equity and access to information.

Representing American Diversity on U.S. Travel Documents: The State Department continues its efforts to incorporate themes and artwork to reflect the diversity of the United States with new designs for the U.S. passport book, the U.S. passport card, the Consular Report of Birth Abroad, and other consular products.

Increasing Intersectionality and Equity in Foreign Affairs through Special Envoys: The State Department has welcomed a U.S. Special Envoy to Advance the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons and a Special Advisor on International Disability Rights. Both actively encourage intersectionality across their global workstreams by engaging in lines of effort to promote racial equity, accessibility, value, and inclusion of individuals from underserved communities.

Strategic Messaging on Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities: The State Department provided overseas U.S. missions with messaging guidance, original video content, and official statements from State Department's leadership on the one-year commemoration of George Floyd's murder, the Tulsa Race Massacre, and Juneteenth.



The State Department also coordinated a global campaign for the 31st anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act to celebrate how the world is powered by diversity, accessibility, equity, and inclusion by highlighting the contributions of persons with disabilities across the globe.

Academic Exchange Programs: The Increase and Diversify Education Abroad for U.S. Students (IDEAS) Programs provide grants, training, and resources to help U.S. higher education institutions increase and diversify student participation and destination where they study. For example, Dillard University is using an IDEAS Grant to establish its first-ever study abroad office, and Alaska Pacific University is using an IDEAS Grant to develop a study abroad program designed to connect Alaska Native students with indigenous peoples in Sweden and Finland.

Professional Exchange Programs: In September 2021, the Office of International Visitors initiated a virtual International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) project entitled “The Problem We All Live With: Dismantling Racial and Social Injustice,” to encourage participants to work together to dismantle systemic racism and advance civil rights in their own countries. The Office of the U.S. Speaker Program recruited 82 U.S. experts on diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility to engage professional foreign audiences on business and economic development; communication and dialogue; education and awareness; and identity, activism, and leadership. The Office of Citizen Exchanges (CE) prioritizes diversity and inclusion, including racial and ethnic diversity, in recruiting a diverse pool of participants in its cultural, sports, youth and professional fellows exchange programs.

Engagement with Foreign Press Centers: The Foreign Press Centers’ Advancing Racial Equity Series connects foreign journalists with experts on the history, contemporary struggles, and opportunities present in U.S. race relations to advance the President Biden’s comprehensive equity agenda. The Foreign Press Centers held eight briefings to-date, highlighting issues such as the history and meaning of Juneteenth, climate equity, social justice movements, the role of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in higher education, and resiliency in Black business communities.



Equity Action Plan

Embedding Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities in U.S. Foreign Policy Development and Implementation

Barriers to Equitable Outcomes

Individuals of underserved communities commonly face obstacles to achieving equity, including barriers and discrimination based on race, sex, ethnicity, class, age, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, sex characteristics, disability, religion, and national origin. Systematic exclusion of underserved communities from full participation in economic, social, and civic life impedes equality and equity globally. Other challenges in a country can exacerbate inequity, such as violence and insecurity, including gender-based violence; a lack of access to justice and legal equality under the law; persistent impunity; lack of data, knowledge, and awareness; unwillingness to cede power by dominant groups; substandard access to information, services, markets, education, and other public goods; a lack of political will; physical and technical barriers to access; or prevalent structural and unconscious biases, among others.

Barriers also exist in the State Department's engagement with underserved communities. For example, varied interpretations of which groups comprise underserved communities across different countries; eroded trust of the United States in countries where diplomacy has historically engaged primarily with the dominant population; limited training for U.S. diplomats in non-majority languages; and U.S. diplomatic presence concentrated in capital cities. Other barriers within the State Department include lack of tools, data, and training to measure and assess equity, as well as limited time, staffing, and resources dedicated to consulting with underserved communities and conducting equity analyses.

Actions and Intended Impact on Barriers

The State Department and its U.S. missions overseas will increase engagement with individuals from marginalized racial and ethnic groups and other underserved communities globally. Bureaus, offices, and missions will apply new equity analyses consisting of quantitative measures and qualitative questions regarding race, ethnicity, and other intersections of marginalization. This analytical framework will underscore embedding equity into the State Department's foreign affairs work as a strategic National Security imperative, yielding more sustainable and effective U.S. foreign policies and diplomatic engagements. It will also raise the visibility of racial and other inequities globally and



generate better-informed foreign policies to decrease barriers to equity and equality worldwide. The State Department can also improve its accuracy in assessing the trajectories of key U.S. foreign policy priorities through sustained engagement with underserved communities.

Tracking Progress

The State Department will develop a three-part equity strategic impact framework to evaluate global progress toward reducing barriers to equity.

1. **Inclusion in Decision-Making and Economic Growth:** Freedom from discrimination as well as equitable and inclusive access to cultural, political, educational, health, social, economic, and financial systems.
2. **Access to Justice and Human Rights:** Consistent and equitable application of laws, policies, and practices to advance access to justice and protect the human rights of individuals of underserved communities.
3. **Power to Advocate:** Open and inclusive civil society spaces to foster strong partnerships among individuals of underserved communities and their allies in their advocacy for social and policy change.

By September 30, 2026, the State Department will achieve the following milestones to advance progress toward embedding racial equity and support for underserved communities in foreign policy:

- **Strategic Planning & Public Reporting:** Include analysis and goals to advance racial equity and support for underserved communities in the State Department's strategic planning documents beginning with the 2022-2026 planning cycle. Add E.O. 13985 reporting requirements as an element of all the State Department's public reports by 2024.
- **Tools & Guidance:** Develop analytic tools for integrating equity into the development and implementation of foreign policy by 2024. Implement guidance and requirements for applying such analyses to U.S. foreign policy, programs, and processes by 2026.
- **Stakeholder Engagement:** Conduct targeted consultations with a variety of stakeholders, including racial and ethnic marginalized and other underserved communities, to improve their access to the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.



Integrating a new equity structure across the State Department requires a robust resource commitment to advance equity globally. Appropriate staffing and funding resource allocations are paramount to operationalizing E.O. 13985 over the long term.

Accountability

The State Department established its first Agency Priority Goal (APG) to advance equity in U.S. foreign policies, programs, and processes. Creating an APG ensures racial equity and support for underserved communities permeate all strategic planning, program and project design, consular activities, and procurement practices to steer U.S. foreign policy development and execution. APGs align with Administration and Department leadership priorities and serve as an effective accountability tool by mandating quarterly reporting on progress over 24 months. The Department's equity APG is intended to drive significant organizational change by identifying outcomes and measuring results.

Furthermore, the State Department will mandate each bureau or office identify at least one Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for coordinating E.O. 13985 implementation. Each senior leader will ensure their bureau or office consistently applies an equity analysis when developing and implementing U.S. foreign policies. Additionally, the State Department may add dedicated positions or units to track progress and implementation, with similar resources provided for U.S. missions overseas.

Embedding Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities in Foreign Assistance Using Key Issue Data and Developing a Social Inclusion Analysis Tool

Barriers to Equitable Outcomes

It is challenging to establish baselines and measure progress and success for the State Department's work in the equity space. Without a common language, the State Department cannot disaggregate activities by bureau, country, region, or globally. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Standardized Program Structure and Definitions (SPSD) provides a consistent way to categorize and aggregate foreign assistance funds across six primary sectors: peace and security; democracy, human rights, and governance; health; economic growth; education; and humanitarian assistance. As a complement, Key Issues are reporting tools created for cross-cutting topics such as gender and disability.



In the absence of a Key Issue, the foreign assistance community lacks the tools to describe and quantify cross-cutting foreign assistance work at any aggregate level above individual programs or projects. This limits the U.S. government's ability to identify best practices and remedy deficiencies. However, equity, including racial equity and support for underserved communities in programming and policy, is an emerging body of work across the State Department and USAID foreign assistance landscape.

Actions and Intended Impact on Barriers

Key Issue Update: The State Department's Office of Foreign Assistance (F) will undertake a comprehensive review and analysis of the new Key Issue launched in FY 2021, Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities. This review will reveal a formal baseline of data to determine where there are equity programming gaps, challenges, and opportunities.

Elements of implementation will determine the:

1. Amount of planned funding to advance racial equity and support for underserved communities in FY 2021;
2. Geographic configuration of racial equity programs across the globe;
3. Types of racial equity programming implemented through foreign assistance; and
4. Breadth of performance indicators used to monitor and evaluate racial equity programs.

This analysis will enable the State Department to view equity through its own "sector" lens and should reveal promising best practices to replicate and address programmatic gaps. In addition, this review will identify ongoing equity work not formally reported through the Key Issue data. Armed with this knowledge, the State Department will ensure its bureaus and posts have a comprehensive understanding of the Key Issue data results.

F will utilize the upcoming Key Issue Review season, in Spring 2022, to engage Key Issue owners to submit updates or revisions to the definition, leading to more accurate equity reporting in FY 2022. F will also engage the State Department's Equity Council to review agency-wide equity definitions. This consultation will further align definitions across the State Department to ensure cohesion and improve reporting across all lines of work.

Analysis Tool to Promote Equity and Social Inclusion: The State Department will also develop an analysis tool to promote equity and social inclusion in foreign assistance



program design, public diplomacy, and foreign policy implementation. Drawing from the successes of the gender sector, this tool can be a driver of real change. The equity and social inclusion analysis tool will prompt State Department personnel and implementing partners to fully consider intersectional issues impacting individuals of racial and ethnic groups and other underserved communities prior to program design.

General elements of implementation will be:

1. A review of related analysis tools and a determination of areas of leverage;
2. External consultation with non-USG equity experts;
3. Consultations with State and USAID equity stakeholders;
4. Drafting and beta-testing elements of the tool;
5. External and internal consultation on the beta-tested tool; and
6. Finalizing and standardizing use of the tool.

Tracking Progress

Key Issue reporting occurs on an annual cycle. Progress will be incremental and largely measured over years. Any adjustments in foreign assistance from this analysis will also be subject to the annual programming cycles at State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. In the immediate term, the State Department will continue to refine the Key Issue definition for the foreign assistance space, and track reporting of the Key Issue across domestic bureaus and U.S. missions overseas. Long-term success factors include an equity budget timeline and performance trend data, an equity-based analysis tool to design foreign assistance programs, learning and evaluations for programming course correction, and establishing a well-defined cadre of equity experts across State and USAID to be a powerful voice for action.

Although the equity and social inclusion analysis tool is a new instrument, the State Department is eager to leverage ongoing operations and expand upon USAID's Inclusive Development Analysis Tool and the Gender Analysis Tool from the State Department's Office of Global Women's Issues to develop a mechanism specific to the State Department's needs and mandate. Standardization of the tool will establish accountability by formalizing and embedding it in routine programming processes. The Office of Foreign Assistance will work collaboratively across the State Department to ensure all bureaus and posts use the tool. Over time, the State Department will create an Equity Community of



Practice where users of the tool can share their learning, resulting actions, and final outcomes.

Accountability

The Key Issue is “co-owned” by the Office of Foreign Assistance (F), the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and USAID. The State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance drives the Key Issue analysis due to its cross-cutting nature. This office works collaboratively on equity efforts with other technical specialists at the State Department on the Joint Strategic Plan, bureau strategies, Integrated Country Strategies, the State Department’s Learning Agenda, and external stakeholder engagement. Many aspects of foreign assistance programming are embedding equity themes and mandatory reporting.

Embedding Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities in Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to Advance U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities

The State Department will measurably increase the scope and scale of Public Diplomacy (PD) and Public Affairs engagement, programming, and partnerships among individuals of racial and ethnic groups and underserved communities. These lines of effort will increase awareness of and access to resources and opportunities for individuals of underserved communities domestically and abroad.

The State Department’s desired outcomes for public diplomacy are:

- Diverse participation by American and foreign participants in PD programs; and
- Inclusive public messages modeling the importance and benefits of equity and inclusion.

Barriers to Equitable Outcomes

Several barriers exist for embedding equity into the State Department’s PD work, including the following:

- The State Department has not provided guidance to posts and bureaus to establish goals for participation from diverse or underserved communities in PD programs, including provision of funding for necessary accommodations. Accommodations can include the use of personal assistants or sign language interpreters, as well as physical or electronic devices or services that enable access and communication for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others.



- The State Department lacks consistent data on diversity among participants in public diplomacy programs.
- Individuals of underserved communities around the world may not meet the criteria for participation in PD programs, such as English language ability.
- Societal norms may prevent individuals of underserved communities in foreign countries from participating in programs or from self-identification.
- Foreign audiences perceive gaps between rhetoric and reality with regards to U.S. values of racial equity.

Actions and Intended Impact on Barriers

Establish Guidance on Equity in Participation in PD Programs: The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs' Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources (R/PPR) will establish guidance to ensure participation by individuals of diverse and underserved communities in PD programs. PD practitioners will plan and execute activities that incorporate intersectional equity principles, including respect for human rights, and in program design advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and increasing the inclusion of marginalized populations.

Provide Guidance and Tools to Consistently Track Equity in PD Program Participation: R/PPR will provide guidance to establish consistent tracking of equity in PD program participation and ensure data collection tools will track such information, such as PD Tools and the Department's Contact Relationship Management tool (CRM). The State Department includes demographic data in surveys deployed overseas and uses data collection tools to provide a platform for Public Diplomacy Sections at U.S. embassies and domestic PD Offices to monitor, track, and report on PD initiatives and activities promoting racial equity and engagement with underserved communities.

Recruit Diverse Participants for PD Programs: Offices sponsoring international exchanges will continue to focus on the diversity of inbound and outbound participants as well as expanding the number of exchange participants from or hosted by U.S. Minority Serving Institutions. Offices will consider broadening criteria for program participation or developing new program options to target communities that may not meet the criteria for existing programs. Overseas PD sections and domestic offices will work to cultivate the demographic diversity of audiences reached by outreach efforts. PD practitioners will increase key stakeholder engagements among underserved communities to achieve policy



objectives, and amplify the impact and reach of diversity, equity, inclusion, and access principles, including racial equity.

Promote Equity through Inclusive Messages: The State Department will ensure messaging on key policy issues reaches underserved communities and emphasizes intersectional issues. The State Department will feature diverse Americans in public communications and commit to expand messages targeted to underserved communities in domestic and international fora on key policy priorities. This messaging will also underscore the United States' own efforts to improve equity for Americans. The State Department will counter disinformation threats through PD programs that develop critical thinking and media literacy skills to empower individuals and networks to combat disinformation, including those harmful to inclusivity and racial equity, along with mitigating racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism.

Tracking Progress

The State Department will develop equity analysis tools to establish baselines, identify and remove barriers, and set targets for future increases in engagement. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' (ECA) Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning, and Innovation (MELI) Unit, the Bureau of Global Affairs' (GPA) Research & Analytics units, and the Office of the Under Secretary's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resource's (R/PPR) Research and Evaluation Unit, Organizational Learning Unit, Professional Development Unit, and Chief Technology Office contribute to the monitoring, tracking and evaluation of public diplomacy efforts to advance equity as a core element of U.S. foreign policy.

ECA's MELI Unit will implement the Monitoring Data for ECA (MODE) Framework, which standardizes indicators and reporting protocols for the collection and use of performance data to improve programming, including for underserved communities. ECA will fully implement MODE by 2023. GPA's Strategic Planning and Organizational Excellence (SPOE) team will continue to collaborate with each office to establish indicators, milestones, and tracking mechanisms to advance equity across the Bureau. Representative milestones and indicators for 2022 include: develop a baseline in 2022 for outreach to media outlets targeting underserved groups and increase by 25 percent annually thereafter; provide services for the hearing impaired during the State Department Spokesperson's Daily Press Briefing by June 2022; and meet or exceed the target of 10 percent of content focused on engaging diverse and underserved communities each quarter.



Accountability

Across the State Department, strategic planning includes objectives that incorporate racial and intersectional equity and support for individuals from marginalized racial and ethnic groups and other underserved communities. Public diplomacy practitioners will use PD Tools and the State Department's Contact Relationship Management tool to analyze and identify three to five target underserved communities and report to R/PPR and regional bureaus. PD teams will use the information to execute and report on expanded equity in programs and communication using the baseline data and sharing effective practices. For equity-related work outside the scope of PD Tools, GPA's SPOE team will continue to track progress toward Bureau goals and report to GPA's Assistant Secretary on a quarterly basis.

Embedding Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities in Consular Services at the State Department

Barriers to Equitable Outcomes

The Bureau of Consular Affairs' limited resources also impact its ability to reorganize and reform its flagship website, travel.state.gov. The Bureau of Consular Affairs expects to offer an X gender marker option on routine applications for U.S. passport books, when all necessary technological updates are completed. It will take a bit longer to fully implement the technological modifications for this option to be available on applications for passport cards, for overseas and domestic emergency passports, and for online passport renewal.

Actions and Intended Impact on Barriers

Applicants seeking the X gender marker option who need an emergency passport prior to full implementation will be able to exchange their emergency passport issued with a binary gender marker for one with the X gender marker for no additional cost, if they make this request within one year of the emergency passport's issuance. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is undertaking a review of travel.state.gov, to make the website more inclusive and useful for all audiences. The project includes focus groups with diverse audiences to gain their feedback on the website's utility and inclusivity. The Bureau of Consular Affairs plans to dedicate personnel to plan and implement a road map for reviewing and regularly updating travel.state.gov and ensuring its use of inclusive language into the future.



Tracking Progress

The addition of the X gender marker option in all citizenship products will be completed in phases. The State Department issued the first X gender marker passport in October 2021. Starting in early 2022, the Bureau of Consular Affairs will offer X as a gender marker option on routine applications for U.S passport books. Upon completing the necessary systems updates, the State Department will offer the X gender marker option for all other citizenship products, including passport cards, domestic and overseas emergency passports, online passport renewal, and Consular Reports of Birth Abroad. In 2021, the Bureau of Consular Affairs standardized the practice to solicit input from its own workforce when developing new designs for the U.S. passport book, the U.S. passport card, the Consular Report of Birth Abroad, and other consular products. In early 2022, design teams will map out multi-year plans for future product redesigns that incorporate early-stage information gathering strategies to inform product artwork and design themes.

Accountability

The Bureau of Consular Affairs incorporated these action items into its strategic planning efforts and will monitor progress towards completion through internal reporting requirements for the Annual Performance Report. The travel.state.gov reform project is also a Performance Goal under the FY 2022-2026 Department of State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan, as well as part of the State Department's Learning Agenda.

Embedding Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities in the State Department's Procurement, Contracts, and Grants

Barriers to Outcomes

A substantial challenge for the State Department remains in identifying, quantifying, and including the many underserved groups named in E.O. 13985 in its small business goals. Some individuals of underserved communities (for example, LGBTQI+, rural) do not fall within the current statutory socioeconomic categories, nor have an opportunity to self-identify as such in the federal contracting system of record (SAM.gov).

The most common impediments to entry for small businesses are shared among the underserved communities. Responses to the State Department's Town Hall meetings with underserved community representative groups demonstrated this mutual challenge. The most cited barriers for all small businesses and underserved communities were the State



Department's geographic dispersion and worldwide performance requirements; access to capital (to include financing, bonding); and facility security clearances.

Small and disadvantaged businesses most commonly enter the federal government market through small contracts that enable them to garner experience and past performance, understand the contracting process and customer missions, build relationships with federal agencies and industry partners, and obtain the necessary funding and resources to bid on more significant contract opportunities. The "Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT)" contracting process was created to incentivize small businesses to enter the market, and for federal agencies to more readily allow such market entry by requiring that awards under the SAT (currently \$250,000) be reserved for small businesses. However, the State Department does not currently have a rigorous process to verify that awards below the SAT are being set aside for small business concerns in compliance with statutory requirements.

This negatively impacts underserved U.S. small businesses by contributing to several identified barriers:

1. **Language and Complexity:** One of the intents of Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) is to allow small businesses to access contracting requirements that are simplified in several aspects: the amount of compliance, the language and descriptions of the requirement itself, as well as the effort required to respond to such opportunities. The exemption of such simple contracting opportunities from the small and underserved business community effectively makes it more difficult to understand, compete for, win, and perform on federal contracts.
2. **Past performance:** The ineffectiveness of a process intended to provide greater access results in a decreased ability to obtain past performance, which is a requirement for consideration on larger, more complex acquisitions.
3. **Set asides:** Allowing unjustified exceptions to the SAT makes a significant number of contracts intended for small and disadvantaged businesses unattainable.

Actions and Intended Impact on Barriers

The State Department will require Competition Advocate reviews/approvals for acquisitions under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT). This will have a positive impact on equity by placing greater scrutiny and accountability on procurement actions



and reporting to ensure U.S. small and underserved businesses, which are the intended recipients of SAT awards, have the maximum practical opportunity to receive them.

Tracking Progress

The State Department will track progress using data, as reported in the System for Award Management, SAM.gov, of all its obligations utilizing Simplified Acquisition Threshold procedures.

For Fiscal Year 2021, according to SAM.gov, more than 70 percent of SAT actions were awarded to entities that were not U.S. small businesses:

Contracting Officer's Size Determination	\$ Obligated	# Transactions
Other than Small Business	\$501,349,072	13,406
Small Business	\$204,917,481	2,851
Total Awards	\$706,266,553	16,257
Small Business Percent of FY2021 SAT Obligations	29%	18%

The Competition Advocate will assess on a quarterly basis the obligations made to entities that are not U.S. small businesses and will work with the Heads of Contracting Activities (HCA) and program offices to review the small business contracts awarding methodology. The Competition Advocate will collaborate with the Office of the Procurement Executive (OPE) and Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) to conduct market research to identify potential small business sources. The OSDBU "Progress Towards Goals" monthly scorecard that is distributed to OPE monthly, and published on SharePoint, will also provide regular, aggregate data to evaluate progress in obligations to small and underserved business.

Over the long term, these changes will improve the State Department's understanding of small business capability by requiring thorough market research and compliance with SAT goals. The greater access to Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) opportunities by small and underserved businesses will grow the industrial supply base that can win first-time contracts and be better positioned to successfully compete for more complex contracting opportunities at the State Department. As a result, the State Department expects to see an increased number and amounts of contracts awarded to U.S. small businesses from marginalized and historically underserved communities.



Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) awards are considered a gateway for new entrants to the federal market and a way for small and disadvantaged businesses to obtain small contracts that position them for larger contracting opportunities. For businesses experiencing barriers and disadvantages in accessing federal contracting opportunities, SAT contracts are significant as a pathway to develop a performance record, gain customer knowledge, receive obligations, and pivot to more complex opportunities that require more significant risk and investment. A broadened path to contracting, and an increased number of opportunities will also help rebuild the small business industrial base and reverse the most recent five-year trend of precipitous declines in the number of small business vendors in the federal marketplace.

Accountability

Within the State Department, the Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) and the Bureau of Administration's Office of the Procurement Executive (A/OPE) co-own these policy issues. These offices have a vested interest in increasing contracting opportunities for small business by monitoring and ensuring regulatory compliance with current policy. The State Department will establish a proactive governance approach to ensure accountability. By enforcing the current policy with written procedures and guidance, the State Department will ensure harmonious implementation. Outreach will accompany written guidance to the State Department's customer base across the enterprise to spur collaboration, cooperation, and accountability. OSDBU and A/OPE will monitor anticipated actions under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) prior to award and conduct quarterly compliance reviews of awards made under the SAT through random sampling.

Improving small and underserved business participation in SAT awards is a named Agency Priority Goal (APG) and the State Department is committed to increasing the dollar value of SAT contracts awarded to U.S. small businesses by three percentage points in Fiscal Year 2022 (to 32 percent), and Fiscal Year 2023 (to 35 percent).