

INFO MEMO

09 2021

A/USDP Action

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FOR: Tom Muir, Interim Director, Director of Administration and Management

FROM: Steven L. Schleien, Chief Operating Officer

Digitally signed by SCHLEIEN, STEVE
N.L. (b) (6)
2021.04.09 17:26:58
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SUBJECT: OSD-Policy: Assessment of the Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

PURPOSE: On April 5, 2021, you asked for a component-level assessment of the stand-down to address extremism in the ranks, including number of personnel trained, recommendations, observations, and other appropriate feedback.

- This memo provides Policy's assessment and the assessments of the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (TAB A); Defense Security Cooperation Agency (TAB B); and Defense Technology Security Agency (TAB C).

BLUF: Policy's stand-down included three-parts: (1) town hall with an FBI brief, presentation by Bishop Garrison, and oath of office lecture; (2) supervisor-led small groups; and (3) self-study. The large attendance at optional special group discussions on violence towards Asian-Americans, the 1965 Baldwin-Buckley debates, and a follow on discussion with Bishop Garrison showed the pent-up demand for conversations, thirst for more information, and desire to do more to address extremism and diversity in the workforce.

DISCUSSION: Answers to the specific questions are provided below.

Was the stand-down completed?

- Yes. Policy conducted a one-day stand-down on March 22, 2021. Policy's Defense Activities and Field Agencies (DAFAs), DSCA, DPAA and DTSA, were invited to participate in the Policy-wide All Hands portion, and held their own team-level discussions at varying dates. Each of the DAFAs has completed a stand-down and their reports are attached as stated above.

How many personnel were trained?

- A/USDP articulated that all Policy members were expected to fully participate. Policy estimates 400+ government personnel were trained on March 22, 2021. Many of our contractors also participated on a voluntary basis. Those unable to attend are required to view a recording of the All Hands and complete self-directed study.

What was the stand-down approach?

- Policy elicited ideas from the staff on activities to address the issues SecDef outlined. Inputs received were voluminous, likely reflecting a desire to continue conversations on diversity, equity, and inclusion that Policy started in summer 2020.

- Many expressed interest in continuing the conversation beyond the formal stand-down to ensure Policy is “an environment free of discrimination, hate, and harassment”.
- Policy’s Stand-Down was a three-part day:
 - *Part 1 – All Hands.* A virtual All Hands with several key note speakers including: Bishop Garrison, an expert from the FBI on domestic extremism and terrorism, and the former dean of the Federal Executive Institute speaking on the meaning and history of the oath of federal office.
 - *Part 2 – Supervisor Discussions.* Small group discussion led by supervisors at multiple levels across the organization to review impermissible behaviors and duty to report extremist behavior.
 - *Part 3 – Self-Directed Study.* The afternoon was devoted to self-directed reflection. Several groups hosted discussions, to include a timely discussion on Asian-American hate following the Georgia shootings. Additionally, staff put together an extensive list of articles, books and videos for individuals to dig deeper on their own.

What were the key areas of emphasis?

- Policy’s stand down educated the staff on extremist trends over the last decade, with an emphasis on recruitment of former or current uniformed military members and ensuring all employees are familiar with reporting requirements for behaviors of concern among civilian and military personnel. Smaller group discussions enabled discussions about how to ensure Policy’s workplace is free from hate, harassment, and discrimination. The supervisor led discussions used the P&R/I&S materials on reporting.

What are the early lessons learned and challenges?

- As initial guidance and requirements focused on uniformed military personnel, such as DoDI 1325.06, did not apply to Policy’s 75% civilian and contractor population.
 - For example, civilians are unfamiliar with the concept of a “stand-down” and required translation. Conducting the training as a stand-down conveyed to the staff that combating extremism was an issue of tremendous importance to the SecDef.
- The follow on leadership guidance from USD(I&S) and (P&R) provided talking points that helped describe prohibited behaviors in the context of Insider Threat and adjudicative guidelines for maintaining a clearance.
 - All scenarios, however, were focused on military personnel making it challenging for civilians to see themselves as part of the problem and solution.
 - This framing, was at times a bit chilling causing some to question whether they would lose their clearances if they had a “III%” bumper sticker or followed certain groups on social media.

- An additional lesson learned was that the extremism conversation was very emotional for many people. The topic of extremism inevitably led to further discussions about systemic racism and additional tough, sensitive topics. Many described how they felt witnessing the events of January 6, 2021 or their personal experiences of harassment and hate.
- A final important point is the challenge of addressing extremism in DoD divorced from a conversation about the broader political context within the country and a lack of similar conversations in other Departments around Washington.
 - To a certain extent, given the value of maintaining an inherently apolitical military, it makes sense for DoD to be out ahead of the rest of the country.
 - However, some found it unfair to seem to be focusing on extremism in the Department without a broader, whole-of-government conversation about extremism.

Do you have any actionable recommendations for next steps?

- Among the civilian workforce in particular, the framing of impermissible behaviors should be broadened beyond Insider Threat and adjudicative guidelines for maintaining a clearance. This could include general standards of conduct, social media standards and expectations, as well as active prevention of discrimination, hate, and harassment in the workplace.
- More training and information should be available to those holding clearances about the lines between their constitutional rights, behaviors of concern, and when to self-report and/or report others.
- Policy staff expressed little interest in a “one and done” approach, with many asking what the follow on steps will be. Some ideas that have been put forward include:
 - *Continuous Education* -- Hosting a regular speaker forum, hosting group classes, and maintaining a suggested resources and reading list; and
 - *Incorporating aspects into routine onboarding* – e.g., Re-taking the oath of office and include discussions of diversity, equity, and inclusion in routine onboarding processes.

WAY FORWARD: Policy will continue to follow up with our staff for follow on ideas and will likely at the minimum pursue the ideas described above.

Attachments:

TAB A – DPAA

TAB B – DSCA

TAB C – DTSA

TAB A
Defense POW/MIA Accountability Agency (DPAA) Assessment
of the Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

Was the stand-down completed?

- DPAA completed its three phase Extremism Training and Stand Down on March 25, 2021.

How many personnel were trained?

- 504 of 570 (88.42%) DPAA personnel attended the Extremism Stand Down. The 66 that did not attend were either on leave, TDY or new arrivals that did not have access to the appropriate systems to attend remotely. However, the DPAA Stand Down was recorded and all personnel that did not attend have been instructed to view the recording.

What was the stand-down approach?

- The preparation and introduction to extremism phase of the training, completed on 10 March, consisted of an overall review and incorporation of material from OSD, Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention/ DHS, HQDA OPMG, DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC), and the FBI.
- DPAA presenters provided an overview on "What is Extremism and Why the Stand-down," attendees viewed Secretary Austin's video, and the DPAA Director highlighted the importance of the oath of office and every individual's responsibility. The Director called on every attendee to recommit themselves to the oath of office and its ideals; recognize we are privileged to serve our nation in this capacity; understand indicators of impermissible speech and behaviors, and how to report them.
- On March 11, DPAA completed phase two consisting of DPAA directorates conducting small group sessions to discuss extremism. Directorate leadership, with assistance from DPAA's General Counsel, elicited feedback from their team on personal experiences and viewpoints as well as three key objectives:
 - What is extremism?
 - What are the indicators?
 - How to report?
- In addition, each directorate received five topics with material to discuss:
 - Violent extremism- Community Awareness Briefing
 - Domestic Terrorism: Definition , terminology and methodology
 - DoD 1325.06
 - Guidance to Department of Defense Personnel with Eligibility to Occupy a Sensitive Position on Reporting Criminal Activities Surrounding Lawful Protests
 - OSD leadership Stand-down to address Extremism in the Force

- On 25 March, DPAA completed phase three which consisted of feedback to the workforce on their questions and concerns raised in the small group sessions, a revisit of the purpose of the training, reporting methods and actions, personal responsibility, resource list for additional self-study, and a reinforcement of the importance of the training through two real examples.

What were the key areas of emphasis?

- The key areas of emphasis included the definition of extremism, the oath of office, reporting, personal responsibility, life experiences, workforce concerns and feedback on what the Agency can do to improve and ultimately prevent or rid the DoD of such ideology.

What are the early lessons learned?

- Early lessons learned first consisted of the fact that discussion of extremism can be challenging (peaceful demonstrations vs. violent extremist actions) and would best be delivered by an expert in the field. There was considerable lack of understanding or knowledge about extremist ideology, common symbols, when/if to report, how to report, and fear of reprisal.

What were the challenges?

- A significant challenge was the volume of information provided. MS Teams Live provided the platform and was a reliable medium.

Do you have any actionable recommendations for next steps?

- A recommendation would be to provide specific DoD uniform training modules on extremism (quarterly or annually), streamline the information, and provide a few civilian examples of extremism to balance the military examples. DPAA plans to deliver the next round of training in May utilizing subject matter experts from DHS or DITMAC.

TAB B
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Assessment
of the Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

Was the stand-down completed?

- DSCA conducted the stand-down on March 31, 2021.

How many personnel were trained?

- DSCA 45 supervisor breakout sessions on March 31st with approximately 20 people in each one for a total of 900 attending. 541 people attended our MS Teams program live, with the others (mostly our West Coast personnel) watching a recording. We had 22 people on pre-approved leave that watched the Teams recording and attending three make-up supervisor breakout sessions this week.

What was the stand-down approach?

- The stand-down approach was ½ day of video content on MS Teams (combination of pre-recorded leadership messages, insider threat training, and video content from the recommended bibliography), followed by supervisor breakouts (43 were conducted in total) and self-study from the recommended bibliography and library links (Anti-Defamation League, DHS, University of Maryland, and the Southern Poverty Law Center.) We also accommodated our West Coast outstation by posting the MS Teams session on SharePoint midday so they could review after their supervisor breakouts.

What were the key areas of emphasis?

- Key areas of emphasis were the meaning of the active duty and civilian oaths, how extremist groups target and recruit from DoD, and the “line” between Constitutionally protected free speech and creating a work environment free from extremist influence that could lead to violent action.

What are the early lessons learned?

- Better tailoring on insider threat training, which is mostly geared towards international espionage
- The need for more specific administrative guidance/regulatory framework on extremism. For example, does speech cross the line when it is perceived by another person to be extreme, or are their “red lines” that staff should not/cannot cross, or do supervisors have a duty to act as they do in sexual harassment/assault situations?
- Almost all breakouts asked, “what’s next” – how do we continue this conversation? Supervisor Talking Points (TPs) did not really address that.
- Most groups were thankful for the dialogue and thought the day was very enlightening.

What were the challenges?

- Max telework presented a challenge – we held several technical dry runs to ensure all the MS Teams content would be delivered seamlessly and supervisors had to navigate their breakouts with MS Teams, in-person, conference lines, or combinations thereof.

- Several groups noted that the video and reading materials seemed to singularly focus on white supremacist extremism without addressing other types of groups/messages. We explained that the content was curated this way because it is white supremacist groups that tend to target and recruit from DoD, and also pointed out that the Supervisor TPs did address criminal gangs as a form of extremism in addition to white supremacy.

Do you have any actionable recommendations for next steps?

- Rededication of the civilian oaths – many reported to not really remembering their oath/stated that it was part of overall onboarding and was not given emphasis as an important career milestone
- Development of more specific guidance on extremist verbiage and behavior in the workplace.
- Retooling of insider threat training materials to include framing the issue for DoD and characteristic/warning signs.

TAB C
Defense Technology Security Agency Assessment
of the Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

Was the stand-down completed?

- Yes, the DTSA stand-down to address extremism was completed on March 22, 2021.

How many personnel were trained?

- Currently, 126 DTSA personnel completed the extremism stand-down. Of the 136 personnel within DTSA only 12 did not attend our mandatory stand-down on March 22, 2021 due to approved TDY or leave. Two people have already made up the training and the remaining 10 have until April 16th to complete. The make-up session includes viewing the recorded Policy morning session, reviewing the DTSA slides with notes, completing iCompass trainings, and submitting a read-out to their supervisor confirming reporting requirements.

What was the stand-down approach?

- The stand-down was completed via MS Teams. There were two sessions. The first session was an all-hands where the Director and Deputy Director provided leadership expectations and displayed the Sec Def video on Extremism. The second portion was completed in small groups led by our Division Chiefs.

What were the key areas of emphasis?

The DTSA stand-down included:

- Objective 1 (Director/Deputy Director Led, Large Group) – Leadership Expectations:
 - Discuss why we are here, provide leadership guidance and expectations.
 - Watch SECDEF video on Extremism
- Objective 2 (Supervisor Led Small Group) – What DTSA Employees Need to Know:
 - Understand and reaffirm the Oath of Office
 - Identify impermissible Behaviors and Prohibited Activities
 - Address employee's responsibility to report and how to report.
 - Conduct Listening Session with Q&A
- Objective 3 (self-paced) – Additional learning Resources
 - Mandatory iCompass Trainings – Hatch Act Overview, FY21 Insider Threat Awareness, and Your Role in Workforce Diversity

What are the early lessons learned?

- MS Teams was effective however, in person sessions may have been more ideal.
- There is a strong appetite for ongoing efforts – more specific to DEI vs. Extremism.

What were the challenges?

- There was some ambiguity regarding the term Extremism and it was not entirely clear how/if Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) fit into the stand-down. Some of our groups intentionally kept the conversations focused on domestic extremism behaviors, which stifled the conversation on DEI. Other groups had fulsome listening sessions that included DEI experiences and efforts. Neither were wrong, just different.

Do you have any actionable recommendations for next steps.

- We understand the SecDef is requesting the Services conduct a Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS). It may be worth looking into before we are directed to complete.

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR PENTAGON LEADERSHIP
DEFENSE AGENCY AND DOD FIELD ACTIVITY DIRECTORS
COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: DoD Extremism Policy Updates

- References: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Immediate Actions to Counter Extremism in the Department and the Establishment of the Countering Extremism Working Group," April 9, 2021
- (b) Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06, "Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," November 27, 2009, as amended

The Department of Defense (DoD) is the greatest fighting force the world has known. Our people come from every corner, every walk of life in this country. They are hard-working and determined, representing the very best that America has to offer. The vast majority of those who serve in uniform do so with great honor and integrity.

Nevertheless, we must be ever vigilant in our efforts to identify and combat extremism within the ranks. Extremist activities, particularly those that undermine the oath we each took to obey the law and support and defend the Constitution of the U.S. against all enemies, foreign and domestic, have no place within the DoD. Given the gravity of our mission, and the sensitivity of the work done by the Department's amazing Service members, any extremist behavior can have an outsized impact. We owe our troops a workplace free from the threat or impact of extremism.

To that end, on April 9, 2021, I directed a review of DoD extremism policy at Reference (a). A group of subject-matter experts from across the Services evaluated current DoD policy and recommended changes that will provide additional clarity for our Service members. This Memorandum and its attachments implement those changes.

Effective immediately, I have approved Attachment 1 and 2 as changes to Reference (b). Attachment 3 highlights those changes.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments (and the Commandant of the Marine Corps) will draft implementing guidance addressing this policy change within 30 calendar days of this signed memorandum. This guidance must be submitted to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for approval prior to publication.

Thank you for your continued efforts to combat extremist activity.

Attachments:

1. DoDI 1325.06 Updated Content
2. DoDI 1325.06 Glossary of Terms
3. DoDI 1325.06 (Full), Redlined Changes

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From: ces.mail@csod.com
To: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
Subject: (DO NOT REPLY) You Have Been Assigned Employee Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Force
Date: Friday, April 2, 2021 3:09:42 PM

This message originated from outside of DoDEA.

Thomas Brady (b) (6),

You have been assigned the following training:

Title: **Employee Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Force**

Due Date: **4/30/2021**

To access this training, click here: [Launch Training](#)

Or copy URL

:https://id.dau.edu/app/dau_virtualcampus_1/exk5bw8t33Hj4e8mo297/sso/saml?RelayState=%252fdeeplink%252fLaunchTraining.aspx%253flaunchLo%253df03c417b-aae5-438a-93de-6636f0727491

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CSOD SYSTEM ID: 11071446

From: ces.mel@csod.com
To: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
Subject: Congratulations you have completed Extremism in the Force!
Date: Friday, April 16, 2021, 3:30:39 PM

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Thomas Brady (b) (6) ,

Congratulations!

You have successfully completed **Extremism in the Force** on **4/16/2021 3:27:00 PM**.

Click here to access your certificate: <https://dau.csod.com/LMS/Eval/CertificateLanding.aspx?qs=%5e%5e%5e%5eRP5vLF1UBUzZnr0TORjVWEjyakI253nBINwbIZyUrtsGL%2bhynN1%2b52gmp%2fXUZQ6mppZ%2f0wsNA2I7017%2FOR%2bpIFMn8GJQVv%2b6hOFuJuI7UCwNhJ%2fm2ebbAZkfzhapTQCs>

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CSOD SYSTEM ID: 11385392

From: (b) (6) [CIV OSD/DoDEA](#)
To: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
Cc: (b) (6) [CIV OSD/DoDEA](#)
Subject: Extremism Completions Update
Date: Thursday, April 15, 2021 3:58:44 PM
Attachments: [2021 Extremism in the Force - TBRADY 20210415.xlsx](#)

Good afternoon Mr. Brady,

I'm sending you this spreadsheet to update you on the progress your direct reports are making with completing the Extremism training. So far nine of twelve have already completed the training so your group is almost done. I'll send an update next week. Enjoy the rest of your day!

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From: [Litton, Leonard G \(Len\) III SES OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\)](#)
To: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA; \(b\) \(6\)](#); [Bianchi, Robert J SES USN NEXCOM NORFOLK VA \(USA\); Barron, Patricia M SES \(USA\); Hinton, Veronica E SES OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\); Lyons, Judd H SES OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Hebert, Lernes J SES OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#); [COL USARMY OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#); [CDR USN OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#); [MAJ USARMY OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\)](#)
Subject: Extremism in DoD
Date: Wednesday, February 17, 2021 10:16:29 PM
Attachments: [Leadership StandDown Framework \(20210209\) OGC Rev. 2-13-21 .docx](#)

Colleagues,

Sorry for the late note, but this document was in flux most of today and wanted to wait until it became more solidified. Sending out as directed by Bear at the Direct Reports today. Please note that it is still not "final-final," but close. So, I recommend that you review for your own personal knowledge right now. I expect that we will get the final approved document out very soon.

Happy to take any questions or concerns that you may have.

v/r,

Len

Draft

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Leadership Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Force

“All Hands” (COVID Mitigated) Discussion

	Page
Video Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III	
<i>Transcript</i>	2
Remarks from Unit Commander or Supervisor	
<i>Suggested Talking Points</i>	4
Division / Work Center / Small Group Training & Facilitated Discussion	
<i>Meaning of the Oath of Office / Oath of Enlistment</i>	5
<i>Impermissible Behaviors</i>	7
<i>Responsibility to Report</i>	9
<i>Case Studies</i>	11
Resources and References.....	12
Listening Sessions	
<i>Common Questions & Answers</i>	13
Reporting of Training Completion.....	15

Draft Transcript

Hello. I'm Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense.

I want to thank you for participating in this very important stand down, and I thank your leadership for supporting this important initiative.

Let me say at the outset there is no doubt in my mind that you take your oath to the Constitution seriously, that you serve this country with honor and dignity and integrity ... and that you believe in -- and uphold -- our core values every day.

Many of you have deployed in harm's way to defend those values. Some of you are in harm's way at this very moment.

I want you to know I am grateful for that. Your fellow citizens are grateful for that.

We understand the sacrifices you and your families are making to defend this nation. And we know a stand down like this can seem like yet another task to undertake, another burden.

But the fact of the matter is, we have a problem in the ranks. And we need your help.

I'm talking, of course, about extremism and white supremacy ... of racism, bigotry and views that run counter to everything we believe in and which tear at the fabric of who we are as an institution.

I've seen this problem before. I've lived through it, as a soldier and as a commander.

It's not new to our country ... and, sadly, it's not new to our military.

What *is* new is the speed and the pervasiveness with which extremist ideology can spread today, through social media ... and the aggressive, organized and emboldened attitude many of these hate groups and their sympathizers are now applying to their recruitment and operations.

It turns my stomach to think that anyone wearing the uniform of a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, Space Guardian, or Coast Guardsman would espouse these sorts of beliefs, let alone act on them.

But some do. Some continue to do so.

We are better than that and we need to show that we're better than that, not just for ourselves and the sort of work environment we want to cultivate for each other ... but also for the country and the very idea of what the United States represents to the world.

And that's the discussion I want you to have today.

I want you to revisit the oath you took when you entered Federal service—whether that be the military or civil service--and when you reenlisted or were promoted.

Read those words again ... consider what they really mean.

Think about the promise you made to yourselves and to your fellow citizens.

I also want you to share with your leadership your own personal experiences with extremists and extremist ideology, should you have any. I know those experiences can be personal—believe me, I know. But it's the reason we're all doing this—to listen to each other's experiences, and to learn from them.

So I want your leadership to listen to those stories ... and to any ideas you might have to help us stamp out of the ranks the dangerous conduct this ideology inspires.

We've got important things to do, each one of us... serious commitments around the world. People depend on us.

So, we can't afford actions that are at odds with our values ... that undermine good order and discipline ... or that harm or harass our fellow Service members or civilian employees, or otherwise violate the oath we share, and the bonds of trust on which we all rely.

Again, thank you for what you and your families do every day. Thank you for upholding your oath. And thank you for helping us get smarter about dealing with this very important readiness issue.

I'm proud to be on your team.

Suggested Talking Points

- On February 5, 2021, the Secretary of Defense directed unit commanders and supervisors at all levels to conduct a leadership “stand down” within 60 days to address the issues of extremist ideology in our ranks.
- As you heard in the Secretary’s video remarks, extremist ideologies, particularly those that undermine the oath we each took to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, have no place within the Department of Defense.
- Actively espousing ideologies that encourage discrimination, hate, and harassment against others will not be tolerated within our *(unit/command/etc)*. I expect the core principles of dignity and mutual respect to guide the actions of the personnel in this unit/organization at all times, to include our conversations here today.
- The vast majority of the men and women in the United States military and those who serve the Department of Defense as civilian employees perform their duties and responsibilities with integrity, and do not support racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists, including white supremacists, and other domestic terrorists such as anti-government violent extremists. However, recent events have shown that we must be ever vigilant in our efforts to identify and combat such ideology within the ranks and organizations.
- As such, we have four goals for today’s discussion.
 - The first is to review the meaning of the Oath we each took on becoming a member of the United States Military or a Department of Defense civilian employee;
 - The second is to review impermissible behaviors – those actions prohibited under applicable law or under DoD, Military Department or Military Service policy;
 - We’ll spend some time reviewing the responsibilities on us all for reporting to our chain of command when we observe or learn of prohibited actions, or those that cause us concern as “signs” of potential future problems; and,
 - We’ll finish with listening sessions – the Secretary wants your feedback on what actions he should consider in combating this issue, and I want it too.
- Thank you in advance for your attention. While I understand this can be a sensitive subject, it’s important that we take on this significant challenge together.

Meaning of the Oath of Office / Oath of Enlistment

Focus: Responsibilities inherent in the Oath

Certain limitations for military members in the national interest and public trust

- As Service members or Department of Defense civilian employees, we each take an Oath of Office upon entering into public service. The framers of the Constitution included the requirement to take an oath in the Constitution itself.
- While the specific wording of that oath may vary depending on the individual role in which you serve, all of our oaths include the commitment to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, and to well and faithfully discharge our duties.
- Because we each took an oath to support and defend the Constitution, and to do our jobs to the best of our ability, we expect military Service members and DoD civilian employees to be guided in their actions by a professional ethic that prioritizes the team, the mission, and the Nation. You are essential to our success and we need you on our team.
- Never forget that being on our team is an honor and a privilege. You serve one of the most-respected institutions in America and that comes with added responsibilities and obligations. You are held to a higher professional standard and must set the example in all that you say and do. Many of you serve in positions of trust, with access to classified information or in sensitive positions. Those of you in leadership and supervisory positions are entrusted with the well-being of individual Service members and civilian employees as well as the well-being of the organization. All of you are expected to do the right thing, to look after each other, and to work together to overcome whatever challenges the mission presents.
- Those of you in the military are held to even higher standards. Service members are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the added appropriate accountability inherent in maintaining the good order and discipline essential for a fighting force.
- Although Service members enjoy the right to free speech protected by the First Amendment, the unique character of the military community and of the military mission requires a balancing of those rights with the important purpose of the military. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States noted as follows: “[t]his Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between the military and civilian

communities result from the fact that ‘it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.’”

The Supreme Court went on to note that: “[w]hile the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.” (Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974))

- For all of us, Service members and DoD civilian employees alike, who enjoy the great privilege of serving in our nation’s defense, we recognize that due to the unique character of the military community and mission, speech that interferes with or prevents the orderly accomplishment of the mission or presents a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, mission, or morale of the troops may be restricted under some circumstances. Similarly, speech in the workplace that interferes with the mission, espouses extremist or discriminatory doctrine, or is disrespectful and harmful to colleagues, will have consequences.
- The DoD has a compelling interest in preventing the advent and spread of hate groups and activities within the Department; in guarding against illegal discrimination; in fostering a military that is politically-neutral and disciplined; and in recruiting and sustaining an all-volunteer force of sufficient strength and quality to provide for the Nation’s security and to sustain that security over time.
- DoD and Military Department and Service regulations help in balancing these interests. For example, there are regulations requiring the security review of information to be released to the public by Service members and civilian employees to the public, such as articles for publication on matters related to the military or your job and duties, and prior approval is required to distribute or post material on a military installation.
- You can always seek advice from your chain of command, supervisors, public affairs, or the legal office before making public statements or publishing materials. Whether it’s a letter to an editor or a social media post, if you have questions about what you want to say, your chain of command, supervisors, public affairs, or legal office can also help you ensure you’re not violating regulations.

Prohibited Activities

Focus: Guiding Principles for the Total Force

DoD Policy on Extremist Activities, DoDI 1325.06, "Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces"

- **Dignity and Respect:** The Department of Defense places the highest importance on treating all personnel with dignity and respect, in an inclusive environment, free from impermissible discrimination, harassment, and hate. And as such, DoD policy expressly prohibits Service members from actively advocating supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology and causes. The Department of Defense also holds its civilian workforce to the highest standards of character and conduct required to protect and promote the public trust.
- Service members must reject active participation in organizations that advance supremacist or extremist ideology, which includes those that advance, encourage, or advocate illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or national origin, or those that advance, encourage, or advocate the use of force, violence, or criminal activity or otherwise advance efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. (DoDI 1325.06, Encl. 3, para 8.b.)
- **Recruitment:** Extremist organizations and individuals often target current or former military members or DoD civilian employees for recruitment because of their unique military skills, knowledge, and abilities, as well as to gain legitimacy for their cause. Service members and DoD civilian employees must be vigilant of these efforts.
- **Active Participation:** Active participation includes, but is not limited to: "Fundraising, demonstrating, rallying, recruiting, training, organizing, leading members, distributing material (including posting online), or knowingly wearing gang colors or clothing, having tattoos or body markings associated with such gangs or organizations; or otherwise engaging in activities in furtherance of objectives of such gangs or organizations that are detrimental to good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment or are incompatible with military service." (DoDI 1325.06, Encl. 3, para 8.b.) Active participation in such activities may also affect determinations of suitability or fitness for civilian employment or continued employment in the DoD and eligibility for National Security positions and/or access to classified information.
- **Indicators:** Participation may lead to violence. Some indicators of individual escalation toward extremism include clear identification with or support for extremist or hate-based ideology; making or attempting to make contact with extremist groups; the possession and/or distribution of extremist literature or paraphernalia; and threatening, intimidating, harassing, or harming of others consistent with extremism or hate-based ideology. While

such conduct may not constitute “active participation,” such signs offer an indicator for commands, prompting action and intervention that can avoid active participation down the road.

- **Duty to Reject:** Service members and DoD civilian employees must reject participation in such activities. With regard to Service members, Department policy makes clear that commanders have the authority to employ the full range of administrative and disciplinary actions, including involuntary separation, dismissal, or even appropriate criminal prosecution against those who actively engage in such activity. Supervisors and leaders of all ranks must also take action to maintain good order and discipline and root out extremism.

Responsibility to Report

Focus: Procedures for Reporting Suspect Behaviors;

Articles of the UCMJ and Administrative Options Available to Leaders

- Reporting: If you observe a co-worker exhibiting concerning behaviors, you have a responsibility to report it through the chain of command or supervision to your local security manager, and/or directly to the Insider Threat program office. Report issues of imminent threats or activity that may constitute criminal conduct to local law enforcement immediately.
 - If you observe a Service member actively participating in an extremist organization in a manner that you suspect violates the UCMJ or the Department of Defense's, a Military Department's, or Service's extremism policies, report the Service member to a supervisor, commander, or military criminal investigator.
 - Extremist behavior by Department personnel that does not rise to the level of a violation of the UCMJ or other applicable laws, or the Department of Defense's, Military Department's, or Military Service's extremism policies may still be a concern under the U.S. Government's national security adjudicative guidelines, used to assess eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position. Creditable allegations of actions addressed in the guidelines found in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, "National Security Adjudicative Guidelines," June 8, 2017, must be reported to security management personnel. (Mention who this is for your unit/organization and provide contact information if possible).
 - Statements showing association with violent extremist behavior by Department personnel or contractors may also be considered a risk factor by the Insider Threat Program. If you observe any behaviors of concern (including extremist activity or anomalous behavior out of character) within your unit, ranks, or organization, report it through your chain of command or supervision, local security manager, or directly to the component insider threat program office. (Mention who this is for your particular unit/organization and provide contact information if possible.)
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 - Counseling and corrective training
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 - Article 117: Provoking Speeches or Gestures
 - Article 133: Conduct Unbecoming
 - Article 134: General Article (Good Order and Discipline)
- Remember, failure to report has a negative impact on the unit or organization. Command climate suffers, groups become polarized, corrosive behaviors undermine confidence in the unit, and readiness is degraded.

Example One: Paramilitary Activity

In September 2019, as a result of an FBI investigation, an Army junior enlisted member was arrested and charged in the federal criminal justice system with one count of distributing information related to explosives and weapons of mass destruction. During the investigation, it was discovered that the Service member had “disseminated guidance on how to construct improvised explosive devices” and had spoken about his desire to travel to Ukraine to fight with the Azov Battalion, a paramilitary group with neo-Nazi sympathies. At the time of his arrest, the Service member stated that he did this to cause “chaos.” He was administratively discharged from the Army and sentenced to 30 months in federal prison.

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In February 2019, the FBI arrested a junior officer in the U.S. Coast Guard after uncovering a stockpile of weapons, ammunition, and opioids in his home. The member planned to conduct a widespread domestic terror attack targeting politicians and journalists in the Washington, D.C. area. The officer was a self-described white nationalist and conducted thousands of internet searches on neo-Nazi and neo-fascist websites using his government computer. The officer was dropped from the Coast Guard rolls and sentenced in federal court to 13 years in prison.

Example Three: Organizing and Recruiting

In May 2019, an Air Force senior enlisted member was alleged to have been a member of Identity Evropa, a neo-Nazi and white supremacist organization. The Service member also allegedly physically posted supremacist propaganda on several occasions. Furthermore, he allegedly served as an organizer with Identity Evropa, recruited other members, and appeared in photographs wearing clothes with the Identity Evropa logo and taking part in a protest sponsored by the group. He was demoted in grade and administratively separated from the Air Force.

- AFI 16-1402, “Counter-Insider Threat Program Management,” 17 June 2020
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- DoDD 5205.16, “The DoD Insider Threat Program,” 28 August 2017, as amended
- DoDI 1325.06, “Handling Dissident and Protest Among Members of the Armed Forces,” 27 November 2009
- DoDM 5200.02, “Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP),” 29 October 2020, Change 1
- MARADMIN 016/21, “Permissible and Prohibited Conduct Related to Public Demonstrations,” 12 January 2021
- MCO 5354.1E-V2, “Prohibited Activities and Conduct,” 15 June 2018
- MILPERSMAN 1910-160, “Separation by Reason of Supremacist or Extremist Conduct,” 28 May 2008
- MILPERSMAN 1920-070, “Separation of Officer Personnel by Reason of Supremacist or Extremist Conduct,” 3 September 2019
- Navy Regulation 1167, “Supremacist Activities,” 14 September 1990
- OPNAVINST 5354.1G, “Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual,” 24 July 2017
- Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks,” 5 February 2021
- Task Force One Navy (TF1N), “Final Report,” 2 February 2021
- Uniform Code of Military Justice, Articles 92 (Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation), 116 (Riot or Breach of Peace), 117 (Provoking Speeches or Gestures), 133 (Conduct Unbecoming), and 134 (General Article)

Common Questions & Answers

Q: If there have been issues with extremism inside the Department of Defense for a long time, why is the Secretary of Defense so focused on this now?

A: The increased level of domestic protests around the country in the past several months has emboldened some violent extremist groups to take more aggressive anti-government and racially motivated actions. These groups are known to actively target current and former military personnel. In light of current events, the Secretary wants DoD personnel at all levels to understand the threat and be trained and educated to take appropriate actions when they see indicators of extremism.

Q: Does DoD actually have a problem with extremist groups?

A: We are seeing an increase in concerning behavior. We believe this is based on societal increases, but there's also an increase in the reporting of suspect behavior. We are actively tracking down these leads and identifying any other associations with these sorts of groups. That's why we need all DoD personnel to report concerning behaviors appropriately so we can thoroughly review all credible reports.

Q: Does DoD check the social media records of Service members, DoD civilian employees, and prospective recruits?

A: Consent for obtaining publicly available social media information is provided when Service members and DoD civilian employees submit their Personnel Security Questionnaire (SF-86) to initiate the background investigation process. DoD is examining a scalable means of implementing social media screening in conjunction with background investigations. Furthermore, the FBI currently screens social media for extremism and criminal activity.

Q: I thought Service members retained their Constitutional rights when they joined the military. Are you telling me I no longer have the right to Free Speech or Peaceful Assembly?

A: "We're entrusted with the security of our nation. The tools of our trade are lethal, and we engage in operations that involve risk to human life and untold national treasure. Because of what we do, our standards must be higher than those of society at large." (General Ronald R. Fogleman, 15th CSAF, quotation on the Air Force Memorial)

Remember that military members and DoD civilian employees have access to classified information and occupy sensitive positions with access to lethal equipment, training, and tactics. Everyone with access to classified information or in a sensitive position is evaluated continuously, using government-wide guidelines to assess their strength of character, honesty, discretion, sound judgment, reliability to protect classified or sensitive information, and trustworthiness. Any doubt is resolved in favor of the national security.

Potentially disqualifying conditions include:

- involvement in, support of, or association/sympathy with persons attempting to or training to commit, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United States;
- association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
 - attempt to overthrow the U.S. Government or any state government;
 - prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from performing their official duties;
 - gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, state, or local government; or prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or any state.

Reporting of Completed Training

Guidance Varies by Service Concerned

Report training of military and civilian personnel complete with outputs or notes of significance via your chain of command.

For the Services: With the exception of those personnel serving on the Joint Staff, OSD, and Field Activities and Agencies, all Services will certify that 100% of their personnel have participated in the SecDef-directed Leadership Stand-Down to Address Extremism. All Service Chiefs will send a memo to their respective Military Department Secretaries certifying 100% completion of the stand-down. They should courtesy copy the CJCS and the OPR (DD, Global Integration, J-5, Joint Staff BGen Kevin Leahy) on the memo. The Military Department Secretaries will then send a similar memo to OSD(P&R) who, in turn, will provide a memo to the SecDef certifying the completion of the stand-down.

For those serving on the Joint Staff: Each Joint Directorate's Military Secretary will send a memo to the Director of Management's (DOM) Military Secretary certifying 100% completion of the Leadership Stand-Down to Address Extremism. The DOM's Military Secretary will send a memo to the Director, Joint Staff, with a courtesy copy to the CJCS and the OPR (DD, Global Integration, J-5, Joint Staff BGen Kevin Leahy) certifying the Joint Staff's 100% completion. The DJS then will provide a memo to OSD(P&R) who, in turn, will send a memo to the SecDef certifying the completion of the stand-down.

From: (b) (6) COL USARMY OSD OUSD P-R (USA)
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Barron, Patricia
M SES (USA); Bianchi, Robert J SES USN NEXCOM NORFOLK VA (USA); Hebert, Lemes J SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA); Hinton, Veronica E SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA); Litton, Leonard G (Len) III SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA); Ludovici, Joseph D SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA); Lyons, Judd H SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA); Moore, William F; Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA
Cc: (b) (6) MAJ USARMY OSD OUSD P-R (USA); (b) (6) CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA); (b) (6) CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA); (b) (6) CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA)
Subject: Extremism Stand Down Training Materials
Date: Friday, February 19, 2021 11:14:28 AM
Attachments: [Leadership StandDown Framework.docx](#)

Team – attached is the approved Extremism Stand Down training framework for your use/reference. We are still waiting for the SD's recorded remarks on the subject but all other material in the attached is complete.

Mr Hebert sent the attached to the M&RA/1s this morning.

regards

Andy

COL (b) (6)
Military Deputy
Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
Pentagon (b) (6)
O: (b) (6)
C: (b) (6)
NIPR: (b) (6)
SIPR: (b) (6)

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Leadership Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Force

“All Hands” (COVID Mitigated) Discussion

	Page
Remarks from Unit Commander or Supervisor	
<i>Suggested Talking Points</i>	2
Division / Work Center / Small Group Training & Facilitated Discussion	
<i>Meaning of the Oath of Office / Oath of Enlistment</i>	3
<i>Impermissible Behaviors</i>	5
<i>Responsibility to Report</i>	7
<i>Case Studies</i>	9
Resources and References.....	10
Listening Sessions	
<i>Common Questions & Answers</i>	11
Reporting of Training Completion.....	13

Suggested Talking Points

- On February 5, 2021, the Secretary of Defense directed unit commanders and supervisors at all levels to conduct a leadership “stand down” within 60 days to address the issues of extremist ideology in our ranks.
- As you heard in the Secretary’s video remarks, extremist ideologies, particularly those that undermine the oath we each took to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, have no place within the Department of Defense.
- Actively espousing ideologies that encourage discrimination, hate, and harassment against others will not be tolerated within our *(unit/command/etc)*. I expect the core principles of dignity and mutual respect to guide the actions of the personnel in this unit/organization at all times, to include our conversations here today.
- The vast majority of the men and women in the United States military and those who serve the Department of Defense as civilian employees perform their duties and responsibilities with integrity, and do not support racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists, including white supremacists, and other domestic terrorists such as anti-government violent extremists. However, recent events have shown that we must be ever vigilant in our efforts to identify and combat such ideology within the ranks and organizations.
- As such, we have four goals for today’s discussion.
 - The first is to review the meaning of the Oath we each took on becoming a member of the United States Military or a Department of Defense civilian employee;
 - The second is to review impermissible behaviors – those actions prohibited under applicable law or under DoD, Military Department or Military Service policy;
 - We’ll spend some time reviewing the responsibilities on us all for reporting to our chain of command when we observe or learn of prohibited actions, or those that cause us concern as “signs” of potential future problems; and,
 - We’ll finish with listening sessions – the Secretary wants your feedback on what actions he should consider in combating this issue, and I want it too.
- Thank you in advance for your attention. While I understand this can be a sensitive subject, it’s important that we take on this significant challenge together.

Meaning of the Oath of Office / Oath of Enlistment

Focus: Responsibilities inherent in the Oath

Certain limitations for military members in the national interest and public trust

- As Service members or Department of Defense civilian employees, we each take an Oath of Office upon entering into public service. The framers of the Constitution included the requirement to take an oath in the Constitution itself.
- While the specific wording of that oath may vary depending on the individual role in which you serve, all of our oaths include the commitment to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, and to well and faithfully discharge our duties.
- Because we each took an oath to support and defend the Constitution, and to do our jobs to the best of our ability, we expect military Service members and DoD civilian employees to be guided in their actions by a professional ethic that prioritizes the team, the mission, and the Nation. You are essential to our success and we need you on our team.
- Never forget that being on our team is an honor and a privilege. You serve one of the most-respected institutions in America and that comes with added responsibilities and obligations. You are held to a higher professional standard and must set the example in all that you say and do. Many of you serve in positions of trust, with access to classified information or in sensitive positions. Those of you in leadership and supervisory positions are entrusted with the well-being of individual Service members and civilian employees as well as the well-being of the organization. All of you are expected to do the right thing, to look after each other, and to work together to overcome whatever challenges the mission presents.
- Those of you in the military are held to even higher standards. Service members are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the added appropriate accountability inherent in maintaining the good order and discipline essential for a fighting force.
- Although Service members enjoy the right to free speech protected by the First Amendment, the unique character of the military community and of the military mission requires a balancing of those rights with the important purpose of the military. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States noted as follows: “[t]his Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between the military and civilian

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- For all of us, Service members and DoD civilian employees alike, who enjoy the great privilege of serving in our nation's defense, we recognize that due to the unique character of the military community and mission, speech that interferes with or prevents the orderly accomplishment of the mission or presents a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, mission, or morale of the troops may be restricted under some circumstances. Similarly, speech in the workplace that interferes with the mission, espouses extremist or discriminatory doctrine, or is disrespectful and harmful to colleagues, will have consequences.
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Case Studies

Focus: Use Examples to Illustrate Problematic Behaviors

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Example Four: Racist and Supremacist Statements

In 2019, an enlisted Marine shared a number of racist social media posts, including one of himself in blackface and with Nazi propaganda. One of the posts depicted military explosives placed in the shape of a Swastika. The member was administratively discharged from the Service.

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- DoDD 5205.16, “The DoD Insider Threat Program,” 28 August 2017, as amended
- DoDI 1325.06, “Handling Dissident and Protest Among Members of the Armed Forces,” 27 November 2009
- DoDM 5200.02, “Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP),” 29 October 2020, Change 1
- MARADMIN 016/21, “Permissible and Prohibited Conduct Related to Public Demonstrations,” 12 January 2021
- MCO 5354.1E-V2, “Prohibited Activities and Conduct,” 15 June 2018
- MILPERSMAN 1910-160, “Separation by Reason of Supremacist or Extremist Conduct,” 28 May 2008
- MILPERSMAN 1920-070, “Separation of Officer Personnel by Reason of Supremacist or Extremist Conduct,” 3 September 2019
- Navy Regulation 1167, “Supremacist Activities,” 14 September 1990
- OPNAVINST 5354.1G, “Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual,” 24 July 2017
- Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks,” 5 February 2021
- Task Force One Navy (TF1N), “Final Report,” 2 February 2021
- Uniform Code of Military Justice, Articles 92 (Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation), 116 (Riot or Breach of Peace), 117 (Provoking Speeches or Gestures), 133 (Conduct Unbecoming), and 134 (General Article)

Common Questions & Answers

Q: If there have been issues with extremism inside the Department of Defense for a long time, why is the Secretary of Defense so focused on this now?

A: The increased level of domestic protests around the country in the past several months has emboldened some violent extremist groups to take more aggressive anti-government and racially motivated actions. These groups are known to actively target current and former military personnel. In light of current events, the Secretary wants DoD personnel at all levels to understand the threat and be trained and educated to take appropriate actions when they see indicators of extremism.

Q: Does DoD actually have a problem with extremist groups?

A: We are seeing an increase in concerning behavior. We believe this is based on societal increases, but there's also an increase in the reporting of suspect behavior. We are actively tracking down these leads and identifying any other associations with these sorts of groups. That's why we need all DoD personnel to report concerning behaviors appropriately so we can thoroughly review all credible reports.

Q: Does DoD check the social media records of Service members, DoD civilian employees, and prospective recruits?

A: Consent for obtaining publicly available social media information is provided when Service members and DoD civilian employees submit their Personnel Security Questionnaire (SF-86) to initiate the background investigation process. DoD is examining a scalable means of implementing social media screening in conjunction with background investigations. Furthermore, the FBI currently screens social media for extremism and criminal activity.

Q: I thought Service members retained their Constitutional rights when they joined the military. Are you telling me I no longer have the right to Free Speech or Peaceful Assembly?

A: "We're entrusted with the security of our nation. The tools of our trade are lethal, and we engage in operations that involve risk to human life and untold national treasure. Because of what we do, our standards must be higher than those of society at large." (General Ronald R. Fogleman, 15th CSAF, quotation on the Air Force Memorial)

Remember that military members and DoD civilian employees have access to classified information and occupy sensitive positions with access to lethal equipment, training, and tactics. Everyone with access to classified information or in a sensitive position is evaluated continuously, using government-wide guidelines to assess their strength of character, honesty, discretion, sound judgment, reliability to protect classified or sensitive information, and trustworthiness. Any doubt is resolved in favor of the national security.

Potentially disqualifying conditions include:

- involvement in, support of, or association/sympathy with persons attempting to or training to commit, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United States;
- association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
 - attempt to overthrow the U.S. Government or any state government;
 - prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from performing their official duties;
 - gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, state, or local government; or prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or any state.

Reporting of Completed Training

Guidance Varies by Service Concerned

Report training of military and civilian personnel complete with outputs or notes of significance via your chain of command.

For the Services: With the exception of those personnel serving on the Joint Staff, OSD, and Field Activities and Agencies, all Services will certify that 100% of their personnel have participated in the SecDef-directed Leadership Stand-Down to Address Extremism. All Service Chiefs will send a memo to their respective Military Department Secretaries certifying 100% completion of the stand-down. They should courtesy copy the CJCS and the OPR (DD, Global Integration, J-5, Joint Staff BGen Kevin Leahy) on the memo. The Military Department Secretaries will then send a similar memo to OSD(P&R) who, in turn, will provide a memo to the SecDef certifying the completion of the stand-down.

For those serving on the Joint Staff: Each Joint Directorate's Military Secretary will send a memo to the Director of Management's (DOM) Military Secretary certifying 100% completion of the Leadership Stand-Down to Address Extremism. The DOM's Military Secretary will send a memo to the Director, Joint Staff, with a courtesy copy to the CJCS and the OPR (DD, Global Integration, J-5, Joint Staff BGen Kevin Leahy) certifying the Joint Staff's 100% completion. The DJS then will provide a memo to OSD(P&R) who, in turn, will send a memo to the SecDef certifying the completion of the stand-down.

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA
(b) (6) Brady, Robert M. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6);
Schiavino-Narvaez, Beth Dr. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
(b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Subject: Extremism in the Force - HQ

Good morning,

Per instruction of my supervisor, I am sending you an Excel spreadsheet with the completion data for the Extremism in the Force mandated training. The following information should prove helpful.

1. The data is presorted alphabetically by last name in column B.
2. The completion status is located in column D. (Completed, Registered, In progress)
3. The location/organization is listed in column I.

Please let me know if you require anything else or have any questions.

(b) (6)
Strategic Talent Development
Capabilities & Initiatives Division
Department of Defense Education Activity
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350
(b) (6)

From: [Booth, William H \(Bill\) SR SES DODHRA HQ \(USA\)](#)
To: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
Cc: [Register, Jeffrey R SES DODHRA HQ \(USA\)](#); (b) (6) [CIV DODHRA HQ \(USA\)](#)
Subject: Fwd: Extremism stand down reporting
Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 6:02:36 PM

Tom,

Reference my Email below to Tom Muir. He needs your Extremism stand data soonest.

V/r

Bill

From: "Booth, William H (Bill) SR SES DODHRA HQ (USA)"
(b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 at 5:58:00 PM
To: "Muir, Thomas M SES (USA)" (b) (6)
Cc: "Register, Jeffrey R SES DODHRA HQ (USA)"
(b) (6) CIV DODHRA
HQ (USA)" (b) (6)
Subject: Re: Extremism stand down reporting

Tom,

Thanks. We certainly executed the stand down and I am confident we reported our numbers. Having said that, our report will be resubmitted directly to you early tomorrow morning. We will also let DODEA know you need their data soonest.

V/r

Bill

From: "Muir, Thomas M SES (USA)"
(b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 at 5:45:46 PM
To: "Booth, William H (Bill) SR SES DODHRA HQ (USA)"
(b) (6)
Subject: Extremism stand down reporting

Bill,

Thanks again for the great support to DA&M on the DW data call on

the civilian workforce. I know your team is working this hard.

I wanted to close the loop on an earlier tasker that somehow we cannot find the DHRA or DODEA response.

Attached is what we show for reporting from DHRA that they want to forward to SD – no report. I know that DHRA certainly conducted the stand down and training, but somehow we failed to capture the report in our roll-up.

Can you please point me in the right direction to get the numbers from DHRA and DODEA? I know you aren't responsible for DoDEA but might have visibility on their numbers and stand down.

Thanks in advance.

V/R

Tom

Thomas M. Muir

Office of the Director, Administration and Management

Department of Defense

Pentagon (b) (6)

Direct: (b) (6)

Office: (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6)

From: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
To: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA; [Brady, Robert M. SES OSD/DoDEA](#); [Schiavino-Narvaez, Beth Dr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#); (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA
Subject: Fwd: STAND-DOWN TO ADDRESS EXTREMISM IN THE RANKS OSD000925-21 FOD FINAL
Date: Saturday, February 6, 2021 9:16:03 AM
Attachments: [STAND-DOWN TO ADDRESS EXTREMISM IN THE RANKS OSD000925-21 FOD FINAL.pdf](#)

We need to develop a PD plan to do this. Need DSE and Supe input and inform our Union partners before we launch. Seems like a DMEO / REDI as the lead but open to your thoughts. Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2021 11:04:56 PM
To: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6) Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Subject: Fwd: STAND-DOWN TO ADDRESS EXTREMISM IN THE RANKS OSD000925-21 FOD FINAL

FYI-FYSA

(b) (6)

From: WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox CMD Correspondence (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2021 7:18 PM
To: OSD Pentagon OCMO Mailbox DA Correspondence; (b) (6); 'Sec Navy'; USAF Pentagon HAF-ES Mailbox ES Workflow; USARMY Pentagon HQDA OAA Mailbox CAPB BR of EXEC COMMS and CONTROL; JS Pentagon DoM Mailbox Joint Secretariat; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox AS-CMO; OSD Pentagon OUSD ATL List DoD Mail; OSD Pentagon OUSD C Mailbox Inbox; OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List CoS ExecSec; OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec Mailbox CoS ExecSec; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy Mailbox USP; OSD Pentagon OUSD P-R List MultiMemo; OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E Mailbox CMO; OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E Mailbox FO; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy List ExecSec Correspondence Team; Policy Front Office ExecSec; OSD MC-ALEX OUSD P-R Mailbox UPR; NG NCR NGB ARNG Mailbox NGB ExecSec; NG NCR NGB ARNG Mailbox NGB ExecSec; AFRICOM Stuttgart ACCS-ALO List J036 AFRICOM Liaison Office; AFRICOM Stuttgart ACSS-S Mailbox Secretariat to the Joint Staff; AFRICOM Stuttgart ACSS-S Mailbox SJS-Taskers; (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) 'CYBER COMMAND'; (b) (6) Lt Col USAF USSPACECOM J0 (USA); EUCOM Pentagon HQ List All Personnel; EUCOM Stuttgart ECSJS List ECJS Group MBA; (b) (6) MAJ USARMY NORAD-USNC WO (USA); (b) (6) CIV CENTCOM WLO (USA); INDOPACOM Yongsan USFK List USFK Multi; JS Pentagon J4 List USTRANSCOM LNO; NORAD-USNC Peterson AFB N-NC SPECIAL STAFF Mailbox SJS OMB;

NORAD-USNC Peterson AFB N-NC SPECIAL STAFF List CC Staff All; 'PACOM ExecSec'; Provost, John G CIV SOCOM HQ SOCOM (USA); (b) (6) CIV JS DOM (USA); (b) (6) CIV USSOCOM SOCOM (USA); 'SOCOM Headquarters'; (b) (6) LTC USSOCOM SOCOM (USA); SOUTHCOM Miami SC-CC Mailbox OMB SCSJS; SOUTHCOM Miami SC-CC Mailbox WFO; 'SPACECOM Headquarters'; STRATCOM Offutt AFB J010 Mailbox SJS; STRATCOM Offutt AFB J003 List USSTRATCOM LNO; TRANSCOM Scott AFB TCCS Mailbox Joint Secretariat; (b) (6) COL USARMY USSPACECOM J0 (USA); OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff; OSD Pentagon OGC List Military Assistants; OSD MC-ALEX CAPE Mailbox CAPE; OSD Pentagon CAPE List IST Team; 'DOD IG CATMS'; 'DoD IG Correspondence'; OSD Pentagon DOTE List Correspondence; OSD MC-ALEX DOTE Mailbox OTE; OSD Pentagon DOD CIO Mailbox ExecSec- Correspondence Control Office; OSD Pentagon OASD LA List Admin; OSD Pentagon OASD LA List Front Office Admin; OSD Pentagon OASD LA List Multi-memo; (b) (6) CIV OSD PA (USA); OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Admin; OSD Pentagon RSRC MGMT List PA-Admin MBX; OSD Pentagon ODNA List Net Assessment-ALL; DCSA MCB Quantico DCSA HQ List FO Admin; 'DAR-DFAS-HQ-COR'; (b) (6); 'Dcaa-dodmail'; DCMA Ft Lee HQ Mailbox Correspondence Control; 'Defense Advanced Research Projects Agencies (DARPA)'; OSD MC-ALEX OUSD C Mailbox WHS-Comptroller-DCAA-CATMS; DCSA MCB Quantico DCSA HQ Mailbox ExecSec; OSD MC-ALEX OUSD C Mailbox WHS-Comptroller-DFAS-CATMS; OSD MC-ALEX OUSD P-R Mailbox ASD-HA; OSD Pentagon OGC List Correspondence Staff; DTRA Ft Belvoir DIR Mailbox CS; DFAS Indianapolis IN HAB Mailbox hq-correspondence; DHA NCR Admin Mgt List HA-CCO; (b) (6); DISA Annapolis OS List Front Office; DISA Ft Meade DD Mailbox COSA; 'DLA - Director'; 'DLA DSG'; 'DoD NSA - National Security Agency'; DSCA NCR FO List Correspondence; DCSA MCB Quantico DCSA HQ Mailbox Front Office; OSD Pentagon DOD CIO Mailbox PUBS Audits; 'Missile Defense Agency (MDA) (USA-MDA)'; OSD Pentagon DOD CIO List NCRDEF Front Office; 'NGA Tasking 1'; 'NGA Tasking 2'; 'NRO'; 'NSA ExecSec (Fort Meade)'; OSD MC-ALEX ODAM Mailbox ADM-PFPA; OSD Pentagon OUSD P-R List DeCA; OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E Mailbox DARPA; OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E Mailbox MDA; OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E Mailbox SDA; OSD MC-ALEX ODAM Mailbox ADM-PFPA-ADMI; OSD MC-ALEX ODAM Mailbox ADM-PFPA; 'USA-ASDR&E-JIEDDO'; OSD NCR OUSD Policy List USP DSCA FO; DMA Ft Meade HQ DMA List GEARS HQDMA; CATMS - HQ - Financial and Business Ops; CATMS - HQ - COS; OSD MC-ALEX OUSD P-R Mailbox UPR-DHRA; DTSA MC-ALEX EO List EO Admin; #HQ - CS - WHS Communications; OEA NCR OEA List oea-managers; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox ASDS OfficeofEconomicAdjustment; OSD Pentagon ODAM List DAM Directors; OSD Pentagon OUSD A-S Mailbox ASDS OfficeofEconomicAdjustment; OSD Pentagon OUSD ATL Mailbox TRMC; OSD MC-ALEX OUSD Policy Mailbox USP-COS-DTSA-EO - ADMIN; DPAA NCR FO Mailbox Admin; OSD Pentagon OUSD R-E Mailbox R-T DTIC; DTSA MC-ALEX IED List DTSACATMS-POLICY-ADMIN; OSD MC-ALEX OCMO Mailbox WHS; WHS Pentagon ESD List Read File; (b) (6) CAPT SD; (b) (6) Col USAF OSD OASD LA (USA); (b) (6) Col USMC OSD PA (USA)

Subject: STAND-DOWN TO ADDRESS EXTREMISM IN THE RANKS OSD000925-21 FOD FINAL

The attached Secretary of Defense memorandum is for your information/action.

From: (b) (6) [Ms. CIV OSD/DoDEA](#)
To: (b) (6) [Dr. CIV OSD/DoDEA](#); Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA; (b) (6) [CIV OSD/DoDEA](#)
Subject: RE: Extremism
Date: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 12:27:22 PM
Attachments: [2021 Extremism in the Force 20210427 - Summary for Mr Brady.xlsx](#)

Sir, please find attached the data for the completion rate of Extremism Stand-down training. We're at 87% completion. Of the remaining 13%, nine schools have 20 or more personnel who are incomplete:

Aviano ES
Barkley ES
Diamond ES
Kadena ES
Netzaburg ES
Patch MS
Ramstein MS
W T Sampson ES/HS
West Point ES

These schools are listed in the first tab in the attached report along with the total number of employees who are incomplete. Please let me know if you would like further information.

V/r,

(b) (6)

Chief, Strategic Talent Development
Capabilities & Initiatives Division
Department of Defense Education Activity
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 9:40 AM
To: Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Extremism


Good morning, sir. As of this morning we are at 87%. (b) (6) and I just reviewed the list that you requested. It has a list by location so that you can view if there is a certain school with a low completion rate; however, I asked them to tighten up on category that was on there.... It looks like some employees got lumped into a general DoDEA category.

With Kindest Regards,

(b) (6)

Chief, Capabilities & Initiatives Division
DoDEA Headquarters
Mark Center East Suite 06D07-04

 (b) (6)

 DSN (b) (6)

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From: Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 9:09 AM

To: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)

CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA

(b) (6)

Subject: Extremism

How are we doing with completion rate for our Training module?

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: [Schiavino-Narvaez, Beth Dr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
To: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
Subject: RE: Extremism in DoD
Date: Thursday, February 18, 2021 9:18:08 AM

Thanks Tom—will review and keep it close hold.

Dr. Beth Schiavino-Narvaez
Chief Academic Officer
Department of Defense Education Activity
4800 Mark Center Drive Rm 06C09
Alexandria, VA 22350
DSN: (b) (6)
Commercial: (b) (6)
Email: (b) (6)

From: Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, February 18, 2021 9:15 AM
To: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6) Brady, Robert M. SES OSD/DoDEA
(b) (6)
Subject: Fwd: Extremism in DoD

Just got this. Please review. We need to discuss how we execute world-wide. I'm troubled by the 'small group' discussion part. Not sure how many personal examples of extremists our teachers could share but I'm sure there are many other issues they will raise with our Principals and Supes. Yikes. I'm also just imagining our Union reaction ! Close hold for the 4 of us now.

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Litton, Leonard G (Len) III SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA)
(b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2021 10:16 PM
To: Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA; (b) (6) Bianchi, Robert J
SES USN NEXCOM NORFOLK VA (USA); Barron, Patricia M SES (USA); Hinton,
Veronica E SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA); Lyons, Judd H SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA)
Cc: Hebert, Lernes J SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA); (b) (6) COL USARMY
OSD OUSD P-R (USA); (b) (6) CDR USN OSD OUSD P-R (USA); (b) (6)
(b) (6) MAJ USARMY OSD OUSD P-R (USA)
Subject: Extremism in DoD

Colleagues,

Sorry for the late note, but this document was in flux most of today and wanted to wait until it became more solidified. Sending out as directed by Bear at the Direct Reports today. Please note that it is still not "final-final," but close. So, I recommend that you review for your own personal knowledge right now. I expect that we will get the final approved document out very soon.

Happy to take any questions or concerns that you may have.

v/r,

Len

From: (b) (6) [CIV OSD/DoDEA](#)
To: [Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA](#)
Cc: (b) (6) [CIV OSD/DoDEA](#); (b) (6) [COL USARMY OSD OUSD P-R \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: Extremism stand down reporting
Date: Thursday, June 10, 2021 6:50:48 AM
Attachments: [Agency Report - Extremism Stand Down Final Spreadsheet with POCs \(DoDEA input\) 18 May 20212.xlsx](#)
[FW 4th Estate Reporting of SD Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks \(46.3 KB\).msg](#)

Tom,

The attached message and spreadsheet were sent to M&RA on 18 May 2021 indicating that our training was completed.

(b) (6)
Chief of Staff
DoD Education Activity
Mark Center East Suite 06F09-02
☎ Office: (b) (6)
Wireless: (b) (6)
📠 Secure: (b) (6)

From: Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Sent: 9 June, 2021 21:02
To: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6) CIV
OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Subject: Fwd: Extremism stand down reporting

Didn't we report our data to M&RA ?

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Booth, William H (Bill) SR SES DODHRA HQ (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 6:02 PM
To: Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA
Cc: Register, Jeffrey R SES DODHRA HQ (USA); (b) (6) CIV DODHRA HQ (USA)
Subject: Fwd: Extremism stand down reporting

Tom,

Reference my Email below to Tom Muir. He needs your Extremism stand data soonest.

V/r

Bill

From: "Booth, William H (Bill) SR SES DODHRA HQ (USA)"

(b) (6)

Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 at 5:58:00 PM

To: "Muir, Thomas M SES (USA)" (b) (6)

Cc: "Register, Jeffrey R SES DODHRA HQ (USA)" (b) (6)

(b) (6)

CIV DODHRA HQ (USA)" (b) (6)

Subject: Re: Extremism stand down reporting

Tom,

Thanks. We certainly executed the stand down and I am confident we reported our numbers. Having said that, our report will be resubmitted directly to you early tomorrow morning. We will also let DODEA know you need their data soonest.

V/r

Bill

From: "Muir, Thomas M SES (USA)" (b) (6)

Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 at 5:45:46 PM

To: "Booth, William H (Bill) SR SES DODHRA HQ (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: Extremism stand down reporting

Bill,

Thanks again for the great support to DA&M on the DW data call on the civilian workforce. I know your team is working this hard.

I wanted to close the loop on an earlier tasker that somehow we cannot find the DHRA or DODEA response.

Attached is what we show for reporting from DHRA that they want to forward to SD – no report. I know that DHRA certainly conducted the stand down and training, but somehow we failed to capture the report in our roll-up.

Can you please point me in the right direction to get the numbers from DHRA and DODEA? I know you aren't responsible for DoDEA but might have visibility on their numbers and stand down.

Thanks in advance.

V/R

Tom

Thomas M. Muir

Office of the Director, Administration and Management

Department of Defense

Pentagon (b) (6)

Direct: (b) (6)

Office: (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6)

(b) (6) CTR (USA)

From: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 6:43 AM
To: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA
Subject: FW: 4th Estate Reporting of SD Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks
Attachments: Agency Report - Extremism Stand Down Final Spreadsheet with POCs (DoDEA (input) 18 May 20212.xlsx

FYSA

From: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2021 9:50 AM
To: (b) (6) COL USARMY OSD OUSD P-R (USA) (b) (6) CIV DECA HQ (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6) Brady, Thomas M. Mr. SES OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Subject: RE: 4th Estate Reporting of SD Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

(b) (6)

As requested, See attached. DoDEA is complete.

r/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6) COL USARMY OSD OUSD P-R (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2021 8:23 AM
To: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6) CIV DECA HQ (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) CIV OSD/DoDEA (b) (6)
Subject: FW: 4th Estate Reporting of SD Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

(b) (6) – can you guys fill in the data (one row) on your completed extremism training and return today.

regards

(b) (6)

COL (b) (6)
Military Deputy
Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
Pentagon (b) (6)
O: (b) (6)
C: (b) (6)
NIPR: (b) (6)
SIPR: (b) (6)

From: Blanks, Julie A SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, May 17, 2021 4:54 PM

To: (b) (6) COL USARMY OSD OUSD P-R (USA) (b) (6) LTC
USARMY OSD OUSD P-R (USA) (b) (6) CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: 4th Estate Reporting of SD Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

Hi, DA&M is missing some info for DeCA and DoDEA re their stand downs. Can you send me the info for columns B-J for both of those organizations (see rows 5 and 8)? Can you provide by COB Tuesday? It looks like for most DAFAs, #assigned and #trained is the same, provided everyone was trained.

Julie Blanks

OUSD(P&R)

(b) (6)

From: Muir, Thomas M SES (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, May 17, 2021 4:39 PM
To: Blanks, Julie A SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: 4th Estate Reporting of SD Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

Julie,

At the direction of the Office of DSD, DA&M initiated a memorandum requesting PSAs to consolidate reporting for completion of the Stand Down to Address Extremism in the ranks. In accordance with the attached memo, final reports from PSAs and their respective DAFAs were due to WHS EEO Program office NLT 12 April 2021. We are still compiling data and have many unanswered DAFAs within the P&R portfolio, including AAFES, DeCA, DHRA, and DoDEA. Attached excel spreadsheet captures the data received and updated as of this morning.

We know that P&R DAFAs have completed the training, but cannot capture the numbers for reporting in accordance with the requirement.

Who can I or our team work with from P&R to help address the data shortfalls?

Thanks for pointing us in the right direction.

V/R

Tom

Thomas M. Muir
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Subject: Extremism Stand Down Training Materials

Team – attached is the approved Extremism Stand Down training framework for your use/reference. We are still waiting for the SD's recorded remarks on the subject but all other material in the attached is complete.

Mr Hebert sent the attached to the M&RA/1s this morning.

regards

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