

OFFICE of INTELLIGENCE and ANALYSIS

INTELLIGENCE IN BRIEF

27 APRIL 2021

IA-49750-21

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

(++) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation

(LI/FOLIO) On 5 February an unknown actor posted a falsified DHS I&A assessment to a website likely to spread disinformation regarding US Government efforts to prevent unauthorized persons' access to firearms. We are not aware of any previous instances of individuals producing and distributing a falsified DHS I&A assessment and cannot rule out future attempts by actors to use similar techniques to spread disinformation to the public.

- (U/FOUO) The falsified version of the assessment contains substantive changes to the title and language on the header page claiming that multiple agencies are monitoring online forums and preparing for nationwide investigations and arrests related to the production of additive manufactured weapons.
- *(LI/FOUO)* The falsified assessment was the subject of a 14 February media article. The author and online commenters expressed skepticism of the authenticity of the falsified assessment and noted the alarmist language as well as dubious attempted redactions. The media article has since been removed from their website, but the falsified assessment is still visible on the website where it was first appeared on 5 February.
- (U//FOUO) The falsified assessment appears to be derived from the DHS I&A *Reference Aid*, "3-D Printed Weapons, Equipment and Materials," published on 4 February and classified at U//FOUO. Proprietary software as well as multiple online tools and downloadable applications allow for the conversion of a .pdf file to an editable format.

↔ Prepared by the Counterterrorism Mission Center. Coordinated within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (CBP, CWMD, ICE, FOD, and TSA). For questions, contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) @hq.dhs.gov

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(4) Comparis	son of Authentic vs Falsified Assessment	
uppend on 4 February, is a three-page Reference equipment and weapons. We note that while the falsified version is similar in formatting, it co		lditive manufacturing
(U) Actual Assessment	(U) Falsified Assessment (alterations denoted by red box)
URCLASSIFIED/OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	OFFICE of INTELLIGENCE and ANALYSIS	
OFFICE of INTELLICENCE and ANALYSIS REFERENCE AID #Familiary2021	REFERENCE AID	Attempted redactions
FUBLIC SAFETY & SECORITY (U/FOUC) 3-D Printed Plastic Weapons, Equipment, and Materials	Combating 3-D Printed Plastic Weapons, Equipment, and Materials	Altered title
expose 3 Domestic violent extremists (DVEs) continue to exploit 3-D printing to produce weapons and firearm accessories that are unregulated and easy to acquire, according to recent federal and local arrests. This jointly authored <i>Raforner Aid</i> is instended to highlight recent incidents of DVE misuse of 3-D printing and demonstrative examples of how the tactic could be exploited by DVEs in the United States. It also aims to provide a description of some elements of 3-D printing operations, including 3-D printers, firearms, components, and accessories made of plastic. The below times associated with 3-D printing operations are not an echastive list and may involve constitutionally protected activities that are not accessarily indicative of DVE use. 3-D printing operations should be evaluated in the totality of circumstances and in accordance with state laws.	 Combined classified BATFE and NSA data efforts shows a significant rise in domestic violent extremists (DVEs) exploiting 3-D printing to produce weapons and firearm accessories that are unregulated and easy to acquire. Through forrent tracking, and other electronic surveillance measures (ESMs), this data shows that DVEs have downloaded and shared files related to 3D printed weapons, equipment, and materials in all 50 states. This critical information has been forwarded to the appropriate local BATFE offices, and multiple coordinated joint effort search warrants, and possibly arrests, will occur nationwide over the next few weeks, ICE and BATFE is also currently seeking to obtain seizure warrants from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio for the follow web domains, in order to combat itlegal 3-D printelly: alBdp.conz dedits.org printedfirearm.com https://seking.the.noture.printel.com afFCF is also currently seeking the voluntary removal of all 3-D printel weapons, equipment, and materials at the following domains from their web tool. If voluntary removal is not met, further action may be taken: 	Altered assessment containing false information on USG and DHS activities
	cgtrader.com cdthsAccom tedsAccom tedsAccom difinder.com difinder.	Missing portion markings and inconsistent formatting
All Prepared by the Countertemption Masion Center and with NCTC, FBL JCAT, and the Douthern Newada Counter-Tempting Center, Overdining during the Drift Insiligence Entreprise (CEP, OWAD, ICE, and OkT), For questions, tambat Drift 2019 Hinging disc gas.		
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Source Summary	(U//FOU®) We have medium confidence in our assessment that the publication of the
Statement	falsified assessments containing fabricated information on law enforcement operations,
	is an attempt to spread disinformation. We base this an internal review of content and
	formatting of the authentic and falsified versions of the assessment.
Definitions	(U/FOUO) Disinformation: An adversary's use of false or misleading information
	created or spread intentionally to alter a target audience's attitudes or behavior to
	benefit the information's creator.
Dissemination	(4) Federal, State, local, and private sector security partners
Reporting Suspicious	(44) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security
Activity	personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other
	personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports
	(SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task
	Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit
	http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.
Warning Notices &	(U//FOUO) This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. It contains
Handling Caveats	information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information
	Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and
	disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to
	be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to
	know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland
	security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and
	key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval
	from DHS.
	(#) Individuals linking, citing, or quoting the falsified assessment highlighted in this
	report are engaging in First Amendment protected activities unless acting in concert
	with a threat actor. This assessment focuses on disinformation contained in a falsified
	DHS assessment that was not produced or authorized by DHS I&A.

Source, Reference, and Dissemination Information

CLASSIFICATION:	UNCLAS	SIFIED//FOR	OFFICIAL US	E ONLY		
Homel Securit			elligence and Ar mer Fee	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Form	
Product Title: (U) Falsified DHS						
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1. Please select partner type:	Select One		and function:	Select One		
2. What is the highest level of i	ntelligence in	formation that y	ou receive?	Select	One	
3. Please complete the following	ng sentence: "	I focus most of r	ny time on:" Sel	ect One		
4. Please rate your satisfaction	with each of	the following:				
	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Product's overall usefulness	0	0	0	0	0	0
Product's relevance to your mission	0	0	0	0	0	0
Product's timeliness	0	0	0	0	0	0
Product's responsiveness to your intelligence needs	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. How do you plan to use this (product in sup	port of your miss	iion? (Check all the	at apply.)		
Drive planning and prepared emergency response operat		raining, and/or		aw enforcement Ir own regional-s	-	
Observe, identify, and/or dis	rupt threats			ır own topic-spec		
Share with partners			formation 1	•	nd security strateg	ies
Allocate resources (e.g. equi		rsonnel)	Do not pla	in to use		
Reprioritize organizational fo			Other:			
6. To further understand your re	-	estion #5, please	provide specific	details about si	tuations in which	you might
use this product.						
7. What did this product <u>not</u> ad	dress that you	anticipated it w	ould?			
8. To what extent do you agree	with the follo	wing two statem	ents?			
		Strongly Agree	Neith Agree nor D	er Agree Isagree Disag	ree Disgree	N/A

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This product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic.	0	0	0	0	0	0
This product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere.	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. How did you obtain this product? Select Or 10. Would you be willing to participate in a fo		ersation abo	ut your feedback	🕼 Yes		
To help us understand more about your organization so w	e can better tail	-				
Name: Organization Contact Number:		Position State Emai			Feedl	omit Dack 2
		E.I.I.ali				

Privacy Act Statement

CLASSIFICATION:

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Product Serial Number: IA-49750-21

REV: 01 August 2017



Attachments: (U-FOUO) IIB - Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation 04272021.pdf

Colleagues,

(U//FOUO) The attached Intelligence In Brief: Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation, dated 27 April 2021 has been released. Senior Leaders, Field Operations, IGA, OPA, and OLA are receiving this message and attachment to ensure uninterrupted access to I&A's finished analytic products.

(U) This product will also be available via NCTC Current and the I&A websites on HSDN and HTSN (JWICS); HSIN; and CapNet.


(U//FOUO) Intended Audience: Federal, State, local, and private sector security partners

(U//FOUO) To locate the product on HSIN, go to HSIN Central page at (b) (7)(E) and copy and place the title in the search bar.

(U//FOUO) For more information regarding HSIN please visit

(b) (7)(E) ______ or contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)@dhs.gov for access.

Very Respectfully, Planning, Production, and Standards Division Office of Intelligence and Analysis



//dsk//

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Homeland Security

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OFFICE of INTELLIGENCE and ANALYSIS

I&A HOMELAND INTELLIGENCE (HINT)

28 APRIL 2021

(U) Tab 1 - Secretary's Strategic Intelligence

Title	Producer

(U) Tab 2 – Intelligence Enterprise Highlights

Title	Producer	
(U//FOUO) Domestic Violent Extremists Pose Heightened Threat to Elected I&A CTMC, FBI,		
Officials Nationwide, IA-50905-21	5	
(U) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation,	I&A CTMC	
IA-49750-21		

(U) Tab 3 – Intelligence Community Highlights

Title	Producer
WIRe2021-04490 (C-LAN only)	CIA, FBI

(U) Tab 4 - Tactical Homeland Intelligence

Title Produced	
(U//FOUO) CETC Intelligence Update 28 April 2021 (C-LAN only)	I&A CETC
(U//FOUO) Daily OSIR Highlights 27 April 2021	I&A CETC

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INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE



DAILY OSIR HIGHLIGHTS

27 April 2021

(U//FOUO) The following information is provided for your situational awareness only. Please note that some of the information in this report is compiled from external open source reporting and does not reflect the opinions or position of DHS Intelligence & Analysis. This information may also change as new information becomes available. This information should only be shared with personnel that have a valid need-to-know within your area of responsibility.

(U//FOUO) Daily OSIR Highlights

(U//FOUO) BLUF: This rollup is a summary of the Current and Emerging Threats Center Open Source Intelligence Reports and other associated unclassified reporting over the last 24 hours. CETC monitors for significant threats to the Homeland and remains in communication with the National Operations Center concerning developments related to current and emerging threats.

(U//FOUO) Nothing significant to report.

(U//FOUO) POC: Direct feedback, evaluations, comments, and follow on collection requests to the Current and Emerging Threats Center (CETC), Open Source Collection Operations (OSCO) by accessing the OSIR evaluation link at Intelink-U

(b) (7)(E)	<u>),</u> Intelink-S <mark>(b) (7)(E)</mark>	, or
Intelink-TS (b) (7)(E)	. Contact CETC OSCO a (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	via e-mail at:
(b) (6), (b) (7)(E) @hg.dhs.gov	b) (6), (b) (7)(E) @ [][[][[][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][

From:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	
Sent:	4/28/2021 10:30:43 AM	[S]
CC:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	
) (6), (b) (7)(E)	
Subject:	(U//FOUO) Unclassified A-LAN HINT for 28 April 2021	

Attachments: 28 April 2021 A-LAN HINT.pdf

Good morning,

Please see today's unclassified edition of the HINT (Homeland INTelligence).

For questions regarding the content of the HINT, or requests to be added to the dissemination, please reach out to I&A's Homeland Executive Intelligence Support Team (HEIST) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) @hg.dhs.gov

V/r,

Current and Emerging Threats Center (CETC)

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)


Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)

"(4) Warning: This document and any information derived therefrom shall not be distributed beyond DHS without prior authorization of the originator, unless required by law, regulation, or executive order to further share this information, and subject to subsequent notice to the originator. Requests for authorization to further disseminate this document or information contained herein to non-DHS IT-systems shall be submitted to I&A's Homeland Executive Intelligence Support Team at 10 (6). (b) (7)(E) @hq.dhs.gov or (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) @hq.dhs.gov

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(U) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation









From:	(b) (6), (b) $(7)(C)$ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent:	(D) (6), (D) (7)(C) (//20) 4 AM
To: (t	b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
CC:	DHS. (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Attachments:	UFOUO IIBFalsified DHS IA Report FEB 2021v10_ERv2.docx
<mark>(b) (6), (b</mark> Hey) (7)(C)
Sending this a	long. Addressed comments and added the definition sent over by for misinformation'.
Thanks,	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6),	(b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV>
Sent: To: (0) (0) (7)(5)	^{(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)} @HQ.DHS.GOV⊀ ^b (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov>
Subject:	UAS Threat Ov eview
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Thanks,	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
	(b) (7)(C) Gehq.DHS.GOV>
Sent: Monday To: (b) (6), (b	/, April 12, 2021 2:53 PM) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV> @HQ.DHS.GOV>
	HEIST(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)(4.)(5, b) (6), (b) (7)(E)
u) (u), (u) (r)(E)	@hq.dhs.gov>(^{b)} (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @b(Q7)(H\$. OV>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) @b)((h) (Eqv>

Greeting all,

Request review on attached reference aid that discusses a fake document attributed to DHS IA that was making the round in mid-February. We went thru the immediate notifications to partners when it was discovered, but would like to expand the audience just in case an external partner picks this up.

Cc'ing HEIST and PB just so they have a heads up and for scheduling purposes.



b) (6), (b) (7)(0

Great job on this piece. Succinct and hits the wavetops the S1 needs to know. Please see my edits attached and let me know if you have any questions. Let's get this wrapped up and off to SBS tonight.

Best,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C @HQ.DHS.GOV>	
Sent: Wednesday, March 1	7, 2021 2:53 PM	
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	한HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	@HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	₽hq.dhs.gov>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	@hq.dhs.gov>;
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@hq.dhs.gov>;	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov>	

Subject: U--LES SIH Internal UAS Threat Overview--Front Office Review


Hi all,

Sending for his computer is forcing an update on A/LAN, he'll be back up in about 30 mins.

Attached the SIH for Friday's CUAS overview S1 for front office review.

Thanks,

Cell:






OFFICE of INTELLIGENCE and ANALYSIS

INTELLIGENCE IN BRIEF

XX APRIL 2021

IA-49750-21

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY





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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 12:36 PM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) @hq.dhs.gov>

Cc:(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)		@hq.dhs.gov>; <mark>(b)</mark>	(6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV>;
(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	@hq.dhs.gov>		

Subject: FW: U-LES IIB Internal Falsified DHS IA Report--Front Office Review


Attachments: U FOUO IIB--Falsified DHS IA Report FEB 2021--v11 PB.docx

Greeting all,

IIB on a fake assessment that appeared online O/A 5 Feb 2021. This appears to be an alteration of a Reference Aid released on 4 FEB 2021.

Sending along for tech and final edits. The IIB and BN, along with G4 clearance are on the IRAS card.






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rom:(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	₩hq.dhs.gov>	
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
Subject: RE: U--LES SIH Internal UAS Threat Overview--Front Office Review

) (6), (0) (7)(0

Great job on this piece. Succinct and hits the wavetops the S1 needs to know. Please see my edits attached and let me know if you have any questions. Let's get this wrapped up and off to SBS tonight.

Best,

o) (6), (b) (7)(0



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Attached the SIH for Friday's CUAS overview S1 for front office review.

Thanks,





US Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis Desk (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Cell: (

From:	$\frac{18A \text{ pB}}{(b)} \frac{(b)}{(6)}, \frac{(b)}{(7)} \frac{(7)}{(E)}$
Sent:	4/23/2021 1:10:22 PM
Subject:	(U//FOUO) Advanced Notification of Pending U//FOUO Intelligence In Brief Release: "(U) Falsified DHS I&A
	Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation"
Attachments:	ADVANCED NOTIFICATION (UFOUO) IIB - Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation
	04272021.pdf

(U) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides the Offices of Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs with notice of the pending release of unclassified products to allow time to draft public affairs guidance.

(U//FOUO) The attached is a draft of the U//FOUO Intelligence In Brief titled "(U) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation". The intended audiences are federal, state, local, and private sector security partners. We plan to publish the final version of this Intelligence In Brief on Tuesday, 27 April 2021.

(U) If we can be of any further assistance or answer any questions, please contact the I&A Planning, Production, & Standards Division a (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

V/R,

Production, Media Services & Dissemination Branch Planning, Production & Standards Division Office of Intelligence and Analysis of Homeland Security ings all)

//DKR//









То: Сс:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov]; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOVI; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV]; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov]
From:	@HQ.DHS.GOVI: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Subject: <u>UFOUO</u>	Thur 4/22/2021 1:53:59 PM (UTC-05:00) RE: Fake document sourced to DHS I&A (references to Ohio) IIBFalsified DHS IA Report FEB 2021v12 PB-Final.docx
Hi all,	
Just a he	eads up and FYSA stuffattached is a near-final draft of the fake assessment piece. (b) (5)
Thanks,	
(b) (6), (b)	
Cell <mark>(b) (</mark>	6), (b) (7)(C)
то: <mark>(b)</mark> Сс: <mark>(b)</mark>) (6), (b) (7)(C) iday, February 26, 2021 10:45 AM (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov> (6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov> : RE: Fake document sourced to DHS I&A (references to Ohio)
Hi all,	
lts possi	ble you'll see this thru coord, but just in case
So, after	r much back and forth, we put this together and sent it out for IE coord. (b) (5)
	(b) (5)

Let me know if y'all have any thoughts.

Thanks,



Subject: RE: Fake document sourced to DHS I&A (references to Ohio)

Good morning all,

Wanted to advise we reached out to the Southern District of Ohio who were not aware of any specific reasons why it was called out in the altered document, but planned to advise the USAO and USMS Court security for awareness purposes. Thank you for making us aware of this issue, and let us know if there's anything else we can assist with.

Have a nice weekend,



Hey (b) (6), (b) (7)(0

On OSCO: We sent a tip sheet; they don't have plans to write an OSIR though (does not fall under current collection requirements). So not expecting any additional info on that front.


Other actions:

(b) (5)		

So that's where I'm at now. I've been here a bit, and never run across someone faking a IA report, so this is new for me. From my foxhole, just want to get out there with something that states this is a fake.

Please feel free to send any comments/concerns or things I missed my way.


Thanks,



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Subject: FW: Fake document sourced to DHS I&A (references to Ohio)



I'm the RIA for the ECR and am stationed in Cleveland. I wanted to touch base related to this issue you have highlighted and determine if CTMC leadership has provided any guidance or a path forward? In addition, within the ECR we were wondering if CTMC forwarded the fake document to OSCO for further exploitation? Apologies if you already did, but as we obviously don't have a clear knowledge of current status, it is merely a consideration given the nature of the document.

I'm not sure if it is related as it's not specific to 3D-firearms but something that might be worth noting: <u>https://www.wdtn.com/news/ohio/ag-yost-announces-creation-of-ohio-stolen-gun-portal/</u>

Otherwise, I am currently unaware of any Ohio-specific nexus at this time, but can work with partners to obtain further clarification pending guidance from CTMC leadership on information needs and requirements.

Feel free to reach out with any questions or discuss this issue further.



b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Regional Intelligence Analyst Field Operations Division | East Central Region Office of Intelligence & Analysis US Department of Homeland Security (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From:(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	@HQ.DHS.GOV>	
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2021 10	D:58:47 AM	
то: <mark>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</mark> @	hq.dhs.gov>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	@HQ.DHS.GOV>
(1) (2) (1) (7) (2)	IQ.DHS.GOV>	
Subject: FW: Fake document sourced to	DHS I&A (references to Ohio)	

Thanks for reaching out	b) (b), (b) (7)
Nothing rings a bell.	
I'm pushing this to ^{(b) (b)}	who covers down on Ohio.

R,

A few local notes:

https://www.thelantern.com/2021/02/ohio-state-researchers-help-develop-customizable-3d-printed-bone-implants/

https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/u-s-air-force-research-lab-files-patent-application-for-3d-printed-nose-simulator-183486/



Regional Director Field Operations Division - Central Region Office of Intelligence and Analysis U.S. Department of Homeland Security (b) (6). (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov> Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2021 10:51 AM To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV> Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV> Subject: Fake document sourced to DHS I&A (references to Ohio)



I'm an analyst with the Counter Terrorism Mission Center. Recently DHS pushed out a product related to 3-D printed weapons (attached). Over the weekend, one of the analysts on our team noticed that a fake version of this product was circulating on social media and on several websites (also attached). I wanted to flag this for you because the Southern District of Ohio is mentioned in the fake product. Can you think of any reason the author would specifically call out Ohio? Or if there's any recent ongoing issues or legal cases related to 3-D printed firearms?

I appreciate your help! Let me know if I should be looping in any other FoD representatives in Ohio.

Best,

From:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
Sent:	4/16/2021 12:36:13 AM	
То:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	
CC:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	
	$ \begin{array}{c} (b) & (b) & (b) & (7) (C) \\ (b) & (6) & (b) & (7) (E) \end{array} \end{array} $ (b) (6), (b) (7) (E)	
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	I&A_PB
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	_s (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)	CRCL Product Review
	(FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=ac8ccaa99d214bb1be8186e/2adca/12-C	RCL Producj
Subject:	Re: UFOUO IIB-Fake DHS IA AssessmentFront Office Review	
(b) (6), (d Thanks	ppreciate the review and revised language.	
Will use the	e version you sent in the definitions box.	
Vr. (b) (6), (b	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
Cell (b) (6	6), (b) (7)(C)	
From: (b) Sen <u>t</u>	(6), (b) (7)(C) @hq.dhs.gov>	
To: (b) (6). (b) (7)(C) 6). (b) (7)(E) $a^{(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)}$ (b) (6). (b) (7)	
Subject: RE	: UFOUO IIB-Fake DHS IA AssessmentFront Office Review	



Please pardon our delayed response. The latest versions of these definitions that effectively represent IC consensus (note, at an $\frac{U//FOUO}{E}$ level) are below, with a few tweaks based on our analysis. Barring further guidance from G4, I recommend their use:

(U//FOUO) Disinformation. An adversary's use of false or misleading information created or spread intentionally to alter a target audience's attitudes or behavior to benefit the information's creator.

(U//FOUO) **Misinformation**. An actor's use of false or misleading information. The actor's intent can change *Misinformation* to *Disinformation*.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)


Officer for Foreign Influence



Thanks for comments on the 'fake assessment' paper (or as I've been semi-snarkly calling it: 'shallow fake'). We




Once we can get the lexicon/terminology question nailed down, we can send it back for review.





This is an interesting piece! Let's put it into an IIB format instead of an RA. This is exactly the kind of topic that belongs in an IIB (a "first time seen" kind of incident, not much more insight than that, but potential implications/concerns that we want to elevate to our customers, etc). Otherwise, Executive Review comments are mostly questions for clarification, so please reach out to discuss!




Subject: RE: U--LES SIH Internal UAS Threat Overview--Front Office Review

Greeting all,

Request review on attached reference aid that discusses a fake document attributed to DHS IA that was making the round in mid-February. We went thru the immediate notifications to partners when it was discovered, but would like to expand the audience just in case an external partner picks this up.

Cc'ing HEIST and PB just so they have a heads up and for scheduling purposes.




Roger will do...I'd love to take credit, but really put a lot of work into this to help get it up to snuff, and the provide the DT and TCO pieces out.

Thanks, From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hq.dhs.gov> Sent: To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (C) (C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C

Best

Great job on this piece. Succinct and hits the wavetops the S1 needs to know. Please see my edits attached and let me know if you have any questions. Let's get this wrapped up and off to SBS tonight.




Sending f

his computer is forcing an update on A/LAN, he'll be back up in about 30 mins.

Attached the SIH for Friday's CUAS overview S1 for front office review.

Thanks,



Chief, UAS Threat Integration Cell US Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis



From:	$\frac{1\&A_{P}}{(b)(6),(b)(7)(E)}$
Sent:	4/22/2021 1:37:24 PM
То:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
CC:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
_	(b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)
Subject:	(U//FOUO) Front Office Preview of Pending U//FOUO Intelligence In Brief Release: "(U) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment
-	Attempts to Spread Disinformation"
Attachments:	FO Preview (UFOUO) IIB - Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation 04272021.pdf
Flag:	Follow up

(U) This preview provides I&A leadership with the opportunity to review the attached unclassified product which is pending release.

(U//FOUO) The attached is a draft of the Intelligence In Brief titled "(U) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation". The intended audiences are federal, State, local, and private sector security partners. We plan to provide DHS Leadership, Public Affairs, and Legislative Affairs with Advance Notification of the pending release of this unclassified product to allow time to draft public affairs guidance.

(U) Unless directed otherwise, we will send the Advance Notification on Friday, 23 April 2021.

(U) If we can be of any further assistance or answer any questions, please contact the I&A Planning, Production, & Standards Division at (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) r_{1} (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

V/R,

Production, Media Services & Dissemination Branch Planning, Production & Standards Division Office of Intelligence and Analysis US Department of Homeland Security

//dkr//

From:	$ \begin{array}{c} \overset{(b)}{(6)} & (6) \\ ((b) & (6) \\ ((b) & (6) \\ ((b) & (7) \\ ((E) \\ ((b) & (6) \\ ((b) & (7) \\ ((E) \\ ((b) & ((b) \\ $
Sent:	
Subject:	(U//FOUO) Advanced Notification of Pending U//FOUO Intelligence In Brief Release: "(U) Falsified DHS I&A
	Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation"
Attachments:	ADVANCED NOTIFICATION (UFOUO) IIB - Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation
	04272021.pdf

(U) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides the Offices of Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs with notice of the pending release of unclassified products to allow time to draft public affairs guidance.

(U//FOUO) The attached is a draft of the U//FOUO Intelligence In Brief titled "(U) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation". The intended audiences are federal, state, local, and private sector security partners. We plan to publish the final version of this Intelligence In Brief on Tuesday, 27 April 2021.

(U) If we can be of any further assistance or answer any questions, please contact the I&A Planning, Production, & Standards Division (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) or (b) (

V/R,

Production, Media Services & Dissemination Branch Planning, Production & Standards Division Office of Intelligence and Analysis US Department of Homeland Security (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (rings all) //DKR// Sent:4/27/2021 2:24:26 PMSubject:FW: (U) IIB: Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation, dated 27 April 2021Attachments:(U--FOUO) IIB - Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation 04272021.pdf

Sir/Ma'am -

(U//FOUO) For your continued awareness, attached is a recent I&A product highlighting a falsified I&A assessment (from February) posted by an unknown actor to a website likely to spread disinformation regarding US Government efforts to prevent unauthorized persons' access to firearms.

 From:
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)
 @Kb)(dh5)gov>

 Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 10:02 AM

 Cc:
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)
 @Kb)(dh)(E)v>

 Subject:
 (U) IIB: Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation, dated 27 April 2021

Colleagues,

(U//FOUO) The attached Intelligence In Brief: Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation, dated 27 April 2021 has been released. Senior Leaders, Field Operations, IGA, OPA, and OLA are receiving this message and attachment to ensure uninterrupted access to I&A's finished analytic products.


(U) This product will also be available via NCTC Current and the I&A websites on HSDN and HTSN (JWICS); HSIN; and CapNet.

(U//FOUO) Intended Audience: Federal, State, local, and private sector security partners

Very Respectfully, Planning, Production, and Standards Division Office of Intelligence and Analysis Department of Homeland Security



//dsk//



 Subject:
 (U) Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation, dated 27 April 2021

 Attachments:
 (U-FOUO) IIB - Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation 04272021.pdf

Sir/Ma'am -

(U//FOUO) For your continued awareness, attached is a recent I&A product highlighting a falsified I&A assessment (from February) posted by an unknown actor to a website likely to spread disinformation regarding US Government efforts to prevent unauthorized persons' access to firearms.

R/



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) 伊姆江州Egov> Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 10:02 AM Cc: (0.0)(7)(E) 原因(小田田) Subject: (U) IIB: Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation, dated 27 April 2021

Colleagues,

(U//FOUO) The attached Intelligence In Brief: Falsified DHS I&A Assessment Attempts to Spread Disinformation, dated 27 April 2021 has been released. Senior Leaders, Field Operations, IGA, OPA, and OLA are receiving this message and attachment to ensure uninterrupted access to I&A's finished analytic products.

(U) This product will also be available via NCTC Current and the I&A websites on HSDN and HTSN (JWICS); HSIN; and CapNet.

(U//FOUO) Intended Audience: Federal, State, local, and private sector security partners

Very Respectfully,

Planning, Production, and Standards Division Office of Intelligence and Analysis Department of Homeland Security



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