



Texas

Potential Challenges

Some Texas counties have attempted to expand their mail-in voting efforts but have faced legal pushback from the Texas State Attorney General. In one high profile legal battle, the Texas State Supreme Court blocked Harris County (which houses Houston) from sending mail-in ballot applications to over two million voters. These ongoing legal disputes may cause confusion among voters and result in a compressed timeline for establishing additional in-person polling places if needed. During the July 14th runoff election, a vendor software issue resulted in an 80-minute delay in reporting election results. While this did not affect the accuracy of results, it may result in decreased confidence among the public during the General Election. CISA staff are connected with Hart, a Texas-based major provider of ballot print, mail, equipment, and technology services.

COVID-19 Considerations

Texas is one of six states that has not opened mail-in voting to any voter concerned about getting COVID-19. The Texas Secretary of State (SoS) released Health Protocols for Voters, a minimum level of recommended health protocols for all voters in Texas, election officials, employees, and poll workers. The Texas SoS is encouraging all eligible Texas voters to vote early. Texas is one of nine states that does not allow residents to register online.

State Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Hybrid
- **Voting Type:** Paper Ballots; DREs with VVPAT; DREs without VVPAT
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the state level:**

(b) (3) (B)

- Last Mile Products: 2018 State-Level Election Security Snapshot Poster delivered

- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:**

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

Last Mile Products: 2018 County-Level Election Security Snapshot Poster delivered

- **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services. Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.
- **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:** Texas (b) (7)(E)
- **Albert Sensor:** Yes. (b) (3) (B)
(b) (3) (B)
- **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 72% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
- **Polling Hours:** 7:00am-7:00pm (CT)
- **Official Election Website:**
<https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/>

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** Texas has a hybrid voter registration system, meaning the SoS oversees elections and local election offices transmit data to the state daily. Hybrid models are a combination of top-down and bottom-up models including risk advantages and vulnerabilities. The voter registration deadline is October 5, 2020.
- **Vote Casting:** Texas uses paper ballots; DREs with VVPAT; and DREs without VVPAT. Vote casting without VVPAT is higher risk due to the lack of software independence through a paper backup. On Election Day, most polling places will be open from 7:30am to 7:00pm (CT).
 - **Mail-in Ballots:** To qualify for a mail-in ballot, voters must be 65 years or older, be disabled, be out of the country on Election Day and during the period for early voting by personal appearance, or be confined in jail but otherwise eligible. Mail-in ballot applications must be dropped off in person by October 13, 2020 or received by mail by October 23, 2020. For most voters, mail-in ballots must be postmarked by 7:00pm (CT) on Election Day and received by 5:00pm (CT) on November 4, 2020.
- **Early Voting:** Texas will allow early in-person voting from October 19, 2020 through October 30, 2020.

Election Day Posture

- Protective Security Advisor (PSA) (b) (6) will support the Texas SoS physically or virtually on Election Day as required.
- PSA (b) (6) will coordinate with Region VI Incident Support Group to share any election security information.
- PSA (b) (6) will participate in the HSIN Connect rooms for real-time coordination, communication, and reporting of incidents.



Utah

Potential Challenges

Utah has had an extensive mail-in voting system since 2012 and currently conducts elections primarily by mail. Based on their relationships with local postmasters and years of experience, local election officials are confident that the 2020 election will be smoothly executed by mail as in past years. United States Postal Service (USPS) officials that serve Utah and the surrounding region say mail-in ballots only make up a fraction of the service's load and should therefore not pose a challenge to USPS' ability to process ballot, even if turnout exceeds past years. A report by the Brookings Institution gave Utah an "A" for its ability to conduct an election during the pandemic. Utah is considering allowing signature cure forms to be sent and received electronically which may present cybersecurity challenges.

COVID-19 Considerations

Utah passed legislation requiring counties to offer in-person voting and allowing them to implement alternative methods, including outdoor and drive-thru options. It also instructs the Lieutenant Governor to conduct a campaign to educate voters about changes in voter registration, methods, and processes for casting ballots and to encourage voters to utilize mail-in voting. It requires counties that have a higher risk of ballots being postmarked late to work with their local post office to date stamp those ballots as they come in and to establish additional drop boxes.

State Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Top-Down
- **Voting Type:** Vote by Mail; Paper Ballots; BMDs; and DREs with VVPAT
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the state level:**
 (b) (3) (B)
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:**
 (b) (3) (B)
- **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services. Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.
- **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:** Utah (b) (7)(E)
- **Albert Sensor:** Yes. (b) (3) (B)
 (b) (3) (B)
- **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 100% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
- **Polling Hours:** 7:00am – 8:00pm (MT)
- **Official Election Website:**
<https://vote.utah.gov/>

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** Utah has a top-down voter registration system, meaning the state controls the input and management of the statewide voter registration database. From a risk perspective, this presents a single target which, if affected by an incident, could disrupt the voting process for a number of voters. Conversely, this model also offers some risk management advantages since states following the top-down model tend to have stronger cybersecurity postures than bottom-up states, based on availability of

resources. The voter registration deadline is October 23, 2020 in order to automatically receive a mail-in ballot, but registration is available in person during early voting and Election Day.

- **Vote Casting:** Utah primarily utilizes mail-in voting and uses paper ballots, BMDs, and DREs with VVPAT at the polls. Ensuring there is an auditable record provides election officials with the ability to verify that the outcomes of the election are correct. On Election Day, polling places will be open between 7:00am and 8:00pm (MT) across the state.
 - **Mail-in Ballots:** Registered voters will automatically receive a ballot in the mail. Ballots will be mailed between October 13, 2020 and October 27, 2020 depending on the county. Voters who do not receive a ballot during this timeframe should immediately contact their local election office.
- **Early Voting:** Utah offers in-person early voting October 20-30, 2020.

Election Day Posture

- Protective Security Advisor (b) (6), Cybersecurity Advisor (b) (6) and Chief Protective Security (b) (6) will provide in-person support at the Utah State Cyber Center.
- Region VIII Regional Director and Operations Staff will virtually support election activities.



Vermont

Potential Challenges

The State of Vermont administers elections at the township and city level. In many jurisdictions, the election official is part-time and has limited resources and support. The Secretary of State (SoS) of Vermont provides additional information and support to its locals to help manage the risks of township- and city-level resource challenges. During an exercise to probe for vulnerabilities at a technology conference in summer 2019, ethical hackers were able to manipulate results produced by the optical scanner that many Vermont towns use. However, Vermont election officials say that hackers would need physical access to the machines and the use of voter-marked paper ballots offer a backstop in case of such interference.

COVID-19 Considerations

Vermont will send mail-in ballots to all active, registered voters for the November General Election. This expansion of mail-in voting comes after the state legislature voted largely along party lines to grant the SoS full authority to unilaterally make emergency election decisions. This vote came after prior disagreement during Spring 2020 between the SoS and Governor over mail-in voting.

State Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Top-Down
- **Voting Type:** Paper Ballots
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the state level:**
 - **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:**
 - **Albert Sensor:** Yes. (b) (3) (B)
 - **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 15% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
 - **Polling Hours:** 5:00am – 7:00pm (ET)
 - **Official Election Website:** <https://sos.vermont.gov/elections/>
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:** None
- **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services. Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (7)(E)

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** Vermont has a top-down voter registration system, meaning the state controls the input and management of the statewide voter registration database. From a risk perspective, this presents a single target which, if affected by an incident, could disrupt the voting process for a number of voters. Conversely, this model also offers some risk management advantages since states following the top-down model tend to have stronger cybersecurity postures than bottom-up states, based on availability of resources. Voters may register to vote through Election Day, including same-day registration on Election Day.
- **Vote Casting:** Vermont uses paper ballots. Ensuring there is an auditable record provides election officials with the ability to verify that the outcomes of the election are correct. On Election Day, polling places will be

open from 5:00am to 7:00pm (ET), although the poll opening time varies by locality between 5:00am and 10:00pm (ET).

- **Mail-in Ballots:** Vermont offers no-excuse mail-in voting to all voters. Due to COVID-19 concerns, Vermont will send mail-in ballots to all active, registered voters. Voters who do not receive a mail-in ballot may request one until November 2, 2020. Voted ballots must be returned to the town clerk's office until the day before the election or to the polling place on Election Day.
- **Early Voting:** Vermont will allow early voting at town clerks' offices as soon as mail-in ballots are ready, starting at least as early as September 19, 2020 through Election Day.

Election Day Posture

- CISA Region I will assume a heightened state of operational readiness to respond to events and incidents affecting the election and supporting infrastructures. CISA Region I will be monitoring remotely and standing by if support is requested. The Protective Security Advisor and Cybersecurity Advisor will remain in close contact with the Vermont SoS Office, Vermont Fusion Center, DHS counterparts, FBI, and all relevant election partners on Election Day.



Virginia

Potential Challenges

In early August, the non-profit group Center for Voter Information sent ~500,000 unsolicited mail-in ballot applications to Virginians, many of which had incorrect return addresses. This led to confusion among voters about the legitimacy of the ballot applications and the mail-in voting system overall. Additionally, a local Virginia election official reported that they contacted a major manufacturer of ballot drop boxes and was informed drop boxes were on back order until late September. This compressed timeline for obtaining drop boxes may present time constraints for local election officials and cause some drop boxes to be set up later than expected.

COVID-19 Considerations

Due to COVID-19, the Commonwealth has expanded in-person absentee early voting from the week prior to the election to 45 days before the election. In February 2020, the Virginia Governor signed into law no-excuse mail-in voting eligibility to all voters. The Commonwealth is anticipating an increase in this service for the General Election. The United States District Court ruled in late August that mail-in voters will not have to obtain a witness signature for the General Election. The state has appropriated \$2 million for prepaid postage for all mail-in ballots, will allow the use of drop boxes, and will implement a mail-in ballot cure process. The Commonwealth is providing PPE for all in-person polling places.

Commonwealth Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Top-Down
- **Voting Type:** Paper Ballots
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the Commonwealth level:**
 (b) (3) (B)
 - Last Mile: 2020 State-Level Election Security Snapshot Poster delivered
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:**
 (b) (3) (B)
- **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services. Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.
- **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:**
 (b) (7)(E)
- **Albert Sensor:** Yes. (b) (3) (B)
 (b) (3) (B)
- **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 60% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
- **Polling Hours:** 6:00am-7:00pm (ET)
- **Official Election Website:**
<https://www.elections.virginia.gov/>

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** Virginia has a top-down voter registration system, meaning the Commonwealth controls the input and management of the Commonwealth-wide voter registration database. From a risk perspective, this presents a single target which, if affected by an incident, could disrupt the voting process for a number of voters. Conversely, this model also offers some risk management advantages since states following the top-down model tend to have stronger cybersecurity postures than bottom-up states, based

on availability of resources. The voter registration deadline is October 13, 2020. Registrations are due by 5:00pm (ET) in person or 11:59pm (ET) online.

- **Vote Casting:** Virginia uses paper ballots. Ensuring there is an auditable record provides election officials with the ability to verify that the outcomes of the election are correct. On Election Day, polling places will be open from 6:00am (ET) to 7:00pm (ET). Voters are encouraged to use mail-in voting due to COVID-19. All mail-in ballots must be postmarked by November 3, 2020 and received by November 6, 2020 to be considered valid.
 - **Mail-in Ballots:** All registered voters are eligible to apply for a mail-in ballot. Applications must be received by the voter's local registrar by October 26, 2020. Once the application is approved, the local registrar will mail a postage prepaid mail-in ballot with instructions and materials to the voter.
- **Early Voting:** New to the 2020 General Election, Virginia will allow early in-person absentee voting from September 19, 2020 – October 31, 2020. Early voting will be available at the voter's local registrar's office during normal business hours and Saturdays 9:00am (ET) to 5:00pm (ET). Voters do not need to qualify for early voting.

Election Day Posture

- CISA Cybersecurity Advisors and Protective Security Advisors will support the Virginia Department of Elections command center during on Elections Day.



Washington

Potential Challenges

Washington has experienced ongoing civil unrest recently which may pose challenges for administering elections in large cities. These challenges include the potential to limit voter access to drop boxes. Since the state is a vote-by-mail state, COVID-19 may impact the printing and distribution of mail-in ballots. The highest risk areas highlighted in the Washington State Election Task Force's current threat landscape are email, phone, social media, and physical threats; natural hazards; UOCAVA email ballots and voter registration information cybersecurity; and foreign interference/influence. Targets of concern in the state include voter registration databases, tabulation systems, drop boxes, private vendor ballot printing companies, and ballot processing and storage facilities. Due to recent wildfires, election officials may have challenges mailing ballots to displaced voters who no longer reside at their registration address. Additionally, voting centers may move or close if impacted by wildfires.

COVID-19 Considerations

Washington automatically mails ballots to all registered voters. In mid-September, a mailer sent out by the United States Postal Service encouraged voters to "plan ahead" and request a mail-in ballot at least 15 days before the election. The Secretary of State (SoS) released a clarifying statement that Washington voters do not need to request a ballot and will receive one automatically if registered. State election officials continue to push for good public health hygiene at state and county election offices but have not requested additional PPE.

State Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Top-Down
- **Voting Type:** Vote-by-Mail
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the state level:**
 (b) (3) (B)
 - Last Mile: 2018 and 2020 State-Level Election Security Snapshot Poster delivered; 2020 Election Day Emergency Response Guide delivered
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:**
 (b) (3) (B)
 - Last Mile: 2018 County-Level Election Security Snapshot Poster delivered
- **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services. Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.
- **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:**
 (b) (7)(E)
- **Albert Sensor:** Yes. (b) (3) (B)
 (b) (3) (B)
- **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 100% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
- **Polling Hours:** County voting centers open during normal business hours beginning October 16, 2020 through 8:00pm (PT) on Election Day
- **Official Election Website:**
<https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/>

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** Washington has a top-down voter registration system, meaning the state controls the input and management of the statewide voter registration database. From a risk perspective, this presents a single target which, if affected by an incident, could disrupt the voting process for a number of voters. Conversely, this model also offers some risk management advantages since states following the top-down model tend to have stronger cybersecurity postures than bottom-up states, based on availability of resources. The state provides mail-in ballots to all voters and has service centers where voters can obtain replacement ballots, which are connected to the statewide voter registration database. Online and mail-in voter registration must be received by October 26, 2020. Residents may also register to vote in-person during normal election office business hours and any time before 8:00pm (PT) on Election Day.
- **Vote Casting:** Washington sends a paper ballot to all registered voters. However, each county will open a voting center during the voting period. Voting centers will be open during business hours during the voting period beginning October 16, 2020 and ending at 8:00pm (PT) on Election Day. Ensuring there is an auditable record provides election officials with the ability to verify that the outcomes of the election are correct.
 - **Mail-in Ballots:** The state will mail a ballot to every eligible registered voter by October 16, 2020. Completed ballots must be returned by mail and postmarked by Election Day or deposited in an official drop box beginning October 16, 2020 through 8:00pm (PT) on Election Day.
- **Early Voting:** Washington voters may cast ballots during the voting period beginning October 16, 2020. Completed ballots must be postmarked by Election Day or deposited in an official drop box by 8:00pm (PT) on Election Day. Residents may also vote in-person at county voting centers during the election period.

Election Day Posture

- A Washington Protective Security Advisor (PSA) will support the SoS Election Office in Olympia, WA with the FBI Election Crimes Coordinator. A Washington PSA and Cybersecurity Advisor will support the State Fusion Center in Seattle, WA.



West Virginia

Potential Challenges

West Virginia will not be sending mail-in ballots to every registered voter as they did for the presidential primary. The change in procedure may cause confusion for some voters who may expect to receive a mail-in ballot application rather than having to apply. In early 2020, due to security concerns with the Voatz app, West Virginia changed its UOCAVA online voting solution to the Democracy Live online ballot delivery, marking, and return system. This system can be used for mail-in voting by voters with disabilities, as well.

COVID-19 Considerations

Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, on April 1, 2020, the West Virginia Governor expanded mail-in ballot application availability to all registered voters. Voters may still vote in person during early voting from October 21, 2020-October 31, 2020 or on the November 3, 2020 Election Day. During the presidential primary, the state sent mail-in ballot applications to every registered voter. For the General Election, voters must request a mail-in ballot beginning August 12, 2020. The request will go into the Statewide Voter Registration System and then be routed to the voter's county clerk, who will send out the ballot with prepaid postage. In response to the volume of mail-in ballots, the Secretary of State Office launched a partnered with Democracy Live to build an online mail-in ballot request portal prior to the General Election.

State Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Top-Down
- **Voting Type:** Paper Ballots; DREs with VVPAT
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the state level:**
 - **(b) (3) (B)**
 - Last Mile: 2019 Last Mile State-Level Election Security Snapshot Poster delivered
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:** None
- **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services. Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.
 - **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:** West **(b) (7)(E)**
 - **Albert Sensor:** Yes. **(b) (3) (B)**
 - **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 62% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
 - **Polling Hours:** 6:30am-7:30pm (ET)
 - **Official Election Website:** <https://sos.wv.gov/elections/>

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** West Virginia has a top-down voter registration system, meaning the state controls the input and management of the statewide voter registration database. From a risk perspective, this presents a single target which, if affected by an incident, could disrupt the voting process for a number of voters. Conversely, this model also offers some risk management advantages since states following the top-down model tend to have stronger cybersecurity postures than bottom-up states, based on availability of resources. The regular voter registration deadline is October 13, 2020. Returning uniformed service members, Merchant Marines, individuals serving outside of the country in support of national security, and

their spouses and dependents may request extended time to register in-person should they miss the deadline.

- **Vote Casting:** West Virginia uses paper ballots and DREs with VVPAT. Ensuring there is an auditable record provides election officials with the ability to verify that the outcomes of the election are correct. On Election Day, most polling places will be open from 6:30am (ET) to 7:30pm (ET). Voters are encouraged to use mail-in voting due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Mail-in ballots without a postmark must be received by the voter's county election office by 7:30pm (ET) on November 3, 2020. Ballots that are postmarked on or before Election Day and overseas ballots must be received by November 8, 2020. Voters may also return their mail-in ballots in-person at their local election office. The deadline for in-person submission of mail-in ballots is November 2, 2020.
 - **Mail-in Ballots:** Due to COVID-19, the West Virginia Governor expanded mail-in ballot application availability to all registered voters. Applications are required and must be received by the voter's county Clerk by October 28, 2020. Once the application is approved, the county clerk will send a postage prepaid mail-in ballot with instructions and materials to the voter.
- **Early Voting:** West Virginia will allow early in-person voting from October 21, 2020-October 31, 2020. Early voting will be available at the county courthouse, annex, or designated community voting location during normal business hours and Saturdays 9:00am (ET) to 5:00pm (ET).

Election Day Posture

- CISA personnel will support and coordinate with election stakeholders via chatrooms and other online platforms. CISA personnel will support in-person, if requested.



Wisconsin

Potential Challenges

Wisconsin may be unable to recruit the 30,000+ poll workers needed for the General Election. Public health concerns about COVID-19 have reduced volunteers from normal recruitment numbers in a year when the Wisconsin Election Commission (WEC) expects high in-person turnout and needs staff to process a surge in mail-in ballots. The state saw a jump from 6% mail-in ballots in pre-COVID-19 elections to 82% mail-in ballots in the most recent primary election. The United States Postal Service has warned the state about possible challenges to meeting its mail-in ballot request and return deadlines (October 29, 2020 and Election Day respectively). The WEC has advised voters who plan use mail-in voting to do so as early as possible, warning that it may take up to two weeks in total to receive and return a mail-in ballot. With the expected surge in mail-in ballots, Wisconsin may encounter tabulation and reporting delays compared to past years, as the state does not allow election officials to begin processing ballots before Election Day. Continued civil unrest in Wisconsin could pose challenges for the election community to conduct safe and smooth in-person voting. Civil unrest leading up to Election Day may threaten the security and access to polling places. CISA Region V has established an effective working relationship with the WEC through outreach from Protective Security Advisors (PSA) and Cybersecurity Advisors (CSA). This outreach includes being active members of the Wisconsin Election Security Council established by WEC to improve cyber and physical security preparedness ahead of the 2020 elections. A bipartisan group of politicians has launched VoteSafe WI to support confidence in the election system and to support both in-person and mail-in voting. Wisconsin has the most election jurisdictions in the country (1,852 jurisdictions at the municipal level and 72 county clerks), creating challenges to effectively engaging at the local level.

COVID-19 Considerations

The WEC is in the process of securing the supplies necessary for the safe administration of in-person voting, but many vendors around the state have exhausted their supply of hand sanitizer, disinfectant wipes, and other cleaning supplies. The state is planning to implement de-escalation training for clerks to handle encounters related to face coverings. Recognizing challenges to voting during the spring primary amid COVID-19, including long lines at reduced polling places and a high number of rejected mail-in ballots, the WEC has mailed all registered voters informational packets that outline voters' options for casting ballots in the General Election. These packets include mail-in ballot applications, for which all voters are eligible without providing an excuse. The Center for Tech and Civic Life, a nonprofit voting advocacy group, will give five cities (Madison, Milwaukee, Green Bay, Kenosha, and Racine) a total of \$6.3 million in grants to support election administration. Funds will go toward polling stations, curbside voting, public education, and PPE for poll workers.

State Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Hybrid
- **Voting Type:** Paper Ballot; DREs with VVPAT
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the state level:**
 - Last Mile: 2020 Election Security Snapshot Poster delivered
- **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:**

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

- **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services. Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.

- **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:**

(b) (7)(E)

- **Albert Sensor:** Yes. (b) (3) (B)
- **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 2% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
- **Polling Hours:** 7:00am – 8:00pm (CT)
- **Official Election Website:**
<https://elections.wi.gov/>

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** Wisconsin has a hybrid voter registration system, meaning the WEC oversees elections and local election offices transmit data to the state in real time. Hybrid models are a combination of top-down and bottom-up models including risk advantages and vulnerabilities. The voter registration deadline is October 14, 2020 by mail or online. Voters may register in person after this date at the municipal clerk's office or at the polling place on Election Day.
- **Vote Casting:** Wisconsin uses paper ballots and DREs with VVPAT. Ensuring there is an auditable record provides election officials with the ability to verify that the outcomes of the election are correct. On Election Day, polling places will be open between 7:00am and 8:00pm (CT) across the state.
 - **Mail-in Ballots:** All Wisconsin voters are eligible to utilize mail-in voting without an excuse. The WEC mailed all voters a mail-in ballot application with an informational packet that encourages them to vote as early as possible, notifying that it may take as long as two weeks to deliver and return a ballot by mail. The mail-in ballot request deadline is October 29, 2020. Voted ballots must be returned by Election Day according to an early October federal appeals court decision. The previous deadline was that ballots had to be postmarked by Election Day and received by November 9, 2020.
- **Early Voting:** Wisconsin offers in-person absentee voting in municipal clerks' offices starting October 20, 2020, although hours and dates vary by locality.

Election Day Posture

- PSA (b) (6) will be located at WEC headquarters in downtown Madison, WI and connected virtually to Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center. CISA will be supporting all election operations virtually, rather than in person, based on current COVID-19 public health guidelines and guidance from CISA leadership.
- CSAs (b) (6) and (b) (6) will be monitoring remotely and standing by if additional local support is requested.
- CISA Region V Operations, Regional Director, and Regional PSA will be monitoring remotely (from Chicago) and standing by if support is requested.
- CISA Region V Operations will also participate in multiple chat rooms, dashboards, and collaboration sites during the voting period to monitor election activities, including the ESI dashboard that will be used to communicate directly with CISA Headquarters.



Wyoming

Potential Challenges

Wyoming allows voters to request mail-in ballots until the day before the election. This is a potential point of confusion for voters, as ballots must be returned by the close of polls on Election Day to be counted. This late request deadline could result in some votes not being counted if voters wait until the week before the election to make a request, as the Secretary of State advises that mail delivery within a county can take up to seven days. The state used ranked-choice voting for the first time this year, which could contribute to confusion among some voters. Wyoming recently upgraded all of their voting machines. While staff received training on the new systems, unfamiliarity with the operating systems may cause challenges.

COVID-19 Considerations

Wyoming's August 2020 primary election had record turnout and was the first election in the state where more votes were cast before Election Day than in person at vote centers. The state made an exception to allow some counties to begin processing ballots before the close of polls for the first time. The state might avoid reporting delays in future elections with a high percentage of mail-in ballots by continuing to allow counties to start tallying votes earlier. Despite being one of the states that received a warning from the United States Postal Service (USPS) about possible challenges in meeting the state's mail-in voting deadlines, state election officials have said they are not concerned about USPS changes significantly affecting the delivery of mail-in ballots. Wyoming has encouraged voters to either return their ballots in person or to vote in person.

State Elections Background

- **Voter Registration System:** Top-Down
 - **Voting Type:** Paper Ballots
 - **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the state level:**
(b) (3) (B)
 - **CISA Cybersecurity Services for Elections at the local level:**
(b) (3) (B)
 - **CISA Physical Security Services for Elections:** CISA Regional Personnel work regularly with state and local election officials, providing a variety of physical security services.
- Due to the large number of services provided, they are not specifically listed here.
- **DHS Sponsored Security Clearances:**
(b) (7)(E)
 - **Albert Sensor:** Yes. (b) (3) (B)
(b) (3) (B)
 - **Local EI-ISAC Membership:** 100% of locals are members of EI-ISAC.
 - **Polling Hours:** 7:00am – 7:00pm (MT)
 - **Official Election Website:**
<https://sos.wyo.gov/elections/>

Risk Assessment and Indicators

- **Voter Registration:** Wyoming has a top-down voter registration system, meaning the state controls the input and management of the statewide voter registration database. From a risk perspective, this presents a single target which, if affected by an incident, could disrupt the voting process for a number of voters. Conversely, this model also offers some risk management advantages since states following the top-down model tend to have stronger cybersecurity postures than bottom-up states, based on availability of resources. The voter registration deadline is October 19, 2020 by mail or online, although registration is available in person during early voting and Election Day.


- **Vote Casting:** Wyoming uses paper ballots. Ensuring there is an auditable record provides election officials with the ability to verify that the outcomes of the election are correct. On Election Day, vote centers will be open between 7:00am and 7:00pm (MT) across the state.
 - **Mail-in Ballots:** All voters may request a mail-in ballot until the day before the election. However, as ballots must arrive by the close of polls on Election Day, voters are encouraged to request their ballot at least one week in advance and return it in person to ensure timely delivery.
- **Early Voting:** Wyoming offers in-person absentee voting in county clerks offices as mail-in ballots are available starting September 24, 2020.


Election Day Posture

- Protective Security Advisor (b) (6) will provide in-person support at the Wyoming Office of Homeland Security.
- Cybersecurity Advisor (b) (6) Region VIII Regional Director, Chief Protective Security (b) (6) and Operations Staff will provide virtual support to election activities.



Appendix A: Poll Times (ET)





Elections Daily Digest

October 27, 2020

Scope Note: The following observations were developed from publicly available sources such as media reporting, social sensing tools, tools to detect inauthentic social media activity, content aggregators, social platforms, podcasts, online databases, and other open source data. This product was developed in compliance with the guidelines set forth in the Department of Homeland Security - Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security - National Risk Management Center COVID-19 Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation, and Critical Infrastructure Risks Operational Use of Social Media Rules of Behavior.

DRAFT: PRE-DECISIONAL WORKING PAPER



Daily Social Media Trends: US Election Topics

Timeframe: October 26, 2020, 12:00AM – October 26, 2020, 11:59PM



Topic	Total Mentions*	% Change in Mentions (since last weekend)	Volume and Velocity** (total mentions and rate of change over time)							Change in Sentiment*** (since last weekend)	Observations
			10/20	10/21	10/22	10/23	10/24	10/25	10/26		
Elections General Mentions Related to US Elections	9.97M	▲ 58%						5,997,481	9,964,243	negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The total volume in the past 24 hours (October 26) increased 58% compared to the total volume in the previous period (October 25). Critical Drivers: Continued debate over the security of mail-in ballots, accusations of liberal bias in the media
Voter Suppression • Voter Intimidation • Polling Place Security	677K	▲ 35%					418,600	676,016	▲ 4% more negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A political correspondent for a syndicated news outlet reported that Michigan election officials are concerned local sheriffs will not enforce voter intimidation laws on Election Day. A journalist for a syndicated news outlet claimed that "Georgia's tremendous investment in keeping black people from voting," could determine close races in Georgia. 	
COVID-19 • Election-focused Political Discourse regarding COVID-19 • Political Exploitation of COVID-19	540K	▲ 50%					236,960	539,151	negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> POTUS accused the "fake news" of a "corrupt media conspiracy" to use COVID-19 pandemic coverage to influence the election, claiming "the topic will totally change" after Election Day. A popular fiction author criticized POTUS for being "mad at COVID" because it is harming "his election campaign" and not because of the American deaths the virus has caused. POTUS's election campaign account shared a video of POTUS claiming that his opponent will "delay the vaccine, delay the therapies, prolong the pandemic, close your schools, and shut down your country." 	
Vote-By-Mail • Mail-in Ballots and Registration • Fraud Claims • Vote Counting	123K	▲ 293%					31,289	123,057	negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> POTUS claimed there are "big problems and discrepancies with Mail In Ballots," and stated that we "Must have final [vote] total" on Election Day. Twitter flagged this tweet for violating its Civic Integrity Policy. An online conservative pundit asserted that Twitter "falsely suggests that voting by mail is safer and more secure than voting in person." A musician and author claimed that a recent Supreme Court ruling invalidating mail-in ballots received after Election Day in Wisconsin makes voting dependent "upon the speed of the US Mail," which has been "sabotaged" by the POTUS appointed Postmaster General. 	

* Total mentions is the number of individual pieces of content (including posts, comments, shares, retweets, and articles) including links related to the topic.

** These figures are approximate.

*** Sentiment analysis is only accurate up to 75% and can provide a holistic overview into the tone of a keyword search. It provides a look into the volume of documents each of which is assigned a tonality score of positive (green), negative (red), or neutral (gray), but should not be considered a definitive or complete snapshot of public sentiment.

Daily Social Media Trends: US Election Topics

Timeframe: October 26, 2020, 12:00AM – October 26, 2020, 11:59PM




Topic	Total Mentions*	% Change in Mentions (since last weekend)	Volume and Velocity** (total mentions and rate of change over time)							Change in Sentiment*** (since last weekend)	Observations
			10/20	10/21	10/22	10/23	10/24	10/25	10/26		
Elections General Mentions Related to US Elections	9.97M	▲ 58%						5,997,481	9,964,243	 negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The total volume in the past 24 hours (October 26) increased 58% compared to the total volume in the previous period (October 25). Critical Drivers: Continued debate over the security of mail-in ballots, accusations of liberal bias in the media
Election Technology • Voting Technology Issues	32.4K	▲ 122%		43,152				14,303	32,220	 negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An election security advocate claimed that remote-access software was found in vote tabulators in several Ohio counties after the 2004 election, and called on voters to photograph precinct totals to compare them to county totals.
Removed/Flagged Social Media Posts • Enforcement of Social Media Community Guidelines	29.6K	▲ 29%			54,100			11,728	29,420	 ▲ 4% more negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A popular actor claimed that "Facebook will suppress all conservative voices...under the pretext of election safety," referencing an article from a syndicated news outlet on Facebook's policy against "election unrest." A conservative online activist claimed that Twitter is censoring his tweets about voter fraud to help the Democratic presidential nominee.

* Total mentions is the number of individual pieces of content (including posts, comments, shares, retweets, and articles) including terms related to the topic

** These figures are approximate.

*** Sentiment analysis is only accurate up to 75% and can provide a holistic overview into the tone of a keyword search. It provides a look into the volume of documents each of which is assigned a tonality score of positive (green), negative (red), or neutral (gray), but should not be considered a definitive or complete snapshot of public sentiment.



Elections Daily Digest (Weekend Edition)

October 26, 2020

Scope Note: The following observations were developed from publicly available sources such as media reporting, social sensing tools, tools to detect inauthentic social media activity, content aggregators, social platforms, podcasts, online databases, and other open source data. This product was developed in compliance with the guidelines set forth in the Department of Homeland Security - Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security - National Risk Management Center COVID-19 Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation, and Critical Infrastructure Risks Operational Use of Social Media Rules of Behavior.



Daily Social Media Trends: US Election Topics

Timeframe: October 23, 2020, 12:00AM – October 25, 2020, 11:59PM (Weekend Coverage)



Topic	Total Mentions*	% Change in Mentions (since last weekend)	Volume and Velocity** (total mentions and rate of change over time)				Change in Sentiment*** (since last weekend)	Observations
			10/16	10/19	10/22	10/25		
Elections General Mentions Related to US Elections	19M	▼ 4%	7,683,459	6,650,711	5,996,191	6,307,680	negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The total volume in the past 72 hours (October 23-25) decreased 4% compared to the total volume in the previous period (October 16-18) Critical Drivers: Continued debate over the security of mail-in ballots, reports of long lines at polling places
Voter Suppression • Voter Intimidation • Polling Place Security	1.45M	▲ 27%	668,144	418,349	531,855	502,454	negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Several online activists expressed incredulity that "it's easier for a white person to vote from space than for an African American or Latino to vote in their home zip code," referencing an article from a political website. A comedian shared a video of people dancing while waiting in a long line to vote and joked that they were making voter suppression "fun." The founder of a technology company claimed that the Mayor of Miami refused to make a large basketball arena a polling place because he was "afraid it would help turnout," citing an article from a syndicated news outlet.
COVID-19 • Election-focused Political Discourse regarding COVID-19 • Political Exploitation of COVID-19	835K	▲ 47%	168,744	236,441	238,935	357,928	negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A blog for a cable news show shared an article from a syndicated news outlet claiming that COVID-19 case surges are coinciding with POTUS's campaign rallies. A conservative online activist claimed that COVID-19 is only "on the front page" because it helps Democrats' election chances.
Vote-By-Mail • Mail-in Ballots and Registration • Fraud Claims • Vote Counting	126K	▼ 5%	102,782	52,009	42,949	30,998	negative sentiment flat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> POTUS retweeted a political pundit who accused a Democratic Congressional candidate of "election fraud" after thousands of ballots were mistakenly sent to his district. The Governor of Texas quoted an article from a local news outlet on the state's recent history of voter fraud convictions and claimed that it reveals "Mail ballot vote fraud in Texas."

* Total mentions is the number of individual pieces of content (including posts, comments, shares, retweets, and articles) including terms related to the topic

** These figures are approximate.

*** Sentiment analysis is only accurate up to 75% and can provide a holistic overview into the tone of a keyword search. It provides a look into the volume of documents each of which is assigned a tonality score of positive (green), negative (red), or neutral (gray), but should not be considered a definitive or complete snapshot of public sentiment.

Daily Social Media Trends: US Election Topics

Timeframe: October 23, 2020, 12:00AM – October 25, 2020, 11:59PM (Weekend Coverage)



Topic	Total Mentions*	% Change in Mentions (since last weekend)	Volume and Velocity** (total mentions and rate of change over time)				Change in Sentiment*** (since last weekend)	Observations
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Election Technology • Voting Technology Issues	51.5K	▼ 56%	70,178	22,708	14,237	14,245	▲ 11% more negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An account exhibiting bot-like characteristics questioned if voting machines in California had been “rigged” to switch votes for Republicans to Democrats. The account has since been deleted. An independent journalist shared an article from his blog about warnings from US officials that “State sponsored Russian hacking groups” are targeting state and local networks ahead of the US election.
Removed/Flagged Social Media Posts • Enforcement of Social Media Community Guidelines	53.6K	▼ 88%	65,404	18,801	11,707	22,749	▼ 6% less negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A conservative pundit accused Twitter of “SUPPRESSING” a story about the Democratic presidential nominee’s son to help the nominee win the election. A conservative online activist accused Twitter of censoring her posts about voter fraud she is “witnessing here in Nevada,” and expressed her frustration with Twitter’s disclaimers stating that mail-in ballots are secure.

* Total mentions is the number of individual pieces of content (including posts, comments, shares, retweets, and articles) including links related to the topic. DHS-1255-002785-12/22/2023

** These figures are approximate.

*** Sentiment analysis is only accurate up to 75% and can provide a holistic overview into the tone of a keyword search. It provides a look into the volume of documents each of which is assigned a tonality score: positive (green), negative (red), or neutral (gray), but should not be considered a definitive or complete snapshot of public sentiment. DRAFT: PRE-DECISIONAL WORKING PAPER

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

From: (b) (6)

To: Scully, Brian (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)

BCC: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)

Kolasky, Robert (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Snell, Allison (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: Social Media Sensing Observations

Date: 2020/10/28 14:48:00

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Latest Social Media Sensing material attached.

Distro: NRMCM Leadership, ESI Leadership, IRAC/IOB Leads, SPP Election POCs, OCC

(b) (6)

Countering Foreign Influence Task Force
DHS | CISA | National Risk Management Center

(b) (6) (HSDN) (b) (6) (JWICS)

(b) (6)

Sender:

(b) (6)

Scully, Brian (b) (6)

(b) (6) (6)

Recipient:

(b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6) (6)

Kolasky, Robert (b) (6)

(b) (6) (6)

Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

(b) (6)


Snell, Allison (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/10/28 14:48:40

Delivered Date: 2020/10/28 14:48:00

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION



Thanks, Allison.

EA: Attached infographics and maps are:

- • Mail-in Voting Processing Factors Map: A weekly-updated map that offers a visual of the movement in each state's mail-in ballot process.
- • Mail-in Voting 2020 Policy Changes Map: A map that offers a visual of changes established to each state as a result of COVID-19.
- • Mail-in Voting Election Integrity Safeguards Infographic: A product that provides the description and in-person equivalent for procedural and physical ballot safeguards.
- • Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic: A product that provides a timeline of post-election processes for the Presidential election from close of polls on Election Day, November 3, 2020, to Inauguration Day on January 20, 2021.
- • Election Results Reporting Risk and Mitigations Infographic: A product that provides an overview of the risks associated with results reporting systems and how they are managed through mitigating measures.
- • Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Infographic
- • Mail in Voting Risk Infographic

Note that we'll have new maps coming out later today, but they are not yet complete (targeting around noon).

Best,

(b) (6) Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst | CISA | (b) (6)
(b) (6)



From: Snell, Allison (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 10:24 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Clark, Alaina (b) (6); Sendek, Sara (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UNCLAS tour setup pics CENTRAL

Minus (b) (6) plus Sara and (b) (6)

We sent this over yesterday for consideration.

We also might want to display our policy/process maps.

(b) (6) can send over the latest.

Allison L. Snell
Election Security Initiative
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cell: (b) (6) Email: (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 10:17 AM
To: Snell, Allison
Cc: Clark, Alaina (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UNCLAS tour setup pics CENTRAL

Hey Allison and (b) (6)

Just thought of this - Is there anything you/ESI would want displayed in Central for the media tour today?

The Central team is prepping graphics for display during their "big screens". I gave them some suggestions based on what's been used for previous media tours last year and before. I saw a pic from [AS1 visit](#) a few months ago, but maybe there are others you might think appropriate or worth considering.

Regards,
(b) (6)

From: Clark, Alaina (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 9:01 PM
To: (b) (6); CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; US-CERT Senior Watch Officer (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UNCLAS tour setup pics

I'll be at Glebe in the morning and come up to Central once I get settled.

Alaina R. Clark
Deputy Chief External Affairs Officer
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

(b) (6)



CISA Logo email signature

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 5:34 PM
To: CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; US-CERT Senior Watch Officer (b) (6)
Cc: Clark, Alaina (b) (6)
Subject: UNCLAS tour setup pics

Great talking with you, (b) (6)

I attached some pictures of the usual graphics used previous for unclassified media tours. I plan to give you a call in the morning around 7:30 / 8:00, unless another time would be better. Obviously, some of these graphic images will need to be updated with CISA seal vice DHS, and replace NCCIC with Central.

Here are some links with graphics that would be useful too.

<https://www.flickr.com/photos/dhsgov/albums/72157716021007266> (mail-in ballot that is new, but I think would be great on one screen, if possible)

<https://www.flickr.com/photos/dhsgov/16124316030/in/album-72157649950349258/> (map w/red dots of CI and other graphic)

I'll look for more tonight and AM, especially video which would be better. In the interim, I hope this helps with your search for now.

Take care,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Office of External Affairs

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6) m

Sender: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)


Recipient: Snell, Allison (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Clark, Alaina (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Sendek, Sara (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/10/30 10:42:56
Delivered Date: 2020/10/30 10:45:25



MAIL-IN VOTING PROCESSING FACTORS

AS OF OCTOBER 22, 2020. NOTE: Additional changes to state mail-in ballot processing factors may have occurred since this date.*




MAIL-IN BALLOT RECEIPT DEADLINE

23 Receipt Allowed After Election Day

STATE MAIL-IN BALLOT PROCESSING BEGINS | **43** Before Election Day | **7** On Election Day—Before Polls Close | **1** After Polls Close on Election Day or After Election Day

*This document is for information purposes only and may be subject to change as a result of litigation or changes to state laws. This data is sourced from state election calendars, NCSL, NASS, and NASED. CISA does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information. Voters should seek the most up-to-date election information from their state and local elected officials.

**Cities or townships with more than 25,000 may begin processing ballots the day before election day.



MAIL-IN VOTING RISK: INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESS

RISK

COMPENSATING CONTROLS



All forms of voting – in this case mail-in voting – bring a variety of cyber and infrastructure risks.

Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls, which build layers of safeguards to defend the process from manipulation.



Implementation of mail-in voting infrastructure and processes within a compressed timeline may also introduce new risk.

Election officials must assess the risks of introducing new infrastructure with the operational risks associated with doing so in a compressed timeline before making a determination. Planning, preparation, training, and redundancy will build resiliency.



For mail-in voting, some of the risk under the control of election officials during in-person voting shifts to outside entities, such as ballot printers, mail processing facilities, and the United States Postal Service.

Private sector partners are implementing technical and procedural best practices and sharing information through the EI-ISAC.

USPS has a dedicated election mail program that includes an intelligent mail barcoding system enabling ballot tracking and chain of custody.



Integrity attacks on voter registration data and systems represent a comparatively higher risk in a mail-in voting environment when compared to an in-person voting environment.

Many jurisdictions have a cure process allowing voters correct a rejected ballot package.

A voter who does not receive a ballot in the mail can go to a voting location and vote a provisional ballot.



The outbound and inbound processing of mail-in ballots introduces additional infrastructure and technology, increasing potential scalability of cyber attacks.

Compensating controls for additional infrastructure are the same as other election technology and infrastructure, so election officials should focus on cyber risk management best practices to build resiliency in the overall election process.



Inbound mail-in ballot processes and tabulation take longer than in-person processing, causing tabulation of results to occur more slowly and resulting in more ballots to tabulate following election night.

Some jurisdictions have implemented election technology and infrastructure to speed up the process.

Some jurisdictions are legally afforded the opportunity to begin processing ballot application and ballots in advance of election day.

Election officials, media, candidates, and NGOs are educating voters and setting the expectation that it will take days, if not weeks, to determine the outcome of many races.



Disinformation risk to mail-in voting infrastructure and processes is similar to that of in-person voting while utilizing different content. Threat actors may leverage limited understanding regarding mail-in voting processes to mislead and confuse the public.

Election officials, media, candidates, and NGOs are educating voters about the mail voting process.

The National Association of Secretaries of State launched #TrustedInfo2020 to highlight state and local election officials as the credible, verified sources for election information.

ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE RISK



PROCESS

1. REGISTRATION



Voter Registration

2. POLLBOOK



Pollbook Preparation



Pollbook Use

3. VOTING MACHINE



Ballot Preparation



Voting Machine Preparation



Voting Machine Use

4. TABULATION



Tabulation Use (Precinct)



Tabulation Use (Central)



Aggregation (State)

5. WEBSITE



Website

RISK ASSESSMENT

INTEGRITY ATTACKS



Integrity attacks on state-level voter registration systems, the preparation of election data, vote aggregation systems, and election websites present particular risk to the ability of jurisdictions to conduct elections.

AVAILABILITY ATTACKS



Availability attacks on state or local-level systems that support same-day registration, vote center check-in, or provisional voting also have the potential to pose meaningful risk to the ability of jurisdictions to conduct elections.

VOTING SYSTEMS



Voting systems present a high consequence target for threat actors but low likelihood of successful attacks at scale, meaning that there is lower risk of incidents when compared to other infrastructure components of the election process.

DIVERSE INFRASTRUCTURE



U.S. election systems are comprised of diverse infrastructure and security controls. However, even jurisdictions that implement cybersecurity best practices are potentially vulnerable to cyber attack by sophisticated cyber actors.

DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS



Disinformation campaigns related to election infrastructure can amplify disruptions of electoral processes and erode public trust in election results.

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
Scully, Brian
To: (b) (6)

Subject: Stop Refreshing That Forecast
Date: 2020/11/01 14:16:07
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Stop Refreshing That Forecast

Why I changed my mind on modeling electoral forecasts

[zeynep](#) Nov 1   

Sender: (b) (6) (b) (6)
Scully, Brianna
Recipient: (b) (6)
Sent Date: 2020/11/01 14:14:13
Delivered Date: 2020/11/01 14:16:07
Message Flags: Unread

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

From: CISA CurOps (b) (6)
To: CISA Daily Ops (b) (6)
Subject: CISA Weekly Operations Infographic 2 Nov 2020
Date: 2020/11/02 08:00:36
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO)

TLP: AMBER

WARNING: Information in this report is FOUO//TLP: AMBER. Recipients may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm, consistent with both the DHS policy relating to safeguarding FOUO information ([link here](#)) and with the Traffic Light Protocol, <http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp>. Information in this report is not customarily in the public domain and may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). Further, this section may contain or be based upon commercial or financial information, which is privileged or confidential, law enforcement sensitive, or deliberative/pre-decisional material. DHS personnel are reminded of their obligations under DHS Form 11000-6, Non-Disclosure Agreement. Further dissemination of any of the information contained in this REPORT requires express consent from the CISA CurOps.

Good Morning,

Please see the attached CISA Ops Infographic for the week of 2 Nov.

Respectfully,

CISA IOD Current Operations
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Office: (b) (6) Email: (b) (6)



cid:image002.png@01D62213.AAB10820

TLP:AMBER

Sender: CISA CurOps (b) (6)

Recipient: CISA Daily Ops (b) (6) (b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/11/02 07:07:21

Delivered Date: 2020/11/02 08:00:36

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION



DIRECTOR'S WEEKLY OPERATIONS INFOGRAPHIC

CISA CENTRAL

202.282.9201

November 2, 2020

ALERT LEVELS

NTAS	None	Bulletin	Elevated	Imminent	
NOC	Steady State	Awareness	Guarded	Concern	Urgent

OPERATION & SITUATION UPDATES

Election Day Posture - 3 NOV

- The Election Security Initiative (ESI) and the Election Operations Team (EOT) will stand up a coordination and incident response center, where incident response, intelligence analysis, communications, policy, and liaison officials will be on standby to assist EI entities with any situation that may arise.
- ESI and the EOT will participate in both the federal and the state, local, tribal, and territorial chat rooms to ensure real-time situational awareness.
- ESI and the EOT will be prepared to explain the security impact of any situation that arises in coordination with other federal, state, local, and private sector partners.
- CISA will have scheduled touch points with inter-agency and private sector partners to ensure broad awareness.

Zeta Recovery Efforts - Southeastern U.S.

- Recovery efforts are primarily focused around power restoration, particularly for polls and critical election facilities.
- Plans are in place ensuring electrical service is provided to polling stations, either through restoration or backup generation.
- Approximately 285,345 customers are without power across LA, AL, and OK.
- FCC deactivated DIRS for this event yesterday at 1300 ET.

COVID-19

- Upward trajectory in COVID-19 case count continues across 49 (+6) jurisdictions (US states and territories), with 3 (-5) jurisdictions in a plateau status, 3 (-2) jurisdictions on a downward trajectory.

ENGAGEMENTS

- 2 NOV: AD Brown and DAD DeLaurentis will participate in the SAFECOM/NCSWIC Leadership Bi-weekly Sync. DAD DeLaurentis will participate in the CAE & Component Requirements Executive Monthly Sync. AD Brown will participate in the General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT) / CISA Next Generation Network (NGN) Meeting.
- 3 NOV: AD Brown will participate in the NSTAC Communications Resiliency Subcommittee Meeting.
- 3 NOV: (A)AD Willke and (A)DAD Walsh will attend the Communications SCC Leadership Touchpoint.
- 5 NOV: AD Ware will attend the weekly NSA sync.
- 5 NOV: (A)AD Willke will provide opening remarks at the Joint NGCC/NSCC CIPAC Quarterly Meeting.
- 5 NOV: DAD DeLaurentis will participate in the NSTAC Communications Resiliency Subcommittee Meeting.
- 6 NOV: (A)AD Willke will speak at (DAD DeLaurentis and (A)DAD Walsh attending) the CIPAC Cross-Sector Councils Leadership Touchpoint Conference Call.

CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

- 3 NOV: Dir Krebs, ExDir Wales, and Senior Cybersecurity Advisor Wales will brief staff of US House and Senate. Subject: Election Day Update.
- 3 NOV: CISA will brief members and staff of US House and Senate. Subject: Tours of Election Security Operations Center. Participants TBD.
- 6 NOV: (A)DAD Hartman will brief HSGAC staff. Subject: DHS OIG report OIG-20-74, Cyber Information Sharing.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- 5 NOV: D/Dir Travis will chair the final sync meeting with the OECD HLRF Secretariat. Key focus will be on operationalizing the critical functions, impacts of COVID 19 on critical risk and supply chain.
- 5 NOV: (A)DAD Kroese will lead the US delegation at the first North American Cybersecurity Cooperation Group between the three U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) governments and industry.

	DIR	D/DIR	COS	(A)AD ISD	AD CSD	AD ECD	AD IOD	(A)AD SED	AD NRMCC
Today	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	PA	NCR
Tomorrow	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	PA	NCR

DHS-1255-002801 12/22/2023



DIRECTOR'S WEEKLY OPERATIONS INFOGRAPHIC

CISA CENTRAL

202.282.9201

November 2, 2020

ALERT LEVELS

NTAS	None	Bulletin	Elevated	Imminent	
NOC	Steady State	Awareness	Guarded	Concern	Urgent

OPERATION & SITUATION UPDATES

Election Day Posture - 3 NOV

- The Election Security Initiative (ESI) and the Election Operations Team (EOT) will stand up a coordination and incident response center, where incident response, intelligence analysis, communications, policy, and liaison officials will be on standby to assist EI entities with any situation that may arise.
- ESI and the EOT will participate in both the federal and the state, local, tribal, and territorial chat rooms to ensure real-time situational awareness.
- ESI and the EOT will be prepared to explain the security impact of any situation that arises in coordination with other federal, state, local, and private sector partners.
- CISA will have scheduled touch points with inter-agency and private sector partners to ensure broad awareness.

Zeta Recovery Efforts - Southeastern U.S.

- Recovery efforts are primarily focused around power restoration, particularly for polls and critical election facilities.
- Plans are in place ensuring electrical service is provided to polling stations, either through restoration or backup generation.
- Approximately 285,345 customers are without power across LA, AL, and OK.
- FCC deactivated DIRS for this event yesterday at 1300 ET.

COVID-19

- Upward trajectory in COVID-19 case count continues across 49 (+6) jurisdictions (US states and territories), with 3 (-5) jurisdictions in a plateau status, 3 (-2) jurisdictions on a downward trajectory.

ENGAGEMENTS

- 2 NOV: AD Brown and DAD DeLaurentis will participate in the SAFECOM/NCSWIC Leadership Bi-weekly Sync. DAD DeLaurentis will participate in the CAE & Component Requirements Executive Monthly Sync. AD Brown will participate in the General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT) / CISA Next Generation Network (NGN) Meeting.
- 3 NOV: AD Brown will participate in the NSTAC Communications Resiliency Subcommittee Meeting.
- 3 NOV: (A)AD Willke and (A)DAD Walsh will attend the Communications SCC Leadership Touchpoint.
- 5 NOV: AD Ware will attend the weekly NSA sync.
- 5 NOV: (A)AD Willke will provide opening remarks at the Joint NGCC/NSCC CIPAC Quarterly Meeting.
- 5 NOV: DAD DeLaurentis will participate in the NSTAC Communications Resiliency Subcommittee Meeting.
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	DIR	D/DIR	COS	(A)AD ISD	AD CSD	AD ECD	AD IOD	(A)AD SED	AD NRMC
Today	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	PA	NCR
Tomorrow	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	NCR	PA	NCR

DHS-1255-002802 12/22/2023

OBTAINED BY AMERICAN OVERSIGHT

From: (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
 Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
 Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
CC: (b) (6)
 Snell, Allison (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread
Date: 2020/11/02 09:59:54
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

ICYMI:

On Friday, Lawfare and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project released a backgrounder on counting and reporting the vote in each of the battleground states: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/preparing-election-night-counting-and-reporting-vote-battleground-states>

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 10:41 AM
To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6); (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Snell, Allison (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI-

National Archives put out an explainer pamphlet on the Electoral College for 2020: <https://www.archives.gov/files/electoral-college/state-officials/presidential-election-brochure.pdf>

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 2:48 PM

To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

Snell,

Allison (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

And here is FVAP's reference doc that shows in which state voters can use the FWAB for registration.

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 2:37 PM

To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

Snell,

Allison (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI, another recent resource folks might find valuable in explaining results processes:

- **CRS - Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions**
<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46565>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 12:40 PM

To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

Snell,

Allison (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI, as mentioned on the last SME call re: physical security discussions –

- Georgetown Law's Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection recently released [50 state fact sheets](#) on "unauthorized private militia groups and what to do if groups of armed individuals are near a polling place or voter registration drive."

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2020 10:00 AM

To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Snell,
Allison (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elx info sharing thread

- Critical progress made on previous challenges experienced during April primary to ensuring the safety of in-person voting and the accessibility of voting by mail, thus leading officials to view the August primary as "a good test run" for November; but challenges remain with regard to poll worker recruitment, absentee ballot tracking, and pending litigation.
- 79% of absentee ballots were returned (713k of 898k total delivered to voters). State already has over 1M absentee ballot requests for Nov.
- 3 major challenges with absentee voting:
 - the process of mailing and returning ballots
 - high numbers of improperly completed ballots (figures not yet released)
 - the shortage of personnel to process ballots in a prompt manner
 - statewide shortage of 700 poll workers. 675 National Guard members deployed.
- Milwaukee was able to open 168 polling sites in August, compared to 5 in April. Previous elections saw 180 sites.
- August primary was largely free of last-minute litigation, which hampered April primary; but lots of ongoing litigation could impact November
- Links to a newer [study](#) that could not conclude that voting in April primary increased the spread of COVID, refuting an earlier [study](#).

From: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2020 9:27 AM

To: (b) (6); (b) (6)

(b) (6)

>; (b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

Allison (b) (6)

Snell,

Subject: RE: SME elx info sharing thread

What were takeaways from this?

Matthew V. Masterson
Senior Cybersecurity Advisor
Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2020 8:34 AM
To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Snell, Allison <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: SME elex info sharing thread

ICYMI –

another MIT/Stanford Healthy Elections report on WI, this time on the August primary:
https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/wisconsin_09-16-20_primary_memo.pdf

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 3:17 PM
To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Snell, Allison (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SME elex info sharing thread

Another report on the WI primary from the MIT/Stanford Healthy Elections folks:
<https://healthyelections.org/state-updates/wisconsin>

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 11:50 AM
To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Snell, Allison (b) (6) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SME elex info sharing thread

A few items from WI that I've seen:

- WI after action report and mail-in voting analysis from April presidential primary - <https://elections.wi.gov/node/6908>
- Postal Service IG report from July on WI mail ballot issues in Milwaukee <https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2020/20-235-R20.pdf>

From: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 10:58 AM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

Snell,

Allison (b) (6)

Subject: Re: SME elix info sharing thread

Anything from WI?

Matthew V. Masterson

Senior Cybersecurity Advisor

Department of Homeland Security

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 10:57:04 AM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6)

Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI -

- PA after action report - <https://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/Documents/2020-08-01-Act35Report.pdf>
- DC after action report - <https://dcboe.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=64981f9e-9b7f-44ae-90e1-b8b5854c72d0>

- Orange County, CA after action report and Nov plans - <https://www.ocvote.com/election-library/docs/2020%20COVID-19%20Report.pdf>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 12:02 PM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6)

Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

WV after action report on June primary:

<https://sos.wv.gov/elections/Documents/WV%202020%20Primary%20After%20Action%20Report.pdf>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2020 12:51 PM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6)

Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

Lengthy UNM report on 2018 elections in NM, includes info on public attitudes about cyber threats and election security.

https://polisci.unm.edu/c-sved/election_security_report_la7-1.pdf

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 3:09 PM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Masterson, Matthew
(b) (6); Snell, Allison
(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

Interesting 2010 Election Law Journal article about the 1918 Flu's impacts on election administration.

(b) (6) Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst | DHS CISA | (b) (6)
(b) (6)



cid:image001.png@01D69254.E1BF7F20

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2020 1:31 PM

To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Masterson, Matthew
(b) (6); Snell, Allison
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

Another stadium to be used for a mega-voting site:

<https://twitter.com/sacramentokings/status/1284141606472302593?s=21>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2020 12:05 PM

To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6); Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

FYI –

New report out yesterday from International IDEA on how COVID-19 and elections internationally:

<https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/managing-elections-during-covid-19-pandemic-considerations-decision-makers?lang=en>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, July 13, 2020 10:28 AM

To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6) Snell, Allison

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

Fulton County, GA just released their after-action report from the primary:

[https://mcusercontent.com/b55dd5dc75b5249128e0595f1/files/97b8cc9a-15bf-48a8-b081-b98a20b16938/FINAL Election Task Force Recommendations to BRE.pdf](https://mcusercontent.com/b55dd5dc75b5249128e0595f1/files/97b8cc9a-15bf-48a8-b081-b98a20b16938/FINAL_Election_Task_Force_Recommendations_to_BRE.pdf)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, July 13, 2020 8:51 AM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6) Snell, Allison

(b) (6); (b) (6) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI –

Postal Service IG report on WI mail ballot issues <https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2020/20-235-R20.pdf>

MO to allow electronic return of UOCAVA ballots

<https://www.therolladailynews.com/news/20200710/missouri-military-overseas-voters-can-now-return-ballot-by-fax-email-or-voter-portal>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, July 2, 2020 10:29 AM

To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6) Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI –

OSET foundation post on counterfeit mail ballots

<https://www.osetfoundation.org/blog/2020/6/30/ballotnonsense>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 1:30 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6)

; Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI –

DE drops internet voting system news report from yesterday

<https://www.delawarepublic.org/post/delaware-drops-internet-based-voting-system-used-some-absentee-voters-amid-security-concerns>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 11:27 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6); Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6)

; Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

ICYMI –

LA County Report on March primary issues (e.g., lack of paper pollbook back-ups to EPBs):

<https://lavote.net/docs/rccc/board-correspondence/VSAP-Board-Report.pdf?v=2> (linked in Zetter's

Politico article today: <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/17/la-county-blames-voter-check-in-tablets-for-election-day-chaos-324894>.

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 4, 2020 12:57 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6)

Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

Also, ICYMI, WSJ piece from yesterday on DC allowing e-mail voting for Tuesday's primary.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/d-c-lets-voters-submit-ballots-by-email-after-mail-problems-11591211518?reflink=share_mobilewebshare

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 4, 2020 12:13 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6)

Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

FYI - Nonprofit Vote webinar on digital voter engagement tools coming up on June 16.

Will be interesting to see how folks are using new digital tools to support voter registration in the COVID environment, and think about the associated risk.

WEBINAR: Digital Voter Engagement Tools

During the COVID Pandemic

Tuesday, June 16 2pm-3pmET/11am-NoonPT

Some estimates predict that **over 2 million new registrations will be lost** each month that DMVs, social service offices, and campaign or field activities are shut down or significantly limited as the nation tries to protect itself from the COVID-19 pandemic. If your organization is looking for digital tools to find unregistered voters, help voters with registration, and educate voters about the voting process and their ballot to fill the gap, this webinar is for you.

On **June 16 at 2pmET**, Nonprofit VOTE is bringing together leading civic tech tools in a virtual "resource fair" so you can find the solutions you need for engaging voters. We're taking the effort out of researching each tool and the awkwardness out of the traditional vendor tables at a conference. Attend the webinar to see demos from groups like **Vote411, BallotReady, Rock the Vote, TurboVote, Register2Vote** and use the Q&A box to get rapid answers to your questions about the platforms.

[RSVP NOW](#)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2020 12:57 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6) Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SME elix info sharing thread

Two items from late last week that may be of interest:

- The EAC [announced](#) a determination that the 2018 and 2020 HAVA election security grants do not expire until expended, as with previous HAVA funds. Earlier EAC guidance to states said the funds had to be expended within 5 years.
- Common Cause and Verified Voting jointly published a [resource](#) on electronic ballot delivery and marking.

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 2:21 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6) Snell, Allison

(b) (6)

Subject: SME elix info sharing thread

I'm expropriating this email thread to create a place for SMEs and others to share resources, news clips, and other assorted items of election geekery that may be relevant to our work.

Something I saw yesterday that is relevant to electronic voting:

- MI consent decree with National Federation of the Blind announced on accessible absentee voting <https://www.nfb.org/about-us/press-room/blind-michigan-voters-win-groundbreaking-lawsuit>. I don't see a copy of the consent decree itself, but will share if I can find it.

From: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 12:26 PM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6) Masterson, Matthew

(b) (6); Snell, Allison (b) (6)

(b) (6)

cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: WI and Covid study

We were passed the attached study relevant to the guidance we've developed.

Sender: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Masterson, Matthew /o=Exchange/abs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group

Recipient: (b) (6)
Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)
Snell, Allison (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/11/02 09:59:53
Delivered Date: 2020/11/02 09:59:54
Message Flags: Unread

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Wales, Alexis (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Roebuck, Jermaine / (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Snell, Allison (b) (6)
CC: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: For Review: Election Day Issue Tracker
Date: 2020/11/02 11:00:52
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Hey team,

See attached for an Election Day Issue Tracker for consideration for use tomorrow. It includes background data on states (can customize to include more datapoints if helpful) and a matrix to track overall issues by infrastructure/ system type.

A few notes/questions:

(b) (5)

- Note the cells in the infrastructure system matrix are formatted to adjust based on whether they have text in them.

Let me know if you have adjustments/changes/additional ideas. Thanks!

Best,

(b) (5)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b) (6) | Cell: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6) | JWICS: (b) (6)



Sender: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Hale, Geoffrey / (b) (6)
Recipient: Wales, Alexis (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Roebuck, Jermaine (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Snell, Allison (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/11/02 11:00:40
Delivered Date: 2020/11/02 11:00:52

OBTAINED BY AMERICAN OVERSIGHT THROUGH LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

State / Territorial Data	Election Infrastructure Systems and Processes													
	Name	Total Population in Thousands (2018)	Total Registered in Thousands (2018)	Electoral Votes	Voter Registration Database (Dr Vendor Environment)	Ballot Book	Ballot Preparation/Use	Voting Machines	Tabulation Systems	Electron Night Reporting	Online Voter Lookup	Proxy/Vote	USPS Systems	Postage/Paid
Alabama		5,023	2,450	9										
Alaska		523	337	3										
American Samoa				0										
Arizona		5,361	1,261	11										
Arkansas		2,281	1,282	6										
California		32,243	11,620	55										
Colorado		4,313	2,645	10										
Connecticut		2,834	1,726	7										
Delaware		728	421	3										
District of Columbia		567	317	3										
Florida		16,845	6,435	29										
Guam				0										
Georgia		7,810	4,840	16										
Hawaii		1,057	523	4										
Idaho		1,299	745	4										
Illinois		9,732	6,068	20										
Indiana		5,096	1,131	11										
Iowa		2,216	1,636	6										
Kansas		2,149	1,489	6										
Kentucky		2,320	2,289	8										
Louisiana		1,458	2,263	6										
Maine		1,074	828	4										
Maryland		3,066	1,095	10										
Massachusetts		5,400	1,115	11										
Michigan		7,697	5,451	16										
Minnesota		4,218	1,600	10										
Mississippi		2,134	1,599	6										
Missouri		4,676	3,299	10										
Montana		822	579	3										
Nebraska		1,426	881	5										
Nevada		2,314	1,277	6										
New Hampshire		1,080	726	4										
New Jersey		7,056	4,297	14										
New Mexico		1,518	916	5										
New York		19,478	8,031	29										
North Carolina		7,917	3,160	15										
Northern Mariana Islands				0										
North Dakota		500	397	3										
Ohio		8,871	6,063	18										
Oklahoma		2,048	1,771	7										
Oregon		3,293	2,274	7										
Puerto Rico				0										
Rhode Island		928	648	4										
South Carolina		3,014	2,430	8										
South Dakota		648	429	3										
Tennessee		5,202	3,183	11										
US Virgin Islands				0										
Texas		21,044	11,634	38										
Utah		2,247	1,443	6										
Vermont		523	345	3										
Virginia		6,386	1,130	11										
Washington		5,225	3,852	10										
West Virginia		1,426	882	5										
Wisconsin		4,436	3,120	10										
Wyoming		430	261	3										

Source: Electoral Votes Data: <https://www.bricanica.com/topics/United-States-Electoral-College-Votes-by-State-1787114>
 Source: Population and Registration Data: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November 2018 (Note: US Territories not included in Dataset)

Wales, Alexis (b) (6)
From: (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Masterson, Matthew /o=Exchange Labs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group
(b) (6)
Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
CISA Central (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)
Snell, Allison (b) (6)
Wilkinson, David (b) (6)
CC: (b) (6) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: For Review: Election Day Issue Tracker
Date: 2020/11/02 11:33:22
Importance: High
Priority: Urgent
Type: Note

(b) (6)

Appreciate this. Because of the number of reporting "venues" tomorrow, it is critical that CISA works off **one** ground-truth "incident tracker."

Adding the folks that will be primarily 1. Receiving reporting from the interagency and 2. Receiving reporting and compiling situational reports.

[@CISA Central](#) and (b) (6) any issues with this formatting?

Alexis

Alexis K. Wales

Election Security Mission Manager
Cybersecurity Division
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Mobile: (b) (6)

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 11:01 AM
To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6) Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) Roebuck, Jermaine (b) (6)
Cc: Snell, Allison (b) (6)
Subject: For Review: Election Day Issue Tracker

Hey team,

See attached for an Election Day Issue Tracker for consideration for use tomorrow. It includes background data on states (can customize to include more datapoints if helpful) and a matrix to track overall issues by infrastructure/ system type.

A few notes/questions:

(b) (5)

- Note the cells in the infrastructure system matrix are formatted to adjust based on whether they have text in them.

Let me know if you have adjustments/changes/additional ideas. Thanks!

Best,

(b) (6)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Office: (b) (6) Cell: (b) (6)
Email: (b) (6) | JWICS (b) (6)



Sender:

Wales, Alexis (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Roebuck, Jermaine (b) (6)

(b) (6)

CISA Central (b) (6)

(b) (6)

<central@cisa.dhs.gov>

Recipient:

(b) (6) (b) (6)

Snell, Allison (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Wilkinson, David (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/11/02 11:31:25

Delivered Date: 2020/11/02 11:33:22

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) (b) (6)
CC: Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
Snell, Allison (b) (6)
Subject: For Review: Updated Risk Posture Document
Date: 2020/11/02 11:34:46
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

(b) (6) and (b) (6)

We have our final risk posture update ready to push to EBT for publishing. Can you do a quick look through to ensure no further edits?

Updates in this document include: triple checking inclusion of all regional edits, updating with all CISA cybersecurity services, including regionally delivered cyber services, and adding a few new datapoints on VM services based on inputs from the regions that we were able to validate with additional VM data.

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

If you have any edits, let us know by 4 PM today before we push this out to EBT for publishing ahead of the big day tomorrow.

Best,

(b) (6)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b) (6) | Cell: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6) | JWICS: (b) (6)



OBTAINED BY AMERICAN OVERSIGHT FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

Sender: (b) (6), (b) (6)

Recipient: (b) (6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
 Snell, Allison (b) (6)
 (b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/11/02 11:34:10
Delivered Date: 2020/11/02 11:34:46

From: (b) (6)

To: (b) (6), (b) (6)

CC: Snell, Allison (b) (6)
 (b) (6)
 <vulnerability@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: ELECTIONS - Informational Re: South Dakota RPT Question
Date: 2020/10/30 09:10:50
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Sounds good (b) (6), (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)
 (b) (5), (b) (7)(E) Please let
 me know if you need anything else.

OBTAINED BY AMERICAN OVERSIGHT FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

Regards,



(b) (6)

Federal Lead – Vulnerability Evaluation
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Phone: (b) (6) | Email: (b) (6)

Logo Description
automatically
generated

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)

Date: Friday, October 30, 2020 at 9:07 AM

To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: "Snell, Allison" (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: Re: South Dakota RPT Question

That's correct. Thanks (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b) (6) | Cell: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 8:58:17 AM

To: (b) (6) (b) (6)

Cc: Snell, Allison (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: Re: South Dakota RPT Question

Good morning (b) (6)

Just to make sure I'm understanding your question correctly. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Regards,



(b) (6)

Federal Lead – Vulnerability Evaluation
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Phone: (b) (6) | Email: (b) (6)

Logo Description
automatically
generated

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, October 29, 2020 at 3:46 PM

To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: "Snell, Allison" (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: South Dakota RPT Question

VM and Region 8,

We're triple checking some information in our recent Election Risk Profile document and need

(b) (5)

(b) (6) (b) (5)

(b) (6) (b) (5)

Really appreciate your help clarifying this.

Best,

(b) (6)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b) (6) | Cell: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6) | JWICS: (b) (6)



Sender: (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (b)
Recipient: Snell, Allison (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Sent Date: 2020/10/30 09:10:45
Delivered Date: 2020/10/30 09:10:50

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

OBTAINED BY AMELIA

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Wales, Alexis /o=Exchange/abs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group
(b) (6)

Masterson, Matthew (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Roebuck, Jermaine (b) (6)
(b) (6)

To: CISA Central (b) (6)
(b) (6)
<central@cisa.dhs.gov>

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Snell, Allison (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Wilkinson, David (b) (6)
(b) (6)

cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: For Review: Election Day Issue Tracker

Date: 2020/11/02 11:50:43

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Thanks Alexis. Adding (b) (6) from ESI as well and reattaching the same draft tracker.

Best,

(b) (6) Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst | CISA | (b) (6) |
(b) (6)

ILLEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION



From: Wales, Alexis (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 11:31 AM
To: (b) (6) (h) (6) Masterson, Matthew
(b) (6) Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6) CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; Rabinovitz, Jeffrey
(b) (6)
Cc: Snell, Allison (b) (6) Wilkinson, David (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: For Review: Election Day Issue Tracker
Importance: High

(b) (6)

Appreciate this. Because of the number of reporting "venues" tomorrow, it is critical that CISA works off one ground-truth "incident tracker."

Adding the folks that will be primarily 1. Receiving reporting from the interagency and 2. Receiving reporting and compiling situational reports.

@CISA Central and (b) (6) any issues with this formatting?

Alexis

Alexis K. Wales

Election Security Mission Manager
Cybersecurity Division
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Mobile: (b) (6)

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 11:01 AM
To: Masterson, Matthew (b) (6) Hale, Geoffrey
(b) (6) Wales, Alexis (b) (6) Roebuck, Jermaine
(b) (6)
Cc: Snell, Allison (b) (6)
Subject: For Review: Election Day Issue Tracker

Hey team,

See attached for an Election Day Issue Tracker for consideration for use tomorrow. It includes background data on states (can customize to include more datapoints if helpful) and a matrix to track overall issues by infrastructure/ system type.

A few notes/questions:

(b) (5)

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Let me know if you have adjustments/changes/additional ideas. Thanks!

Best,

(b) (6)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b) (6) | Cell: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6) | JWICS: (b) (6)



Sender: (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Wales, Alexis (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Masterson, Matthew (D) (b)
(b) (6)
Hale, Geoffrey (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)

Recipient: CISA Central (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Snell, Allison (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Wilkinson, David (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Sent Date: 2020/11/02 11:50:42

Delivered Date: 2020/11/02 11:50:43