

We received a report from Wyoming Office of Homeland Security that this account is fraudulent -- [https://twitter.com/\[REDACTED\]](https://twitter.com/[REDACTED]). I've asked for more information, if they have any, and will pass along anything I receive.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.

<b>Sender:</b>	Scully, Brian <O=(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)> (b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/21 17:41:17
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/21 17:41:00

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Signal
<b>Date:</b>	2020/11/02 11:54:12
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

Hey (b)(6)

Apologies for delay getting these to you, but we've been working some legal and records management issues to get access to signal.

The below is a list of folks from my team that I'd like to be able to include in the chat.

Thanks,

Brian

Brian Scully

DHS Countering Foreign Interference Task Force

National Risk Management Center

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, November 2, 2020 11:36:03 AM

**To:** Scully, Brian (b)(6)

**cc:** (b)(6)

**Subject:** names and phone numbers

User	Phone Number
(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Brian Scully	(b)(6)
(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Countering Foreign Influence Task Force  
DHS | CISA | National Risk Management Center

(b)(6) (HSDN) (b)(6) (JWICS)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)		(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		
	(b)(6)			
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/11/02 11:54:12			

(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**To:** (b)(6)

Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Bri  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**CC:** Masterson, Matthew (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** Misleading election website

**Date:** 2020/10/05 13:48:47

**Priority:** Normal

**Type:** Note

Hi (b)(6)

I wanted to share a report we received about a misleading website from an election official to see if this might be within bounds for Google Safe Browsing. The website's domain, govoteky.us, is similar to the official Kentucky election domain, govoteky.com, and the website collects personal data from voters. Facebook and Twitter have both taken down the account and blocked the site.

See the report from the election official below.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

**From:** Misinformation Reports (b)(6)

**Sent:** Sunday, October 4, 2020 11:27:39 AM

**To:** Scully, Brian (b)(6) CISA Central (b)(6) CFITF

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Misinformation Reports (b)(6)

**Subject:** Case #CIS-MIS000028: False website for KY State Board of Elections

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Misinformation for Kentucky State Board of Elections

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Saturday, October 3, 2020 10:09 PM

**To:** Misinformation Reports (b)(6)

**Subject:** Facebook misinfo

<https://www.facebook.com/GoVoteKY/>





The Kentucky state board of elections website is govoteky.com

This website Is asking voters to disclose their personal information so as to determine if they have ballot irregularities.

Any voter who wants to determine whether or not they have at had a ballot irregularity can find this information on the states official website it is open information freely available to the voter. As well as open records accessible.

This website serves no purpose other than to mislead voters and scrape data.

This is the first time I've submitted this information through this email channel please confirm with me the time frame in which it will be taken down and what further steps I need to take.

Best, (b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

.....

This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

.....

Sender:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
Recipient:	(b)(6)			
	Scully, Brian	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		
	(b)(6)			
	Masterson, Matthew	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
	Hale, Geoffrey	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		
	(b)(6)			
Sent Date:	2020/10/05 13:48:45			
Delivered Date:	2020/10/05 13:48:47			

**From:** CFITF (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**CC:** CFITF (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Need your assistance  
**Date:** 2020/11/09 22:14:00  
**Priority:** Normal  
**Type:** Note

(b)(6) please see the note below concerning a threatening message via a YouTube comment.

(b)(6)

Countering Foreign Influence Task Force  
DHS | CISA | National Risk Management Center

(b)(6) (HSDN) (b)(6) (JWICS)

(b)(6)

*The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.*

*CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.*

*In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.*

---

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, November 9, 2020 8:09:57 PM

**To:** Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Subject:** Need your assistance

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hey Matt:

I need your assistance with something. I just received a threatening message to one of our Elections SIG members through our YouTube Channel. You can see it here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vqk-EiT5qZA>

Who should I forward this to?

Thank you,

Scott C. Algeier

Executive Director, IT-ISAC

(b)(6)



Virus-free. [www.avast.com](http://www.avast.com)

<b>Sender:</b>	CFITF (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	CFITF (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/11/09 22:14:23
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/11/09 22:14:00

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Bri  
(b)(6)  
**CC:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) J  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: [External] Post E-Day check in  
**Date:** 2020/11/05 16:37:50  
**Priority:** Normal  
**Type:** Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Super busy still guys. We are prepping for post results disruption / mis / dis / CIB and are working with our peers and outside providers to ensure we are well ahead of it. Not major incidents on platform. Our Elections Defense Operations Center will be maintained 24X7 for a few weeks to come. Let us know if we can help you in any way.

Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

CSO TikTok

(b)(6)

W: (b)(6)

C: (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Date:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 at 2:13 PM

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6) " (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** [External] Post E-Day check in

Hi (b)(6) – It was a busy day yesterday, but overall I'd say good planning really paid off. We're still all hands on deck over here, of course, but wanted to check in with you all to see how things are looking from your end.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

**Countering Foreign Influence Task Force  
DHS | CISA | National Risk Management Center**

(b)(6) (HSDN) | (b)(6) (JWICS)  
(b)(6) | (b)(6)



CISA Wordmark CMYK 20181115\_4 color seal with dk blue text

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Bri
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
**CC:** CFITF (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: CISA imposter account  
**Date:** 2020/12/04 12:50:59  
**Priority:** Normal  
**Type:** Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you, We will escalate

On Fri, Dec 4, 2020 at 12:30 PM Schaul, Robert (b)(6) wrote:  
Hey guys — passing along an imposter account that has been brought to our attention. The account handle is @cisa2020 and is using the CISA logo as the avatar. This has already been reported in platform through the “imposter resolution form” (Ticket numbers are 0182891186 and 0182894256).

V/r,  
Rob

*The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.*

*In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.*

(b)(6)

Countering Foreign Influence Task Force  
DHS | CISA | National Risk Management Center

(b)(6) (HSDN) (b)(6) (JWICS)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)

**Sender:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		
	CFITF	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)			
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/12/04 12:50:24			
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/12/04 12:50:59			

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)

To: (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

CC: CFITF (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

Subject: Re: Tweet w/ fake CISA doc

Date: 2020/12/12 12:56:37

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi (b)(6)

Looks like our team has labeled the tweet consistent with our civic integrity policy.

On Sat, Dec 12, 2020 at 12:46 PM (b)(6) (b)(6) wrote:  
Hi guys — passing along the following tweet brought to our attention.  
<https://twitter.com/donnieb86158295/status/1337491195661066240?s=10>

Best,

(b)(6)

Countering Foreign Influence Task Force  
DHS | CISA | National Risk Management Center

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(JWICS)

*The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.*

*CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.*



*In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.*

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	CFITF	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/12/12 12:56:11	
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/12/12 12:56:37	

From: (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
CFITF (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
To: (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Subject: RE: Are these real?  
Date: 2020/11/06 09:36:00  
Priority: Normal  
Type: Note

Sorry for spamming! Forgot to add the disclaimer...

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.

In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.

---

**From:** CFITF

**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 9:34 AM

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Cc:** CFITF (b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: Are these real?

**Good morning Twitter – Please see the reporting below.**

---

**From:** Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 9:19 AM

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: Are these real?

See more below from PA. have we heard anything?

Matthew V. Masterson  
Senior Cybersecurity Advisor  
Department of Homeland Security  
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 9:16 AM

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Subject:** Fwd: Are these real?

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Here's a little more. Any word on your side? We just got a request from a reporter. We know the one on our page was taken down, but it appears there are more floating out there.

(b)(6)

Director of Policy  
PA Department of State

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 6:29 AM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:**

**Subject:** RE: Are these real?

I think I found a version of the video: [https://twitter.com/\(b\)\(6\)/status/1324556436135882753](https://twitter.com/(b)(6)/status/1324556436135882753)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 3:35 AM

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Are these real?

Thank you for the notice. If you got screenshots or links can you send those?

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 12:01 AM

**To:** (b)(6)

(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Fwd: Are these real?

FYI only at this point

(b)(6)

Director of Policy  
PA Department of State

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, November 5, 2020 11:36 PM

**To:** Matt Masterson (DHS)

**Subject:** Re: Are these real?

The only guess I have is, if this is real, they took live feed from "remaking" damaged ballots. I just have no idea where this might have come from...

(b)(6)

Director of Policy  
PA Department of State

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, November 5, 2020 11:22:52 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

DHS)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Are these real?

Matt,

Sorry to message late, but was going through the dos page and comments (old habits from EAC die hard) and came across these posts. Sorry to screenshot, but if you go to our page you should be able to see the comments on the post and go to the pages.

Are these making their way around the internet? Because there is no polling place I know of that has overhead cameras. Just don't want another "burning ballots" fake thing spreading.

Apologies for sending to you all first, but I didn't want to call an all hands meeting here when some of our folks are getting their first few real hours rest since Monday.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Sender:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)			
Recipient:	CFITF	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
Sent Date:	2020/11/06 09:47:42			
Delivered Date:	2020/11/06 09:36:00			

OBTAI... BY AMERICAN OVERSIGHT FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)			
	(b)(6)			
<b>To:</b>	Roland Cloutier . (b)(6)			
<b>CC:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6)			
<b>Subject:</b>	Re: TikTok Invites to Industry Meetings			
<b>Date:</b>	2020/10/09 17:31:59			
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal			
<b>Type:</b>	Note			

Hey guys — apologies for the delay. We were determining the best avenue to advocate for your inclusion on the industry meetings. We cannot invite entities ourselves, and it seems the best avenue would be for you to reach out directly to Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, or Google. If you need anything further, happy to help the best we can.

(b)(6)

Countering Foreign Influence Task Force  
DHS | CISA | National Risk Management Center

(b)(6) (HSDN) | (b)(6) (JWICS)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

**From:** Roland Cloutier . (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 4:40:21 PM

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Subject:** TikTok Invites to Industry Meetings

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Good Afternoon (b)(6)

Can you let me know the best way to get our team invited to the industry meetings on election interference defense? I previously has advised that we would like to be part of those but we have not received any notifications of meetings. Can you assist?

Regards,

Roland

Roland Cloutier

CSO TikTok

(b)(6)

W: (b)(6)

C: (b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	Schaul, Robert (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)		
	(b)(6)		
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/09 17:31:59		

From: (b)(6)  
Sent Via: (b)(6)  
To: (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller  
Date: 2021/02/23 01:27:51  
Priority: Normal  
Type: Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Yes, I'm familiar with the process and the documents. Simply saying, "We get our funding from (X)," while providing no information whatsoever about how (X) itself is funded, is not transparency -- it's obfuscation. Check Your Fact is funded from the Daily Caller's newsroom budget, and the Daily Caller is funded by the Daily Caller News Foundation (DCNF). So where does the DCNF get its money from? Providing tax forms that merely document how much revenue the DCNF takes in does nothing to answer that question.

On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 6:03 PM (b)(6) <(b)(6)> wrote:  
Hi all. I serve as an IFCN assessor in Asia and so, I'm familiar with the process. Here's a link to the latest application made by Daily Caller's Check Your Fact and the assessor's evaluation (the certification must be renewed annually).

You can see the funding sources they disclosed, download their tax returns, etc, in Criterion 4a. All applications and assessments are publicly available on IFCN's website, by the way.

<https://ifencodeofprinciples.poynter.org/application/public/check-your-fact/38F5A0E1-4438-54B9-68BA-4F805B53B429>

With all good wishes,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) PhD  
Associate Professor of Practice  
Journalism and Media Studies Centre  
The University of Hong Kong  
Tel: (b)(6)  
E-mail: (b)(6)  
Web: <https://sites.google.com/view/masatokajimoto/>



From: (b)(6) on behalf of (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Date: Tuesday, 23 February 2021 at 02:56  
To: (b)(6) (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller

One of the key requirements of IFCN certification is supposed to be transparency of funding. If anyone can parse this word salad and figure out who or what funds the Daily Caller's fact-checking arm, I'd like to know:

<https://checkyourfact.com/about-us/>

On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 6:30 AM (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> wrote:  
On the other hand, you really have to ask yourself if you want to be featured on a website with a history of <https://www.snopes.com/news/2018/09/06/many-daily-caller-writers-expressed-white-supremacist-views/>, next to headlines like “<https://dailycaller.com/2021/02/19/public-schools-woke-liberal-activism-critical-race-theory-teachers-unions-enrollment-private-schools/>.”

It's something everyone has to answer for themselves. I personally wouldn't lend them the credibility.

From: (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> On Behalf Of (b)(6)  
Sent: Saturday, February 20, 2021 8:04 PM  
To: mailto:(b)(6)  
Subject: Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller

The Daily Caller has a NewsGuard Green rating (scoring 70/100), a Source Credibility of Medium from Logically, an Our.news status of Verified, and an MBFC factual-reporting rating of Mixed:

[https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/daily-caller/&data=04|01|\(b\)\(6\)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129300953|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjojV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=A1mPGasqiBEYDHPjEArxM6KsOb2cVEB5uT+sn6zOzvA=&reserved=0](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/daily-caller/&data=04|01|(b)(6)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129300953|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjojV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=A1mPGasqiBEYDHPjEArxM6KsOb2cVEB5uT+sn6zOzvA=&reserved=0)

By way of comparison CNN and MSNBC are also MBFC Mixed. Another thing Daily Caller has in its favor is its connection with the IFCN-verified fact-checking site:

[https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://checkyourfact.com/&data=04|01|\(b\)\(6\)|\(b\)\(6\)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129310953|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjojV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=8VThJL/4Ox7erij2v50LQKDsIVFScwmo2b+](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://checkyourfact.com/&data=04|01|(b)(6)|(b)(6)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129310953|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjojV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=8VThJL/4Ox7erij2v50LQKDsIVFScwmo2b+)

kPVmh2AE=&reserved=0

Plus their interview with Dr. Gleb Tsipursky seemed fair and fine.

On Feb 19, 2021, at 6:17 AM 'Dr. Gleb Tsipursky' via Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation <mailto:(b)(6)> wrote:  
Sharing my personal experience being interviewed by The Daily Caller a few months ago on my own project to address misinformation, it was a good experience, and they published a fair interview. Here's the article, FYI. Anyone interested in knowing more can contact me off the list <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://dailycaller.com/2020/10/06/politicians-pro-truth-pledge-stop-spread-misinformation/&data=04|01|deanj@ned.org|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129310953|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWljoimc4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiv2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=GxSzMfHznsl2GYRli+1zHWYZAarneCAU1jl0qxKEfxc=&reserved=0>

On Feb 19, 2021, at 2:41 AM, (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> wrote:  
... According to my database, Daily Caller has published several misinforming articles themselves.

De : mailto:(b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> de la  
part de (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)>  
...the Daily Caller is an "orange" site (by the Grinberg et al., 2019, classification)

bg

--

[https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://hearingvoices.com/&data=04|01|\(b\)\(6\)|\(b\)\(6\)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129320942|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWljoimc4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiv2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=8QP6UGoRfhZb3PxsFXJmYiCtzIxUQB2UmpbDT5h0iUk=&reserved=0](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://hearingvoices.com/&data=04|01|(b)(6)|(b)(6)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129320942|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWljoimc4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiv2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=8QP6UGoRfhZb3PxsFXJmYiCtzIxUQB2UmpbDT5h0iUk=&reserved=0)  
[https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://iffy.news/&data=04|01|\(b\)\(6\)|\(b\)\(6\)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129320942|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWljoimc4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiv2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=APZn4HRRz4GLSgBVEbBVlJwVp9VGYWHv+EjvKeVwuE=&reserved=0](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://iffy.news/&data=04|01|(b)(6)|(b)(6)|889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129320942|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWljoimc4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiv2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=APZn4HRRz4GLSgBVEbBVlJwVp9VGYWHv+EjvKeVwuE=&reserved=0)

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

(1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or

rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.

(2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.

(3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1&data=04|01|b89bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129330937|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=nSRerkRaVlqjTFkm32uJD7eg0l5rn/vR3o494UuT0TU=&reserved=0> before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to <mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>.

To view this discussion on the web visit

[https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/2A87C797-CA15-4732-9B18-](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/2A87C797-CA15-4732-9B18-CA26A077E94C%40hearingvoices.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer&data=04|01|b89bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129330933|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=Padq9VDqg9pGUApGwUNRBg3/uG9UiiRA+Hzml1WIoFs=&reserved=0)

[CA26A077E94C%40hearingvoices.com?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=footer&data=04|01|b89bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129330933|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=Padq9VDqg9pGUApGwUNRBg3/uG9UiiRA+Hzml1WIoFs=&reserved=0](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/2A87C797-CA15-4732-9B18-CA26A077E94C%40hearingvoices.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer&data=04|01|b89bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a|4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d|1|0|637494699129330933|Unknown|TWfPbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=|3000&sdata=Padq9VDqg9pGUApGwUNRBg3/uG9UiiRA+Hzml1WIoFs=&reserved=0).

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

(1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.

(2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.

(3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at <https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1> before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to <mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>.

To view this discussion on the web visit

[https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/MN2PR18MB3309FA83352F14763B93AE2AA5819@MN2PR18MB3309.namprd18.prod.outlook.com?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=fo](https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/MN2PR18MB3309FA83352F14763B93AE2AA5819@MN2PR18MB3309.namprd18.prod.outlook.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=fo)



oter.

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

- (1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.
- (2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.
- (3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at <https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHWGEjt5Z4wg1> before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to <mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>.

To view this discussion on the web visit [https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/CAK-uGwMj-YJKdrUst+iy8UdiC+nMi1XqQ\\_-sdT\\_rSVXT751c4Q@mail.gmail.com?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=footer](https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/CAK-uGwMj-YJKdrUst+iy8UdiC+nMi1XqQ_-sdT_rSVXT751c4Q@mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer).

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

- (1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.
- (2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.
- (3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at <https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHWGEjt5Z4wg1> before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com](mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com).

To view this discussion on the web visit <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/CAK-uGwN67nOD5G0gk1bObSZuuewkmNFSxJyo4aSDroGFt1vzSw%40mail.gmail.com>.

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)	
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2021/02/22 21:32:13	
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2021/02/23 01:27:51	
<b>Message Flags:</b>	Unread	

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>SentVia:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller
<b>Date:</b>	2021/02/22 13:55:59
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

One of the key requirements of IFCN certification is supposed to be transparency of funding. If anyone can parse this word salad and figure out who or what funds the Daily Caller's fact-checking arm, I'd like to know:  
<https://checkyourfact.com/about-us/>

On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 6:30 AM (b)(6) wrote:

On the other hand, you really have to ask yourself if you want to be featured on a website with a history of hiring writers with white supremacist views, next to headlines like "public schools are becoming cesspools of woke liberal activism."

It's something everyone has to answer for themselves. I personally wouldn't lend them the credibility.

---

**From:** (b)(6) **On Behalf Of** Barrett Golding  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 20, 2021 8:04 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller

The Daily Caller has a NewsGuard Green rating (scoring 70/100), a Source Credibility of Medium from Logically, an Our.news status of Verified, and an MBFC factual-reporting rating of Mixed:

<https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/daily-caller/>

By way of comparison CNN and MSNBC are also MBFC Mixed. Another thing Daily Caller has in its favor is its connection with the IFCN-verified fact-checking site:

<https://checkyourfact.com/about-us/>

Plus their interview with Dr. Gleb Tsipursky seemed fair and fine.

On Feb 19, 2021, at 6:17 AM, 'Dr. Gleb Tsipursky' via Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation (b)(6) wrote:

Sharing my personal experience being interviewed by The Daily Caller a few months ago on my own project to address misinformation, it was a good experience, and they published a fair interview. Here's the article, FYI. Anyone interested in knowing more can contact me off the list <https://dailycaller.com/2020/10/06/politicians-pro-truth-pledge-stop-spread-misinformation/>

On Feb 19, 2021, at 2:41 AM (b)(6) wrote:

... According to my database, Daily Caller has published several misinforming articles themselves.

De : (b)(6) > de la part de (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

...the *Daily Caller* is an "orange" site (by the Grinberg et al., 2019, classification)

bg

--

<https://hearingvoices.com/>

<https://iffy.news/>

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

(1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.

(2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.

(3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at <https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHWGEjt5Z4wg1> before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com](mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com).

To view this discussion on the web visit

<https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/2A87C797-CA15-4732-9B18-CA26A077E94C%40hearingvoices.com>.

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

(1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.

(2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.

(3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at <https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHWGEjt5Z4wg1> before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com](mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com).

To view this discussion on the web visit

<https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/MN2PR18MB3309FA83352F14763B93AE2AA5819%40MN2PR18MB3309.namprd18.prod.outlook.com>.

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:



(1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.

(2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.

(3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at <https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1> before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com](mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com).

To view this discussion on the web visit [https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/CAK-uGwMj-YJKdrUst%2Biy8UdiC%2BnMi1XqQ\\_-sdT\\_rSVXT751c4Q%40mail.gmail.com](https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/CAK-uGwMj-YJKdrUst%2Biy8UdiC%2BnMi1XqQ_-sdT_rSVXT751c4Q%40mail.gmail.com).

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)	
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2021/02/22 13:51:38	
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2021/02/22 13:55:59	

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>SentVia:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>CC:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller
<b>Date:</b>	2021/02/23 01:27:48
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi all. I serve as an IFCN assessor in Asia and so, I'm familiar with the process. Here's a link to the latest application made by Daily Caller's Check Your Fact and the assessor's evaluation (the certification must be renewed annually).

You can see the funding sources they disclosed, download their tax returns, etc, in Criterion 4a. All applications and assessments are publicly available on IFCN's website, by the way.

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://ifncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/application/public/check-your-fact/38F5A0E1-4438-54B9-68BA-4F805B53B429\\_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci22MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxoGLpE4A\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://ifncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/application/public/check-your-fact/38F5A0E1-4438-54B9-68BA-4F805B53B429_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci22MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxoGLpE4A$)

With all good wishes,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

PhD

Associate Professor of Practice  
Journalism and Media Studies Centre  
The University of Hong Kong

Tel: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)

Web:

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://sites.google.com/view/masatokajimoto/\\_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci22MukIfV2XzfR2rp0Wx1zTFZQk\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://sites.google.com/view/masatokajimoto/_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci22MukIfV2XzfR2rp0Wx1zTFZQk$)

From: (b)(6) on behalf of (b)(6) (b)(6)

Date: Tuesday, 23 February 2021 at 02:56

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller

One of the key requirements of IFCN certification is supposed to be transparency of funding. If anyone

can parse this word salad and figure out who or what funds the Daily Caller's fact-checking arm, I'd like to know:

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://checkyourfact.com/about-us/\\_;!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0Wx18YWQow\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://checkyourfact.com/about-us/_;!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0Wx18YWQow$)

On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 6:30 AM (b)(6) wrote:

On the other hand, you really have to ask yourself if you want to be featured on a website with a history of [https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://www.snopes.com/news/2018/09/06/many-daily-caller-writers-expressed-white-supremacist-views/\\_;!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxqyTqaHQ\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://www.snopes.com/news/2018/09/06/many-daily-caller-writers-expressed-white-supremacist-views/_;!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxqyTqaHQ$), next to headlines like "https://urldefense.us/v3/\_https://dailycaller.com/2021/02/19/public-schools-woke-liberal-activism-critical-race-theory-teachers-unions-enrollment-private-schools/\_;!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxUTskPh4\$ ."

It's something everyone has to answer for themselves. I personally wouldn't lend them the credibility.

From: (b)(6) On Behalf Of (b)(6)  
Sent: Saturday, February 20, 2021 8:04 PM  
To: mailto:fakenewssci@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: [fakenewssci] Daily Caller

The Daily Caller has a NewsGuard Green rating (scoring 70/100), a Source Credibility of Medium from Logically, an Our.news status of Verified, and an MBFC factual-reporting rating of Mixed: [https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:\\*\\*Amediabiasfactcheck.com\\*daily-caller\\*&data=04\\*7C01\\*\(b\)\(6\)7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a\\*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d\\*7C1\\*7C0\\*7C637494699129300953\\*7CUnknown\\*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=\\*7C3000&sdata=A1mPGasqiBEYDHPjEArxM6KsOb2cVEB5uT\\*sn6zOzvA=&reserved=0\\_\\_;Ly8vLyUIJSUIJSUIJSUr!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxwjCADPg\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:**Amediabiasfactcheck.com*daily-caller*&data=04*7C01*(b)(6)7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d*7C1*7C0*7C637494699129300953*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=*7C3000&sdata=A1mPGasqiBEYDHPjEArxM6KsOb2cVEB5uT*sn6zOzvA=&reserved=0__;Ly8vLyUIJSUIJSUIJSUr!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxwjCADPg$)

By way of comparison CNN and MSNBC are also MBFC Mixed. Another thing Daily Caller has in its favor is its connection with the IFCN-verified fact-checking site: [https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:\\*\\*Acheckyourfact.com\\*&data=04\\*7C01\\*\(b\)\(6\)7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a\\*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d\\*7C1\\*7C0\\*7C637494699129310953\\*7CUnknown\\*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=\\*7C3000&sdata=8VThJL\\*4Ox7erij2v50LQKDsIVFScwmo2b\\*kPVmh2AE=&reserved=0\\_\\_;Ly8vJSUIJSUIJSUIJS8r!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0Wx9JwDL7E\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:**Acheckyourfact.com*&data=04*7C01*(b)(6)7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d*7C1*7C0*7C637494699129310953*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=*7C3000&sdata=8VThJL*4Ox7erij2v50LQKDsIVFScwmo2b*kPVmh2AE=&reserved=0__;Ly8vJSUIJSUIJSUIJS8r!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0Wx9JwDL7E$)

Plus their interview with Dr. Gleb Tsipursky seemed fair and fine.

On Feb 19, 2021, at 6:17 AM, 'Dr. Gleb Tsipursky' via Combating Fake News: The Science of

Misinformation <mailto:fakenewssci@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Sharing my personal experience being interviewed by The Daily Caller a few months ago on my own project to address misinformation, it was a good experience, and they published a fair interview. Here's the article, FYI. Anyone interested in knowing more can contact me off the list

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:\\*\\*Adailycaller.com\\*2020\\*10\\*06\\*politicians-pro-truth-pledge-stop-spread-misinformation\\*&data=04\\*7C01\\*\(b\)\(6\)\\*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a\\*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d\\*7C1\\*7C0\\*7C637494699129310953\\*7CUnknown\\*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=\\*7C3000&sdata=GxSzMfHznsl2GYRI\\*1zHWYZAarneCAU1jl0qxKEfx=&reserved=0\\_;;Ly8vLy8vLyUIJSUIJSUIJSUr!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2Xzfr2rp0Wx7caPqm8\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:**Adailycaller.com*2020*10*06*politicians-pro-truth-pledge-stop-spread-misinformation*&data=04*7C01*(b)(6)*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d*7C1*7C0*7C637494699129310953*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=*7C3000&sdata=GxSzMfHznsl2GYRI*1zHWYZAarneCAU1jl0qxKEfx=&reserved=0_;;Ly8vLy8vLyUIJSUIJSUIJSUr!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2Xzfr2rp0Wx7caPqm8$)

On Feb 19, 2021, at 2:41 AM, (b)(6) wrote:

... According to my database, Daily Caller has published several misinforming articles themselves.

De : <mailto:fakenewssci@googlegroups.com> <<mailto:fakenewssci@googlegroups.com>> de la part de (b)(6)

...the Daily Caller is an "orange" site (by the Grinberg et al., 2019, classification)

bg

--

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:\\*\\*Ahearingvoices.com\\*&data=04\\*7C01\\*\(b\)\(6\)\\*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a\\*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d\\*7C1\\*7C0\\*7C637494699129320942\\*7CUnknown\\*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=\\*7C3000&sdata=8QP6UGoRfhZb3PxsFXJmYiCtzIxB2UmpbDT5h0iUk=&reserved=0\\_;;Ly8vJSUIJSUIJSUIJQ!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2Xzfr2rp0WxlRQDhZM\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:**Ahearingvoices.com*&data=04*7C01*(b)(6)*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d*7C1*7C0*7C637494699129320942*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=*7C3000&sdata=8QP6UGoRfhZb3PxsFXJmYiCtzIxB2UmpbDT5h0iUk=&reserved=0_;;Ly8vJSUIJSUIJSUIJQ!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2Xzfr2rp0WxlRQDhZM$)  
[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:\\*\\*Aiffy.news\\*&data=04\\*7C01\\*\(b\)\(6\)\\*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a\\*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d\\*7C1\\*7C0\\*7C637494699129320942\\*7CUnknown\\*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=\\*7C3000&sdata=APZn4HRRz4GLSgBVEbBVIJwjVp9VGyWHv\\*EjvKeVwuE=&reserved=0\\_;;Ly8vJSUIJSUIJSUIJSs!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2Xzfr2rp0WxgR1E6C4\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:**Aiffy.news*&data=04*7C01*(b)(6)*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d*7C1*7C0*7C637494699129320942*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0=*7C3000&sdata=APZn4HRRz4GLSgBVEbBVIJwjVp9VGyWHv*EjvKeVwuE=&reserved=0_;;Ly8vJSUIJSUIJSUIJSs!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2Xzfr2rp0WxgR1E6C4$)

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

- (1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.
- (2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.
- (3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:\\*\\*Agoo.gl\\*forms\\*h1UkZHWGEjt5Z4wgl&data=04\\*7C01\\*\(b\)\(6\)\\*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a\\*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d\\*7C1\\*7C0\\*7C637494699129330937\\*7CUnknown\\*7CTWFpbGZ](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:**Agoo.gl*forms*h1UkZHWGEjt5Z4wgl&data=04*7C01*(b)(6)*7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d*7C1*7C0*7C637494699129330937*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZ)



sb3d8eyJWlJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=\*7C3000&sd  
ata=nSRerkRaVlqjTFkm32uJD7eg0l5rn\*vR3o494UuT0TU=&reserved=0\_;;Ly8vLyUIJSUIJSUIJSUv!!  
BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0  
WxAfjTiQk\$ before you apply for membership.

---  
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News:  
The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to  
mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.

To view this discussion on the web visit

[\[--  
#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and  
protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and  
strengthen first amendment principles.\]\(https://urldefense.us/v3/\_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:\*\*Agroups.google.c<br/>om\*d\*msgid\*fakenewssci\*2A87C797-CA15-4732-9B18-CA26A077E94C\*40hearingvoices.com\*utm\_medium=email&utm\_source=footer&data=04\*7C01\*7\(b\)\(6\)<br/>\(b\)\(6\)7C889bda42c90e49c7c56408d8d60ced2a\*7C4e07708641b34a22b78e41daff10793d\*7C1\*<br/>7C0\*7C637494699129340933\*7CUnknown\*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWlJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV<br/>2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=\*7C3000&sdata=Padq9VDqg9pGUApGwUNRBg3\*uG9U<br/>iiRA\*Hzml1WIoFs=&reserved=0\_;;Ly8vLy8vJT8lJSUIJSUIJSUIJSUv!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\_<br/>DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxShUcXbA\$ .</a></p></div><div data-bbox=\)](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https:**Agroups.google.c<br/>om*d*msgid*fakenewssci*2A87C797-CA15-4732-9B18-</a></p></div><div data-bbox=)

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and  
exchange:

- (1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric  
and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.
- (2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the  
record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.
- (3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by  
two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at  
[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1\\_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_  
1\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxUXBrEAs\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxUXBrEAs$) before you  
apply for membership.

---  
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News:  
The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to  
mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.

To view this discussion on the web visit

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/MN2PR18MB3309FA83352F  
14763B93AE2AA5819@MN2PR18MB3309.namprd18.prod.outlook.com?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_so  
urce=footer\\_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222M  
ukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxTf0agts\\$ .](https://urldefense.us/v3/_https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/MN2PR18MB3309FA83352F<br/>14763B93AE2AA5819@MN2PR18MB3309.namprd18.prod.outlook.com?utm_medium=email&utm_so<br/>urce=footer_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222M<br/>ukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxTf0agts$ .)

--  
#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and  
protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and  
strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and

exchange:

- (1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.
- (2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.
- (3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at [https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_\\_https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1\\_\\_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxUXBrEAs\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/__https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1__!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxUXBrEAs$) before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to <mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>.

To view this discussion on the web visit

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_\\_https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/CAK-uGwMj-YJKdrUst\\*iy8UdiC\\*nMiIXqQ\\_-sdT\\_rSVXT751c4Q@mail.gmail.com?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=footer\\_!Kys!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxCVqQ7J8\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/__https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/CAK-uGwMj-YJKdrUst*iy8UdiC*nMiIXqQ_-sdT_rSVXT751c4Q@mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer_!Kys!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxCVqQ7J8$)

--

#FakeNewsSci seeks to cultivate and continue an academic and practical agenda around defining and protecting against fake news and misinformation, and work to build news literacy, defend a free press and strengthen first amendment principles.

There are three ground rules for this community aimed at ensuring appropriate communication and exchange:

- (1) Civility is the primary responsibility of membership - we intend to avoid uncivil debates or rhetoric and those who violate this rule will be immediately removed.
- (2) To preserve people's comfort with being open and frank, all exchanges are to be treated as "off the record" unless the member(s) in question explicitly agree otherwise.
- (3) To maintain high-quality exchanges of ideas and practice, all new members must be recommended by two other group members to be added to this group. Please fill the form at [https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_\\_https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1\\_\\_!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxUXBrEAs\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/__https://goo.gl/forms/h1UkZHwGEjt5Z4wg1__!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxUXBrEAs$) before you apply for membership.

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Combating Fake News: The Science of Misinformation" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com](mailto:fakenewssci+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com).

To view this discussion on the web visit

[https://urldefense.us/v3/\\_\\_https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/E04EB633-DAF2-4F61-B211-29FD0DAD1E67\\*40hku.hk\\_!JQ!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921\\_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxfvVbcs\\$](https://urldefense.us/v3/__https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/fakenewssci/E04EB633-DAF2-4F61-B211-29FD0DAD1E67*40hku.hk_!JQ!!BCIRuOV5cvtbuNI!WoeY921_DVABxP6NU6AYqD2zQ6hKIQ8dFj9U7zjhvOci222MukIfV2XzfR2rp0WxfvVbcs$)

Sender: (b)(6)

<[fakenewssci@googlegroups.com](mailto:fakenewssci@googlegroups.com)>

**Recipient:** (b)(6)  
<fakenewssci@googlegroups.com>

**Sent Date:** 2021/02/22 21:02:50

**Delivered Date:** 2021/02/23 01:27:48

**From:** Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**To:** Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**CC:** Geoffrey Hale (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Draft deck for Region 7 engagement  
**Date:** 2020/10/01 08:48:00  
**Priority:** Normal  
**Type:** Note

Can you look at this – they will also be presenting to both R7 staff and stakeholders (b)(6) also dropped it in Pineapples.

I think it is fine to present.

**Allison L. Snell**

Election Security Initiative

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 30, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** Snell, Allison (b)(6) Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Draft deck for Region 7 engagement

All,

Wanted to give you all a chance to look at the deck (b)(6) and I are planning to use for the Region 7 “Town Hall” engagement tomorrow. We borrowed from the Joint Chiefs brief and our regular 101 to pull this together.

Flagging this FYSA because initially we thought the intent was just to brief R7 staff (as we did a couple weeks back for Region 8), but we learned yesterday we’ll actually be briefing a broader group of critical infrastructure partners (fed and SLTT) from the region. As of yesterday they were expecting an audience of 50-ish people, non-election officials (no media).

Let us know if you have any issues with using this deck for that audience.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative



Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Phone: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	Snell, Allison (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	Masterson, Matthew (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Geoffrey Hale (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/01 08:49:11
	<b>Delivered Date:</b> 2020/10/01 08:48:00

# ELECTION SECURITY BRIEFING

## CISA REGION VII PARTNERS



# Election Systems: Designated Critical Infrastructure

**Mission Statement:** To ensure the Election Stakeholder Community – infrastructure owners and operators, partisan organizations, and the electorate – has the necessary information to adequately assess risks and protect, detect, and recover from those risks. The 2017 designation of election infrastructure as critical infrastructure provides a basis for the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies to: Recognize the importance of these systems; Prioritize services and support to enhancing security for election infrastructure; Provide the elections community with the opportunity to work with each other, the Federal Government, and through the Coordinating Councils; Hold anyone who attacks these systems responsible for violating international norms.



# Threats to Election Infrastructure

Potential Adversaries: Nation-state actors  
Black Hat Hackers  
Criminals  
Politically Motivated Groups  
Insiders  
Terrorists  
Possible Motivations: Undermine Trust in Democracy  
Foreign Policy Goals  
Sow Social Division  
Financial Gain  
Subvert Political Opposition  
Fame and Reputation  
Foment Chaos/Anarchy  
Retribution for Perceived Grievances  
Potential Targets: Voter registration databases  
Voting systems  
Election reporting systems  
Storage

facilities and polling places  
Public confidence in the integrity of the election



# History of CISA's Election Security Mission

**2016**

Reactive Response to Incidents in the 2016 Election

- Triggered by widely publicized incidents targeting states and a political organization.
- DHS worked to rapidly engage the election stakeholder community.

**2017**

Early engagement with the election community

- Critical Infrastructure designation issued on January 6, 2017.
- Stood up the Election Task Force, began meeting with state election officials, established the Government Coordinating Council (GCC).

**2018**

Proactively building trust and elevating security

- Funded the creation of the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC).
- Provided services, exercises, and classified and unclassified threat briefings.

**2019-2020**

Partnering for more secure elections

- Increased engagement at local level via Last Mile initiative.
- #Protect2020 Strategic Plan with four Lines of Effort (LOE) ahead of the 2020 Election Cycle.



# E-Day -33

- 2020 Presidential General Election has Begun  
North Carolina: initial batch of mail-in ballots sent on Sept. 4  
Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia, Wyoming: early in-person voting began on Sept. 18  
All states: initial delivery of military & overseas (UOCAVA) ballots sent by Sept. 19  
1.5 million+ votes already cast  
CISA Heightened Readiness Posture



# CISA Election Infrastructure Risk Products

- CISA recently published a risk assessment of election infrastructure
- Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment
- CISA also published two more targeted products
- [FOUO] Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (co-authored with EAC, FBI & NIST)
- Mail-in Voting in 2020 Infrastructure Risk Assessment



Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE NOTE  
NOV 20, 2020 | 100% EIR

MAIL-IN VOTING IN 2020 INFRASTRUCTURE RISK ASSESSMENT

Each row contains 10 questions and 10 answers. The questions are listed on the left, and the answers are listed on the right. The questions are: 1. What is the purpose of this assessment? 2. What are the key findings? 3. What are the risks? 4. What are the compensating controls? 5. What are the recommendations? 6. What are the next steps? 7. What are the conclusions? 8. What are the lessons learned? 9. What are the key takeaways? 10. What are the final thoughts?

**MAIL-IN VOTING RISK: INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESS**

RISK	COMPENSATING CONTROLS
All forms of voting – in this case mail-in voting – bring a variety of cyber and infrastructure risks.	Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls, which build layers of safeguards to defend the process from manipulation.
Implementation of mail-in voting infrastructure and processes within a compressed timeline may also introduce new risks.	Election officials must assess the risks of introducing new infrastructure with the operational risks associated with doing so in a compressed timeline before making a determination. Planning, preparation, training, and redundancy will build resiliency.
For mail-in voting, some of the risk under the control of election officials during in-person voting shifts to outside entities, such as ballot printers, mail processing facilities, and the United States Postal Service.	Private sector partners are implementing technical and procedural best practices and sharing information through the EII-SAC. USPS has a dedicated election mail program that includes an intelligent mail barcoding system enabling ballot tracking and chain of custody.
Integrity attacks on voter registration data and systems represent a comparatively higher risk in a mail-in voting environment when compared to an in-person voting environment.	Many jurisdictions have a cure process allowing voters correct a rejected ballot package. A voter who does not receive a ballot in the mail can go to a voting location and vote a provisional ballot.
The outbound and inbound processing of mail-in ballots introduces additional infrastructure and technology, increasing potential scalability of cyber attacks.	Compensating controls for additional infrastructure are the same as other election technology and infrastructure, so election officials should focus on cyber risk management best practices to build resiliency in the overall election process.
Inbound mail-in ballot processes and tabulation take longer than in-person processing, causing tabulation of results to occur more slowly and resulting in more ballots to tabulate following election night.	Some jurisdictions have implemented election technology and infrastructure to speed up the process. Some jurisdictions are legally afforded the opportunity to begin processing ballot applications and ballots in advance of election day. Election officials, media, candidates, and NGOs are educating voters and setting the expectation that it will take days, if not weeks, to determine the outcome of many races.
Disinformation risk to mail-in voting infrastructure and processes is similar to that of in-person voting while utilizing different content. Threat actors may leverage limited understanding regarding mail-in voting processes to mislead and confuse the public.	Election officials, media, candidates, and NGOs are educating voters about the mail voting process. The National Association of Secretaries of State launched #TrustedInfo2020 to highlight state and local election officials as the credible, verified sources for election information.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE NOTE  
NOV 20, 2020 | 100% EIR

ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT

Plan and then start the election process. The election process is a complex, multi-step process that involves many different entities and systems. The process is designed to ensure that the election is fair, secure, and transparent. The process is also designed to ensure that the election is accessible to all eligible voters. The process is also designed to ensure that the election is conducted in a timely and efficient manner.


**ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE RISK**

PROCESS	RISK ASSESSMENT
<b>1. REGISTRATION</b>	<b>INTEGRITY ATTACKS</b> Integrity attacks on state-level voter registration systems, the preparation of election data, vote aggregation systems, and election websites present particular risk to the ability of jurisdictions to conduct elections.
<b>2. POLLBOOK</b>	<b>AVAILABILITY ATTACKS</b> Availability attacks on state or local-level systems that support same-day registration, vote center check-in, or provisional voting also have the potential to pose meaningful risk to the ability of jurisdictions to conduct elections.
<b>3. VOTING MACHINE</b>	<b>VOTING SYSTEMS</b> Voting systems present a high consequence target for threat actors but low likelihood of successful attacks at scale, meaning that there is lower risk of incidents when compared to other infrastructure components of the election process.
<b>4. TABULATION</b>	<b>DIVERSE INFRASTRUCTURE</b> U.S. election systems are comprised of diverse infrastructure and security controls. However, even jurisdictions that implement cybersecurity best practices are potentially vulnerable to cyber attack by sophisticated cyber actors.
<b>5. WEBSITE</b>	<b>DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS</b> Disinformation campaigns related to election infrastructure can amplify disruptions of electoral processes and erode public trust in election results.

(b)(6)



# Election Infrastructure and Processes




- Attack surface for election infrastructure is broad and diverseIncludes county / sub-county managed systems with less cybersecurity expertise Includes vendors, such as voting system manufacturers, ballot printers, and database / website hosting servicesIntegrity attacks against state-level networked systems present particular risk




# Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic

- Response measures include significant policy & procedural change, varying by state  
Mail-in voting: many states expanding voting options and/or relaxing requirements, driven in part by voter demand  
In-person: all states implementing COVID-19 mitigation measures, some expanding early voting, some localities consolidating voting sites, poll worker recruitment incentives  
States tested changes during primaries  
November plans largely set, late changes possible due to litigation



(b)(6)

# Mail-in Voting: Infrastructure and Process



- For mail-in voting, some risk shifts to outside entities, such as ballot printers, mail processing facilities, and the United States Postal Service. Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls, which build layers of safeguards to defend the process from manipulation




# Post-Election: Mapping

- Election security doesn't end after polls close on Nov. 3CISA mapped post-election processes from close of polls to Inauguration Day, including:

- Election Administration
- Inbound Mail Processing
- Tabulation
- Unofficial Results Reporting
- Canvass Process
- Provisional Adjudication & Cure
- Post-Election Audits
- Certification
- Recount
- Electoral College

of Electors  
Determination  
of Controversy  
Electoral College  
Vote Certificate of  
Vote Swearing-in  
of Congress  
Joint Meeting of  
Congress  
Inauguration Day




(b)(6)



# Building Stakeholder Capacity

**Top Recommendations for Election Infrastructure Stakeholders Mitigate Internet Vulnerabilities in a Timely Manner Strengthen Password Policy and Auditing Processes Implement Network Segmentation Have a Plan and Implement Backups Replace Unmaintainable Equipment Election Infrastructure Resource Library available at <https://www.cisa.gov/protect2020> Voluntary, no-cost suite of services available to Election Infrastructure partners from CISA CISA field personnel help to promote and coordinate delivery of these capabilities**



# CISA Activities through Election Day

Heightened readiness posture: Constant interagency coordination  
Regular unclassified threat reporting to election community  
Classified intelligence briefings, as needed  
Near real-time push of technical threat indicators  
E-day and early voting operations centers

Public messaging:

The poster is divided into several sections. At the top, it says 'THE 2020 ELECTION MAY LOOK AND FEEL DIFFERENT BUT YOUR ENGAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL'. Below this, it says 'BE A PREPARED, PARTICIPATING & PATIENT VOTER'. The bottom section says 'BE PATIENT: RESULTS MAY BE SLOWER THAN WHAT WE ARE USED TO IN PAST ELECTIONS'. There are also sections for 'BE PREPARED: YOUR VOTING PROCESSES AND VOTING LOCATIONS MAY HAVE CHANGED' and 'PARTICIPATE: THE COUNTRY IS FACING A SHORTAGE OF ELECTION WORKERS'. The poster includes various icons, checkmarks, and text boxes providing information about voting processes, registration, and the importance of voter participation.

**★ ★ ★ ★ ★**  
**THE 2020 ELECTION MAY LOOK AND FEEL DIFFERENT BUT YOUR ENGAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL**

**BE A**  
☒ **PREPARED,**  
☒ **PARTICIPATING &**  
☒ **PATIENT**  
**VOTER**

Voters should look to their state and local election officials as the trusted sources for election information. Contact your election office directly or visit their websites and verified social media pages to ensure accurate election information and to minimize any potential for misinformation and disinformation. You may also visit the Election Assistance Commission at [eac.gov](http://eac.gov) for trusted information.

**BE PREPARED:**  
**YOUR VOTING PROCESSES AND VOTING LOCATIONS MAY HAVE CHANGED**

**Ahead of the election, prepare by:**  
☒ Registering to vote. Some states require you to register 30 days before election day. If you are already registered, ensure your information is up-to-date. Please visit [vote.gov](http://vote.gov) for more information on how to register in your state.  
☒ If you vote in person, don't forget to bring eligible identification documentation, if required in your state, and double-check your polling location- it may have moved from the last election.

☒ If you vote by mail-in or absentee ballot, make sure to understand the requirements and ensure you return your ballot by the deadline. You may be allowed to return your mail-in or absentee ballot by hand (e.g., to a dropbox, election office, or voting location). Mail-in/absentee ballots should be requested ASAP to allow sufficient time for the mail to be delivered and returned.

**PARTICIPATE:**  
**THE COUNTRY IS FACING A SHORTAGE OF ELECTION WORKERS**

Please consider volunteering via [helpamericavote.gov](http://helpamericavote.gov).  
☒ Elections are run locally by your neighbors. They could use your help to ensure a smooth election day for your community.

**BE PATIENT:**  
**RESULTS MAY BE SLOWER THAN WHAT WE ARE USED TO IN PAST ELECTIONS**

☒ Increased usage of mail-in and absentee ballots resulting from the public health emergency may lead to slower than usual results reporting in some states. Election officials perform due diligence and follow defined processes to verify election results.  
☒ Verify your sources to ensure you are reading and sharing trusted information. Our adversaries may exploit post-election uncertainty through the spread of inaccurate information.

Results you see via media outlets are unofficial. Election officials are responsible for finalizing election results.



Direct2020Questions



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)





From: (b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Scully, Brian (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CC: (b)(6)

Subject: ESI Task and Review, 10/1

Date: 2020/10/01 17:01:07

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Good evening,

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

#### Current Priorities

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**Joint CFI/ESI Products**

(b)(5)

**ESI Tasks/Products:**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**CFI Products:**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Office (b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6) /o=EXCHANGE LABS/ou=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Recipient:**

Masterson, Matthew /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group  
(b)(6)  
Hale, Geoffrey /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group  
(b)(6)

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(6)  
Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/01 17:00:36  
**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/01 17:01:07

Page 022

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



Page 023

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 024

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 025

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 026

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 027

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 028

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



Page 029

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 030

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 031

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 032

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 033

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 034

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



Page 035

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 036

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 037

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 038

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 039

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 040

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



Page 041

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 042

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 043

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 044

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 045

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 046

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



Page 047

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 048

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 049

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 050

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 051

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 052

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 053

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



**From:** (b)(6)  
Scully, Brian (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**CC:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** <For Review> Weekly Digest  
**Date:** 2020/10/01 19:45:05  
**Priority:** Normal  
**Type:** Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi Brian and Team,

Please see the attached for the weekly digest. Feel free to reach out with any questions or comments.

Best Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Senior Consultant | Deloitte Advisory  
Deloitte & Touche LLP

Direct: (b)(6)

(b)(6) | [www.deloitte.com](http://www.deloitte.com)

This message (including any attachments) contains confidential information intended for a specific individual and purpose, and is protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient, you should delete this message and any disclosure, copying, or distribution of this message, or the taking of any action based on it, by you is strictly prohibited.

Deloitte refers to a Deloitte member firm, one of its related entities, or Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited ("DTTL"). Each Deloitte member firm is a separate legal entity and a member

v.E.1

Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(h)(6)  
(b)(6) J  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(h)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Message Flags:** Unread

**From:** (b)(6)  
Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**CC:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** <For Review> Weekly Digest  
**Date:** 2020/10/01 19:44:45  
**Priority:** Normal  
**Type:** Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi Brian and Team,

Please see the attached for the weekly digest. Feel free to reach out with any questions or comments.

Best Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Senior Consultant | Deloitte Advisory  
Deloitte & Touche LLP

Direct: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

[www.deloitte.com](http://www.deloitte.com)

This message (including any attachments) contains confidential information intended for a specific individual and purpose, and is protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient, you should delete this message and any disclosure, copying, or distribution of this message, or the taking of any action based on it, by you is strictly prohibited.

Deloitte refers to a Deloitte member firm, one of its related entities, or Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited ("DTTL"). Each Deloitte member firm is a separate legal entity and a member

of DTTL. DTTL does not provide services to clients. Please see [www.deloitte.com/about](http://www.deloitte.com/about) to learn more.

v.E.1

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
	Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/01 19:40:56
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/01 19:44:45
<b>Message Flags:</b>	Unread

OBTAI... FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) GROUP
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Alli (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) E (b)(6) =ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group
<b>CC:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	RE: Cross-sector Councils Update on Elections
<b>Date:</b>	2020/10/02 08:44:04
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

(b)(6)

My slides are attached. Let me know if you need anything else.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Phone: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Sent:</b>	Thursday, October 1, 2020 3:05 PM
<b>To:</b>	Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Cc:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	RE: Cross-sector Councils Update on Elections

Hi (b)(6)

Please send me your presentation by 9am tomorrow if you want it included in the webinar for the meeting.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

**From:** Snell, Allison (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, September 28, 2020 9:09 AM

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: Cross-sector Councils Update on Elections

(b)(6)

Matt may not be able to cover, but we'll find someone.

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, September 28, 2020 7:49:52 AM

**To:** Masterson, Matthew (b)(6); Snell, Allison

(b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

**Subject:** Cross-sector Councils Update on Elections

Good morning Matt,

Would you be able to discuss elections on the next cross-sector councils COVID-19 conference call this Friday, October 2?

We can put you on the agenda from 11:40-11:55am if that time works with your schedule.

Thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6) PMP

Stakeholder Engagement Division

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

O: (b)(6) | M: (b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Alli
	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) E
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	(b)(6)
(b)(6)	
<b>Sent Date:</b> 2020/10/02 08:43:31	
<b>Delivered Date:</b> 2020/10/02 08:44:04	

# ELECTION SECURITY UPDATE

## COVID-19 CROSS-SECTOR COUNCILS CALL







# E-Day -32

- 2020 Presidential General Election has begun  
North Carolina: initial batch of mail-in ballots sent on Sept. 4  
Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia, Wyoming: early in-person voting began on Sept. 18  
All states: initial delivery of military & overseas (UOCAVA) ballots sent by Sept. 19  
1.5 million+ votes already cast  
CISA Heightened Readiness Posture




# CISA Election Infrastructure Risk Products

- CISA recently published a risk assessment of election infrastructure. Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment. CISA also published two more targeted products [FOUO] Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (co-authored with EAC, FBI & NIST) Mail-in Voting in 2020 Infrastructure Risk Assessment.



# Election Infrastructure and Processes




- Attack surface for election infrastructure is broad and diverseIncludes county / sub-county managed systems with less cybersecurity expertise Includes vendors, such as voting system manufacturers, ballot printers, and database / website hosting servicesIntegrity attacks against state-level networked systems present particular risk




# Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic

- Response measures include significant policy & procedural change, varying by state  
Mail-in voting: many states expanding voting options and/or relaxing requirements, driven in part by voter demand  
In-person: all states implementing COVID-19 mitigation measures, some expanding early voting, some localities consolidating voting sites, poll worker recruitment incentives  
States tested changes during primaries  
November plans largely set, late changes possible due to litigation



# Mail-in Voting: Infrastructure and Process



- For mail-in voting, some risk shifts to outside entities, such as ballot printers, mail processing facilities, and the United States Postal Service. Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls, which build layers of safeguards to defend the process from manipulation





# Post-Election: Mapping

- Election security doesn't end after polls close on Nov. 3CISA mapped post-election processes from close of polls to Inauguration Day, including:

- Election Administration
- Inbound Mail Processing
- Tabulation
- Unofficial Results Reporting
- Canvass Process
- Provisional Adjudication & Cure
- Post-Election Audits
- Certification
- Recount
- Electoral College

of Electors  
Determination  
of Controversy  
Electoral College  
Vote Certificate of  
Vote Swearing-in  
of Congress  
Joint Meeting of  
Congress  
Inauguration  
Day



(b)(6)

October 2, 2020

# CISA Activities through Election Day

CISA has entered a heightened readiness posture to support election security: Increased pace and regularity of interagency coordination Regular unclassified threat reporting to election community Classified intelligence briefings for election stakeholders, as needed Near real-time push of technical threat indicators Election Day operations centers, including cyber situational awareness rooms Updated public messaging



# Be a “Three-P” Voter in 2020

- Developed in partnership with U.S. Election Assistance Commission  
Designed to encourage voters to:  
Be Prepared by staying informed about how voting may be different in their state this year  
Participate, if they can do so safely  
Be Patient on Election Night



**THE 2020 ELECTION MAY LOOK AND FEEL DIFFERENT BUT YOUR ENGAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL**

**BE A**  
☒ **PREPARED,**  
☒ **PARTICIPATING &**  
☒ **PATIENT**  
**VOTER**

Voters should look to their state and local election officials as the **trusted sources** for election information. Contact your election office directly or visit their websites and verified social media pages to ensure accurate election information and to minimize any potential for misinformation and disinformation. You may also visit the Election Assistance Commission at [eac.gov](http://eac.gov) for trusted information.

**BE PREPARED:**  
YOUR VOTING PROCESSES AND VOTING LOCATIONS MAY HAVE CHANGED

*Ahead of the election, prepare by:*

- ☒ Registering to vote. Some states require you to register 30 days before election day. If you are already registered, ensure your information is up-to-date. Please visit [vote.gov](http://vote.gov) for more information on how to register in your state.
- ☒ If you vote in person, don't forget to bring eligible identification documentation, if required in your state, and double-check your polling location-- it may have moved from the last election.
- ☒ If you vote by mail-in or absentee ballot, make sure to understand the requirements and ensure you return your ballot by the deadline. You may be allowed to return your mail-in or absentee ballot by hand (e.g., to a dropbox, election office, or voting location). Mail-in/absentee ballots should be requested ASAP to allow sufficient time for the mail to be delivered and returned.

**PARTICIPATE:**  
THE COUNTRY IS FACING A SHORTAGE OF ELECTION WORKERS



Please consider volunteering via [helpamericavote.gov](http://helpamericavote.gov).

- ☒ Elections are run locally by your neighbors. They could use your help to ensure a smooth election day for your community.

**BE PATIENT:**  
RESULTS MAY BE SLOWER THAN WHAT WE ARE USED TO IN PAST ELECTIONS

- ☒ Increased usage of mail-in and absentee ballots resulting from the public health emergency may lead to slower than usual results reporting in some states. Election officials perform due diligence and follow defined processes to verify election results.
- ☒ Results you see via media outlets are unofficial. Election officials are responsible for finalizing election results.
- ☒ Verify your sources to ensure you are reading and sharing trusted information. Our adversaries may exploit post-election uncertainty through the spread of inaccurate information.



(b)(6)

October 2, 2020



# Election Disinformation Toolkit


- Built around the theme that “We’re in This Together” Designed to support election officials’ efforts to: Communicate timely, trusted, verified election process details Mitigate against the effects of false or misleading information



The graphic displays two pages from the 'Election Disinformation Toolkit'. The top page is titled 'FAQs: STOPPING ELECTION DISINFORMATION' and features the theme 'We're in This Together. Disinformation Stops with You.' It lists three types of disinformation: Malinformation (false but not created with intent to harm), Misinformation (based on fact but used to mislead), and Disinformation (deliberately created to mislead). It also lists 'BEST SOURCES FOR ACCURATE & RELIABLE ELECTION INFORMATION' including state election authority, state and local official websites, and the Election Assistance Commission. The bottom page is titled 'We're in This Together. Disinformation Stops with You.' and provides detailed guidance for election officials on how to respond to disinformation, emphasizing the importance of being a trusted source and using strategic messaging. It includes a list of actions such as promoting election officials as the trusted source, ensuring voters get accurate information, and being prepared, participating, and patient. A small image of a smartphone screen with the text '#TRUSTEDINFO2020' is also visible.

# FBI-CISA Public Service Announcements

- Series of announcements in partnership with FBI highlighting threats to 2020 election. Topics include: False claims of hacking Cyber threats to voting processes Foreign disinformation about election results Spread of disinformation through online journals DDoS attacks





(b)(6)

(b)(6)

October 2, 2020














# MAIL-IN VOTING:

## ELECTION INTEGRITY SAFEGUARDS

### PROCEDURAL

SAFEGUARD	DESCRIPTION	IN-PERSON EQUIVALENT
 Ballot packages and envelopes	Many states coordinate with USPS to designate ballot packages as "Official Election Mail" to demonstrate authenticity.	None
 Signature attestation	In many states, ballot packages are signed by the voter attesting under penalty of perjury that they are the person who filled out the ballot.	A voter announces their name and address and signs a pollbook attesting their identity.
 Signature verification	In many states, election officials verify each signature manually or by using technology. In most states, there is an escalated review process for ballots flagged as having an issue.	Voters sign the poll book. However, there is no similar process for verifying in-person voter signatures prior to issuing voter a ballot.
 Voter validation	In some states, a voter's identity must be validated before the ballot proceeds to the tabulation process.	This process is the same for states with voter ID or proof of residency requirements.
 Voter authentication	In some states, each voter is authenticated by having a witness sign the ballot package or by having it notarized.	There is no pre-authentication equivalency. Some states have the opposite where an in-person voter's identity can be challenged.
 Cure process	In some states, if the voter cannot be validated or authenticated, the voter is contacted to correct any issues.	Similarly, the provisional process provides an additional round of checks before the ballot is accepted or rejected.

### PHYSICAL BALLOT



 Ballot style codes	Most ballots have proprietary style codes, such as timing marks, code channels, or QR codes. If the codes are not recognized by the voting machines, the ballot is rejected, and an election official manually reviews it.	N/A
 Ballot paper specifications	Most ballots are printed on a specific type of paper. If the paper does not match the specifications in length, paper weight, or opacity, the voting machine will reject the ballot.	N/A
 Ballot watermarks	Some ballots have watermarks indicating that the ballot is authentic. Watermarks are specific to each election and confirm the ballot was printed by an approved printing authority.	N/A





# ELECTION RESULTS REPORTING RISK AND MITIGATIONS

Results reporting systems have inherent risks, both static (risks to systems from cyber actors) and dynamic (risks to information over time). These risks can be managed through mitigating measures<sup>1</sup>.

	RISK	MITIGATING MEASURES
STATIC (SYSTEM) 	Like all technical systems, the technology used to report unofficial vote counts could be vulnerable to malicious attacks and errors.	Security measures such as physical transport of official data, and auditing measures help manage risk and ensure integrity of election results.
	Unofficial election reporting often occurs on public-facing websites, presenting an attack surface for malicious actors. A successful attack would not change official results but can endanger public confidence.	Ensure tabulation and reporting systems have controls in place, including strong passwords, multi-factor authentication, and firewalls. Maintain an air-gap from the official tabulation systems. Use duplicate systems and media sources for redundancy.
	Some jurisdictions electronically transmit, such as by modeming or email, unofficial results from polling locations, creating cyber risks such as person-in-the-middle attacks.	Jurisdiction should only use electronically transmitted results for unofficial reporting. Manually transmitted results should be used in the official tabulation system. Create duplicate copies and validate their consistency.
	Reporting results may have temporary data errors that will be corrected over time. Errors can occur through hand entry of data, miscommunication of results, and data transmission.	Every state has a canvass process to detect and mitigate these errors. Audits, such as risk-limiting audits, and validation against duplicate sources will allow for the detection and correction of these errors.
	Results reporting systems can be taken offline through availability attacks such as DDoS.	Security measures such as Intrusion Protection Systems, DDoS protection services, as well as duplicate sites and media sources ensure data availability.
DYNAMIC (INFORMATION) 	Dynamic risk exists because results change over time, which may confuse voters. Since the public may be unaware of this process, deviation from expected results may create suspicion and mistrust and enable misinformation and disinformation about election results.	Election officials should make every effort to provide transparency in the process, including reporting the number and types (e.g. absentee, provisional) of ballots yet to be counted. This helps educate voters on the variability of information.
	<b>Natural Evolution:</b> Tabulating election results may mean leads in electoral races change over time. Typically, this change occurs most dramatically on election night and into the canvass as election officials process and tabulate ballots.	Results evolve naturally as votes are counted through the canvass process to determine final, conclusive results. Educate voters and the media about the dynamic nature of results reporting through public messaging and engagement.
	<b>Errors and Corrections:</b> As in any system, accidental errors can occur within the dynamic environment of the unofficial election reporting system. When errors are caught and addressed, reporting numbers may change drastically over a short period of time.	The post-election canvass and audits, such as risk-limiting audits, are used to detect errors, make corrections, and determine final, conclusive results. Election officials may consider publicly logging the changes in unofficial results after election night.
	<b>Exit Polls:</b> While news organizations rarely use exit polls alone to call election results, leaked results of exit polling on election day can create public confusion about accuracy of final results.	Diverse methods of verifying quality of election data provides a measure of detection against compromises. Detecting anomalies that may maliciously or accidentally impact election results reporting allows election officials the opportunity to respond and resolve the issues.

DHS-125500112 05/31/2023

<sup>1</sup>Some information on this chart was derived from Stephen Pettigrew and Charles Stewart's recent analysis: "Protecting the Perilous Path of Election Returns" (2020)

**From:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6) S  
(b)(6)  
Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Alli  
**CC:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Graphics for 508 Compliance  
**Date:** 2020/10/05 12:19:25  
**Priority:** Normal  
**Type:** Note

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

(b)(6)

Attached are all five documents. Based on our conversation this morning and the fact that we were making edits to the Processing Factors, I figured it would be easier to send all as a single package, so that you have them in one location.

Further, as discussed last week, the intended processes for updates is as follows:

- • You and I track each week
- • On Thursday night, I will send all edits from the week to the Graphics Team
- • The Graphics Team will make the necessary edits and create a 508 compliant version by 12:00pm on Friday
  - • The "as of date" will be Thursday even though we are posting on Friday, since we are only tracking through Thursday
- • I will provide that to you for EA to post in the afternoon

Let me know if you have any questions or concerns regarding this information. Also, if you see any additional edits, please let me know.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Subject Matter Expert  
Lafayette Group Inc.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, October 2, 2020 5:04 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Graphics for 508 Compliance

(b)(6)

1. • CISA Mail in Voting Processing Factors Map (Note: Not attached...With (b)(6) and Graphics Team for final updates)
2. • CISA Mail in Voting Policy Changes Map
3. • CISA Mail in Voting Election Integrity Safeguards Infographic
4. • CISA Post Election Process Mapping Infographic
5. • CISA Election Results Reporting Risks Infographic

Please ensure these are 508 compliant before we push them to the CISA website. By Monday around 2 PM would be great if needed to get these done. If you need more time, just let me know and we can discuss.

Best,

(b)(6)

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6)

Cell (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)



**Sender:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

**Recipient:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/05 12:18:45

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/05 12:19:25

**Message Flags:** Unread



<b>From:</b>	McKinnis, Seth /O=EXCHANGE/ABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6) JOHNSON, LAUREN (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>CC:</b>	Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Election Infographics for Posting on CISA.gov
<b>Date:</b>	2020/10/05 12:34:32
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

Team,

We have the five infographics ready for publishing on the CISA website. All have been cleared by OCC, EA, and CISA Leadership and are 508 compliant. The five are:

1. • CISA Mail in Voting Processing Factors Map
2. • CISA Mail in Voting Policy Changes Map
3. • CISA Mail in Voting Election Integrity Safeguards Infographic
4. • CISA Post Election Process Mapping Infographic
5. • CISA Election Results Reporting Risks Infographic

Note: for the two maps, we will be updating them on a weekly basis with any late breaking changes from states. We will publish a new version each Friday through Election Day. The process for this update will be:

1. • ESI (me and Ryan) will track changes throughout week.
2. • Thursday PM, ESI will send all changes to LGI Graphics Team
3. • NLT Friday Noon, the Graphics Team will make the necessary edits and ensure 508 compliance.
  - a. • The "as of date" will be Thursday for each product.
4. • ESI will send to EA by 2 PM on Friday for publishing on CISA.gov by COB Friday.

Let me know if you have any questions. Thanks!

Best,

(b)(6) Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst | CISA (b)(6)  
(b)(6) cisa.dhs.gov 202-680-0058





<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
	(b)(6) S
	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Alli
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Geoff
	(b)(6)
	Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/05 12:34:29
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/05 12:34:32



# ELECTION RESULTS REPORTING RISK AND MITIGATIONS

Results reporting systems have inherent risks, both static (risks to systems from cyber actors) and dynamic (risks to information over time). These risks can be managed through mitigating measures<sup>1</sup>.

	RISK	MITIGATING MEASURES
STATIC (SYSTEM) 	Like all technical systems, the technology used to report unofficial vote counts could be vulnerable to malicious attacks and errors.	Security measures such as physical transport of official data, and auditing measures help manage risk and ensure integrity of election results.
	Unofficial election reporting often occurs on public-facing websites, presenting an attack surface for malicious actors. A successful attack would not change official results but can endanger public confidence.	Ensure tabulation and reporting systems have controls in place, including strong passwords, multi-factor authentication, and firewalls. Maintain an air-gap from the official tabulation systems. Use duplicate systems and media sources for redundancy.
	Some jurisdictions electronically transmit, such as by modeming or email, unofficial results from polling locations, creating cyber risks such as person-in-the-middle attacks.	Jurisdiction should only use electronically transmitted results for unofficial reporting. Manually transmitted results should be used in the official tabulation system. Create duplicate copies and validate their consistency.
	Reporting results may have temporary data errors that will be corrected over time. Errors can occur through hand entry of data, miscommunication of results, and data transmission.	Every state has a canvass process to detect and mitigate these errors. Audits, such as risk-limiting audits, and validation against duplicate sources will allow for the detection and correction of these errors.
	Results reporting systems can be taken offline through availability attacks such as DDoS.	Security measures such as Intrusion Protection Systems, DDoS protection services, as well as duplicate sites and media sources ensure data availability.
DYNAMIC (INFORMATION) 	Dynamic risk exists because results change over time, which may confuse voters. Since the public may be unaware of this process, deviation from expected results may create suspicion and mistrust and enable misinformation and disinformation about election results.	Election officials should make every effort to provide transparency in the process, including reporting the number and types (e.g. absentee, provisional) of ballots yet to be counted. This helps educate voters on the variability of information.
	<b>Natural Evolution:</b> Tabulating election results may mean leads in electoral races change over time. Typically, this change occurs most dramatically on election night and into the canvass as election officials process and tabulate ballots.	Results evolve naturally as votes are counted through the canvass process to determine final, conclusive results. Educate voters and the media about the dynamic nature of results reporting through public messaging and engagement.
	<b>Errors and Corrections:</b> As in any system, accidental errors can occur within the dynamic environment of the unofficial election reporting system. When errors are caught and addressed, reporting numbers may change drastically over a short period of time.	The post-election canvass and audits, such as risk-limiting audits, are used to detect errors, make corrections, and determine final, conclusive results. Election officials may consider publicly logging the changes in unofficial results after election night.
	<b>Exit Polls:</b> While news organizations rarely use exit polls alone to call election results, leaked results of exit polling on election day can create public confusion about accuracy of final results.	Diverse methods of verifying quality of election data provides a measure of detection against compromises. Detecting anomalies that may maliciously or accidentally impact election results reporting allows election officials the opportunity to respond and resolve the issues.

DHS-125500117 05/31/2023







<sup>1</sup>Some information on this chart was derived from Stephen Pettigrew and Charles Stewart's recent analysis: "Protecting the Perilous Path of Election Returns" (2020)






# MAIL-IN VOTING:

## ELECTION INTEGRITY SAFEGUARDS

### PROCEDURAL

SAFEGUARD	DESCRIPTION	IN-PERSON EQUIVALENT
 Ballot packages and envelopes	Many states coordinate with USPS to designate ballot packages as "Official Election Mail" to demonstrate authenticity.	None
 Signature attestation	In many states, ballot packages are signed by the voter attesting under penalty of perjury that they are the person who filled out the ballot.	A voter announces their name and address and signs a pollbook attesting their identity.
 Signature verification	In many states, election officials verify each signature manually or by using technology. In most states, there is an escalated review process for ballots flagged as having an issue.	Voters sign the poll book. However, there is no similar process for verifying in-person voter signatures prior to issuing voter a ballot.
 Voter validation	In some states, a voter's identity must be validated before the ballot proceeds to the tabulation process.	This process is the same for states with voter ID or proof of residency requirements.
 Voter authentication	In some states, each voter is authenticated by having a witness sign the ballot package or by having it notarized.	There is no pre-authentication equivalency. Some states have the opposite where an in-person voter's identity can be challenged.
 Cure process	In some states, if the voter cannot be validated or authenticated, the voter is contacted to correct any issues.	Similarly, the provisional process provides an additional round of checks before the ballot is accepted or rejected.

### PHYSICAL BALLOT

 Ballot style codes	Most ballots have proprietary style codes, such as timing marks, code channels, or QR codes. If the codes are not recognized by the voting machines, the ballot is rejected, and an election official manually reviews it.	N/A
 Ballot paper specifications	Most ballots are printed on a specific type of paper. If the paper does not match the specifications in length, paper weight, or opacity, the voting machine will reject the ballot.	N/A
 Ballot watermarks	Some ballots have watermarks indicating that the ballot is authentic. Watermarks are specific to each election and confirm the ballot was printed by an approved printing authority.	N/A





# POST ELECTION PROCESS MAPPING

This infographic provides a timeline of post-election processes for the 2020 presidential election from the close of polls on **Election Day, November 3, 2020, to Inauguration Day on January 20, 2021.**

## ELECTION TIMEFRAME

### ELECTION DAY



#### Close of In-Person Voting

Poll workers cease in-person voting and close their polling locations at a prescribed time, which varies by state and local jurisdiction. Individuals in line at closing are permitted to remain in line and vote. Polls close between 6:00 - 9:00 p.m. local time, unless extended by court order. Final polls close in Alaska at 1:00 a.m. Eastern Time on November 4, 2020.<sup>1</sup>



#### Inbound Mail Processing

Mail ballots must be returned using prescribed methods (i.e., by mail or dropped off at an approved location) and by a prescribed deadline, which vary by state. Some states require ballots be in the physical possession of election officials by the return deadline, which is typically Election Day, whereas others permit later receipt if mail ballots are postmarked by Election Day or meet other specified criteria. Mail-in ballot receipt deadlines range from 4:30 p.m. the day before Election Day in Louisiana to 17 days after Election Day in California.<sup>2</sup>

Military and overseas voters must also return Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots using prescribed methods and deadlines, which can differ from those for mail ballot return.



#### Tabulation

Tabulation is the process of totaling votes. Tabulation practices and timelines vary greatly by state and local jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, tabulation concludes on election night. In others, tabulation continues for days or weeks. Tabulation can take place in multiple locations (e.g., at individual polling locations and/or central locations), often depending on the types of ballots being tabulated.

Ballots cast in-person are typically tabulated at voting locations using scanners or direct recording electronic voting equipment. Tabulation reports from a specific voting location or machine can be made available when polls close.

Mail-in ballots are typically tabulated at a central location. Some jurisdictions tabulate mail-in ballots at polling locations. Mail-in ballots are often tabulated on Election Day, though in some locations the process occurs only after Election Day. In many locations mail ballot envelopes are validated, opened, and scanned prior to Election Day.

Provisional ballots are tabulated centrally during the canvass period in most jurisdictions.



#### Unofficial Results Reporting (Election Night Reporting)

Aggregating tabulation data, many state and local election officials begin reporting unofficial election results at the close of polls on election night, known as Election Night Reporting (ENR). In most states and jurisdictions, these unofficial results are updated periodically as more ballots are tabulated in the days or weeks after Election Day. Media outlets rely on unofficial results to report preliminary results totals and project election outcomes.

Due to expected increases in mail ballot usage, the percentage of votes tabulated and unofficial results released on election night is expected to be substantially lower than previous presidential elections. Results are not final until certification.



NOVEMBER 3,  
2020

### CANVASS



#### Canvass Process

The canvass process allows election officials to validate and count ballots that were not able to be counted on Election Day either because they were received after that, were cast provisionally, or otherwise needed additional adjudication. The canvass enables election officials to resolve discrepancies, validate vote counts, and take remedial actions to ensure completeness and accuracy before certification of election results. For each state, there are typically separate local and state deadlines by which a canvass must conclude and results are certified.



#### Provisional Ballot Adjudication

Nearly all states offer provisional ballots to individuals who claim registration and eligibility to vote but whose status cannot be confirmed at the time of voting. Provisional ballots are kept separate from other ballots until after the election when a determination can be made as to whether the ballot is counted (or partially counted). The timeline for adjudicating provisional ballots varies by state, but generally takes place within a few days after Election Day.



#### Cure Processes

Some states permit voters the opportunity to correct or “cure” deficiencies related to their submission of mail or provisional ballot packages, such as missing or mismatched signature, or lack of required ID or proof of residency at the polling location. Some jurisdictions proactively notify voters of the need to cure a discrepancy. Cure deadlines vary by state and can continue into the post-election period. The latest possible cure deadline is December 6 in New Jersey.<sup>3</sup>



#### Post-Election Audits

Some states require post-election audits as part of their canvass process. Such audits might include ballot reconciliation audits to account for ballots issued and cast, procedural audits to verify chain of custody or other procedures, and tabulation audits that validate the vote tallying equipment. Tabulation audits can vary from a traditional audit that examines how the voting equipment tallied a fixed percentage of ballots cast to a risk-limiting audit which provides human examination of a random sample of all voted ballots to statistically affirm election results.



STATE  
DEPENDENT

### CERTIFICATION



#### Certification of Results

Certification is the act of confirming the official results. This event occurs after officials tally results from all valid ballots and validate and legally approve results. Certification is typically completed by the state chief election official, governor, or a board of canvassers. For the presidential election, each state certifies the election of presidential and vice-presidential candidates’ electors to the Electoral College.<sup>4</sup>

State certification deadlines vary by state, ranging from a few days to several weeks after Election Day. The latest state certification deadline is December 18 in Arkansas.<sup>5</sup>



#### Recount

A recount is a process to determine the accuracy of an initial count. This can include a replication of the tabulation and/or a re-canvass of the election. Not all states offer a recount process. Twenty states and the District of Columbia provide for automatic recounts if the margin between the top two candidates is within certain parameters. In other states, specified people (e.g., candidates or voters) may request a recount.<sup>6</sup> A recount may conclude with an updated certification of results.









STATE  
DEPENDENT



# POST ELECTION PROCESS MAPPING



## APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENT

ELECTORAL COLLEGE		<b>Ascertainment of Electors</b> Per Federal law, each state’s chief executive creates and submits a Certificate of Ascertainment listing the persons appointed as presidential and vice-presidential electors to the Archivist of the United States (and others). This certificate must be submitted “as soon as practicable” after the “final ascertainment” of the appointment of the electors, or “as soon as practicable” after the “final determination of any controversy or contest” concerning such election under its statutory procedure for election contests.	 STATE DEPENDENT
		<b>Determination of Controversy</b> Per Federal law, each state makes its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of its electors “at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors.” <sup>7</sup>	 DEC. 8, 2020
		<b>Meeting and Vote of the Electoral College</b> Per the Constitution and Federal law, each state’s appointed electors are required to meet at a place designated by that state on the “first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their appointment” and cast their votes for president and vice president. <sup>8</sup>	 DEC. 14, 2020
		<b>Certificate of Vote</b> Per Federal law each state’s electors, after voting, create Certificates of Vote, listing the electors’ votes for president and vice president, and submit them to the President of the Senate, the Archivist of United States, the state’s secretary of state, and the federal judge in the district where the electors have assembled. <sup>9</sup>  If no Certificates of Vote have been received by the President of the Senate or the Archivist from a state’s electors by December 23, 2020, (“the fourth Wednesday in December”), Federal law requires the President of the Senate to request immediate submission of the certificates lodged with the state’s secretary of state and federal district judge. <sup>10</sup>	 DEC.23, 2020
SWEARING IN OF CONGRESS		<b>Swearing in of Congress</b> Per the Constitution and Federal Law, the new congress is sworn in on January 3. Prior any other business, any Member of the House of Representatives administers the oath of office to the Speaker, after which the Speaker administers the oath of office to all the Members present; and to any Members who afterward appear, prior to Members taking their seats. <sup>11</sup>	 JAN. 3, 2021
JOINT MEETING OF CONGRESS		<b>Joint Meeting of Congress</b> Per the Constitution and Federal law, the U.S. Congress meets in joint session on “the sixth day of January succeeding every meeting of the electors” to count the electoral votes submitted by each state’s electors and declare the winners of the presidential and vice-presidential election. <sup>12</sup> Procedures for how Congress counts votes and addresses objections to state vote counts are detailed in the Constitution and Federal law.	 JAN. 6, 2021
INAUGURATION DAY		<b>Inauguration Day</b> The President and Vice President’s terms in office end at noon on January 20, 2021, as required by the Constitution. <sup>13</sup> The new terms of the successor or re-elected president and vice president begin at the same time.	 JAN. 20, 2021

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/electiondatesandhours.php>

<sup>2</sup> LSA-R.S. 18-1311. CA Elec Code § 3020

<sup>3</sup> Voters have "48 hours prior to the date for the final certification ... to provide a cure." [https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2020/bills/A4500/4276\\_r2.pdf](https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2020/bills/A4500/4276_r2.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> Under Federal law, “electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State” on Election Day, that is, the “Tuesday next after the first Monday in November” every fourth year. 3 U.S.C. §1

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.nass.org/resources/2018-election-information/Canvassing-Timeframes-and-Recount-Thresholds>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-recount-thresholds.aspx>

<sup>7</sup> 3 U.S.C. §5

<sup>8</sup> 3 U.S.C. §7

<sup>9</sup> 3 U.S.C. §11

<sup>10</sup> 3 U.S.C. §12-13

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Constitution, amend. 20, sec 1. 2 U.S.C. §25

<sup>12</sup> 3 USC §15


<sup>13</sup> U.S. Constitution, amend. 20, sec 1





# MAIL-IN VOTING 2020 POLICY CHANGES

AS OF OCTOBER 2, 2020. NOTE: Additional changes to state mail-in voting policies may have occurred since this date.\*



**5** Mail Ballot To All Registered Voters

**5** Policy Change— Mail Ballot To All Registered Voters

**25** Absentee— No Excuse Required

**10** Absentee Policy Change— Relaxed Excuse


**6** Absentee— Excuse Required

\*This document is for information purposes only and may be subject to change as a result of litigation or changes to state laws. This data is sourced from state election calendars, NCSL, NASS, and NASED. CISA does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information. Voters should seek the most up-to-date election information from their state and local elected officials.



# MAIL-IN VOTING PROCESSING FACTORS

AS OF OCTOBER 2, 2020. NOTE: Additional changes to state mail-in ballot processing factors may have occurred since this date.\*



\*This document is for information purposes only and may be subject to change as a result of litigation or changes to state laws. This data is sourced from state election calendars, NCSL, NASS, and NASED. CISA does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information. Voters should seek the most up-to-date election information from their state and local elected officials.



OBTAINED BY AMERICAN FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(6)	
McKinnis, Seth (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)	
From:	(b)(6) S
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)	
(b)(6) (b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
To:	(b)(6)
Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6) (b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
CISA CurOps (b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
cc:	(b)(6)
(b)(6)	
Subject: FOR REVIEW: 2020 General Election Risk Posture	
Date: 2020/10/05 16:08:12	
Importance: High	
Priority: Urgent	
Type: Note	

Matt, Geoff, Alexis, and (b)(6)

A moment long awaited....attached is our draft 2020 General Election Risk Posture for concurrent ESI, IOD, and CSD review, ahead of the November 3<sup>rd</sup> election (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Columbia. Note that the map on page 3 is clickable. Simply select any state and you'll jump to that entity within the PDF.

If we could get feedback or clearance by 3 PM on Thursday October 8th, that would be great. If you need more time for review, just let me know. Thanks!

Best,

(b)(6)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6) JWICS: (b)(6)



<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
	Wales, Alexis (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (b)(6) Alli
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6) (b)(6)

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(6)
(b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b> 2020/10/05 16:07:36
<b>Delivered Date:</b> 2020/10/05 16:08:12

From: (b)(6)

To: Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

Snell, Allison / (b)(6)

Scully, Brian (b)(6)

CC: Sendek, Sara (b)(6)

Subject: ESI Task and Review, 10/5

Date: 2020/10/05 17:32:53

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Good evening,

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

#### Current Priorities

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**Joint CFI/ESI Products**

(b)(5)

**ESI Tasks/Products:**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**CFI Products:**

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
	Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	Snell, Allison / (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	Scully, Brian (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b> 2020/10/05 17:32:14	
<b>Delivered Date:</b> 2020/10/05 17:32:53	
<b>Message Flags:</b> Unread	

Wales, Alexis (b)(5)

**From:** (b)(5)

(b)(6)

Bartoli-Munro, Yvonne /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group  
**To:** (b)(6) 101ed2da24135b4d0b852a4a85540-Bartoli-Mun  
<Yvonne.Bartoli-Munro@cisa.dhs.gov>;  
Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Alli  
(b)(6)

**cc:** (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: 0900 With the National Security Council

**Date:** 2020/10/06 08:50:40

**Priority:** Normal

**Type:** Note

(b)(5)

**Alexis K. Wales**

Election Security Mission Manager

Cybersecurity Division

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Mobile: (b)(6)

**From** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 8:48 AM

**To:** Wales, Alexis (b)(6)

(b)(6) >; Snell, Allison <(b)(6)>

**Cc:** Roebuck, Jermaine (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: 0900 With the National Security Council

Hi Alexis,



Does Thursday by 3pm work? I can reshuffle some things, if we need it sooner.

Best,  
Kyle Parks

(b)(6)

Election Operations Team  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 8:45 AM

**To:** (b)(6) Snell, Allison

(b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: 0900 With the National Security Council

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

**Alexis K. Wales**

Election Security Mission Manager  
Cybersecurity Division  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Mobile: (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 8:44 AM

**To:** (b)(6) Snell, Allison (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: 0900 With the National Security Council

Alexis,  
Will do.  
Regards,  
Yvonne

---

**From:** Wales, Alexis (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 8:43 AM

**To:** (b)(6) Snell, Allison

(b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

Freitas, Ashley <Ashley.Freitas@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** 0900 With the National Security Council

@Bartoli-Munro, Yvonne & @Allison Snell

I have a 0845 this morning with IOD leadership that will likely go the full 30 minutes.

(b)(5)

Best,  
Alexis

**Alexis K. Wales**

Election Security Mission Manager  
Cybersecurity Division  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Mobile: (b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/06 08:50:34
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/06 08:50:40

STATE  
ALABAMA  
ALASKA  
ARIZONA  
ARKANSAS  
CALIFORNIA  
COLORADO  
CONNECTICUT  
DELAWARE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
FLORIDA  
GEORGIA  
HAWAII  
IDAHO  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
KANSAS  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MAINE  
MARYLAND  
MASSACHUSETTS  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
MISSISSIPPI  
MISSOURI  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEVADA  
NEW HAMPSHIRE  
NEW JERSEY  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
NORTH DAKOTA  
OHIO  
OKLAHOMA  
OREGON  
PENNSYLVANIA  
RHODE ISLAND  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
TENNESSEE  
TEXAS  
UTAH  
VERMONT  
VIRGINIA  
WASHINGTON  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING  
ALABAMA

ALASKA  
ARIZONA  
ARKANSAS  
CALIFORNIA  
COLORADO  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
FLORIDA  
GEORGIA  
HAWAII  
IDAHO  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
IOWA  
KANSAS  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MAINE  
MARYLAND  
MASSACHUSETTS  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEVADA  
NEW JERSEY  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
NORTH DAKOTA  
OHIO  
OKLAHOMA  
OREGON  
RHODE ISLAND  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
TENNESSEE  
TEXAS  
UTAH  
VERMONT  
VIRGINIA  
WASHINGTON  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING  
ALABAMA  
ALASKA  
ARIZONA  
ARKANSAS  
CALIFORNIA  
COLORADO  
CONNECTICUT  
DELAWARE

FLORIDA  
GEORGIA  
HAWAII  
IDAHO  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
IOWA  
KANSAS  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MAINE  
MARYLAND  
MASSACHUSETTS  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
MISSISSIPPI  
MISSOURI  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEVADA  
NEW HAMPSHIRE  
NEW JERSEY  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
NORTH DAKOTA  
OHIO  
OKLAHOMA  
OREGON  
PENNSYLVANIA  
RHODE ISLAND  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
TENNESSEE  
TEXAS  
UTAH  
VERMONT  
VIRGINIA  
WASHINGTON  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING  
ALABAMA  
ALASKA  
ARIZONA  
ARKANSAS  
CALIFORNIA  
CONNECTICUT  
DELAWARE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
FLORIDA  
GEORGIA

IDAHO  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
IOWA  
KANSAS  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MAINE  
MARYLAND  
MASSACHUSETTS  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
MISSOURI  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEVADA  
NEW HAMPSHIRE  
NEW JERSEY  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
OHIO  
OKLAHOMA  
PENNSYLVANIA  
RHODE ISLAND  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
TENNESSEE  
TEXAS  
VERMONT  
VIRGINIA  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING  
CALIFORNIA  
COLORADO  
LOUISIANA  
WASHINGTON  
ARIZONA  
CALIFORNIA  
COLORADO  
FLORIDA  
HAWAII  
INDIANA  
IOWA  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MONTANA  
NEVADA  
NEW JERSEY  
OHIO  
OREGON

RHODE ISLAND  
UTAH  
VIRGINIA  
WASHINGTON  
WISCONSIN  
ALABAMA  
ALASKA  
ARIZONA  
ARKANSAS  
COLORADO  
CONNECTICUT  
DELAWARE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
FLORIDA  
GEORGIA  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
IOWA  
KANSAS  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MARYLAND  
MASSACHUSETTS  
MICHIGAN  
MISSISSIPPI  
MISSOURI  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEVADA  
NEW JERSEY  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
OHIO  
OKLAHOMA  
OREGON  
PENNSYLVANIA  
RHODE ISLAND  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
TENNESSEE  
TEXAS  
UTAH  
VERMONT  
VIRGINIA  
WASHINGTON  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING  
ALABAMA  
ALASKA  
ARIZONA

ARKANSAS  
CALIFORNIA  
COLORADO  
CONNECTICUT  
DELAWARE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
FLORIDA  
GEORGIA  
IDAHO  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
IOWA  
KANSAS  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MAINE  
MARYLAND  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
MISSISSIPPI  
MISSOURI  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEVADA  
NEW JERSEY  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
NORTH DAKOTA  
OHIO  
OKLAHOMA  
OREGON  
PENNSYLVANIA  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
TENNESSEE  
TEXAS  
UTAH  
VERMONT  
VIRGINIA  
WASHINGTON  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING  
ALABAMA  
ALASKA  
ARIZONA  
ARKANSAS  
CALIFORNIA  
COLORADO  
CONNECTICUT  
DELAWARE



DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FLORIDA

GEORGIA

IDAHO

ILLINOIS

INDIANA

IOWA

KANSAS

KENTUCKY

LOUISIANA

MAINE

MARYLAND

MASSACHUSETTS

MICHIGAN

MINNESOTA

MISSOURI

MONTANA

NEBRASKA

NEVADA

NEW HAMPSHIRE

NEW JERSEY

NEW MEXICO

NEW YORK

NORTH CAROLINA

NORTH DAKOTA

OHIO

OKLAHOMA

OREGON

PENNSYLVANIA

SOUTH CAROLINA

SOUTH DAKOTA

TENNESSEE

TEXAS

UTAH

VERMONT

VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON

WEST VIRGINIA

WISCONSIN

WYOMING

ALABAMA

ALASKA

ARIZONA

ARKANSAS

CALIFORNIA

COLORADO

CONNECTICUT

DELAWARE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FLORIDA

GEORGIA

HAWAII

IDAHO  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
IOWA  
KANSAS  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MAINE  
MASSACHUSETTS  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
MISSISSIPPI  
MISSOURI  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEVADA  
NEW HAMPSHIRE  
NEW JERSEY  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
NORTH DAKOTA  
OHIO  
OKLAHOMA  
OREGON  
PENNSYLVANIA  
RHODE ISLAND  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
TENNESSEE  
TEXAS  
UTAH  
VERMONT  
VIRGINIA  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING  
ALABAMA  
ALASKA  
ARIZONA  
ARKANSAS  
CALIFORNIA  
CONNECTICUT  
DELAWARE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
FLORIDA  
GEORGIA  
IDAHO  
IOWA  
KENTUCKY  
LOUISIANA  
MAINE

MARYLAND  
MASSACHUSETTS  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
MISSISSIPPI  
MISSOURI  
MONTANA  
NEBRASKA  
NEW HAMPSHIRE  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW YORK  
NORTH CAROLINA  
NORTH DAKOTA  
OREGON  
PENNSYLVANIA  
RHODE ISLAND  
SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
VERMONT  
WEST VIRGINIA  
WISCONSIN  
WYOMING



[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-07
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-05
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-25
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-12
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-20
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-24
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-06
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-05
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-14
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-13
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-16
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-05
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-26
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-17
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-24
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-18
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-01
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-05
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-17
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-17
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-24
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-15
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-06
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-29
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-16
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-14
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-05
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-18
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-14
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-17
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-20
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-19
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-16
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-21
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-10-20
[DATE FIELD] EARLY VOTING BEGINS	2020-09-24
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-09-09
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-10-09
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-10-07
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-09-18
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-10-05
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-10-09
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-10-02
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE BALLOT MAILING START DATE	2020-09-19



[illegible]

DHS-1255001145 05/31/2023

[illegible]



DHS-1255001147 05/31/2023

DHS-1255001148 05/31/2023

2020-11-03  
2020-11-03  
2020-10-27  
2020-10-27  
2020-10-27  
2020-10-05  
2020-10-20  
2020-10-30  
2020-11-03  
2020-10-12  
2020-10-19  
2020-10-27  
2020-10-31  
2020-10-01  
2020-11-02  
2020-10-27



[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-01
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-25
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-02
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-20
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-03
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-29
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-02
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-26
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-29
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-20
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-03
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-09-29
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-02
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-27
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-03
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-14
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-01
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-03
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-02
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-10-21
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-03
[DATE FIELD] MAIL-IN/ABSENTEE PROCESSING CAN BEGIN	2020-11-03

0.0  
2.0  
8.0  
5.0  
10.0  
8.0  
20.0  
25.0  
17.0  
26.0  
18.0  
25.0  
  
26.0  
18.0  
21.0  
13.0  
7.0  
11.0  
  
18.0  
21.0  
33.0  
11.0  
11.0  
10.0  
4.0  
10.0  
0.0  
12.0  
1.0  
1.0  
19.0  
6.0  
5.0  
12.0  
9.0  
24.0  
21.0  
5.0  
7.0  
0.0  
0.0  
10.0  
0.0  
9.0  
0.0  
0.0  
0.0  
10.0  
3.0  
0.0

0.0  
0.0  
0.0  
-3.0  
-3.0  
1.0  
0.0  
0.0  
-14.0  
0.0  
0.0  
3.0  
0.0  
0.0  
-4.0  
0.0  
-7.0  
-1.0  
6.0  
6.0  
1.0  
0.0  
0.0  
0.0  
4.0  
7.0  
2.0  
0.0  
0.0  
5.0  
6.0  
-1.0  
0.0  
0.0  
-6.0  
0.0  
22.0  
29.0  
34.0  
52.0  
67.0  
36.0  
6.0  
21.0  
36.0  
29.0  
22.0  
30.0  
53.0  
31.0  
27.0

68.0

41.0

42.0

30.0

40.0

28.0

35.0

45.0

34.0

56.0

18.0

37.0

7.0

17.0

7.0

8.0

43.0

28.0

8.0

From: (b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

CC: (b)(6)

Subject: ESI Task and Review, 10/6

Date: 2020/10/06 16:02:59

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Good afternoon,

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

#### Current Priorities

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

**Joint CFI/ESI Products**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**CFI Products:**

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Recipient:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/06 16:02:20

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/06 16:02:59

**From:**

Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**To:**

(b)(6)

**CC:**

Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

**Date:** 2020/10/06 11:42:54

**Priority:** Normal

Type: Note

(b)(6)

Meant to copy you too.

Thanks.

R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief, Election Infrastructure SSA/Partner Engagements  
NRMC, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

*With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values*

From: (b)(6) (b)(6) >

Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 11:42 AM

To: Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)

(b)(6) Snell, Allison (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

(b)(6)

Geoff,

Good morning. Forwarding the proposed NRMC Election Poll Worker Study COA email string between Bob and (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

I provide some proposed email verbiage below for review/approval. Any/all mods welcome:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

R,

XXXX

(b)(5)

separately. I am glad to send unless one of you wants to email them.

Glad to call to discuss if needed.

Thanks.

R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief, Election Infrastructure SSA/Partner Engagements  
NRMC, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

*With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values*

**From:** Kolasky, Robert (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 11:07 AM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

Looks good. COA approved

(b)(6)

Assistant Director, DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
National Risk Management Center

(b)(6)

From (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 10:50 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

Bob,

Working with (b)(6) and their contacts, (b)(6) and I have arrived at three possible courses of action (detailed below). The first is our recommended course of action, in case you do not have time to review the options we dismissed as non-viable or less-than desirable.)

Please let us know how you would like to proceed.

(b)(6)

please feel free to comment further if I have missed or mischaracterized anything. (And thank you for your assistance, your insights were invaluable.)

**Election Worker Shortage Outreach  
Proposed Courses of Action**

**COA #1 – (Recommended) ESI reach out to Executive Directors at EAC, NASS, and NASED**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Page 124

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



(b)(6)

COVID-19 Incident Response Analysis Cell (IRAC) Lead

National Risk Management Center

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Mobile: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)



CISA Wordmark CMYK 20181115\_4 color seal with dk blue

text

<b>Sender:</b>	Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Alli
	(b)(6)
	Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/06 11:42:53
	<b>Delivered Date:</b> 2020/10/06 11:42:54

From: (b)(6)  
Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)  
To: (b)(6)  
Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Scully, Brian (b)(6)  
CC: (b)(6)  
Subject: ESI Task and Review, 10/6  
Date: 2020/10/06 16:03:00  
Priority: Normal  
Type: Note

Good afternoon,

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

#### Current Priorities

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**CATT Taskings**

(b)(5)

**Joint CFI/ESI Products**

(b)(5)

**ESI Tasks/Products:**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**CFI Products:**

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Recipient:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/06 16:02:20

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/06 16:03:00

**Message Flags:** Unread

**From:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**To:**

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**CC:**

Figueroa, Juan

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

**Date:** 2020/10/06 11:42:54

<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

(b)(6)

Meant to copy you too.

Thanks.

R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief, Election Infrastructure SSA/Partner Engagements  
NRMCC, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Office (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6) Email (b)(6)

*With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values*

---

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 11:42 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) Hale, Geoffrey  
(b)(6)  
**Cc:** Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

(b)(6) Geoff,

Good morning. Forwarding the proposed NRMCC Election Poll Worker Study COA email string between (b)(6) (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

I provide some proposed email verbiage below for review/approval. Any/all mods welcome:

(b)(6), (separate emails)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

R,

XXXX

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

I am glad to send unless one of you wants to email them.

Glad to call to discuss if needed.

Thanks.

R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief, Election Infrastructure SSA/Partner Engagements  
NRMC, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Office (b)(6) Cell (b)(6) Email (b)(6)

*With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values*

**From:** Kolasky, Robert (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 11:07 AM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

Looks good. COA approved

(b)(6)

*Assistant Director, DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
National Risk Management Center*

(b)(6)

**From** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 10:50 AM

**To:** Kolasky, Robert <robert.kolasky@cisa.dhs.gov>

**Cc** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

Bob,

Working with (b)(6) and their contacts, (b)(6) and I have arrived at three possible courses of action (detailed below). The first is our recommended course of action, in case you do not have time to review the options we dismissed as non-viable or less-than desirable.)

Please let us know how you would like to proceed.

(b)(6) please feel free to comment further if I have missed or mischaracterized anything. (And thank you for your assistance, your insights were invaluable.)

**Election Worker Shortage Outreach  
Proposed Courses of Action**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



Page 133

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

(b)(6)

COVID-19 Incident Response Analysis Cell (IRAC) Lead  
National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Mobile: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)



CISA Wordmark CMYK 20181115\_4 color seal with dk blue

text

<b>Sender:</b>	Figueroa, Juan /O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP	
	(b)(6)	J
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)	
	(b)(6)	
	Snell, Allison	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	Figueroa, Juan	J
<b>Sent Date:</b> 2020/10/06 11:42:53		
<b>Delivered Date:</b> 2020/10/06 11:42:54		

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Scully, Brian (b)(6)

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

**CC:** (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Docs for govt/industry Synch?

**Date:** 2020/10/07 13:20:14

**Priority:** Normal

**Type:** Note

Hi (b)(6)

Attached please find the Election Infrastructure Processing Infographics to share during today's call, which will be rolled out shortly.

Thanks!

(b)(6)

Election Infrastructure Sector-Specific Agency  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Department of Homeland Security  
Office (b)(6)  
Cell (b)(6)  
NEW: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Scully, Brian (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 9:58 AM

**To:** Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6) Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: Docs for govt/industry Synch?

Sounds good. Thanks.

Brian Scully  
DHS Countering Foreign Interference Task Force  
National Risk Management Center  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** Snell, Allison (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 9:57:14 AM

**To:** Scully, Brian (b)(6) Masterson, Matthew

(b)(6); Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
**Cc:** JOHNSON, LAUREN <lauren.johnson@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Docs for govt/industry Synch?

We're rolling them out shortly. (b)(6) will send you the links and files shortly.

**Allison L. Snell**  
Election Security Initiative  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Cell (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Scully, Brian (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 9:24 AM  
**To:** Masterson, Matthew (b)(6) Hale, Geoffrey  
(b)(6); Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Docs for govt/industry Synch?

Did you all have any documents you'd like me to share with our govt and industry partners before the call?

Brian Scully  
DHS Countering Foreign Interference Task Force  
National Risk Management Center

(b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6) Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:18:13
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:20:14

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

**From**

(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**To:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**CC:**

**Date:** 2020/10/07 13:31:13

**Type:** Note

(b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Wales, Alexis (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Recipient:**

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/07 13:31:08

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/07 13:31:13

<b>From:</b>	Scully, Brian (b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>CC:</b>	Matthew Masterson (b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Docs for govt/industry synch
<b>Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:32:00
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

(b)(6) and (b)(6)

Matt plans to mention the attached during the call this afternoon. Could you please share with your industry colleagues?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	Scully, Brian (b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	Matthew Masterson (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:32:41
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:32:00



From: (b)(6)

To: Scully, Brian (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

CC: Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Final Dataset and Viz - Key Election Dates

Date: 2020/10/07 13:36:53

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

(b)(6) See attached for the Key Election Dates dataset (and visualization package, if they are interested) to send to social media companies ahead of our meeting.

Best,

(b)(6) Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst | CISA (b)(6)  
(b)(6)



From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 2:39 PM

To: Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Subject: Final Dataset and Viz - Key Election Dates

Team,

See attached for our final dataset and updated visualization dashboard for key election dates in all 50 states and DC. I've also attached a screenshot of the dashboard as well, which now includes new datapoints, such as early voting dates, the UOCAVA mailing deadline, and the Electoral College Meeting and Vote date.

For those of you with NRMCMCTE access you can access the live dashboard here:

[https://analytics.nrmcanalysis.dhs.gov/#/views/PostElectionProject\\_2020\\_v1\\_1/dashboard\\_screen?:iid=2](https://analytics.nrmcanalysis.dhs.gov/#/views/PostElectionProject_2020_v1_1/dashboard_screen?:iid=2)

Dave, let me know if you need anything on this as we send out to the partners.

Best,

(b)(6)

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

JWICS (b)(6)



<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
	Scully, Brian (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:36:16
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:36:53

From: (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

CC: Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: Final Dataset and Viz - Key Election Dates

**Date:** 2020/10/07 13:36:54

**Priority:** Normal

**Type:** Note

(b)(6) See attached for the Key Election Dates dataset (and visualization package, if they are interested) to send to social media companies ahead of our meeting.

Best,

(b)(6) Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst | CISA | (b)(6)  
(b)(6)



From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 2:39 PM

To: Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** Final Dataset and Viz - Key Election Dates

Team,

See attached for our final dataset and updated visualization dashboard for key election dates in all 50 states and DC. I've also attached a screenshot of the dashboard as well, which now includes new datapoints, such as early voting dates, the UOCAVA mailing deadline, and the Electoral College Meeting and Vote date.

For those of you with NRMCMCTE access you can access the live dashboard here:

[https://analytics.nrmcanalysis.dhs.gov/#/views/PostElectionProject\\_2020\\_v1\\_1/dashboard\\_screen?:iid=2](https://analytics.nrmcanalysis.dhs.gov/#/views/PostElectionProject_2020_v1_1/dashboard_screen?:iid=2)

Dave, let me know if you need anything on this as we send out to the partners.

Best,

**Seth McKinnis**

Cyber and Infrastructure Risk Analyst, National Risk Management Center

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)



<b>Sender:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	Snell, Allison (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:36:16
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/07 13:36:54

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	
<b>CC:</b>	
<b>Subject:</b>	FW: Final Dataset and Viz - Key Election Dates
<b>Date:</b>	2020/10/07 14:14:00
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

Sorry...a few documents I missed. These are also for distro to industry partners.

(b)(6)	
<b>Sender</b>	(b)(6)
<b>Recipient</b>	
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/07 14:14:40
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/07 14:14:00

<b>From:</b>	Scully, Brian <(b)(6)> (b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>CC:</b>	Matthew Masterson (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	FW: Final Dataset and Viz - Key Election Dates
<b>Date:</b>	2020/10/07 15:11:00
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

Hey (b)(6)

Here's the dataset. We shared with Facebook to send out after the call started, so I suspect you'll receive from them as well.

Regards,

(b)(6)

<b>Sender:</b>	Scully, Brian (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6) Matthew Masterson (b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/07 15:11:32
<b>Delivered Date:</b>	2020/10/07 15:11:00

From: (b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Scully, Brian (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CC: (b)(6)

Subject: ESI Task and Review, 10/7

Date: 2020/10/07 17:27:53

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Good evening,

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

#### Current Priorities

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**CATT Taskings**

(b)(5)

**Joint CFI/ESI Products**

(b)(5)

**ESI Tasks/Products:**

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

**CFI Products:**

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/07 17:27:19

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/07 17:27:53

**From:**

Figueroa, Juan /O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=CD94355784CA4EF5AD94F9425E51A66A-FIGUEROA, J <juan.figueroa@cisa.dhs.gov>

**To:**

Brown, Keisha /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=bd70df25b75a4595aea61bbdecbbdb70-Brown, Keis <keisha.brown@cisa.dhs.gov>

**CC:**

Snell, Allison /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=39243cc21189404aa7f73a21e5e1f1c7-Snell, Alli <Allison.Snell@cisa.dhs.gov>;  
Figueroa, Juan /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=cd94355784ca4ef5ad94f9425e51a66a-Figueroa, J <juan.figueroa@cisa.dhs.gov>

**Subject:** FW: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

**Date:** 2020/10/06 11:42:54

**Priority:** Normal

Type: Note

(b)(6)

Meant to copy you too.

Thanks.

R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief, Election Infrastructure SSA/Partner Engagements  
NRMC, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

*With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values*

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 11:42 AM

To: Masterson, Matthew (b)(6); Hale, Geoffrey

(b)(6)

Cc: Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)

(b)(6) Snell, Allison (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

(b)(6) Geoff,

Good morning. Forwarding the proposed NRMC Election Poll Worker Study COA email string between (b)(6) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

I provide some proposed email verbiage below for review/approval. Any/all mods welcome:

(b)(6) (separate emails)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

R,

XXXX

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

I am glad to send unless one of you wants to email them.

Glad to call to discuss if needed.

Thanks.

R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief, Election Infrastructure SSA/Partner Engagements  
NRMCC, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

*With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values*

**From:** Kolasky, Robert (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 11:07 AM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6),

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

Looks good. COA approved

*Bob Kolasky*

*Assistant Director, DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
National Risk Management Center*

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 10:50 AM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Election Worker Survey COA Recommendation

Bob,

Working with (b)(6) and their contacts, (b)(6) and I have arrived at three possible courses of action (detailed below). The first is our recommended course of action, in case you do not have time to review the options we dismissed as non-viable or less-than desirable.)

Please let us know how you would like to proceed.

(b)(6)

please feel free to comment further if I have missed or mischaracterized anything. (And thank you for your assistance, your insights were invaluable.)

**Election Worker Shortage Outreach  
Proposed Courses of Action**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)


(b)(5)

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(6)

COVID-19 Incident Response Analysis Cell (IRAC) Lead  
National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Mobile: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)



CISA Wordmark CMYK 20181115\_4 color seal with dk blue

text

<b>Sender:</b>	Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Recipient:</b>	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	Figueroa, Juan (b)(6)
<b>Sent Date:</b>	2020/10/06 11:42:53
	<b>Delivered Date:</b> 2020/10/06 11:42:54

<b>From:</b>	(b)(6)
	Snell, Allison (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>To:</b>	DaRosa, Antonio (b)(5)
	(b)(6) (b)(5)
	(b)(6)
<b>CC:</b>	(b)(6)
	(FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=09bf25a812744a449c728078be1c6b73-Brett.Rouze <brett.r.rouze@hq.dhs.gov>;
	Ryan, William J (b)(6)
	(b)(6) (b)(6)
<b>Subject:</b>	Regional ODNI meeting
<b>Date:</b>	2020/10/08 15:01:48
<b>Priority:</b>	Normal
<b>Type:</b>	Note

Allison Tony

File this request under never a dull moment in RII.

FBI NY is hosting the DNI regional meeting on the 19<sup>th</sup>. The whole topic of elections has been pretty much beaten like a baby seal. So they've asked me to speak about what to expect the day/days after election day. I don't think saying I plan on having a massive hangover will fly. Looking to pick your brains for some things to talk about. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

But I'm thinking :

(b)(5)

I'll get the dates for PA NY NJ when ballots need to be counted by and I'll speak with Bill for his input but I'm curious as to what you would advise, recommend I speak about maybe some TPS

(b)(6)

Regional Director | Region II: NY, NJ, PR and USVI  
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Cell: (b)(6)

Email (b)(6)

**Sender:** Durkin, John /O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP



(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

DaRosa, Antonio (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Recipient:** (b)(6)

Ryan, William J (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/08 15:01:47

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/08 15:01:48

From: (b)(6)

To: Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
<james.tipton@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Scully, Brian (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
CC: Sendek, Sara (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Subject: ESI Task and Review, 10/8  
Date: 2020/10/08 17:09:42  
Priority: Normal  
Type: Note

Good evening,

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

#### Current Priorities

(b)(5)

#### CATT Taskings

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
Office (b)(6) Cell: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6)

**Recipient:**

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

(b)(6)

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(6)  
Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Scully, Brian (b)(5) (b)(5) Bri  
(b)(5)  
(b)(5)  
(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/08 17:09:03  
**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/08 17:09:42

(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Scully, Brian (b)(6)

(b)(6) Bri

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Type:** Note

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

(b)(5)

GH LITIGATION

(b)(5)

**CATT Taskings**

(b)(5)

**Joint CFI/ESI Products**

(b)(5)

**ESI Tasks/Products:**

(b)(5)

**CFI Products:**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office:

(b)(6)

Cell:

(b)(6)

mail:

(b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison

(b)(6)

**Recipient:**

(b)(6)

Scully, Brian

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/09 17:16:28

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/09 17:17:07

From: (b)(6)  
Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)  
To: (b)(6)  
Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)  
Snell, Allison (b)(6)  
Scully, Brian /o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (b)(6)  
CC: (b)(6)  
Subject: ESI Task and Review, 10/9  
Date: 2020/10/09 17:17:07  
Priority: Normal  
Type: Note

Good evening,

Below is an update on the list of current priorities that ESI currently has for action. In addition, an updated status of all ESI and CFI products that are currently in development or in the OCC/EA clearance process and eventually route to CISA FO for final review and approval.

#### Current Priorities

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**CATT Taskings**

(b)(5)

**Joint CFI/ESI Products**

(b)(5)

**ESI Tasks/Products:**

(b)(5)

**CFI Products:**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Election Security Initiative

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

**Sender:**

(b)(6)

Masterson, Matthew (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hale, Geoffrey (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Snell, Allison (b)(6)

**Recipient:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Scully, Brian (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OBTAINED BY AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION THROUGH LITIGATION

(b)(6)

**Sent Date:** 2020/10/09 17:16:28

**Delivered Date:** 2020/10/09 17:17:07

**Message Flags:** Unread



**Congressional  
Research Service**

Informing the legislative debate since 1914

---

# Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

**Sarah J. Eckman**

Analyst in American National Government

**R. Sam Garrett**

Specialist in American National Government

**Karen L. Shanton**

Analyst in American National Government

October 8, 2020

**Congressional Research Service**

7-5700

[www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov)

R46565



## Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

Several states have implemented new election administration processes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic that could affect how and when ballots are counted. Even under normal circumstances, finalizing federal election results takes days or weeks after election day. Among other steps, state, territorial, and local election officials *canvass* votes to ensure that ballots are valid and counted accurately. Election observers, audits, and other processes are designed to enhance transparency. This report addresses frequently asked questions on these and related subjects. The discussion emphasizes the period between the time a voter casts a ballot and when election officials *certify*, or finalize, the results.

### SUMMARY

R46565

October 8, 2020

Sarah J. Eckman  
Analyst in American  
National Government  
(b)(6)

R. Sam Garrett  
Specialist in American  
National Government  
(b)(6)

Karen L. Shanton  
Analyst in American  
National Government  
(b)(6)

For a copy of the full report,  
please call 7-5700 or visit  
[www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

## Contents

Introduction .....	1
Scope of the Report.....	1
What is the difference between returns reported on election night and final results? .....	3
How do states finalize election results?.....	3
What procedures might election jurisdictions use to provide transparency and demonstrate that the canvass is conducted correctly? .....	5
What processes help election officials determine voter eligibility and the validity of ballots cast? .....	6
When do states count ballots and certify election results? .....	9
How might the COVID-19 pandemic affect vote count procedures and timing in 2020? .....	10
How have states responded to potential effects of COVID-19 on the 2020 vote count? .....	11
What processes are available if disputes remain after election results are certified? .....	12

## Contacts

Author Contact Information .....	14
----------------------------------	----



## Introduction

The results voters see reported on election night are the culmination of several steps in the election administration process, but are not the end of the process. Each state, territory, and the District of Columbia—which administer federal elections—has its own process for counting votes and declaring winners, but all follow similar steps. Election administrators, political officials, and members of the public continue working after election night to finalize official results. This process typically takes several days or even weeks. State-or territorial-level federal election results in the United States are never official on election night. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the additional time required to process far more mail ballots than most jurisdictions normally receive led to slower ballot processing times in some primary elections, and is expected to do so again in the November general election.

The current environment also creates the potential for foreign or domestic disinformation campaigns designed to undermine confidence in American elections as the normal counting process occurs amid greater public scrutiny than that process typically receives. On September 22, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) jointly issued a public service announcement noting that "Foreign actors and cybercriminals could exploit the time required to certify and announce elections' results by disseminating disinformation that includes reports of voter suppression, cyberattacks targeting election infrastructure, voter or ballot fraud, and other problems intended to convince the public of the elections' illegitimacy."<sup>1</sup>

These circumstances have generated renewed interest among some Members of Congress, other public officials, and voters about how election officials count votes and determine election results. This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about the processes for counting, documenting, and ensuring transparency after votes are cast. It addresses federal elections, although the discussion herein also generally applies to elections for state or local offices.

Professional election administrators manage most or all of the ballot-counting process.<sup>2</sup> Members of the public, the media, or credentialed observers typically monitor most or all of the ballot-counting process.<sup>3</sup> Specific practices and requirements vary by jurisdiction. Election officials develop standard practices to document the chain of custody for ballots, ensure transparency, and generate accurate results.

## Scope of the Report

The frequently asked questions below are designed to provide a resource for Members of Congress and congressional staff as they conduct oversight and consider legislation related to

<sup>1</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, *Foreign Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Election Results*, public service announcement I-092220-PSA, September 22, 2020, <https://www.ic3.gov/media/2020/200922.aspx>.

<sup>2</sup> For a recent profile, see, for example, Natalie Adona et al., *Stewards of Democracy: The Views of American Local Election Officials*, Democracy Fund, report, June 26, 2019, <https://democracyfund.org/idea/stewards-of-democracy-the-views-of-american-local-election-officials/>.

<sup>3</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Policies for Election Observers*, October 12, 2016, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx>; and National Conference of State Legislatures, *Post-Election Audits*, October 25, 2019, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx>.

federal elections. The discussion emphasizes the period between when voters cast ballots and election officials certify election results for federal elections. Because states, territories, and localities administer federal elections, the report contains general discussion of law, policy, and practice in those jurisdictions, but does not attempt to do so comprehensively.<sup>4</sup> The report briefly discusses recounts and contested elections, but those topics are largely beyond the scope of this report. Other CRS products provide information on related topics concerning contested U.S. House elections,<sup>5</sup> the electoral college,<sup>6</sup> and the congressional role in verifying and counting presidential election results.<sup>7</sup>

The report is intentionally brief to make the content more accessible. It does not discuss legislation or identify specific requirements and processes in individual jurisdictions.<sup>8</sup> As such, the general information presented in this report does not assess any election jurisdiction's processes for or performance at administering elections. Similarly, the report does not provide specific compliance information, legal analysis, or policy analysis about critical infrastructure issues. Other CRS reports provide additional information about elections policy issues generally.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Federal law typically has relatively little effect on the process of counting and finalizing election results. As noted elsewhere in this report, other CRS products provide additional information about federal and constitutional provisions regarding contests, recounts, and certifying electoral college results.

<sup>5</sup> See CRS Report RL33780, *Procedures for Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives*, by L. Paige Whitaker.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11641, *The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline*, by Thomas H. Neale; CRS Report R43824, *Electoral College Reform: Contemporary Issues for Congress*, by Thomas H. Neale; and CRS Report R40504, *Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis*, by Thomas H. Neale.

<sup>7</sup> See CRS Report RL32717, *Counting Electoral Votes: An Overview of Procedures at the Joint Session, Including Objections by Members of Congress*, coordinated by Elizabeth Rybicki and L. Paige Whitaker.

<sup>8</sup> For additional information on the general processes discussed in this report, see, for example, Joint COVID Working Group; Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [CISA], Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council, Sector Coordinating Council, *Inbound Ballot Process*, Version 1.0. These and related documents are available on the CISA "#PROTECT2020" website, "Election Security GCC and SCC Resources" section, <https://www.cisa.gov/protect2020>. See also Tim Harper, Rachel Orey, and Collier Fernekes, *Counting the Vote During the 2020 Election*, Bipartisan Policy Center, August 2020, <https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/counting-the-vote-during-the-2020-election/>.

<sup>9</sup> Congressional readers may contact the coauthors of this report for additional information on elections policy. See, for example, CRS Report R45302, *Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview*, by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Report R45549, *The State and Local Role in Election Administration: Duties and Structures*, by Karen L. Shanton; CRS Report R46146, *Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress*, coordinated by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Report R46455, *COVID-19 and Other Election Emergencies: Frequently Asked Questions and Recent Policy Developments*, coordinated by R. Sam Garrett; CRS In Focus IF11477, *Early Voting and Mail Voting: Overview & Issues for Congress*, by Sarah J. Eckman and Karen L. Shanton; and CRS In Focus IF11286, *Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems*, by Karen L. Shanton.

### Brief Background: Ballot Submission to Election Results

Election jurisdictions around the country use various processes and terminology to count ballots and obtain election results. The information noted below is generally applicable and abbreviated. Additional detail appears in the questions and answers in the text of this report. State, territorial, and local election jurisdictions document and publicize their individual requirements.

- **Submitting Ballots.** Voters deposit completed (also called “marked”) ballots in a ballot box or scanner at in-person polling places. Mail and early in-person ballots are received at designated sites across a precinct or at a central location.
- **Tabulating Ballots.** Ballots are counted, or *tabulated*, where they are cast, at centralized election offices, or both. These tabulations may occur multiple times to verify the accuracy of the total ballot count.
- **Canvassing Ballots.** Election officials aggregate ballot totals and document and reconcile questions about ballot validity through a process known as *the canvass*.
- **Certifying Results.** Final election results are called *certified* results. State-level certification occurs after the canvass (and, if required in that state, after audits).

As discussed in the questions and answers in the text of this report, a combination of professional election administrators, volunteers, and members of the public may be involved in these steps, depending on jurisdiction. Documenting chain of custody for ballots, following established procedures for observing elections and challenging ballots, and auditing results also help ensure transparency and accuracy.

## What is the difference between returns reported on election night and final results?

Federal election results at the state or territorial levels are never official in the United States until after election day. Results appearing in media reports or that election jurisdictions release on election night are unofficial and preliminary. These initially reported (either by the media or election officials) totals do not necessarily include all ballots submitted in the jurisdiction, have not been subject to the canvassing process, and could change. Consequently, in 2020 and before, it is normal and expected that final election totals differ from those announced on election night. It is also common that the candidates in various races can trade leads throughout election night and after, as additional ballots are counted.<sup>10</sup> Typically, it takes several days or weeks to finalize election results through the canvass (and audits, where applicable) and certify a winner. State or territorial law sets deadlines for how and when these processes occur.

## How do states finalize election results?

Although individual procedures vary by state, finalizing election results typically involves two major steps, the *canvass* and *certification*. The *canvass* involves assembling and verifying all validly cast ballots so that they can be aggregated into the final official election results (generally called *certified* results).<sup>11</sup> As an Election Assistance Commission publication explains, “The purpose of the canvass is to account for every ballot cast and ensure that every valid vote cast is included in the election totals. This involves accounting for every absentee ballot, every early

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Nathaniel Persily and Charles Stewart III, “Actually, We’ll Know a Lot on Election Night,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 26, 2020, p. C4.

<sup>11</sup> For example, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines* define the canvass as a “Compilation of election returns and validation of the outcome that forms the basis of the official results by a political subdivision.” See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines*, Vol. 1, Version 1.1 (2015), p. A-5.



voting ballot, every ballot cast on Election Day, every provisional ballot, every challenged ballot, and every overseas and military ballot.”<sup>12</sup> Depending on jurisdiction, groups of professional election officials, appointed canvassing boards, or both conduct the canvass.

Typical steps in the canvass include reconciling any discrepancies in the number of ballots issued versus those cast; duplicating damaged ballots that scanners cannot read, documenting that process, and counting the duplicated ballots; if applicable, addressing discrepancies in signatures or cast ballots (e.g., questions about voter intent based on ballot markings); and reconciling the number of ballots cast with the number of voters who voted in person at the polling place.<sup>13</sup> These processes may be repeated multiple times as precincts and vote centers compile their results and balloting information is consolidated at subsequently higher levels of election administration (e.g., precinct, county, and state).

In some jurisdictions, statistical data and written reports accompany the certified results and provide additional information about the canvassing process and how discrepancies were addressed. Similarly, in some cases, the certification is the final step in the canvassing process. In others, the governor or chief state election official (e.g., secretary of state) issues certified results based on information provided in the canvassing authority’s final report or meeting.

In some states, very close election margins during the canvass trigger recounts, discussed at the end of this report. Some jurisdictions also conduct *postelection audits*, which are intended to check the accuracy of the election results.<sup>14</sup> These audits involve comparing the results generated by the election system against a sample of paper records of the vote, such as paper ballots or the voter-verifiable paper audit trails generated by direct-recording electronic voting machines.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Election Assistance Commission, *Quick Start Management Guide: Canvassing and Certifying an Election*, October 2008, p. 3. For additional discussion of military and overseas citizen voting, see, for example, CRS In Focus IF11642, *Absentee Voting for Uniformed Services and Overseas Citizens: Roles and Process*, In Brief, by R. Sam Garrett.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, *Quick Start Management Guide: Canvassing and Certifying an Election*, October 2008, pp. 7-9; and U.S. Election Assistance Commission, *Election Management Guidelines*, pp. 133-138. The *Quick Start* document is available on the EAC website at <https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/quick-start-guides>. The *Election Management Guidelines* document is available on the EAC website at [https://www.eac.gov/election\\_management\\_resources/election\\_management\\_guidelines.aspx](https://www.eac.gov/election_management_resources/election_management_guidelines.aspx).

<sup>14</sup> National Institute of Standards and Technology, *Election Terminology Glossary – Draft*, <https://pages.nist.gov/ElectionGlossary/>.

<sup>15</sup> Exactly how jurisdictions that use postelection audits conduct them varies, but postelection audits generally can be grouped into two categories: (1) traditional postelection audits, which sample a fixed percentage of voting districts or machines, and (2) risk-limiting audits, which use statistical methods to determine how many districts or machines have to be sampled to achieve a specified level of confidence that the election results are accurate. For more information about postelection audits in general or risk-limiting audits in particular, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, *Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy*, Washington, DC, 2018, pp. 93-96, <https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy>; National Conference of State Legislatures, *Post-Election Audits*, October 25, 2019, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx>; and Mark Lindeman and Philip B. Stark, “A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits,” *IEEE Security and Privacy*, vol. 10, no. 5 (September-October 2012), pp. 42-49.

## What procedures might election jurisdictions use to provide transparency and demonstrate that the canvass is conducted correctly?

Election officials work to ensure that the certified election results they provide are generally perceived to be fair, accurate, and legitimate. One way they do so is by having consistent, reliable, and transparent ballot collection and canvass procedures, which are typically established well before the election. To ensure that individual voters can cast their ballots privately and securely, and that those ballots are handled and counted correctly, multiple election administrators and/or public witnesses, representing multiple political parties, generally are involved at various stages of the vote-collecting and-counting processes.

Certain categories of individuals can serve as *election observers*, as defined by state laws; these observers typically include individuals serving on behalf of various political parties and can also include individuals from nonpartisan civic or legal organizations, as well as academics or unaffiliated individuals. States may require potential observers to obtain certain accreditation.<sup>16</sup> An important role for observers under some state laws is monitoring in-person voting on election day for indications of voter coercion, intimidation, or fraud, as well as technological issues and administrative errors or misapplication of election protocols.<sup>17</sup>

States that utilize drop boxes for mail ballots often have video surveillance or trained election staff monitoring the drop box site during voting and have mechanisms in place for ballot retrieval and chain of custody,<sup>18</sup> such as deploying two individuals to collect ballots from each box.<sup>19</sup> Other elements of the voting process, including signature verification for mail ballots, typically also involve multiple individuals.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Policies for Election Observers*, October 12, 2016, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx>. This CRS report does not address federal election observers or monitors that may be deployed under the Voting Rights Act. For brief additional discussion, see CRS Report R45302, *Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview*, by R. Sam Garrett.

<sup>17</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Poll Watcher Qualifications*, August 6, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watcher-qualifications.aspx>. Federal provisions in criminal law, the Voting Rights Act, or both also could be relevant. See for example, CRS Report R45302, *Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview*, by R. Sam Garrett; and CRS Testimony TE10033, *History and Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965*, by L. Paige Whitaker.

<sup>18</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *VOPP: Table 9: Ballot Drop Box Definitions, Design Features, Location and Number*, August 18, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-9-ballot-drop-box-definitions-design-features-location-and-number.aspx>.

<sup>19</sup> For example, see Arizona Secretary of State's Office, Elections Services Division, *Arizona Elections Procedures Manual*, December 2019, p. 61, at [https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2019\\_ELECTIONS\\_PROCEDURES\\_MANUAL\\_APPROVED.pdf](https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2019_ELECTIONS_PROCEDURES_MANUAL_APPROVED.pdf); and California Secretary of State, *Vote-by-Mail Ballot Drop Boxes and Vote-by-Mail Drop-Off Locations*, California Code of Regulations Title 2, div. 7, ch. 3, §20137, Ballot Collection Procedures and Chain of Custody, at <https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/vote-mail-ballot-drop-boxes-and-drop-locations>.

<sup>20</sup> For example, see William Janover and Tom Westphal, "Signature Verification and Mail Ballots: Guaranteeing Access While Preserving Integrity—A Case Study of California's Every Vote Counts Act," *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2020), p. 329; and "How are Ballots Processed?" articles available from Grand County, Colorado, Clerk & Recorder's Office, *Ballots & Processing*, at <https://www.co.grand.co.us/1093/Ballots-Processing>.



In many states, canvassing boards and processes include participants who were not directly involved in the administration of the election itself to help provide impartial review.<sup>21</sup> Most states also allow some election observers or members of the media to access certain postelection procedures,<sup>22</sup> such as counting absentee ballots or conducting postelection audits or logic and accuracy tests.<sup>23</sup> Some jurisdictions may also provide a canvass livestream and allow the public to view the process online.<sup>24</sup> Postelection audits may be conducted by an independent audit board, rather than state or local administrators.<sup>25</sup>

## What processes help election officials determine voter eligibility and the validity of ballots cast?

State and local election officials use various mechanisms to ensure that only eligible voters cast ballots and that each voter only votes once in an election. The specific processes vary by state and can further vary based on the type of ballot cast (e.g., in-person or by mail).

Election officials primarily use voter registration data to determine whether or not an individual is eligible to vote in a given election, regardless of whether the voter chooses to vote in-person or via a mail (or absentee) ballot.<sup>26</sup> Election officials use state-level voter registration requirements and procedures,<sup>27</sup> as well as verification requirements under the Help America Vote Act of 2002

<sup>21</sup> For example, see Florida Supervisors of Elections, *2020 FSASE Canvassing Board Manual*, at [https://www.myfloridaelections.com/portals/fsase/2020%20Canv%20Board%20Manual%20FINAL\\_reduced.pdf](https://www.myfloridaelections.com/portals/fsase/2020%20Canv%20Board%20Manual%20FINAL_reduced.pdf); Minnesota Secretary of State, *Canvassing Boards*, at <https://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-voting/how-elections-work/canvassing-boards/>; and Washington Secretary of State, *Introduction to County Canvassing Boards*, at [https://www.sos.wa.gov/\\_assets/elections/introduction-to-county-canvassing-boards.pdf](https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/introduction-to-county-canvassing-boards.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Policies for Election Observers*, October 12, 2016, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx>; Pamela Brown and Jeremy Herb, “Avalanche of Mail Ballots—And Ballot-Watchers—Threatens to Slow Results After Polls Close,” CNN Politics, September 15, 2020, at <https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/15/politics/voting-ballots-challenge-election/index.html>; National Conference of State Legislatures, *Post-Election Audits*, October 25, 2019, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx>.

<sup>23</sup> Logic and accuracy tests, which are typically conducted prior to an election but may also be conducted after the election in some jurisdictions, are used to check that election equipment is functioning correctly and that it is programmed and calibrated correctly for the current election. They involve running a test deck of ballots through the election equipment and may be conducted by a team of representatives of multiple political parties, open to the public, or both. See, for example, Texas Secretary of State, *Electronic Voting System Procedures*, <https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/electronic-voting-system-procedures.shtml>.

<sup>24</sup> For example, see “Live Stream of County Ballot Tabulation Centers,” section from Arizona Secretary of State, *Voting Equipment*, at <https://azsos.gov/elections/voting-election/voting-equipment>; and Montgomery County, Maryland, Board of Elections, *2020 Presidential General Election Ballot Canvass*, at <https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/Elections/2020PrimaryElection/primary-ballot-canvass.html>.

<sup>25</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Post-Election Audits*, October 25, 2019, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx>.

<sup>26</sup> With the exception of North Dakota, all states and territories require individuals to register to vote prior to casting their ballots in federal elections; for more information, see CRS Report R46406, *Voter Registration: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress*; and CRS Report R45030, *Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent Developments*. North Dakota does maintain a Central Voter File and requires voters to provide identification; see North Dakota Century Code, ch. 16.1-02, at <https://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t16-1c02.html>, and North Dakota Secretary of State, *ID Required for Voting*, at <https://vip.sos.nd.gov/IDRequirements.aspx?ptlPKID=103&ptlPKID=7>.

<sup>27</sup> For more information, see National Conference of State Legislators, *Voter List Accuracy*, March 20, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-list-accuracy.aspx>.

(HAVA),<sup>28</sup> to confirm a registrant's identity and eligibility to vote, often by comparing information on voter registration applications with other government agency records.

Once a voter is on a state's list of eligible voters, this information is used by election officials to monitor how, and if, voters have received a ballot, to ensure that each eligible voter can cast a vote and that no voter casts multiple ballots in the same election.<sup>29</sup> When voting in-person, *poll books*, or lists of eligible voters, are used by local election administrators to confirm that individuals are currently registered voters and are at the correct voting location for their precinct or election district. *Electronic* (or *e-poll*) *books* are commonly used today and may be able to provide more recently updated voter information or some voter data in real time.<sup>30</sup> In jurisdictions that use centralized vote centers, e-poll books can help election administrators verify that a voter has not previously voted at another location. In addition to identifying voters from poll book records, 35 states also have some form of voter identification requirement in effect for in-person voting during the 2020 election.<sup>31</sup>

In circumstances where voters can vote by mail, some jurisdictions automatically send ballots to voters and others require voters to request a mail ballot.<sup>32</sup> States that automatically send ballots or ballot request forms to voters generally rely upon address information on file in state voter registration records.<sup>33</sup> In the voter records, election administrators typically note which persons have requested and cast absentee ballots. Ballot tracking measures often allow an individual voter to check the status of his or her mail ballot, following it from the time it is sent out by election administrators to when it is returned and cast.<sup>34</sup> These mail ballot tracking measures, in conjunction with in-person voting records, also help election officials to ensure that only a single ballot is counted for each voter; for example, election officials can void a mail ballot if it has not

<sup>28</sup> Under HAVA, for example, voter registration applicants must provide a current and valid driver's license number, the last four digits of their Social Security number, or an alternate, unique identifying number assigned by the state for voter registration purposes (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(5)(A)(i-ii)). HAVA also requires that states coordinate their voter registration lists with state agency records on felony status and state agency records on death (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(2)(A)(ii)), and directs state DMV officials to enter into agreements with the Social Security Administration and with the chief state election official to verify and match certain voter registration applicant information (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(5)(B)). HAVA also requires that new voters who submit a voter registration application by mail, and have not previously voted in a federal election in a state, must provide a current and valid photo identification or present "a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter," along with their registration application or when they vote for the first time (52 U.S.C. §21083(b)); individuals who fall into this category and are unable to provide documentation when voting for the first time may cast a provisional ballot.

<sup>29</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Double Voting*, September 3, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/double-voting.aspx>.

<sup>30</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Electronic Poll Books | e-Poll Books*, October 25, 2019, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-pollbooks.aspx>.

<sup>31</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Voter Identification Requirements | Voter ID Laws*, August 25, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx>.

<sup>32</sup> See Juliette Love, Matt Stevens, and Lazaro Garmio, "Where Americans Can Vote by Mail in the 2020 Elections," *The New York Times*, August 14, 2020, at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/11/us/politics/vote-by-mail-us-states.html>; and Kate Rabinowitz and Brittany Renee Mays, "At Least 83% of American Voters Can Cast Ballots by Mail in the Fall," *The Washington Post*, August 20, 2020, at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/vote-by-mail-states/>.

<sup>33</sup> If a voter must request a mail ballot, he or she can often provide a different mailing address for ballot delivery.

<sup>34</sup> Jocelyn Grzeszczak, "These Are the States Where You Can Track Your Mail-In Vote," *Newsweek*, August 18, 2020, at <https://www.newsweek.com/these-are-states-where-you-can-track-your-mail-vote-1525920>.



yet been cast by a voter who decides to vote in-person instead or if officials receive a mail ballot from a voter after he or she has voted in-person.<sup>35</sup>

States employ a number of measures to verify that a mail ballot is completed by the intended voter.<sup>36</sup> Many jurisdictions require voter signatures to accompany completed mail ballots. The voter's signature often accompanies a legal attestation, asserting the voter's identity and eligibility. Election officials, computer software, or both are used to match the signature(s) submitted by the voter to a known signature on file from the voter's registration records or other government agency records, if applicable, via a process known as *signature verification*.<sup>37</sup> If there is a missing, mismatched, or ambiguous signature, some states contact the voter and may provide an opportunity for the voter to correct the issue through processes known as *signature curing*, which may include an affidavit, a copy of additional identification, or both.<sup>38</sup> States may also have requirements for witness signatures or notarization of mail ballots, and voters may need to submit a copy of their photo identification with a mail ballot in certain circumstances.<sup>39</sup> Election officials may also check to ensure that the return address on a mail ballot matches that of the

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, California Secretary of State, *Voting at a Polling Place after Applying to Vote by Mail*, at <https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/voting-california/if-you-applied>; and "Michigan's Absentee Voting Process," in Michigan Bureau of Elections, *Election Officials' Manual*, November 2019, ch. 6, at [http://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/VI\\_Michigans\\_Absentee\\_Voting\\_Process\\_265992\\_7.pdf](http://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/VI_Michigans_Absentee_Voting_Process_265992_7.pdf). Some jurisdictions may allow a voter who had previously requested a mail ballot to cast a regular in-person ballot. Other jurisdictions may require a voter who had previously requested a mail ballot to cast a provisional ballot in-person, to allow election administrators to confirm that the mail ballot has not been cast; a provisional ballot may be required, for example, if a voter cannot provide the blank mail ballot to officials at the polling site. For additional discussion, see, for example, Associated Press, "States Have Checks in Place to Prevent Voters From Voting Twice," August 26, 2020, at <https://apnews.com/article/9308770212>, and Nick Corasaniti and Stephanie Saul, "Is Voting Twice a Felony?" *The New York Times*, September 9, 2020, at <https://www.nytimes.com/article/voting-twice.html>.

<sup>36</sup> Some states may waive certain requirements to make accommodations for individuals with disabilities who need assistance completing their ballots on a case-by-case basis. For further discussion of these issues, see Maggie Astor, "What It's Like to Vote With a Disability During a Pandemic," *The New York Times*, September 25, 2020, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/us/politics/voting-disability-virus.html>.

<sup>37</sup> For additional discussion on registration, see CRS Report R46406, *Voter Registration: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress*; and CRS Report R45030, *Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent Developments*. For additional discussion of signature verification, see, for example, Joint COVID Working Group; Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [CISA], Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council, Sector Coordinating Council, *Signature Verification and Cure Process*, Version 1.0. These and related documents are available on the CISA "#PROTECT2020" website, "Election Security GCC and SCC Resources" section, <https://www.cisa.gov/protect2020>; Rachel Orey and Emma Jones, "Is Voting by Mail Safe and Reliable? We Asked State and Local Elections Officials," Bipartisan Policy Center, June 12, 2020, at <https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/is-voting-by-mail-safe-and-reliable-we-asked-state-and-local-elections-officials/>; and William Janover and Tom Westphal, "Signature Verification and Mail Ballots: Guaranteeing Access While Preserving Integrity—A Case Study of California's Every Vote Counts Act," *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2020), pp. 321-343.

<sup>38</sup> See Joint COVID Working Group; Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [CISA], Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council, Sector Coordinating Council, *Signature Verification and Cure Process*, Version 1.0. These and related documents are available on the CISA "#PROTECT2020" website, "Election Security GCC and SCC Resources" section, <https://www.cisa.gov/protect2020>, pp. 3-5; and National Conference of State Legislatures, *VOPP: Table 15: States That Permit Voters to Correct Signature Discrepancies*, August 28, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-15-states-that-permit-voters-to-correct-signature-discrepancies.aspx>.

<sup>39</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *VOPP: Table 14: How States Verify Voted Absentee Ballots*, April 17, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-14-how-states-verify-voted-absentee.aspx>.



voter.<sup>40</sup> Some states require that a voter return his or her own ballot or limit who, aside from the voter, can return an absentee ballot.<sup>41</sup>

## When do states count ballots and certify election results?

The timeline for counting votes can vary, depending on when states and localities allow voters to cast their ballots<sup>42</sup> and when election officials are allowed to begin processing and counting those ballots. The window available for voters to cast ballots varies by state, as jurisdictions have different polling place hours on election day, as well as different policies regarding the availability and duration of in-person early voting and mail voting.<sup>43</sup> In several states, mail ballots are sent, and early in-person voting may begin, at least 45 days ahead of election day.<sup>44</sup> Depending on state law, early voting might end several days before election day or continue until the day before election day. For mail ballots, states vary in whether the ballots must be received on election day or postmarked by election day.<sup>45</sup>

In many states, election officials can begin “processing” absentee ballots they have received before election day, though what “processing” means varies by state. Processing often can involve scanning the tracking barcode on a return ballot envelope and signature verification, where the signature required on the outside of the ballot envelope is compared with a voter’s known signature from state registration records. Some states also allow early ballots to be counted before election day, whereas other states prohibit ballots from being counted before polls close on election day.<sup>46</sup> States also vary in how and when they count provisional ballots cast on

<sup>40</sup> Darrell M. West, “How does vote-by-mail work and does it increase election fraud,” Brookings Institute, June 22, 2020, at <https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-does-vote-by-mail-work-and-does-it-increase-election-fraud/>.

<sup>41</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *VOPP: Table 10: Who Can Collect and Return an Absentee Ballot Other Than the Voter*, August 28, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-10-who-can-collect-and-return-an-absentee-ballot-other-than-the-voter.aspx>.

<sup>42</sup> For information on early and mail voting timelines in each state, see National Association of Secretaries of State, *Dates and Deadlines for Early and Absentee Voting in the November 3<sup>rd</sup> General Election*, August 2020, at <https://www.nass.org/node/1967>. A list of changes made by states for the 2020 election is available from Ballotpedia, *Changes to election dates, procedures, and administration in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic*, 2020, at [https://ballotpedia.org/Changes\\_to\\_election\\_dates,\\_procedures,\\_and\\_administration\\_in\\_response\\_to\\_the\\_coronavirus\\_\(COVID-19\)\\_pandemic,\\_2020#Absentee.2Fmail-in\\_voting\\_procedure\\_changes](https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020#Absentee.2Fmail-in_voting_procedure_changes).

<sup>43</sup> The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA; 52 U.S.C. §§20301-20311) specifies separate requirements for citizens abroad and members of the *uniformed services* (primarily military members). For brief additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11642, *Absentee Voting for Uniformed Services and Overseas Citizens: Roles and Process*, In Brief, by R. Sam Garrett.

<sup>44</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *State Laws Governing Early Voting*, August 27, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/early-voting-in-state-elections.aspx>; and National Conference of State Legislatures, *VOPP: Table 7: When States Mail Out Absentee Ballots*, August 24, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-7-when-states-mail-out-absentee-ballots.aspx>.

<sup>45</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *VOPP: Table 11: Receipt and Postmark Deadlines for Absentee Ballots*, September 10, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-11-receipt-and-postmark-deadlines-for-absentee-ballots.aspx>.

<sup>46</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *VOPP Table 16: When Absentee/Mail Ballot Processing and Counting Can Begin*, September 9, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-16-when-absentee-mail-ballot-processing-and-counting-can-begin.aspx>.

election day.<sup>47</sup> Some states begin counting provisional ballots immediately after polls close, with statutory deadlines ranging from two days to weeks after an election, whereas other states examine provisional ballots as part of the canvass process.<sup>48</sup> Some states do not specify a deadline for their certified election results, and other states have deadlines ranging from November 5 to December 11 for the 2020 general election.<sup>49</sup>

## How might the COVID-19 pandemic affect vote count procedures and timing in 2020?

States' actions to expand access to mail voting and voters' concerns about the safety of in-person voting have prompted an increase in mail ballot requests in many states in 2020.<sup>50</sup> Mail ballots require more processing than ballots cast in person and may arrive after the close of polls in jurisdictions that accept ballots postmarked by election day.<sup>51</sup> Unfamiliarity with 2020 mail voting timeframes or procedures—due to general lack of experience with mail voting or changes in processes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic—could lead some voters to make mistakes when completing or submitting mail ballots.<sup>52</sup> Delays, or concerns about delays, in postal service could prompt voters who have requested mail ballots to nevertheless go to the polls in person to vote.<sup>53</sup>

Any or all of those factors could affect vote count procedures and timing in 2020. Voter errors on mail ballots could increase processing time in jurisdictions that offer voters opportunities to cure their ballots, for example, or prompt litigation that delays the release of official results.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>47</sup> *Provisional ballot* is a general term used to describe a ballot provided to a voter when there is uncertainty surrounding the voter's eligibility, under circumstances described in HAVA or state law.

<sup>48</sup> National Conference of State Legislatures, *Provisional Ballots*, September 17, 2020, at <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx>; Ballotpedia, *State by State Provisional Ballot Laws*, at [https://ballotpedia.org/State\\_by\\_State\\_Provisional\\_Ballot\\_Laws](https://ballotpedia.org/State_by_State_Provisional_Ballot_Laws).

<sup>49</sup> Ballotpedia, *Election Results Certification Dates, 2020*, at [https://ballotpedia.org/Election\\_results\\_certification\\_dates\\_2020](https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results_certification_dates_2020); and National Association of Secretaries of State, *State Election Canvassing Timeframes and Recount Thresholds*, August 2020, at <http://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/2020-08/summary-canvass-recount-laws-aug2020.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> Adam Levy, Ethan Cohen, and Liz Stark, "Surge of Ballot Requests Already Setting Records in the US," CNN, September 25, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/25/politics/ballot-requests-voting-election-2020/index.html>.

<sup>51</sup> For more information about processing of mail ballots, see the "What processes help election officials determine voter eligibility and the validity of ballots cast?" section of this report.

<sup>52</sup> Barry Burden, Robert M. Stein, and Charles Stewart III, "More Voting by Mail Would Make the 2020 Election Safer for Our Health. But It Comes with Risks of Its Own.," *The Washington Post*, April 6, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/06/more-voting-by-mail-would-make-2020-election-safer-our-health-it-comes-with-risks-its-own/>; and National Conference of State Legislatures, *Absentee and Mail Voting Policies in Effect for the 2020 Election*, <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-mail-voting-policies-in-effect-for-the-2020-election.aspx>.

<sup>53</sup> See, for example, Larry Seward, "With Some Absentee Ballots Still Not Delivered, Indiana Clerk Blames Post Office for Delays," WCPO-ABC Cincinnati, October 1, 2020, at <https://www.wcpo.com/news/election-2020/with-some-absentee-ballots-still-not-delivered-indiana-clerk-blames-post-office-for-delays>; and Ellie Rushing and Jonathan Lai, "Philly Mail Delays Lead to Big Worries About 2020 Election as Post Office Slows," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 6, 2020, at <https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/mail-voting-philadelphia-post-office-delays-20200806.html>.

<sup>54</sup> Specific information about litigation is beyond the scope of this report. For more information about current COVID-19-related election litigation, see, for example, Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, *COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker*, <https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/search>.



Jurisdictions might require in-person voters to use a provisional ballot, which requires additional processing to confirm voter eligibility and prevent double voting, if they are on record as requesting a mail ballot.<sup>55</sup> Depending on how jurisdictions choose to conduct their counts—whether they increase postelection staffing, for example, or extend the timeframe for processing mail ballots—such factors could lead to later release of official election results in some states in 2020 than in previous years.<sup>56</sup>

The COVID-19 pandemic might also affect the 2020 vote count in other ways, in addition to direct and indirect effects of increased mail voting. Increased interest in and expanded access to in-person early voting could help offset effects like those described above, while other results of the pandemic might contribute to them. Health or economic effects of the pandemic could contribute to understaffing of election offices or ballot-processing teams, for example, and COVID-19-related closures or backlogs at offices that process voter registration information could contribute to an increase in provisional voting in some jurisdictions.<sup>57</sup> New or ongoing lawsuits about aspects of the election other than mail voting could also affect the procedures election officials use to tally the 2020 vote and the timeline on which they finalize the count.<sup>58</sup>

## How have states responded to potential effects of COVID-19 on the 2020 vote count?

States have responded to some potential effects of the COVID-19 pandemic by trying to minimize or prevent delays in the count and release of official election results. Measures employed by some states include moving up the date when election workers can start processing mail ballots and hiring additional temporary staff to help with ballot processing.<sup>59</sup> Election officials in many jurisdictions are working with local postmasters and United States Postal Service election mail coordinators to help identify ways to facilitate timely delivery of mail ballots, such as by creating color-coded mail ballot return envelopes and providing estimated

<sup>55</sup> Edward B. Foley, “Vote Early and Often? That’ll Just Slow Down the Ballot Count,” *The Washington Post*, September 4, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/04/trump-vote-twice-states/>.

<sup>56</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey Toobin, “The Legal Fight Awaiting Us After the Election,” *The New Yorker*, September 21, 2020, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/09/28/the-legal-fight-awaiting-us-after-the-election>; and Edward B. Foley, “Why Vote-by-Mail Could Be a Legal Nightmare in November,” *Politico*, April 7, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/07/danger-moving-vote-by-mail-168602>.

<sup>57</sup> See, for example, Amy Hudak, “Short Staffing at DMV Due to COVID-19 Creating Voter Registration Backlog,” WPXI, October 1, 2020, <https://www.wpxi.com/news/short-staffing-dmv-due-covid-19-creating-voter-registration-backlog/K62CCH6UINC7JKYTXJQQLUAVEY/>.

<sup>58</sup> Specific information about litigation is beyond the scope of this report. For more information about current COVID-19-related election litigation, see, for example, Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, *COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker*, <https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/search>.

<sup>59</sup> Some federal funding made available to states for certain election expenses may be used for these purposes. Congress provided \$400 million in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136) for grant funding to help states, territories, and the District of Columbia to prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID-19 under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145). Congress also provided \$425 million to states, territories, and Washington, DC, for general election grant funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93). For more information, see CRS Insight IN11508, *Elections Grant Funding for States: Recent Appropriations and Legislative Proposals*, by Karen L. Shanton. See also, for example, Associated Press, “Michigan Legislature Eases Processing of Absentee Ballots,” September 25, 2020, <https://www.wxyz.com/news/election-2020/michigan-legislature-eases-processing-of-absentee-ballots>; and Brian X. McCrone, “Here’s How Pa. Will Get All the Mail-In Ballots Counted in November,” NBC Philadelphia, August 31, 2020, <https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/politics/decision-2020/heres-how-pa-is-preparing-for-the-presidential-election-in-november/2515837/>.

drop-off dates for election mail.<sup>60</sup> Many election officials are also encouraging voters to cast their ballots early, where possible, by returning mail ballots promptly or taking advantage of in-person early voting periods.<sup>61</sup>

In addition to trying to minimize or prevent delays in the release of official election results, many jurisdictions have taken steps to educate voters about the potential for and meaning of any delays that do occur. A concern some have raised about the 2020 elections is that delays in the release of official results might lead some to question the legitimacy of the election.<sup>62</sup> Many states have responded to such concerns by sharing public information about typical postelection processes and timelines or adapting their plans for initial results reporting to more clearly convey the incompleteness of unofficial results. In one state, for example, the secretary of state announced that early reporting would include data on the number of requested mail ballots that had not yet been counted to provide a sense of the potential scope of outstanding ballots.<sup>63</sup>

## What processes are available if disputes remain after election results are certified?

Different terminology applies to various scenarios surrounding disputed election results. The term *recount* refers to retabulating ballots to ensure that the certified count was accurate (although, in some jurisdictions, recounts might occur before certification).<sup>64</sup> Election officials generally conduct recounts when elections result in very close margins of victory to confirm that the certified results are accurate, or if there is evidence that counting equipment malfunctioned.<sup>65</sup> There are two kinds of recounts: automatic and requested. Typically, a narrow margin of victory

<sup>60</sup> United States Postal Service Office of Inspector General, *Audit Report: Processing Readiness of Mail During the 2020 General Election*, August 31, 2020, pp. 3-4, <https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2020/20-225-R20.pdf>. Some concerns have been raised in the lead-up to the 2020 elections about potential effects of operational changes at the United States Postal Service on delivery of mail ballots. For additional discussion of such concerns, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Examining the Finances and Operations of the United States Postal Service During COVID-19 and Upcoming Elections*, hearing, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., August 21, 2020, <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/examining-the-finances-and-operations-of-the-united-states-postal-service-during-covid-19-and-upcoming-elections>; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, *Protecting the Timely Delivery of Mail, Medicine, and Mail-in Ballots*, hearing, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., August 24, 2020, <https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/protecting-the-timely-delivery-of-mail-medicine-and-mail-in-ballots>.

<sup>61</sup> See, for example, Star Connor, “WV Secretary of State Encourages Absentee Ballot Voting,” WVVA, September 24, 2020, <https://wvva.com/2020/09/24/wv-secretary-of-state-encourages-absentee-ballot-voting/>; and Blake Keller and Brianna Owczarzak, “Whitmer Encourages Residents to Vote as Early Voting Kicks Off Across Michigan,” WNEM, September 24, 2020, [https://www.wnem.com/news/whitmer-encourages-residents-to-vote-as-early-voting-kicks-off-across-michigan/article\\_e38d9e62-fe70-11ea-9282-a7359f85ceef.html](https://www.wnem.com/news/whitmer-encourages-residents-to-vote-as-early-voting-kicks-off-across-michigan/article_e38d9e62-fe70-11ea-9282-a7359f85ceef.html).

<sup>62</sup> See, for example, Andy Sullivan and Michael Martina, “How a ‘Blue Shift’ in U.S. Mail Ballots Might Set Off Election Week Chaos,” Reuters, September 8, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-delay/how-a-blue-shift-in-u-s-mail-ballots-might-set-off-election-week-chaos-idUSKBN25Z111>.

<sup>63</sup> Andrew J. Tobias, “Preparing for Possibly Unclear Result, Ohio Will Report the Number of Outstanding Mail Ballots on Election Night,” *Cleveland.com*, September 8, 2020, <https://www.cleveland.com/open/2020/09/preparing-for-possibly-unclear-result-ohio-will-report-the-number-of-outstanding-mail-ballots-on-election-night.html>.

<sup>64</sup> For example, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission Voluntary Voting System Guidelines define *recount* as “[r]etabulation of the votes cast in an election.” See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines*, Vol. 1, Version 1.1 (2015), p. A-16.

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, *Election Management Guidelines*, p. 147. The *Election Management Guidelines* document is available on the EAC website at [https://www.eac.gov/election\\_management\\_resources/election\\_management\\_guidelines.aspx](https://www.eac.gov/election_management_resources/election_management_guidelines.aspx).



in an individual race (e.g., less than one-half percent in some states) triggers an *automatic recount* as specified in state statutes. In other cases, candidates or voters may *request* recounts (sometimes called *initiated* recounts), often at their expense and under processes specified in state statutes.<sup>66</sup> Relevant state, territorial, or local election statutes specify which recount options are available in particular jurisdictions, if any, and under what circumstances.

States or other election jurisdictions conduct recounts either by rescanning ballots or by hand counting, depending on circumstances and relevant requirements, and may address all or part of the certified results. Recounts also may involve a *recanvass*—in some states a separate process—to reexamine the validity of the ballots included in the certified results. Election officials, recount boards, or both typically conduct recounts.

Although timing varies by state, statutes typically limit the period during which recounts may occur. Election officials can face particularly tight deadlines for conducting recounts if they occur shortly before officeholders-elect are to be sworn in. In addition, for presidential elections, a federal “safe harbor” deadline may affect how long states have to conduct their recounts in presidential elections.<sup>67</sup>

Election *contests* focus on the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the election. As with recounts, contests follow processes addressed in relevant state law. Generally, contests are resolved through litigation that is beyond the scope of this report. The Federal Contested Election Act (FCEA) provides procedures for resolving contested U.S. House elections.<sup>68</sup> Ultimately, Article I, Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution specifies that each chamber of Congress “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” Other CRS products provide information on related topics concerning contested U.S. House elections,<sup>69</sup> the electoral college,<sup>70</sup> and the congressional role in verifying and counting presidential election results.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>66</sup> For example, as the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has explained, “although post-election audits can lead to a full recount if errors are detected, they differ from a recount in that they are conducted regardless of the margins of victory. Recounts are most often triggered or requested if there is a tight margin of victory.” See National Conference of State Legislatures, “Post-Election Audits,” October 25, 2019, <https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx>.

<sup>67</sup> For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11641, *The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline*, by Thomas H. Neale; and CRS Report R40504, *Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis*, by Thomas H. Neale.

<sup>68</sup> 2 U.S.C. §§381–396. For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33780, *Procedures for Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives*, by L. Paige Whitaker.

<sup>69</sup> See CRS Report RL33780, *Procedures for Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives*, by L. Paige Whitaker.

<sup>70</sup> See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11641, *The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline*, by Thomas H. Neale; CRS Report R43824, *Electoral College Reform: Contemporary Issues for Congress*, by Thomas H. Neale; and CRS Report R40504, *Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis*, by Thomas H. Neale.

<sup>71</sup> See CRS Report RL32717, *Counting Electoral Votes: An Overview of Procedures at the Joint Session, Including Objections by Members of Congress*, coordinated by Elizabeth Rybicki and L. Paige Whitaker.

## Author Contact Information

Sarah J. Eckman  
Analyst in American National Government

(b)(6)

R. Sam Garrett  
Specialist in American National Government

(b)(6)

Karen L. Shanton  
Analyst in American National Government

(b)(6)



January 11, 2021

## INFORMATION

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR

FROM: Bob Kolasky (b) (6)  
Assistant Director  
National Risk Management Center

SUBJECT: CISA's Countering Foreign Influence Mission During Transition

**Timeliness:** The NRMC will dissolve the CISA CFI Task Force on January 19, at the end of the current administration, to preserve flexibility for the new leadership in this mission. In consideration of that, NRMC is providing the Acting CISA Director the short-term plan for continuing CISA Countering Foreign Influence (CFI) Task Force and Mis, Dis, and Malinformation (MDM) work.

**Purpose:** The purpose of this memorandum is to provide NRMC's short-term plan for the CISA Countering Foreign Influence (CFI) Task Force and Mis, Dis, and Malinformation (MDM) work.

**Context and CISA and or DHS Equities:** The NRMC will dissolve the CISA CFI Task Force, at the end of the current administration to preserve flexibility for the new leadership in this mission.

Recognizing the importance of this mission, in the immediate term, the NRMC will continue to address the risk of MDM in a similar scope to the mission of the Task Force through NRMC's programmatic functions and the CFI team will continue to operate as a section within the NRMC's Election Security Initiative. At the same time, the NRMC will also study risks associated with MDM that do not emanate from foreign actors so as to better understand how to mitigate them in the face of a complex information environment where bad information can contribute to radicalization.

NRMC will work with the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and the Office of the Chief Counsel to provide recommendations for the future of CISA's role in countering risks from MDM to you in January 2021 for consideration by the incoming Biden administration.

**CISA and/or Component Coordination:** This memo has been coordinated with SPP, OCC, and EA. Clearances are as follows:

- 1/6/21: EA – (b) (6) cleared with no comment
- 1/4/21: OCC – (b) (6) cleared with comment. Comment adjudicated by NRMC.
- 12/21/20: SPP – (b) (6) cleared with edits/additions. Comment adjudicated by NRMC.

CC:

Steve Harris, Acting Deputy Director

Dan Sutherland, CISA Office of Chief Counsel

Joe Croce, Chief Strategy Officer

Erin Wieczorek, Acting Chief of External Affairs