

(U//FOUO) **MEETING OF THE COUNTERTERRORISM SECURITY GROUP/
COUNTERING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY**
JANUARY 28, 2021, 1-2:30 PM
VIA SVTC

(U//FOUO) **Purpose:** Domestic violent extremism (DVE) has become an increasingly urgent national security threat. Addressing it effectively and responsibly demands a shared commitment to three guiding principles: (1) forging a whole-of-government effort while protecting law enforcement prerogatives, such as those that belong to the Department of Justice (DOJ), including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); (2) building a community to address DVE and its drivers across the relevant parts of the federal government and extending into civil society, the technology sector, and beyond; and (3) focusing specifically on violence and that which contributes to it while scrupulously avoiding hindering non-violent expressions of ideological or political views or other constitutionally protected activity. Members of the Counterterrorism Security Group/Countering Domestic Violent Extremism Interagency Community (CSG/DVE) will discuss the launch of a 100-day sprint (1) to review existing efforts to counter DVE and (2) to build a strategic framework for designing and implementing additional efforts to counter DVE.

(U//FOUO) **Discussion**

(U//FOUO) **Introduction to 100-Day Sprint**

(U//FOUO) Recent acts of domestic terrorism have made clear the urgency of accelerating and augmenting efforts to address the threat posed by DVE. National Security Council (NSC) staff will be leading a 100-day sprint to build a strategic framework for doing so. CSG/DVE members will convene to reach a shared initial understanding of the current threat, ensure that their respective departments and agencies provide appropriate representation and participation for the sprint, and identify intended work streams within this effort to craft a strategic framework for policy innovation and development to tackle DVE.

(U//FOUO) **Threat Picture**

(U//FOUO) FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will brief CSG/DVE members on the current DVE threat picture. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) will provide any initial findings as it responds to guidance from the President, conveyed by the Assistant to the President for National Security

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Affairs and the Homeland Security Advisor, to provide by March 1, 2021, a comprehensive, Intelligence Community-coordinated assessment of today's DVE threat. This initial shared understanding of the threat will facilitate a steadfastly fact-driven approach to conceptualizing and addressing the DVE threat.

(U//FOUO) Outline of 100-Day Sprint and Intended Participants

(U//FOUO) NSC staff will provide CSG/DVE members with a preview of the intended 100-day sprint to review ongoing U.S. Government efforts to address DVE and to determine how to construct a strategic framework to accelerate and augment those efforts and, moreover, provide the mechanism for continuing policy innovation, development, and implementation. CSG/DVE members will be asked to anticipate a high pace of meetings to facilitate this intended sprint. Additionally, CSG/DVE members will be asked to ensure that their respective departments and agencies provide representation and participation to enable rapid, responsible progress in addressing the DVE threat. Agencies traditionally seen as not focused on national security such as the Department of Commerce, Department of Education, and Department of Health and Human Services will be asked to ensure consistent participation, express views, and assist with efforts where appropriate.

(U//FOUO) Intended Work Streams in 100-Day Sprint

(U//FOUO) NSC staff will offer CSG/DVE members a sense of anticipated work streams within the 100-day counter-DVE sprint, all subject to further legal and policy review and all intended to put in motion important efforts that generally will require additional time to implement fully. CSG/DVE members will provide feedback and identify any particular challenges or concerns anticipated with respect to the following anticipated work streams:

(1) Improving DVE information collection, analysis, and dissemination within the U.S. Government by (a) understanding current resources and products focused on the DVE threat; (b) ensuring that more frequent, more detailed, and better coordinated collection, analysis, and dissemination of information regarding DVE occurs, consistent with applicable law; and (c) building relationships for civil society efforts that already track DVE threats to provide, to the extent appropriate, their insights and analysis in real-time to

challenge
and
concern
(inconsistent
standards)

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relevant government actors, potentially to include law enforcement, at the federal, state, and local level.

(2) Enhancing efforts to address DVE online radicalization by (a) utilizing existing channels, such as the NCTC-disseminated unclassified publication The Beacon, between the U.S. Government and key technology companies to ensure that information is shared in both directions on online DVE trends and trajectories; (b) considering a convening to bring together and energize government, civil society, tech companies, and alternative content creators; and (c) exploring whether the U.S. Government should join the international Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online.

(3) Augmenting DVE screening and identification in law enforcement, the military, and sensitive private-sector employers such as through (a) DOJ/FBI training to (and, where appropriate, learning from) state and local law enforcement and major private-sector security and other sensitive employers to screen for domestic violent extremists when hiring and to identify those who radicalize once hired; and (b) DOD enhancements to screening and identification of domestic violent extremists within the military, including the Reserves and National Guard, as well as appropriate information-sharing with law enforcement.

(4) Enhancing DVE prevention and counter-radicalization efforts by placing on sounder footing and with greater community buy-in evidence-based prevention efforts aimed at stopping the next generation of domestic violent extremists from becoming radicalized, including by (a) fulfilling the President's promise to end the existing Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention program and broadly review past prevention programs; (b) engaging in a "listening tour" with stakeholder community members to determine what sort of federal funding and other support they would find most useful and non-intrusive to augment prevention efforts; (c) providing substantially more funding for next-generation grants and related prevention programs focused on public health approaches that reduce violence by building the capacities of community-based social workers, mental health professionals, and others well placed to steer individuals away from DVE; and (d) offering training to support civil society's efforts to undermine DVE recruitment in local communities.

(5) Supporting federal law enforcement as a resource on these issues, such as potentially through (a) DOJ's use of the Anti-

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Terrorism Advisory Council to ensure that U.S. Attorney's Offices nationwide are prioritizing investigations and prosecutions to address domestic violent extremists and are trained on how to utilize effectively all legal tools available against them; (b) provision of greater resources and more senior leadership to the recently established DOJ/FBI collaboration between counterterrorism prosecutors and investigators and hate crimes prosecutors and investigators; and (c) consideration of whether additional legal authorities may be needed from Congress and of how existing authorities can be used in innovative ways to assist in addressing the DVE threat, including potentially through novel civil litigation.

(6) Empowering state and local law enforcement to tackle DVE by (a) ensuring that state and local law enforcement are receiving at the unclassified level frequent, current intelligence and analysis regarding domestic violent extremists, including trends in online recruitment efforts; and (b) facilitating DOJ and FBI training to state and local law enforcement on tools available to identify, disrupt, and where appropriate investigate and prosecute domestic violent extremists, including state-level domestic terrorism and hate crimes laws.

(7) Exploring whether more can and should be done to utilize watch-listing to identify and address domestic violent extremists.

(8) Addressing DVE's transnational dimension and linkages by ensuring that (a) the State Department works with interagency partners to review foreign entities linked to DVE (or the foreign components of mixed foreign/domestic entities) to determine whether any such entities should, under statutory criteria, be designated as foreign terrorist organizations and/or specially designated global terrorists; (b) the Treasury Department evaluates whether its Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence can enhance efforts to track international funding related to DVE; and (c) ODNI/NCTC facilitates information-sharing and exchange of lessons learned with trusted foreign partners on international dimensions of today's DVE threat, including foreign malign influence operations and the spread of disinformation.

(U//FOUO) CSG/DVE members will provide initial feedback on these intended lines of efforts and offer suggestions for additional work to be considered as part of the counter-DVE sprint. Overall, these lines of effort are intended to be illustrative, rather than exclusive, and to create the right interagency

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community and mechanism for forging innovative and effective efforts to address the DVE threat going forward while ensuring that sufficient resourcing is provided for those efforts.

(U//FOUO) Conclusion and Next Steps

(U//FOUO) CSG/DVE members will provide additional suggestions for the 100-day counter-DVE sprint and indicate any obstacles or concerns that they anticipate.

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