2021 Election Calendar
as of 5/10/2021

- Indicates that event will be tabulated by AP
Italics indicate that information is tentative

January
1. New Mexico (CD 1 special election)
2. New Hampshire (State House 23 - Bow, Dunbarton special election)
3. New Jersey State Primary (Gov, Senate, Assembly)
4. Virginia State Primary (Gov, LtGov, Attorney Gen, House of Delegates)
5. Louisiana (State 7 special primary)
6. Georgia (State House 34 & 156 special elections)
7. Wisconsin (State House 37 special primary)
8. Alabama (State House 78 special primary runoff, if needed)
9. New York State Primary (NYC mayoral & municipal offices, etc.)
10. California (State House 19 special primary)

February
1. New York (NYC Council 24 special election)
2. Louisiana (State 35 special primary)
3. Georgia (State House 90 special primary)
4. Oklahoma (State 23 special primary)
5. Wisconsin Spring Primary (Sup of Public Instruction: StIl Sen 13 & StIl House 89 special primaries)
6. New York (NYC Council 31 special election)
7. Texas (State House 60 special election runoff)

March
1. Louisiana (State 26 special general)
2. Connecticut (StIl Sen 27 special election)
3. Massachusetts (StIl House 19 Suffolk special primary)
4. Rhode Island (Statewide bond referendum special election)
5. Georgia (StIl House 80 special primary runoff)
6. Maine (StIl Sen 14 special election)
7. Louisiana Municipal/Special Primary (CD 2, StIl House 82 & SBE 4 special primaries)
8. Virginia (StIl Sen 38 special election)
9. Alabama (StIl Sen 14 & StIl House 73 special primaries)
10. Massachusetts (StIl House 19 Suffolk special general)

April
1. California (StIl House 79 special primary)
2. Missouri (StIl House 45 special election)
3. Wisconsin Spring Election (Sup of Public Instruction: StIl Sen 13 & StIl House 89 special general)
4. Connecticut (StIl House 112 special election)
5. New Hampshire (StIl House 21 Merrimack special election)
6. New Hampshire (StIl House 23 - Bow, Dunbarton special primary)
7. Louisiana Municipal/Special General (CD 2, StIl House 82 & SBE 4 special general)
8. Connecticut (StIl House 73 special primary runoff)

May
1. Texas Uniform/Municipal Election Date (CD 6 special election)
2. California (StIl House 54 special primary)
3. Pennsylvania State Primary (Judicial and mayoral/municipal offices; StIl 22 & 49. StIl House 56 & 60 special elections; 4 statewide ballot measures)
4. Alabama (StIl House 78 special primary)

June
1. New Mexico (CD 1 special election)
2. New Hampshire (StIl House Merrimack 23 - Bow, Dunbarton special election)
3. New Jersey State Primary (Gov, StIl Sen, StIl Assembly)
4. Virginia State Primary (Gov, LtGov, Attorney Gen, House of Delegates)
5. Louisiana (StIl Sen 7 special primary)
6. Georgia (StIl House 34 & 156 special elections)
7. Wisconsin (StIl House 37 special primary)
8. Alabama (StIl House 78 special primary runoff, if needed)
9. New York State Primary (NYC mayoral & municipal offices, etc.)
10. California (StIl House 19 special primary)

July
1. Louisiana (StIl Sen 7 special general if needed)
2. Alabama (StIl Sen 14 & StIl House 73 special general if needed)
3. Georgia (StIl House 34 & 156 special general if needed)
4. Wisconsin (StIl House 37 special general)
5. California (StIl House 54 special election if needed)

August
1. Michigan (Detroit mayor/municipal primary, StIl Sen 28 special primaries)
2. Ohio (CD 11 & CD 15 special primary)
3. Washington State Primary (Seattle mayor/municipal primary, etc.)
4. Minnesota Primary (Municipal and local offices)
5. California (StIl House 18 special election if needed)

September
1. Alabama (StIl House 78 special general)

October
1. Louisiana Open Primary

November
1. GENERAL ELECTION
2. Colorado (Statewide bond measure)
3. Florida (CD 29 special primary, re tabulation; Miami mayor/municipal general)
4. Georgia (Atlanta mayor/municipal)
5. Maine (Statewide ballot measure(s))
6. Massachusetts (Boston mayor/municipal)
7. Michigan (Detroit mayor/municipal, StIl Sen 8 & StIl Sen 28 special general)
8. Minnesota (Municipal and local offices)
9. New York (NYC mayoral & municipal offices, statewide ballot measures, etc.)
10. Ohio (CD 11 & CD 15 special election)
11. Pennsylvania (Judicial and mayoral/municipal offices)
12. Tennessee (Statewide ballot measures)
13. Virginia (Gov, LtGov, Attorney Gen, House of Delegates)
14. Washington (Seattle mayor, municipal elections, statewide ballot measures)

December
1. Alabama (StIl House 78 special primary)

January (2023)
1. Florida (CD 29 special general)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>SCC Full Membership Meeting</th>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>2021/05/27 13:00:00</td>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attendees</td>
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</table>
SCC Members,
Please hold this time for the SCC Full Membership Meeting. More details regarding this meeting will be added to this invitation prior to the meeting.
Thank you,
EII SSA
Election Infrastructure Subsector Specific Agency, Election Security Initiative
National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Email: EIISSA@cisa.dhs.gov
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From: [Redacted]</th>
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*Election Infrastructure SSA* [Redacted]

<EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov>
Obtained by America First Legal Foundation through litigation

Subject: 
Date: 2021/05/27 10:21:52
Start Date: 2021/05/27 13:00:00
End Date: 2021/05/27 14:30:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule, Meeting, Request
Location: [b](6) [PIN: [b](6)]

HSIN/Adobe Connect Link: https://share.dhs.gov/sccfullcouncil/

Dial-in: [b](6) [b](6) [b](6)
PIN: [b](6) [b](6) [b](6)

SCC Members,
Thank you for taking the time to meet before the holiday weekend. The meeting agenda will be attached to this invitation prior to the meeting and the dial-in and HSIN/Adobe Connect link can be found above.

This meeting will be conducted through BOTH HSIN/Adobe Connect and a Dial-in. Please use the link provided to have a live view of the meeting presentation and please call into the number provided for the meeting’s audio. A HSIN account is not required to attend this meeting, you may log in as a guest.

If the provided link does not work or you do not have access to a computer at the time of the meeting, a copy of the meeting’s presentation will be added to this invitation on the day of the meeting.

Please note, Roll Call will be taken at the beginning of the meeting through the Dial-in number. If we miss you or you call in after this portion of the meeting, please email EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov to record your attendance.

Lastly, please use the following link to participate in the SCC Membership Survey: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAlpQLSemo-aTrQuDp5qyGj9ZWtK0thsWDyMZfRjA_111VhWUmrIj8A/viewform?usp=sf_link

We look forward to meeting with you soon.

Thank you,

EISSA
EII SSA/ESI, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Email: EISSA@CISA.DHS.GOV
**Subject:** SCC Full Membership Meeting

**Date:** 2021/05/27 11:19:22

**Start Date:** 2021/05/27 13:00:00

**End Date:** 2021/05/27 14:30:00

**Priority:** Normal

**Type:** Schedule,Meeting,Request

**Location:**

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**HSIN/Adobe Connect Link:** [https://share.dhs.gov/sccfullcouncil/](https://share.dhs.gov/sccfullcouncil/)

SCC Members,
Thank you for taking the time to meet before the holiday weekend. The meeting agenda and materials are attached to this invitation and the dial-in and HSIN/Adobe Connect link can be found above.

This meeting will be conducted through **BOTH** HSIN/Adobe Connect and a Dial-in. Please use the link provided to have a live view of the meeting presentation and please call into the number provided for the meeting's audio. A HSIN account is not required to attend this meeting, you may log in as a guest.

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Lastly, please use the following link to participate in the SCC Membership Survey: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAlpQLSemo-aTrQuDp5qyGj9ZWtK0thsvDvMfZrJj8A_111VhWUmrIj8A/viewform?usp=sf_link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAlpQLSemo-aTrQuDp5qyGj9ZWtK0thsvDvMfZrJj8A_111VhWUmrIj8A/viewform?usp=sf_link)

We look forward to meeting with you soon.

Thank you,

**EISSA**
EI SSA/ESI, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Email: **EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov**
Elections Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Committee (EISCC) New Member Packet

Welcome! We’re pleased that you’ve joined the Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Committee. The following documents are intended to help you get grounded in the work of the Sector Coordinating Committee, and to become familiar with the resources available to you as a member organization.

The EISCC was created in 2018 with the mission of advancing the physical security, cyber security, and emergency preparedness of the nation’s election infrastructure. The EISCC accomplishes this mission through our work as individual entities and in coordination with other private critical infrastructure sectors as well as with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the state, local and tribal governments (SLTTs), and the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council (GCC).

The primary objectives of the EISCC include coordinating with Federal, State, and Local agencies including the Department of Homeland Security around security and emergency preparedness issues, facilitating information sharing about physical and cyber threats, risks, incidents, and protective measures, and developing, in coordination with DHS and EIGCC partners, recommendations, plans and procedures in support of infrastructure protection.

Membership in the EISCC is open to organizations with significant business or operating interests in U.S. election infrastructure systems or services. Applications for membership are generally voted on at the EISCCs two annual in-person meetings. The EISCC is led by an Executive Committee comprised of a Chair, Vice Chair, Immediate Past Chair, and two members at large. With the exception of the Immediate Past Chair,
Executive Committee members are elected by the full council membership at the EISCC’s winter meetings.

The current Executive Committee of the EISCC are:
Chair - Hart Intercivic
Vice Chair - ES&S
Immediate Past Chair - Unisyn Voting Systems
Member-at-Large - Smartmatic
Member-at-Large - Democracy Works

To facilitate the information sharing portion of the EISCC’s mission, and to take full advantage of membership, there are a few additional resources and organizations you may want to sign up for.

- One of the important benefits of being part of the SCC is having access to more information. In some cases that could mean sensitive information, and in order to facilitate that, our partners at the Department of Homeland Security have connected us to the Private Sector Clearance Program. With this program, your primary and alternate contacts will be offered the opportunity to apply for security clearances in order to have access to confidential information when it is available to our sector. This is a fairly rigorous application process and requires the person to provide detailed background information. It is not specifically a requirement of SCC membership, and DHS tries to provide one-day "sign-ins" when there is information that may need a broader, but still selective, audience, but we highly recommend having at least one person in your organization go through this process. To begin the nomination process, please reach out to Ex-Comm member at

- The EI-ISAC, hosted by the MS-ISAC/CIS is primarily structured for SLTT membership and support, but SCC members can join for free as supporting members and can share and receive information, though they are not eligible for
the full services associated with membership. SCC members can apply for membership directly here.

- The EI-SIG, hosted by the IT-ISAC, is primarily structured for private sector participation, and is open to for-profit SCC member organizations. It provides full incident/operational support for members, who must pay dues in order to receive services. SCC members can apply for membership by contacting [b](6)

Also included in this packet are the EISCC Charter, Criteria for Membership, a robust summary of resources available through CISA, the most recent Sector Specific Plan, a document drafted jointly with the GCC laying out our goals for securing the sector, and an incident communication guidance fact sheet, which provides contact information for the Federal Partners who can support SCC members in the case of an incident.

We hope these resources are helpful. If you have questions, don’t hesitate to reach out to the Executive Committee members. We’re very glad to have you as a member of the Sector Coordinating Committee.

Sincerely,

[b](6)

New Member Packet Table of Contents

- New Member Packet Cover Sheet & Table of Contents
- EISCC Charter (Current Version Updated 2/9/21)
- EISCC Criteria for Membership
- CISA Election Infrastructure Security Resource Guide
- Elections Infrastructure SubSector Specific Plan (Current Version Updated 2019)
- EISCC Incident Communications Guidance
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council

Meeting Agenda

Thursday, May 27, 2021
1:00 p.m. – 2:30 p.m. EST

HSIN/Adobe Connect

1:00 p.m.
Welcome & Introductions

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC Executive Committee

1:10 p.m.
SCC Roll Call
EI SRMA Team

1:15 p.m.
DHS Updates
ESI Team
- DHS and CISA Leadership
- Executive Order
- Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack
- Physical Security and Law Enforcement

1:45 p.m.
CISA Services
ESI Team
- New Services and Programs
- Services Review

2:00 p.m.
Working Group Updates
[Redacted] and Working Group Co-Chairs
- Joint Digital Network Development Working Group
- Joint Managing Mis/Disinformation Working Group
- Joint NIST Cybersecurity Framework Working Group
- Joint SSP Working Group

2:10 p.m.
SCC Updates
SCC Executive Committee
- New Members Welcome Packet
- Supply Chain Risk Management
- National Elections Infrastructure TTX

2:20 p.m.
New Business and Open Discussion
- Summer Meeting 2021

2:30 p.m.
Executive Committee Closing Comments
SCC Executive Committee
ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE 
SUBSECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL 
FULL COUNCIL MEETING
Housekeeping

- Dial-in: [redacted], PIN: [redacted]. All lines are open. Please keep your phone muted when not speaking. Adobe Connect Link: [redacted]. We do not call your name, please register your attendance by emailing EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov.
Agenda Overview

- 1:00 – Executive Committee Opening Comments
- 1:10 – Roll Call
- 1:15 – DHS Updates
- 1:45 – CISA Services
- 2:00 – Working Group Updates
- 2:10 – SCC Updates
- 2:20 – New Business and Open Discussion
- 2:30 – Executive Committee Closing Comments
Executive Committee Opening Comments

SCC Executive Committee
InterCivic, Chair
Systems and Software, Vice Chair
Unisyn Voting Solutions
Election Democracy Works
Smartmatic

Obtained by America First Legal Foundation through litigation
DHS Program Updates

- DHS and CISA LeadershipExecutive Order on Improving the Nation’s CybersecurityColonial Pipeline Ransomware AttackPhysical Security and Law Enforcement
CISA Services

- New Services and Programs
  - CISA Election Security Overview
  - Election Security: Building Trust through Secure Practices
  - Election Security Risk in Focus: Ransomware
  - Election Security Risk in Focus: Phishing
  - Services Review
  - Remote Penetration Testing
  - Critical Product Evaluation
  - Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
  - Phishing Campaign Assessment
Working Group Updates

Joint SSP Working Group Status: Hiatus (re-starting soon)

GCC Co-Chair: 

SCC Co-Chair: 

Next Steps: Change to focus on analysis and implementation of the SSP to review goals, evaluate progress, and identify new goals. Re-map goals and objectives to past, current, and proposed new (if any) working groups.
Working Group Updates

Joint NIST Cybersecurity Framework Working Group Status: Active
GCC Co-Chair: [b](6), NISTSCC Co-Chair: [b](6) ES&S
Next Meeting: TBD (early July 2021)
NIST Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile: csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8310/draft
Working Group Updates

Joint Managing Mis/Disinformation Working Group Status: ActiveGCC Co-Chair: Hon. Kim WymanSCC Co-Chair: Possible next steps: Baseline what worked and didn’t work while combating mis/disinformation in 2020. Create or review “Rumor Control” implementation guide/training materials. Work to identify or provide guidance on partnering with community influencers uniquely positioned to reach target audiences with accurate information.
Working Group Updates

Joint Digital Network Development Working Group Status: Proposal to disband. SCC Co-Chair: [Redacted] GCC Co-Chair: [Redacted] Proposal to disband: Proposal to incorporate objectives into a Joint Training Sub-Working Group: Identifying instances where reporting to the EI-ISAC doesn’t satisfy state reporting requirements and documenting additional steps required Training and documentation for incoming election officials and service providers on existing information networks.
SCC Updates

- New Members Welcome Packet
- Supply Chain Risk Management
- National Elections Infrastructure
- TTX
New Business / Open Discussion
Executive Committee Closing Comments

SCC Executive Committee, Hart InterCivic Chair, Election Systems and Software, Vice Chair, Democracy Works, Unisyn Voting Solutions, Smartmatic

Obtained by America First Legal Foundation through litigation
Thank you! If you missed roll call, please email EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov to record your attendance.
SCC Members,

The 2021 SCC Summer Meeting is scheduled for August 13, 2021, from 12:30 - 4:00 p.m. CT. This meeting will be a hybrid format, and members are encouraged to participate however they are most comfortable. Please see below for the meeting details.

The in-person portion of the SCC Summer Meeting will take place during the in-person National Association of Secretaries of State 2021 Summer Conference at Marriott Des Moines Downtown.

There will be a virtual portion of the meeting for those unable to join us in-person. The format will be announced prior to the meeting.

Meeting Name: 2021 SCC Summer Meeting  
Date: August 13, 2021  
Time: 12:30 p.m. CT - 4:00 p.m. CT  
Location: 700 Grand Ave, Des Moines, IA 50309  
Dial-In: TBD  
Link: TBD  
Materials: TBD

If you have any questions, please email EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov.

Thank you,

EIS SRMA  
Election Infrastructure Subsector Risk Management Agency, Election Security Initiative
SCC Members,

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Link: TBD
Materials: TBD

If you have any questions, please email EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov.

Thank you,

EI SRMA
Election Infrastructure Subsector Risk Management Agency, Election Security Initiative
Great, looking forward to it! I’ll reach out a few days ahead of the conference so we can coordinate a time.

And, well ... we might actually be speaking sooner rather than later on one of the things. I’ll be sending a request to the press shop later today asking to speak with you for a story I am doing about infrastructure security concerns raised by the ongoing Arizona review and the one proposed in PA. Happy to chat offline ahead of that to talk through what I am working on if that is helpful. My cell is [REDACTED] and I’m on Signal.

Christina

Christina Almeida Cassidy | AP Journalist | [REDACTED] (Signal) | @AP_Christina

Thanks, Christina. I’ll be there in Iowa and would be happy to hear what you are working on.

Geoff

[EXTERNAL]

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.
Hi Geoff, hope you are well. You may recall that we met way back when at NASS just before the pandemic hit in early 2020. Gosh, that seems like ages ago. I was hoping that you might have some time to chat when NASS rolls around again next month. I will be in Iowa. Just hoping for some off the record time to catch up and talk through some of the stuff I am working on.

Thanks!

Christina
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council
Meeting Agenda

Friday, August 13, 2021
12:30 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. EST
Des Moines Marriott Downtown
700 Grand Ave, Des Moines, IA
Windows Room
Dial-in: (6) PIN: (6)

12:30 p.m. Welcome & Introductions

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC ExCom Members

SCC Roll Call
EI SSA Team

12:45 p.m. NASS Priorities on Elections Critical Infrastructure
Secretary

1:00 p.m. DHS Updates
Geoff Hale
• Physical Security Assessment
• CISA Services and New Products

1:45 p.m. Election Assistance Commission Updates

2:00 p.m. New Member Discussion
• Discussion
• Voting Instructions

2:15 p.m. Working Group Updates

2:30 p.m. State Legislative Updates from NCSL

2:55 p.m. Supply Chain Risk Management

3:30 p.m. Review of Recent Events
• BlackHat & DEF CON
• EI-SIG Plans for future
• Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

3:45 p.m. New Business and Open Discussion

4:00 p.m. Executive Committee Closing Comments

DHS-1255000272 03/29/2023
Subject: 2021 SCC Summer Meeting
Date: 2021/08/11 13:15:16
Start Date: 2021/08/13 13:30:00
End Date: 2021/08/13 17:00:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request
Location: 700 Grand Ave, Des Moines, IA 50309
SCC Members,

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Meeting Name: 2021 SCC Summer Meeting
Date: August 13, 2021
Time: 12:30 p.m. CT - 4:00 p.m. CT
Location: 700 Grand Ave, Des Moines, IA 50309
Dial-In: (b)(6)
PIN: (b)(6)
Link: TBD
Materials: TBD

If you have any questions, please email EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov.
Thank you,

EI SRMA
Election Infrastructure Subsector Risk Management Agency, Election Security Initiative
National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Email: EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov

[(b)(6)]

[(b)(6)]

[(b)(6)]
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Sent Date: 2021/08/11 13:14:56
Delivered Date: 2021/08/11 13:15:16
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council
Meeting Agenda

Friday, August 13, 2021
12:30 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. CT

Des Moines Marriott Downtown
700 Grand Ave, Des Moines, IA
Windows Room

Dial-in: (b)(6)
PIN: (b)(6)

12:30 p.m. Welcome & Introductions

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC ExCom Members

SCC Roll Call
EI SSA Team

12:45 p.m. NASS Priorities on Elections Critical Infrastructure
Secretary (b)(6)

1:00 p.m. DHS Updates
Geoff Hale
- Physical Security Assessment
- CISA Services and New Products

1:45 p.m. Election Assistance Commission Updates
(b)(6)

2:00 p.m. New Member Discussion
- Discussion
- Voting Instructions

2:15 p.m. Working Group Updates
(b)(6)

2:30 p.m. State Legislative Updates from NCSL
(b)(6) NCSL

2:55 p.m. Supply Chain Risk Management
(b)(6)

3:30 p.m. Review of Recent Events
(b)(6) Ed Smith, Sam Derheimer
- BlackHat & DEF CON
- EI-SIG Plans for future
- Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

3:45 p.m. New Business and Open Discussion

4:00 p.m. Executive Committee Closing Comments
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council

Meeting Agenda

Friday, August 13, 2021
12:30 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. CT

Des Moines Marriott Downtown
700 Grand Ave, Des Moines, IA
Windows Room

Link: https://share.dhs.gov/sccsummer/

12:30 p.m.
Welcome & Introductions

SCC Roll Call
EI SSA Team

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC ExCom Members

12:45 p.m.
NASS Priorities on Elections Critical Infrastructure
Secretary [IA]

1:00 p.m.
DHS Updates
Geoff Hale

- CISA Services and New Products
- Physical Security Assessment

1:45 p.m.
Election Assistance Commission Updates

2:00 p.m.
New Members Discussion

- Discussion
- Voting Instructions

2:15 p.m.
Working Group Updates

2:30 p.m.
State Legislative Updates from NCSL
NCSL

2:55 p.m.
Supply Chain Risk Management

3:30 p.m.
Review of Recent Events

- BlackHat & DEF CON
- EI-SIG Plans for future
- Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

3:45 p.m.
New Business and Open Discussion

4:00 p.m.
Executive Committee Closing Comments

DHS-1255000280 03/29/2023
ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE SUBSECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL 2021 SUMMER MEETING
Housekeeping

- Dial-in: [redacted] PIN: [redacted] All lines are open. Please keep your phone muted when not speaking.
- Adobe Connect Link: https://share.dhs.gov/scssummer Roll Call
- If we do not call your name, please register your attendance by emailing EIssa@cisa.dhs.gov.
NASS PRIORITIES ON ELECTIONS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
SECRETARY

(b)(6)
Chain of Custody Guidance

Released by CISA in August 2021

Chain of custody is a security consideration across critical infrastructure. Tracking control of data and assets to ensure transparency, accountability, and trust. Highlights impacts and risks from a broken chain of custody. The integrity of the system and its data will be deemed untrustworthy. A court of law can render the system and data inadmissible if inability to definitively determine if an actor has manipulated your systems or data.

Examples of Physical Chain of Custody:
- Chemicals: 
  - Monitor and control access to hazardous materials.
  - Maintain a chain of custody for all hazardous materials.
- Electronic Security: 
  - Implement secure methods for handling and storing sensitive data.
  - Ensure that all data is properly encrypted.

Examples of Digital Chain of Custody:
- Healthcare: 
  - Implement electronic signatures and secure data transfer methods.
  - Ensure that all data is properly encrypted.
- Financial Services: 
  - Implement secure methods for handling financial transactions.
  - Ensure that all data is properly encrypted.

Broken Chain of Custody:
A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset (e.g., data, systems) is lost or compromised. In such cases, the data or asset must be retraceable. To prevent loss or misuse, security measures should be implemented to ensure that the data is not accessible to unauthorized parties.
Chain of Custody Guidance

A Complex Topic Vastly Oversimplified

1. Identify: What do you care about? Who is authorized to access and control it?

2. Protect: What can they do to the things you care about? How do you keep non-authorized people from accessing it?

3. Detect: Is there enough evidence to know something happened? Can you tell if something occurred and what it was?

4. Respond: How will you determine the impact? How will you prevent further consequences? Do you know what to do next?

5. Recover: What will it take to trust the asset again?
Cybersecurity Services

CISA Services
- Vulnerability Scanning (Cyber Hygiene)
- Penetration Testing
- Phishing Campaign Assessment
- Product Evaluation
- Crossfeed
- Cyber Resilience Review

CISA Election Security Trainings
- Election Security Overview
- Ransomware
- Phishing
- Building Trust through Secure Practices
Physical Security

CISA resources available to election officials

- Protective Security Advisors
- Physical Security Assessments
- Physical Security at Voting Locations and Election Facilities

Mitigating the Impacts of Doxing on Critical Infrastructure Guidance
Physical Security

Coordinated Federal Support

Report immediate threats to local law enforcement (9-1-1). Report threats and violent acts to the FBI at 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324), prompt 1, then prompt 3. DOJ, DHS, and FBI, and others are working together in recognition of increasing threats against election workers/administrators/officials.
Protective Security Advisor,
Iowa Cybersecurity And Infrastructure Security Agency
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION UPDATES
New Members Discussion

- Discussion Voting Instructions
Working Group Updates

Joint SSP Working Group Next Meeting: August 24, 2021 @ 3pm ET
GCC Co-Chair: SCC Co-Chair:

Next Steps: Change to focus on analysis and implementation of the SSP to review goals, evaluate progress, and identify new goals. Re-map goals and objectives to past, current, and proposed new (if any) working groups. Goal is to update and finalize joint subsector goals and activities by early 2022.
Working Group Updates

Joint NIST Cybersecurity Framework Working Group
Status: Active
GCC Co-Chair: [Redacted]
NISTSCC Co-Chair: [Redacted]
ES&S
Next Meeting: TBD
NIST Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile: csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8310/draft
Working Group Updates

Joint Managing Mis/Disinformation Working Group Next Meeting: Early-Mid September
GCC Co-Chair: Secretary Kim Wyman
SCC Co-Chair: 

Next steps: Baseline what worked and didn’t work while combatting mis/disinformation in 2020. Create a “Rumor Control” implementation guide and other resources/training materials. Work to identify or provide guidance on partnering with community influencers uniquely positioned to reach target audiences with accurate information.
Working Group Updates

Joint Digital Network Development Working Group Status: Disbanded
SCC Co-Chair: [redacted]
GCC Co-Chair: [redacted]
Proposal to incorporate objectives into a Joint Training Sub-Working Group: Identifying instances where reporting to the EI-ISAC doesn’t satisfy state reporting requirements and documenting additional steps required for training and documentation for incoming election officials and service providers on existing information networks.
2021 Election Legislation, A Sampling

Director, Elections and Redistricting

August 13, 2021
Strengthening the legislative institution. Serving 7,383 legislators and 25,000 staff.
2021 Was a Busy Year in Legislatures.
Today’s Outline

Topics New This Year

Evergreen Topics

Cybersecurity and Funding?
Topics New This Year
Indiana Kentucky Virginia Vermont Latest thinking: can problems be cured by text?

**Ballot Curing**

When a voter returns an absentee/mail ballot and the signature is missing or not correct, can the voter fix it so their ballot counts?
Ballot Collection

- IA, MT: "ballot harvesting" to some extent. Now, 43 states have some form of ballot collection limit; most restrict to a family or household member.

Ballot Drop Boxes

- FL, GA, IA, MD, MN, VA: stipulate the maximum number (mostly). Previous laws stipulated security features (mostly). Now, at least 17 states address drop boxes somehow in statute.
2021 Enactments Related to People Running Elections

We’ve seen no enactments about poll workers (as opposed to poll watchers).

1. Election Officials
   Establishing fines or penalties for violations, or prohibits them from local decision-making

2. Poll Watchers
   Clarifying what poll watchers can observe
Evergreen Topics
Our big topics

Early Voting
KY added it in IA and GA reduced it slightly

Absentee Voting
- MA adopted for 2021

All Mail Voting
- NV and VT adopted CA adopted for 2021

Voter ID
- WY and AR adopted new stricter laws MO, NE & PA may get it on 2022 ballots

Registration
- DE, HI-Automatic RegME—Online RegMT—repealed Election Day Reg NE & OK—joining ERIC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION POLICIES</th>
<th># States 2000</th>
<th># States 2020</th>
<th>Changes 2021 so far</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>All Mail Voting</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Felon Voting Rights 2009 – 2020: 17 (relaxed) 2 (restricted)2021: 3 states + DC relaxed laws further</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Other Topics

- Ranked Choice Voting
  - Voter list maintenance
  - Creating online portals to request absentee ballots
  - Tweaks to absentee processes
Cybersecurity and Funding???
The Canvass: August 2021

INSIDE THIS ISSUE
- Lead Article: The What, Why and How of Election Audits
- Legislative Update: From the Chair
- Odds and Ends: Ask NCSL, Worth Noting and From the Elections Team

RESOURCES
- Previous Issues
- To Subscribe

Reach out anytime!

Subscribe -- Just tell me you're interested.
Supply Chain Risk Management

- BlackHat & DEF CONEI-SIG Plans for coordinated vulnerability disclosure
Executive Committee Closing Comments

SCC Executive Committee
Hart InterCivic Chair
Election Systems and Software, Vice Chair
Democracy Works
Unisyn Voting Solutions
Smartmatic

Obtained by America First Legal Foundation through litigation
Thank you! If you missed roll call, please email EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov to record your attendance.
**Working Group Formation Profile - CIPAC Compliant**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsoring Sector(s):</th>
<th>Election Infrastructure Subsector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Working Group:</td>
<td>Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council Supply Chain Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Group Type:</td>
<td>☒ Sector Specific  ☐ Cross Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Creation:</td>
<td>MONTH DAY, 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor's Concurrence Document:</td>
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| Detailed WG Purpose: | • Adapt existing resources produced by the Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force and CISA to provide election-oriented information.  
• Create checklists and resources that vendor's and election officials can use to assess their supply chain risk management strategy.  
• Outline current best practices regarding supply chain risk management within the election community.  
• Share resources throughout the election community to increase awareness of supply chain risk management. |
| Expected Deliverables: | • TBD |
| Expected Meeting Frequency: | • TBD |
| Expected End Date: | Indefinite/On-going |
| EIS SCC ExCom members: | |
| Organization: | Name: | Phone: | Email: |
| Hart InterCivic | (b)(6) | (b)(6) | (b)(6) |
| Election Systems and Software | (b)(6) | (b)(6) | (b)(6) |
| Democracy Works | (b)(6) | (b)(6) | (b)(6) |
| Smartmatic | (b)(6) | (b)(6) | (b)(6) |
| Unisyn Voting Solutions | (b)(6) | (b)(6) | (b)(6) |
| Working Group Co-Chairs | |
| Organization: | Name: | Phone: | Email: |
| TBD | | | |
| Associated Sub-Working Groups | |
| None at this time | Established: | ☐ Formation Profile signed |
| Working Group Members: | ☐ Membership confirmed by Working Group Co-Chairs |
| Organization: | Name: | Phone: | Email: |
| | | | |
Subject Matter Experts:

<table>
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<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None at this time</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

SSA/Administrative Support Staff Assigned:

<table>
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<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CISA/ NRMC/ ESI</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISA/ NRMC/ ESI/ EI SRMA</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
<td>(b)(6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Working Group Formation Profile has been reviewed and validated for CIPAC compliance

CIPAC DFO: __________________________ Date: __________________________
Election Infrastructure Subsector
Subsector Coordinating Council Winter Meeting
Meeting Summary
May 27, 2021

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC ExCom Members

- The Election Infrastructure (EI) Subsector Coordinating Council (SCC) Executive Committee (ExCom) thanked the SCC member representatives for attending the meeting and encouraged everyone to look for people within their organizations who are interested in the work the SCC is doing and help them to get involved.

SCC Roll Call
EI SRMA Team

- The Election Infrastructure Subsector Risk Management Agency (EI SRMA) conducted a roll call and asked that any organization that missed this portion of the call email EISSL@cisa.dhs.gov to record their attendance.

DHS Updates
ESI Team

DHS and CISA Leadership

- Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas was confirmed by Congress. He has stated that election security will remain a top priority for the Department.
- Acting Director Brandon Wales currently leads CISA. President Biden nominated Jen Easterly, who is awaiting Senate confirmation.

Executive Order

- The Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity outlined how Federal Government agencies will lead by example in securing systems to defend against the current threat landscape.
- The Executive Order prioritizes improving software supply chain vulnerabilities.
- The Executive Order establishes a Cyber Safety Review Board to perform incident response after an attack. After a cyber incident, the Review Board will provide lessons learned on how to better protect critical infrastructure.
- The Executive Order assigns CISA, alongside other federal partners, the responsibility of promoting and improving security of critical infrastructure.

Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack

- On May 7, 2021, Colonial Pipeline, one of the nation’s largest oil pipelines, was forced to shut down due to a ransomware attack. In a press release, the company stated that once it learned of the attack it proactively took certain systems offline to contain the threat. As a result, the company had to temporarily halt all pipeline operations.
Election Infrastructure Subsector
Subsector Coordinating Council Winter Meeting
Meeting Summary

- This attack demonstrated how an attack on a business operations network can impact the delivery of products and information.
- To better protect organizations against ransomware attacks, CISA recommends the following:
  - Update software and operating systems with the latest patches.
  - Never click on links or open attachments in unsolicited emails.
  - Back up data and store it offline.
  - Follow safe practices when using devices that connect to the Internet.
- More information and resources on ransomware can be found at CISA.gov/ransomware.
- Microsoft, a SCC Member, offers Account Guard services to any organization in the elections community that uses Microsoft for email. Those interested in this service can contact [redacted] at [redacted].

Physical Security and Law Enforcement
- The EI SRMA Team shared a six-point plan to help election officials and private sector partners improve their physical security posture. Included in this plan is engagement in the National Security Council (NSC) Election Security Group (ESG) Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), additional engagement with CISA’s regional staff, developing new physical security products for election officials, and hosting a discussion forum with representatives of national law enforcement associations.

CISA Services
Geoff Hale and [redacted]

New Services and Programs
- The CISA Exercises team can organize state and organizational level Tabletop exercises. If interested, please contact EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov.
- CISA is offering four new or updated training programs. These trainings can be tailored to meet an organization’s unique needs and interests. The trainings are as follows:
  - CISA Election Security Overview: An overview of the election security risk landscape and CISA’s role in assisting election stakeholders to manage risk and strengthen resilience in election infrastructure.
  - Election Security Risk in Focus: Ransomware: Overview of ransomware including attack vectors and impacts with an emphasis on risks to election infrastructure and available resources.
  - Election Security Risk in Focus: Phishing: Overview of phishing including types, detection, and impacts with an emphasis on risks to election infrastructure...
and available resources.

**Services Review**

- Since 2018, CISA has performed the following services for SCC members:
  - Remote Penetration Testing (RPT): 3 completed
  - Critical Product Evaluation (CPE): 4 completed, 2 ongoing, 1 planned
  - Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA): 1 completed, 1 ongoing
  - Phishing Campaign Assessment (PCA): 3 completed
- This fiscal year, CISA has completed delivery of assessments to 31 election infrastructure stakeholders and 66 are in progress. CISA served 115 election infrastructure customers in FY19.
- These numbers do not account for Cyber Hygiene (CyHy), which offers continuous scanning of public IP addresses and provides weekly reporting and ad hoc alerts. There are currently 339 election infrastructure stakeholders using CyHy, including 21 private sector organizations, 6 of which are SCC members.
- CISA emphasized that these services are available to new and current SCC members at no cost.
- Participating in these services provides organizations insights and recommendations on how to improve their cybersecurity posture. As a secondary benefit, the increased awareness and insights CISA gains through organizations participating in these services allows CISA to be more informed advocates to Congress about the specific needs of the sector.

**Working Groups**

---

**Joint Digital Network Development (DND) Working Group**

- The SCC and GCC ExComs voted to disband the Joint DND Working Group.
- The Co-Chairs will meet with the Co-Chairs of the GCC Training Working Group to discuss how to merge the groups’ objectives and create a Joint Training Working Group.

**Joint Managing Mis/Disinformation Working Group**

- The next Working Group meeting is June 7, 2021. During this meeting, the Working group will receive a briefing from DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
- The Working Group outlined the following objectives:
  - Objective 1: Create an inventory of lessons learned from mis/disinformation activities in the past year.
  - Objective 2: Create a “Rumor Control” implementation guide/training materials and/or communications training materials.
  - Objective 3: Identify or develop guidance on partnering with community
influencers uniquely positioned to reach target audiences with accurate information.

- Objective 4: Share information on the current mis-, dis-, and malinformation threat environment.

**Joint NIST Cybersecurity Framework Working Group**
- NIST released the *Cybersecurity Framework for Elections* profile for public comment.
- The Working Group will start to look at protections for voting registration databases.
- The next meeting and publication of the profile will be scheduled for July.

**Joint Subsector Specific Plan Working Group**
- Co-Chairs will meet on June 15, 2021 to discuss the next steps for the Working Group.

**SCC Updates**

**SCC Executive Committee**

**New Members Welcome Packet**
- The EI SRMA Team recently sent a request to update contact information for SCC organizations. For those who have not provided updates, please reply to that email to ensure your organization receives information shared through the EI SRMA.
- The SCC ExCom distributed a membership survey prior to the meeting and encouraged members to provide their responses.
- A draft of the SCC Welcome Packet was attached to the meeting invitation. Through this resource, the ExCom wants to provide the most important information and resources to new members.
  - The Welcome Packet includes a brief overview of the SCC, what partnerships SCC memberships are eligible for, the SCC Charter, criteria for membership, the Subsector Specific Plan, a communications guide, the CISA Services Catalogue, and frequently asked questions for the Election Infrastructure Special Interest Group.
- The ExCom is also interested in establishing a Buddies program for new SCC members. This program would pair a current SCC member with a new member to ensure SCC onboarding is an organized experience.
  - Any current SCC members interested in this program should contact the ExCom.

**Supply Chain Risk Management**
- During the month of April, CISA sent out resources and information for National Supply Chain Integrity Month. The public-private Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force provided information and resources on four different themes: building collective supply chain resilience, assessing
Election Infrastructure Subsector
Subsector Coordinating Council Winter Meeting
Meeting Summary

ICT trustworthiness, understanding supply chain threat, and knowing the essentials. The Task Force has formed the following working groups:

- Information Sharing Working Group
- Small and Medium-sized Business (SMB) Working Group
- Product Use Acceleration Working Group
- Study Group on Lessons Learned from Recent Software Supply Chain Attacks

- Additionally, CISA released two resources that organizations can use to assess the trustworthiness of their vendors and suppliers: Mitigating ICT Supply Chain Risks with Qualified Bidder and Manufacturer Lists and Vendor SCRM Template.

National Election Infrastructure TTX

- [b](6) SCC Member, provided an overview of the upcoming Tabletop the Vote exercise.

- The SCC ExCom encourages SCC members to participate with their state and local customers, if possible. Slots will also be available for SCC members to participate separately.

- Invitations will be sent to SCC members in the coming weeks.

New Business and Open Discussion

Summer Meeting 2021

- The SCC Summer Meeting is usually scheduled around the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) Summer Conferences.

- NASS will host its summer conference in Des Moines, Iowa. NASED will host a virtual conference. Election Center will host its summer conference in Scottsdale, Arizona.

- The ExCom distributed a membership survey prior to the meeting to determine how many members are planning on attending these in-person events. The ExCom will determine the format for the 2021 Summer Meeting after receiving responses.

Executive Committee Closing Comments

- The ExCom thanked everyone for attending the meeting and reminded the members to respond to the membership survey distributed prior to the meeting.

Attendance

EIS SCC ExCom Principals

Democracy Works
Hart InterCivic
Unisyn
Election Infrastructure Subsector
Subsector Coordinating Council Winter Meeting
Meeting Summary

Smartmatic
Election Systems and Software

EI SCC Members

Associated Press
Arikkan/CCS
Amazon Web Services
BlueCrest
Civix
Democracy Live
Demtech Voting Solutions
DFM Associates
Dominion Voting Systems
Election Systems & Software
Election Systems & Software
Election Systems & Software
Electronic Registration Information Center
Electronic Registration Information Center
Freeman, Craft, McGregor Group
Freeman, Craft, McGregor Group
Hart InterCivic
K&H Printers
Microsoft
MicroVote
Pro V&V
Pro V&V
Runbeck Election Services
Ryder Election Services
SeaChange
SLI Compliance
Smartmatic
Tenex Software Solutions, Inc.
Voatz
VOTEC
VOTEC
Voting Works
VR Systems
VR Systems

DHS Representatives

CISA/ NRMC/ ESI
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI/ EI SRMA
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI
Election Infrastructure Subsector
Subsector Coordinating Council Winter Meeting
Meeting Summary

CISA/ NRMC/ ESI/ EI SRMA
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI/ EI SRMA
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI/ EI SRMA
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI

DHS Support Staff
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI/ EI SRMA
CISA/ NRMC/ ESI/ EI SRMA
Here are a few questions if you wanted to add anything:

- What does it mean for election security now that full copies of the Dominion EMS software have been released into the wild following the incident in Mesa County?
- Are you concerned that any cybercriminal, any partisan actor looking to undermine confidence in elections now has full access to the software that designs ballots, configures machines, tallies results and unlimited time to craft an attack?
- What steps if any can you take to protect this software?

Hi Geoff,

Given the fact that we now know the Dominion EMS software has been released into the wild and available for download on the Internet, I wanted to check in to see if you wanted to add anything for my story on the threats surrounding these so-called audits. I’ve had to rewrite my story to focus on the software release but I see that what you told me earlier is similar to what you told WaPo for their newsletter today.

This is what I had from you:

Geoff Hale, who leads the election security effort at the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, said his agency has always taken the position that officials should presume Russia and other U.S. adversaries already have access to these systems. That’s why it’s so important for election offices to have processes in place to conduct a successful election in the event of a breach.
“We’ve premised all of our guidance to election jurisdictions on the idea that the underlying software and systems would already be available to a skilled adversary,” Hale said. “This certainly doesn’t help. This doesn’t reduce the threat landscape in any way. But we haven’t demonstrably changed our posture because of this.”

I am on deadline for today. Story should move this afternoon so please let me know soonest.

Many thanks,

The information contained in this communication is intended for the use of the designated recipients named above. If the reader of this communication is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error, and that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify The Associated Press immediately by telephone at and delete this email. Thank you.
SCC members,

First of all it was great seeing many of you in person at the NASS summer conference and we appreciate those who participated remotely. Our continued collaboration on issues that affect our industry and our customers is key to our mutual success. It is for that reason that we are contacting you today.

During the SCC call you heard [b][5] speak to you about forming a supply chain working group. This group will identify best practices for supply chain risk management for election tech providers based on existing materials developed by the US government and other relevant entities and create easy to follow guides or check lists that will help you identify risks to your supply chain and offer potential controls or mitigations to reduce that risk. If your products fall under VVSG, RABET-V, or other federal requirements supply chain risk management is rapidly becoming a larger consideration for your business management processes.

Your organization’s participation in this effort is critical to our mutual success. While you may not be the person worried about supply chain security where you work, there is likely someone else within your organization that is and it is to them we would like you to pass this email to. Perhaps your organization has not considered how a supply chain risk management program is necessary or beneficial. Regardless, please give strong consideration to having your organization represented at our first supply chain working group meeting via the attached invite. Our first call will be to hear from CISA about what’s been done so far and then organize our efforts to support our industry and our customers.

Thank you.

Sender: Election Infrastructure [b][8]
[b][6]
[<EISSA@csa.dhs.gov>]

Recipient: [b][0]
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council
Supply Chain Risk Management Working Group
Meeting Agenda
Friday September 9, 2021
1:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. ET

Dial-in: [(b)(6)]
PIN: [(b)(6)]

Welcome/Opening Comments: [(b)(6)]

DHS Discussion: [(b)(6)] Geoff, Juan

- The emerging and changing threat landscape
  - What are the top threat-vulnerability-exploit triplets DHS is seeing exploited, especially as they relate to election systems?
  - What are DHS and other federal agencies doing (standard setting, direct assistance to industry, publications, etc.)

SCC Supply Chain Working Group Discussions: [(b)(6)]

- Working group structure, functions, DHS support, industry actions
- Working Group roadmap and next steps

Open Discussion: All

- SCC partners perspectives/experience with SCRM

Upcoming Meetings: [(b)(6)]

- Establish meeting cadence
- TBD

Adjourn
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council
Supply Chain Risk Management Working Group
Meeting Agenda

Friday September 9, 2021
1:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. ET

Dial-in: [Redacted]
PIN: [Redacted]

Welcome/Opening Comments: [Redacted]

DHS Discussion: [Redacted] Geoff, Juan

- The emerging and changing threat landscape

SCC Supply Chain Working Group Discussion: [Redacted]

- Working group structure, functions, DHS support, industry actions
- Working Group roadmap and next steps

Open Discussion: All

- SCC partners perspectives/experience with SCRM

Upcoming Meetings: [Redacted]

- Establish meeting cadence
- TBD

Adjourn
SCC Members,

Thank you for your participation in today’s SCC Supply Chain Risk Management Working Group. For your reference, DHS materials regarding broad supply chain security can be found at [www.cisa.gov/supply-chain](http://www.cisa.gov/supply-chain). Please review these documents and take note of how these products could be tailored to provide more specific information to the election infrastructure community.

As mentioned during the call, please reply to this email and provide the following information:

- Name
- Title
- Organization
- Interested sub-group (Hardware, Software, Services, Paper Ballots)
- Confirm availability, Thursday at 2:00 p.m. ET (If not available, please provide your general availability)

Please forward this information to anyone in your organization who may have interest in participating in this group, and if you have any questions contact EISSA@cisa.dhs.gov.

Thank you,

**EI SSA**

EI SSA/ESI, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Email: EISSA@CISA.DHS.GOV
Subject: SCC Supply Chain Working Group
When: Thursday, September 9, 2021 2:00 PM-3:00 PM.
Where: [redacted]
Dial-in: [redacted]
PIN: [redacted]

SCC members,
First of all it was great seeing many of you in person at the NASS summer conference and we appreciate those who participated remotely. Our continued collaboration on issues that affect our industry and our customers is key to our mutual success. It is for that reason that we are contacting you today.

During the SCC call you heard [redacted] speak to you about forming a supply chain working group. This group will identify best practices for supply chain risk management for election tech providers based on existing materials developed by the US government and other relevant entities and create easy to follow guides or check lists that will help you identify risks to your supply chain and offer potential controls or mitigations to reduce that risk. If your products fall under VVSG, RABET-V, or other federal requirements supply chain risk management is rapidly becoming a larger consideration for your business management processes.

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working group meeting via the attached invite. Our first call will be to hear from CISA about what's been done so far and then organize our efforts to support our industry and our customers.

Thank you.
In preparation for Thursday’s SCC Full Council meeting, attached please find the agenda and meeting presentation.

Microsoft Teams meeting
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council
Meeting Agenda

Thursday, January 27, 2022
9:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. ET

Link: Teams

9:00 a.m. Welcome, Agenda Overview & Housekeeping

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC ExCom Members

9:15 a.m. Update- Joint SCC-GCC ExCom Meeting

9:30 a.m. CIS / EI-ISAC

9:50 a.m. Introduction to Kim Wyman

10:00 a.m. DHS Updates
ESI Team
- CISA Personnel Update
- EI Clearance Program Update

10:30 a.m. EI-SCC Executive Committee Elections
SCC ExCom
- Discussion
- Voting Instructions
- Nominee Speeches

11:00 a.m. Working Group Updates
- Joint SSP Working Group
- Joint Mis/Disinformation Working Group
- Joint Training Working Group
- Joint NIST CSF Working Group.
- Supply Chain Risk Management Working Group &

11:40 a.m. New Business and Open Discussion

11:55 p.m. Executive Committee Closing Comments
ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE SUBSECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL WINTER 2022 MEETING
Agenda Overview

- Welcome & Housekeeping
- Executive Committee Opening Comments
- Update - Joint SCC/ GCC Executive Committee Meeting
- CIS/ EI-ISAC Briefing
- Introduction to Kim Wyman
- DHS Updates
- Executive Committee Elections Working Group Updates
- New Business and Open Discussion
- Executive Committee Closing
- Comments
- Adjourn
Housekeeping

- Microsoft Teams Meeting Link: Click here to join the meeting
  Audio only: [ ]

  Phone Conference ID [ ]
  Please keep teams or phone muted when not speaking.
  Attendance will be taken via Teams participant list. Please email [ ]@cisa.dhs.gov if you used the Dial-in option.
Primary 2021 Objectives:

- **Communication**
  - Ensure industry partners receive vital threat intel and alerts
  - Continuous learning

- **Capacity**
  - Increase membership – fill gap areas
  - Improve member threat awareness and management
  - Fully staff all WGs and projects with SCC representatives

- **Resources**
  - Consistent and sustainable support
  - Products geared to educate/assist SCC members
Update- Joint SCC-GCC ExCom Meeting

Primary 2022 Objectives:

- **Communication**
  - Ensure industry partners have access to security briefings and alerts
  - Continuous learning
  - Trusted resource for CISA and GCC as new issues arise in 2022

- **Capacity**
  - Identify and fill new gap areas in knowledge/coverage (new members)
  - Fully staff all WGs and projects with SCC representatives

- **Resources**
  - Host SCC-focused TTX (Jan 27)
  - Identify and develop new products/services relevant to SCC members
  - Promote Vulnerability Disclosure Policies across SCC
  - Physical safety / security
Introduction to Kim Wyman
DHS Updates
ESI Team

- CISA Personnel Updates
- EI Clearance Program Updates
El Clearance Program Update

- El Clearance Program Status Update
- New policies impacting nominations
- Annual Training Reminder
EL Program Status Update

- EL Clearance Program overview and update. It will no longer be described in "Phases" (i.e. +2 and +3) Comprehensive approach, ensuring equal partnership representation. Goal is to expand access, increasing information sharing in the sector. Consolidating Clearance Program processes: Nominators: SCEOs, RDs, PSAs, EI SRMA Team GCC and SCC clearances do not count towards state clearance allowances.

- Nominees per state: Eight SCEOs or designated alternative: One. Incoming SCEOs: Three. Existing State Clearance Holders: Two. Local Election Officials: Two. Nominees per SCC Organization:

Two Other Private Sector Stakeholders
All incoming clearance candidates will now receive correspondence from PSCP within 3-4 weeks of submitting their nomination to the EI SRMA Team (Previously 2-3 business days). With the exception of SCEO’s, all clearance nominees are required to provide 2-3 sentences detailing their job function, which will support their justification for a clearance. Non-compliance/non-response (missing deadlines)
Per the 2019 NDAA, all SCEOs (or designee) are eligible to apply for a TS/SCI clearance upgrade. SCC Executive Committee members are eligible to apply for a TS/SCI clearance upgrade. The EI Clearance Program is now offering TS/SCI clearances to: SCEOs (or designated staff member) GCC Executive Committee Members SCC Executive Committee Members
REMINDER: Annual Training Documents will be distributed TODAY. Return the requested documents by the listed deadline or your clearance will be discontinued! As a SCC representative or alternate, you are eligible to be nominated for a Secret clearance. If you are interested, or have any questions, please contact @cisa.dhs.govAnna Guiseppe:
2022 Executive Committee Election

- Discussion Voting Instructions Nominee Speeches (2 minutes per nominee)
Working Group Updates

Various

- Joint SSP Working Group
- Joint Mis/Disinformation Working Group
- Joint Training Working Group
- Joint NIST CSF Working Group
- Supply Chain Risk Management Working Group
Joint Subsector Specific Plan Working Group Chairs: [Redacted] and [Redacted]  

Next meeting date: TBD

Working Group Current Status and Objectives: EI SSP WG concluded the 2020 EI SSP is no longer operative given significant changes post-2020; general agreement amongst GCC/SCC members on January 21st Joint Executive Committee Meeting. EI SSP WG recommended that the 2020 document be removed from the CISA website while the National Plan is being finalized (mid-2022) and the EI SSP is being fully revised for 2024. Members were generally supportive of producing a Bridging Document to guide sector functions for 2022 – target for development and circulation is by mid-March 2022.
Working Group Updates

Joint Managing Mis/Disinformation Working Group Chair: [Redacted] GCC Chair TBD Next meeting date: TBD Working Group Purpose and Current Objectives: Develop and implement a strategic approach to countering and/or pre-empting mis- and disinformation that targets election stakeholders and entities. Recently developed two products that are currently in the final review stages, which will be released today. Those products are the Rumor Control Start-up Guide and the Planning and Incident Response Guide.
Working Group Updates

Joint Training Working Group Chairs: [Redacted] and [Redacted]

Next meeting date: February 9th, 1:00pm ET

Working Group Purpose and Current Objectives: The Working Group recently distributed the Training Matrix for comments to the GCC and SCC. Comments were due yesterday, January 26. The EI SRMA Team will consolidate these and distribute them to the Training Working Group for discussion at their next meeting.

Goals: raise awareness about existing resources, identify any gaps to fill, and be able to educate those new to the space
Working Group Updates

Joint NIST Cybersecurity Framework Working Group
Chairs: [ ] and [ ]
Next meeting date: TBD
Working Group Updates

SCRM Working Group Chairs: [b](6) and [b](6) Next meeting date: Working Group Current Status and Objectives: Sub-Working Groups: Hardware Services Software Paper Ballots
New Business / Open Discussion
Executive Committee Closing Comments
Thank you for joining us! Please email @cisa.dhs.gov to register your attendance. Questions? Email: @cisa.dhs.gov
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: SCC Full Council Meeting
Date: 2022/02/23 09:17:28
Start Date: 2022/03/31 14:00:00
End Date: 2022/03/31 15:00:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request
Location: Microsoft Teams Meeting

Attendees:
Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app
Click here to join the meeting

Or call in (audio only)

United States, Washington DC

Phone Conference ID

Find a local number | Reset PIN

** U.S. Department of Homeland Security **

Learn More | Meeting options
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: SCC FULL COUNCIL MEETING

Date: 2022/02/23 09:23:35

Start Date: 2022/03/31 14:00:00

End Date: 2022/03/31 15:00:00

Priority: Normal

Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request

Location: Microsoft Teams Meeting

Attendees: (b)(6)
SCC Members,

Please disregard the calendar invite you just received from [Redacted] and please respond to this one.

We look forward to meeting with you on March 31 at 2:00pm ET.

Best,

SRMA
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: SCC FULL COUNCIL MEETING
Date: 2022/03/18 10:16:32
Start Date: 2022/03/31 14:00:00
End Date: 2022/03/31 15:30:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request
Location: Microsoft Teams Meeting

DHS-1255000393 03/29/2023
SCC Members,

We look forward to meeting with you on March 31 at 2:00pm ET. Meeting materials will be provided in advance of the meeting.

Best,

SRMA
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: SCC FULL COUNCIL MEETING
Date: 2022/03/29 16:04:50
Start Date: 2022/03/31 14:00:00
End Date: 2022/03/31 15:30:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request
Location: Microsoft Teams Meeting

Attendeess: [Redacted]
SCC Members,

In preparation for Thursday’s SCC Full Council meeting, attached please find the agenda. Additional meeting materials will be provided in advance of the meeting.

Best,

SRMA
Election Infrastructure SSA

From: [Redacted]
(b)(6)

To: [Redacted]
(b)(6)

(c)(5) cisac.dhs.gov>
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: SCC FULL COUNCIL MEETING
Date: 2022/03/31 12:46:17
Start Date: 2022/03/31 14:00:00
End Date: 2022/03/31 15:30:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request
Location: Microsoft Teams Meeting

Election Infrastructure SSA: [b](6)
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SCC Members,

In preparation for Thursday's SCC Full Council meeting, attached please find the agenda. Additional meeting materials will be provided in advance of the meeting.

Best,
SRMA

Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app
Click here to join the meeting
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council Meeting Agenda
Thursday March 31, 2022
2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. ET
Microsoft Teams

2:00 p.m.  Welcome & Introductions

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC Executive Committee

2:10 p.m.  NICE Framework Introduction (NIST)

2:20 p.m.  NIST Cybersecurity Framework

2:30 p.m.  DOJ Election Task Force

2:40 p.m.  DHS Services and Assessments Overview

2:50 p.m.  MDM Presentation

3:00 p.m.  DHS Updates
Geoff Hale
  • Ukraine/ Russia Tensions

3:05 p.m.  SCC General Organization Items
  • 2022 SCC Goals

3:10 p.m.  Working Group Updates
  • General Working Group Discussion
  • Joint Training Working Group
  • Joint Managing Mis/Disinformation Working Group
  • Joint SSP Working Group
  • SCRM Working Group

3:20 p.m.  New Business and Open Discussion
  • New Membership Vote - Data Defenders

3:25 p.m.  Executive Committee Closing Comments
SCC Members,

In preparation for Thursday’s SCC Full Council meeting, attached please find the agenda. Additional meeting materials will be provided in advance of the meeting.

Best,

SRMA

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Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app
Click here to join the meeting
Or call in (audio only)
(b)(6) United States, Washington DC
Phone Conference ID: (b)(6)
Find a local number | Reset PIN

×

*** U.S. Department of Homeland Security ***

Learn More | Meeting options
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: SCC FULL COUNCIL MEETING
Date: 2022/03/31 13:00:23
Start Date: 2022/03/31 14:00:00
End Date: 2022/03/31 15:30:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request
Location: Microsoft Teams Meeting
Attendees:
SCC Members,

In preparation for Thursday’s SCC Full Council meeting, attached please find the following meeting materials:

- Final Agenda
- Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan: 2022 Status Update
- New Membership Application - Data Defenders

Best,

SRMA

Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council Meeting Agenda

Thursday March 31, 2022
2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. ET
Microsoft Teams

2:00 p.m. Welcome & Introductions

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC Executive Committee

2:10 p.m. NICE Framework Introduction (NIST)

2:20 p.m. NIST Cybersecurity Framework

2:30 p.m. DOJ Election Task Force

2:40 p.m. DHS Services and Assessments Overview

2:50 p.m. MDM Presentation

3:00 p.m. DHS Updates
Geoff Hale
  - Ukraine/ Russia Tensions
  - Classified Briefing

3:05 p.m. SCC General Organization Items
  - 2022 SCC Goals

3:10 p.m. Working Group Updates
  - General Working Group Discussion
  - Joint Training Working Group
  - Joint Managing Mis/Disinformation Working Group
  - Joint SSP Working Group
  - SCRM Working Group

3:20 p.m. New Business and Open Discussion
  - New Membership Vote- Data Defenders

3:25 p.m. Executive Committee Closing Comments
In January 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Election Infrastructure Subsector under the Government Facilities Sector through a critical infrastructure designation for election infrastructure. The designation makes it clear both domestically and internationally that election infrastructure enjoys all the benefits and protections of critical infrastructure that the U.S. Government has to offer.¹

Since its inception, the Subsector has established and developed strong partnerships among government stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels and between the public and private sectors, forming both a Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). These bodies have provided a focused mechanism for collaboration between state and local election officials, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), law enforcement, the intelligence community, and private sector partners to enhance information sharing about risks to the Nation’s election systems, identify resources to help mitigate such risks, communicate best practices, address identified vulnerabilities, and enable election officials’ and private sector partner’s access to threat information.

The Joint Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan (SSP), initially approved by the GCC and SCC in 2020, provided a framework for industry and government partners to establish shared priorities for security efforts in the face of threats to election infrastructure, while also setting a path for ongoing collaboration and capability development. Since the approval of the joint SSP, the threat environment has evolved, and the Subsector has responded with new processes and capabilities. Consequently, the previous SSP is no longer operative. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (National Plan), which provides a guiding framework for all critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors, is under revision by CISA and its stakeholders with expected completion in mid-2022. A refresh of the Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan is pending along with the updated National Plan.

In the meantime, this document provides Joint Interim Guidance for the EI Subsector partnership through the 2022 Midterm Elections. It focuses on the activities that the GCC and the SCC have identified to address the Subsector’s current security priorities. These efforts aim to boost collective capabilities for responding to national or large-scale incidents and build resilience across the elections ecosystem through coordinated information sharing and risk mitigation.

¹ The January 2017 Department of Homeland Security designation defines “election infrastructure” as the following: “storage facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulations locations used to support the election process, and information and communications technology to include voter registration databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage the election process and report and display results on behalf of state and local governments.” https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical.
ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE SUBSECTOR VISION
“A unified government and private sector approach to empower the election stakeholder community to build resilience for election infrastructure threats and risks.”

ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE SUBSECTOR MISSION
“To coordinate effort by state and local election officials, private sector and non-profit partners, and the Federal Government to manage risks and secure election infrastructure against new and evolving threats.”

Current Issues
Addressing Physical Security for Election Facilities and Personnel
In the lead up to and the aftermath of the 2020 general election, public officials and private individuals whose jobs involved administering elections or supporting those who administer elections became the subject of threatening communication and conspiracy theories. Election facilities, including government offices and tabulation centers, became the focus of protests or other activity. Private industry facilities were also targeted by protests or others making threats and/or looking to disrupt business operations.

State and local election officials must balance security with access and transparency. Election officials operate on principles of open public access and transparency, which can create challenges for adopting physical security principles and practices to protect workers and employees. Voting sites can be soft targets due to their open access and limited security barriers, and Election Day workers are mostly temporary employees.

CISA currently provides the public and private sectors with access to a diverse array of trainings, exercises, and best practice resources that focus on prevalent physical security attack methods (e.g., active shooter, vehicle ramming, bombing), along with corresponding protective measures through Physical Security of Voting Locations and Election Facilities guidance that election officials and private sector partners can use to improve their physical security posture. Community-based resources are also available through the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships to help prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence.

In July 2021, the US Department of Justice created the Task Force on Threats Against Election Workers to aggregate reports of such activity against election workers, administrators, officials, and others associated with elections. The Task Force also leads the federal law enforcement response and, where appropriate, prosecution of threats and harassment of election officials, workers, and others. Representatives from the Task Force have spoken to NASS, NASED, Election Center, and a variety of other stakeholder groups.

As part of the Last Mile effort, CISA created customizable posters that jurisdictions can post in their offices detailing state-specific laws governing threats, harassment, and other relevant activity, as well as contact information for federal, state, and local law enforcement. CISA has also provided resources on doxing prevention to help members of the subsector take steps to protect their personal information before it can be made public. Finally, the EAC created a webpage aggregating information for election officials experiencing threats, including mental health resources for those experiencing threats, harassment, or other unwelcome communications. There is ongoing work to be done to ensure the safety of both election facilities and members of the subsector themselves, including the formal development of protocols for reporting such hostile activity.
Managing Risks to the Supply Chain

The federal government has prioritized efforts to raise awareness around the risks associated with industry supply chains and related products and/or services that may contain potentially malicious functionality, are counterfeit, or are vulnerable due to manufacturing and development practices. Understanding and adopting processes to assure product integrity, security, resilience, and quality are all considerations for Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) efforts.

In response to Executive Order 13873, the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) SCRM Task Force has worked with industry and government partners to:

- Develop a standardized taxonomy of ICT elements (e.g., hardware, software, and services)
- Perform criticality assessments on these ICT elements with appropriate stakeholder input
- Assess the national security risks stemming from vulnerabilities in ICT hardware, software, and services including components enabling 5G communications.

Representatives of the Task Force have met with EIC SCC leaders to keep industry partners apprised of their progress.

In June 2021, the Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council (SCC) established a Sector Coordinating Council SCRM Working Group to explore potential practices and risk mitigation efforts within the Subsector. The SCRM Working Group seeks to assist election technology providers and election officials with procurement practices around election-related software, hardware, and services to assess and reduce risks to the election jurisdiction and their supply chain partners. In today’s global economy, it is almost impossible not to rely on a supply chain that stretches to all parts of the globe. As such, supply chain risk management is necessary to ensure that election officials and their supply chain partners only procure election-related software, hardware, and services from legitimate sources that have a program in place to manage supply chain integrity risk.

In February 2022, the SCRM Subgroup on Ballot Paper issued a white paper outlining risk mitigations for Subsector partners regarding ballot paper and envelopes. The Working Group also released a document in March 2022 as an introduction to how organizations and downstream supply chain partners, including election officials, can better secure their supply chain. It seeks to provide the following information related to election supply chain risk management:

- Provide SCRM WG guidance on election software related supply chain risk management in order to assist others when procuring election related software, hardware, and services;
- Leverage existing resources provided by the CISA and the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) SCRM Task Force;
- Provide checklists and other resources that technology providers and election officials may use to assess their election software supply chain risk management strategy;
- Identify best practices regarding software supply chain risk management within the election community; and
- Share resources through the election community to increase awareness of supply chain risk management practices.
This work compliments efforts by a range of stakeholders to update the federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), approved by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. These guidelines cover design, development and testing specifications for accuracy, security, functionality, privacy, usability and accessibility of certified voting systems. Technology manufacturers who are subject to the VVSG currently provide a range of product and component sourcing and supplier information to the federal government.

Securing Chain of Custody

Prolonged public attention on the administration of elections means that the processes by which election officials secure equipment and materials are under a microscope. Referred to as chain of custody, these processes include how officials ensure the continued integrity of everything from ballots to pollbooks to voting machines during their life cycle, including their control or transfer from place to place—or person to person. This may also extend to digital information or records to ensure that integrity and confidentiality are not compromised. While each state and territory has their own jurisdiction-specific requirements, it is critical that election officials also understand the role that chain of custody procedures, especially for voting equipment, play in the broader security of the election ecosystem. In addition, most private sector election support providers have contractual agreements outlining permissions for third party access to equipment.

According to the Department of Homeland Security, chain of custody threats can result in: unscheduled disruptions (i.e. equipment malfunction); criminal incidents and terrorist attacks; cyber incidents; supply chain attacks (exploiting vulnerabilities to cause system or network failure); or, foreign influence operations (to spread misinformation or undermine democratic processes). Specific to elections, the loss of physical or digital control of chain of custody can result in election offices being unable to provide assurance that equipment or records have not been tampered with or manipulated in violation of established processes.

In 2021, both CISA and the FAC issued guidance documents on chain of custody focusing on critical infrastructure generally, and elections. Additionally, a recently developed CISA training, "Building Trust through Secure Practices", addresses implementing and communicating chain of custody procedures. More education and training is needed to help election officials develop and implement chain of custody protocols, including how they pertain to the integrity of the greater Subsector.

In addition to educating members of the Subsector on chain of custody procedures, state and local election officials must educate their stakeholders—legislators, appropriators, and voters—on these processes to inform decision making and combat mis-, dis-, and malinformation. Further training resources from the GCC on chain of custody can help state and local election officials more effectively communicate on this topic.
Countering Election Mis/Disinformation

Misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation (MDM) have long posed a threat to election security and integrity. While often inadvertent, misinformation that provides voters with inaccurate guidance, such as the incorrect voter registration deadline or voting location, can be damaging to the point of disenfranchising voters. The malicious forms of MDM, disinformation and malinformation, are tools used to intentionally confuse voters and undermine confidence in the election process. Taken to their extreme, MDM can result in threats or violence against election workers, officials, or volunteers.

Individual election officials, industry providers, and other organizations represented by Subsector Councils have implemented efforts to counter MDM. For example, NASS launched the #TrustedInfo initiative to encourage voters to get election information directly from election officials. CISA, many individual states and local election jurisdictions, and several election technology providers produced “rumor control” or “myth vs. fact” web pages to dispel MDM and voter confusion, and provide accurate information about election administration, technology, and security.

After the 2020 election, the GCC and SCC launched the Joint MDM Working Group to leverage opportunities to coordinate efforts across the Subsector. Thus far, the working group has created two products to help state and local election officials and industry providers prepare for and respond to risks of MDM: the Rumor Control Page Start-Up Guide and the MDM Planning and Incident Response Guide for Election Officials. The MDM Working Group provides a forum through which the Subsector can continue to identify challenges in countering MDM, and it will continue to produce resources for addressing such challenges.

Another approach the Subsector has taken to addressing MDM is promoting adoption of the .gov top level domain, available exclusively to U.S. governments. Getting information from a .gov website or email address allows the public to have confidence the information is from an official government source. As of April 2021, the .gov program is administered by CISA and is available at no cost. Finally, the information sharing mechanisms discussed below provide information and tools for building awareness of MDM narratives and countering them.

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Information Sharing at the Classified and Unclassified Levels

The earliest goals and accomplishments of the Subsector Councils related to the improvement of information sharing. The GCC established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing & Analysis Center (EI-ISAC) to support incident response, trend analysis, and information sharing across the Subsector. SCC members belong to the EI-ISAC as supporting members and benefit from the information sharing it provides. An ongoing goal of the GCC and SCC is to increase membership in the EI-ISAC among small-to-medium election jurisdictions and industry providers. EI-ISAC membership recently surpassed 3,000 entities and continues to grow.

The Elections Industry Special Interest Group (EI-SIG) was separately formed by industry technology manufacturers in 2018 through the Information Technology Information-Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC). The EI-SIG continues to serve as an important vehicle for information-sharing, training, and industry-focused security initiatives, including adoption of organizational coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies.

Subsector members regularly receive threat information from the U.S. Intelligence Community through ISACs and other avenues, such as classified and unclassified briefings. These briefings from DHS and its federal partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), allow election officials and industry providers to remain updated on cybersecurity threats and influence operations from foreign adversaries. The Subsector continues to add election officials and industry providers to the Election Infrastructure Clearance Program so they have access to appropriate classified briefings. The Subsector is increasingly looking for ways to share information on physical security threats to election infrastructure, voting locations, and personnel. As the 2022 midterm elections approach, the Subsector Councils acknowledge an ongoing need for improvement related to physical security information sharing, including the development of information sharing protocols.

The GCC continues to encourage use of its voluntary Threat Information Sharing and Incident Reporting Protocols across the Subsector. These protocols ensure information is appropriately shared across jurisdictions so that when one jurisdiction is facing a threat, the other jurisdictions can monitor for the same threat. The protocols also guide election officials to incident response resources.

The SCC updated its general guidance incident reporting for member organizations in 2021 and continues to utilize this framework subject to all federal, state, and local requirements for such notifications.

Resources for Enhancing Election Security, including Cybersecurity and Ransomware Attacks

Although the Subsector is facing increasing physical security and MDM threats, cybersecurity remains an ongoing priority. The GCC and SCC have a sustained focus on increasing the availability and use of cybersecurity resources, services, and training from CISA, EI-ISAC, and others.

CISA, with the help of the GCC and SCC, encourages election officials and industry providers to continue to utilize their cybersecurity assessments and detection and prevention services including new services that are more scalable to grow their reach across the more than 10,000 election jurisdictions and industry providers. Also, in addition to growing its membership to optimize information sharing, the EI-ISAC is expanding participation in its most recently added services such as Malicious Domain Blocking and Reporting (MDBR).
The GCC Training Working Group recently expanded to include the SCC in an acknowledgement of the importance of training across the entire Subsector, not just for election officials. The newly established joint working group advises CISA, EI-ISAC, EAC, and others on areas where training resources are lacking. The phishing-focused and “building trust through secure practices” courses from CISA are recent additions created based on input from the Training Working Group. Additionally, many state election offices have partnered with the private sector and academia or produced in-house cybersecurity training for employees and local election officials. The EI-SIG offers cybersecurity training to member companies and their employees as well.

The GCC and SCC continue to focus on empowering their members to manage cybersecurity risk and plan for potential incidents. Members of both Subsector councils provided input on the Election Security Risk Profile Tool, hosted by EAC and created by CISA, which helps election administration stakeholders assess their risk and prioritize their resources for mitigating risk. CISA’s Last Mile Initiative is a collaborative effort with election officials to produce customized products (e.g., Snapshot Posters, Election Day Emergency Response Guides, and other templates) that address the dynamic or conditional cyber and infrastructure risks of state and local election administrators and industry providers. Many state election offices have worked with their private sector partners and others to produce their own products to enhance preparedness at the state-level, and to help local officials prepare for cyber incident response.
Organization Membership Application

What is the Role of the EI-SCC? The general mission of the Elections Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Council (EI-SCC) is to serve as the private sector’s asset/owner interface for advancing security and emergency preparedness levels for U.S. election infrastructure, in accordance with the law. This mission will be accomplished through the voluntary interactions and self-governance of participating CI asset owners and operators represented on the Council, as set forth in Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 and related authorities. The SCC works with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council (EI GCC) and other sectors of critical infrastructure, as appropriate.

The SCC Charter lists the following objectives for the group:

- Serve as the primary liaison between the election subsector and federal, state, and local agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), concerning private election subsector security and emergency preparedness issues;

- Facilitate sharing of information and intelligence about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents and potential protective measures;

- Coordinate with DHS and the EIS GCC to develop, recommend and review sector-wide plans, procedures, and effective practices in support of infrastructure protection, including training, education, and implementation;

- Represent the election subsector in discussions with other infrastructure sectors, as well as with the EIS GCC, on matters of threat, security, risk analysis, emergency preparedness and response, and other related matters;

- Identify and communicate priorities, obstacles or impediments to effective critical infrastructure security and resilience protection programs and develop/recommend to appropriate authorities actions to mitigate them;

- Provide a mechanism to ensure that the specialized knowledge and expertise of sector operators, owners and other pertinent representatives is available as a resource.
Contact Information

**Company/Organization Name:** Data Defenders, LLC.

**Primary Organization Address:** 111 W. Jackson Blvd. STE 1700

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<tr>
<th>City</th>
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<td>IL</td>
<td>60604</td>
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**Company Phone:** (b)(6)

**Website:** www.data-defenders.com

**Primary Contact/Representative:** (b)(6)

**Title:** Managing Principal

**Mailing Address:** 111 W. Jackson Blvd. STE. 1700

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<td>(b)(6)@data-defenders.com</td>
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</table>

**Additional Contact/Representative:** (b)(6)

**Title:** Chief Technology Officer

**Address:** 111 W. Jackson Blvd. STE 1700

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Please include a description of your organization and how it meets member qualifications, including existing business/working relationships with U.S. state and local election officials:

Membership is open to any owner or operator with significant business or operating interests in U.S. election infrastructure systems or services, as defined by the January 2017 Department of Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure Designation. Eligible prospects will be U.S. elections-focused organizations that can demonstrate their assets are used by state and local governments in administering elections.

**Entities whose main purpose of business or operation is not primarily elections must submit a separate Statement of Interest to clearly outline their reasons for seeking participation, their ability to meet Council membership criteria and any current or contemplated election projects. (Please attach with completed membership application.)**
Type of Elections Infrastructure Assets (select all that apply to your organization):

- [ ] Voting Systems (Includes Labs)
- [ ] Voter Registration Systems
- [ ] Election Management Systems
- [ ] Election Results Reporting Systems
- [ ] Public Information Systems for Voting
- [ ] Electronic Poll Book Systems
- [X] Security-Related Systems (Election-Specific)
- [ ] Physical Security (Technical, Storage, Processing Facility)
- [ ] OTHER (Please note)

Approximately how many people in your organization are dedicated to providing elections-focused solutions and/or support?

- [X] 20

What are your organizational priorities in protecting election infrastructure? (Select all that apply):

- [X] Business continuity
- [X] Risk assessment and management
- [X] Cyber security
- [ ] Physical security
- [ ] Compliance
- [X] Threat analysis
- [X] Crisis communication
- [ ] Other (please list): Click here to enter text.

EI-SCC Meeting Attendance

The EI SCC aims to hold two in-person (full) membership meetings per year, with call-in capabilities for most meetings. Ad hoc calls are scheduled as needed, on an issue-by-issue basis, or for specific working groups. Members are expected to participate on a regular basis. Lack of participation can be reasons for suspension or expulsion from the Council. Your submission of a completed, signed application is recognition of your understanding of these conditions.

Sign and Date:

Cyrus Walker

03/04/2022

Please complete the information in this form and return your completed application to the SCC by emailing Chair. Thank you!
Good Morning EI SCC,

We hope this email finds you well.

Thank you again for joining us during our last full council meeting.

As a follow up to the meeting, we ask that one member from your organization complete the survey below to vote on Data Defenders, the SSP update, and additional SCC matters by COB Friday April 15.  

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/HSHYTW8

Please notify us or the SRMA team if you have any questions.

Best,
EI SCC ExCom
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SCC Members,

As a reminder, please submit your survey responses by COB tomorrow.

The survey includes new member information, the SSP update, and future logistical requests. It is important that we have a response from each organization to move forward.

Please let us know if you are unable to open the link below or if you have any questions.

Thanks!

Election Infrastructure Subsector Risk Management Agency (SRMA)
Election Security Initiative, National Risk Management Center
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

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From: Election Infrastructure SSA
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2022 9:26 AM
To: [b](6) [b](6) [b](6)
Cc: EISRMATeam
Subject: EI SCC Survey

Good Morning EI SCC,

We hope this email finds you well.

Thank you again for joining us during our last full council meeting.

As a follow up to the meeting, we ask that one member from your organization complete the survey below to vote on Data Defenders, the SSP update, and additional SCC matters by COB Friday April 15.

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/HSHTTW8
Please notify us or the SRMA team if you have any questions.

Best,
EI SCC ExCom
Got it. Thanks. Are you thinking today for sure, or just sometime this weekend?

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Hi Michael,

My deadline is a bit fluid as I have a lot of balls in the air on this. But the sooner the better.

Kate

DHS-1255000460 03/29/2023
Hi Kate - do you have a deadline here?

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

From: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 11:24:57 AM
To: Feldman, Michael
Cc: McConnell, Scott
Subject: Re: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

Thank you, Kate
Adding Michael and Scott who may be able to assist you:

Get Outlook for iOS

From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 10:37 AM
To: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Subject: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Good morning, Mr. Hale.

I apologize for bothering you on a holiday weekend. I’m a reporter with The Associated Press in Atlanta. I’m reaching out to you because I saw in an email that was filed as an exhibit in federal court in Atlanta last year that you had communicated with Dr. Alex Halderman about a report on the Dominion ImageCast X machines that he produced as an expert witness in a lawsuit (Curling v. Raffensperger.) In a status report filed earlier this month with the court, CISA said that it plans to release a public advisory on June 3 on the vulnerabilities identified by Dr. Halderman. The status report also said that CISA would conduct a pre-disclosure process for two weeks before that release.

I understand that the pre-disclosure process was to include the release of an advisory to officials in the jurisdictions that use the affected machines ahead of the public release. I have reason to believe that
advisory went out yesterday. Can you confirm that an advisory was sent to affected jurisdictions yesterday, May 27? Does CISA have any public comment on that advisory?

Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

Kate Brumback
Reporter
The Associated Press, Atlanta
Cell: (8)
Twitter

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Got it, no worries. Could you just keep us informed as you firm up your deadline on this?

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

That's still up in the air. I apologize, I'm not trying to be difficult. It depends on several factors that aren't entirely in my control.

[EXTERNAL]
Got it. Thanks. Are you thinking today for sure, or just sometime this weekend?

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

From: Michael Feldman
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 12:06:39 PM
To: Feldman, Michael; Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Cc: McConnell, Scott
Subject: RE: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

Hi Michael.

My deadline is a bit fluid as I have a lot of balls in the air on this. But the sooner the better.

Kate

From: Feldman, Michael
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 12:05 PM
To: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Cc: McConnell, Scott
Subject: Re: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

[EXTERNAL]

Hi Kate - do you have a deadline here?

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

From: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 11:24:57 AM
To: Feldman, Michael; McConnell, Scott
Cc: 
Subject: Re: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

DHS-1255000464 03/29/2023
Thank you, Kate
Adding Michael and Scott who may be able to assist you.

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (Redacted)
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 10:37 AM
To: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) (Redacted)
Subject: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

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Good morning, Mr. Hale.

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Kate Brumback
Reporter
The Associated Press, Atlanta
Cell: (Redacted)
Twitter: (Redacted)

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Sender:

Recipient:

Sent Date: 2022/05/28 12:23:51
Delivered Date: 2022/05/28 12:23:55
I’ll likely be able to provide information to you later today, will be in touch.

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Will do. Can you confirm that the advisory went out yesterday? And do you expect to have a statement?

[EXTERNAL]
Got it, no worries. Could you just keep us informed as you firm up your deadline on this?

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

From: [b](b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 12:20:46 PM
To: Feldman, Michael [b](b)(6); Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Cc: [b](b)(6)
Subject: RE: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

That’s still up in the air. I apologize. I’m not trying to be difficult. It depends on several factors that aren’t entirely in my control.

From: Feldman, Michael [b](b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 12:17 PM
To: [b](b)(6) Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Cc: [b](b)(6)
Subject: RE: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

[EXTERNAL]

Got it. Thanks. Are you thinking today for sure, or just sometime this weekend?

Michael Feldman

Director of Public Affairs
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

From: [b](b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 12:06:39 PM
To: Feldman, Michael [b](b)(6); Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
Cc: [b](b)(6)
Subject: RE: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

Hi Michael.
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[EXTERNAL]

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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

From: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
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To: Michael Feldman
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Subject: Re: AP query re: Dominion ImageCast X advisory

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From:
Sent: Saturday, May 28, 2022 10:37 AM
To: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him)
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Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

Reporter
The Associated Press, Atlanta
Cell: [Redacted]
Twitter: @katebrumback

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received this communication in error, please notify The Associated Press immediately by telephone at [b](6)  and delete this email. Thank you.
EI SCC Members,

After additional discussion with NASED the SCC would be better served moving our meeting to the July 21, which is comprised entirely of closed NASED sessions.

Please also be aware that Ed Smith is in touch with the local CISA Protective Security Advisor contingent, as is NASED, so that we can have some assurances regarding personal security as we gather in Madison.

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

SRMA

---

Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app
Click here to join the meeting

Or call in (audio only)

United States, Washington DC

Phone Conference ID

Find a local number | Reset PIN

* * * * * U.S. Department of Homeland Security * * * * *
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council

Meeting Agenda

Thursday, July 21, 2022
9:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. CT

Hilton Monona Terrace
The Founder Room

9 E Wilson St, Madison, WI 53703

Microsoft Teams
Dial-in: [Number]
PIN: [Number]

9:00 a.m.
Welcome & Introductions

Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC ExCom Members

9:10 a.m.
SCC Roll Call
EI SRMA Team

9:15 a.m.
CISA Update

9:45 a.m.
DHS Clearance Program Update

10:00 a.m.
New Membership Discussion
• Logically

10:15 a.m.
Journalist Panel

10:45 a.m.
SCC Member Spotlight: EasyVote

11:15 a.m.
Working Group Updates
• SCRM
• SSP
• Training
• MDM

11:45 a.m.
New Business and Open Discussion
Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council

Meeting Agenda

- Vendor Outreach

11:55 a.m.   ExCom Closing Comments
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: 2022 SCC Summer Meeting
Date: 2022/07/21 08:09:51
Start Date: 2022/07/21 10:00:00
End Date: 2022/07/21 13:00:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule.Meeting.Request
Location: Hilton Monona Terrace 9 E Wilson St, Madison, WI 53703- THE LIBERTY ROOM

Attendees:
EI SCC Members,

In preparation for tomorrow’s meeting, attached please find the agenda and slide deck.

We look forward to seeing everyone tomorrow morning.

Regards,

EI SRMA

EI SCC Members,

Good afternoon SCC members,

We hope this message finds you well.

We are roughly three weeks away from our upcoming in-person full council meeting. As you finalize your travel arrangements, we’d like to provide logistical details. Please see below:

Date: Thursday, July 21, 2022

Time: 9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. CT
Location: Hilton Monona Terrace 9 E Wilson St, Madison, WI 53703

We are adding the finishing touches to the agenda, which we will share with you upon completion. In the interim, please review the attached membership application for Logically. We will vote to confirm or deny their application during our full council meeting.

Please note that we are hosting this meeting in conjunction with the NASED Summer Conference, which will be held less than a mile away at The Madison Concourse Hotel. Also, for your awareness, DHS Protective Services will provide security to our members during our meeting, which they are also providing during the NASED meetings.

If you haven’t RSVP’d to participate in-person, please do so as soon as possible to ensure we have an accurate head count. There will also be an option to participate virtually for those unable to attend in person.

We look forward to seeing you in Madison!

Regards,
EI SCC Executive Committee

Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app
Click here to join the meeting

Or call in (audio only)

Phone Conference ID: 8322877922
Find a local number | Reset PIN

**** U.S. Department of Homeland Security ****

Learn More | Meeting options

Sender: Election Infrastructure SSA
Recipient: 0

DHS-1255000485 03/29/2023
ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE SUBSECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL SUMMER 2022 MEETING
Welcome & Housekeeping

EI SRMA Team

- Microsoft Teams Meeting Link: Click here to join the meeting
  - [b](6) Audio only:
  - [b](6) Phone Conference ID: [b](6) # Please keep teams or phone muted when not speaking.
Agenda Overview

SCC Chair, Smartmatic

- Welcome
- Executive Committee Opening
- Comments
- SCC Roll Call
- DHS Program Updates
- DHS Security Clearance Update
- New Membership Discussion
- Journalist Panel Member Spotlight: Easy Vote
- Working Group Updates
- New Business and Open Discussion
- Adjourn
Executive Committee Opening Comments

El SCC ExCom Members

- Chair (Smartmatic)
- Vice Chair (Enhanced Voting)
- Member-at-large (ES&St)
- Member-at-large (BPro)
- Immediate Past Chair (Hart InterCivic)
DHS Program Updates

bx(6)
Activities through Election Day

- Tabletop the Vote
- JCDC Briefings
- Classified Briefing
- Cadence
- E-Day Operations Room

Tabletop the Vote
2022 August 17, 18, 19
Registration Closes July 29
Insider Threat Mitigation

Insider Threat: the potential for an insider to use their authorized access or special understanding of an organization to harm that organization.

Resources for All CI Sectors: Insider Threat Mitigation Guide
Self-Assessment Tool
Videos
Resources for Election Infrastructure Stakeholders: Election Infrastructure Insider Threat Mitigation Guide
Training
Additional Exercises & Trainings

- Exercises “Tabletop in a box” – new election packages
- State-based exercises
- Training
- Election Security Overview
- Insider Threat Mitigation
- Building Trust Through Secure Practices
- Phishing
- Ransomware
Critical Product Evaluation (CPE)

- Support to state & local governments & private-sector Critical Infrastructure partners Open-ended vulnerability research
- Proactive testing & assessment services at no cost
- Multi-week, comprehensive evaluation of a vendor’s solution or appliance that support CI operations
- Aids in the identification of potential vulnerabilities
- Assistance in developing remediations or mitigation strategies

For more information or to submit a product, reach out to vulnerability@cisa.dhs.gov
CISA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

CVD Process Coordinate the remediation and public disclosure of newly identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities in products and services with affected vendor(s)

5-Step Process Collection Analysis Mitigation Control Application of Mitigation Disclosure

Goal

To ensure that CISA, the affected vendor(s) and/or service provider(s), and the vulnerability reporter all disclose simultaneously, to ensure that users and administrators receive clear and actionable information in a timely manner.
CISA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

Disclosure Timelines for mitigation development, as well as the type and schedule of
disclosure, may be affected by various factors: 
- Active exploitation
- Threats of an especially serious
- Nature
- Situations that require changes to established standards may result in changes to the
disclosure timeline
- Notification Considerations
- Stakeholders
- Impacted entities - Organizations known to operate systems with the disclosed vulnerability
- Potentially vulnerable entities - Organization which may operate systems with the disclosed vulnerability
- Standards Bodies
- Certifying Bodies
- Sector partners
- Public Approach
- When local jurisdictions are impacted entities, what is the preferred notification approach?
Vulnerability Disclosure Policies

CISA Guide to Vulnerability Reporting for Election Administrators
Considerations for adopting a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (VDP)
EI-ISAC VDP Program
For state & local election offices
selections -vdp@cisecurity.org
Team Lead, Engagement, Assistance & Training
Election Security & Resilience (ESR) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Contact CISA:
electionsecurity@cisa.dhs.gov
El Clearance Program Update

- El Clearance Program Status Update
- 30 Secret
- 3 Top Secret/SCI
- 86 Total clearances available for SCC Members
- Benefits of Private Sector Clearance Program (PSCP)
- Required Information
- Timeline
- Initiation (14 days) → Investigation (40 days) → Adjudication (20 days)
- TS/SCI Eligibility
Questions? EI Clearance Program

Point of Contact

[Blank fields]

Obtained by America First Legal Foundation through litigation.
New Membership Discussion

- Logically Discussion Voting Instructions- One member per organization, please email your vote to @cisa.dhs.gov by 11 a.m. CTRResults will be read at the end of this meeting
Company Overview

EasyVote modernizes the election process for Cities, Counties, and States by providing Cloud – Based software tools for preparation and management of the election process. EasyVote has been providing its software for 10 years and has over 250 jurisdictions in 22 states as users.
The Incident

On January 31, 2022, EasyVote was notified of a possible breach of its software. It was found that uploaded documents were accessed from a blob storage on Microsoft Azure.
Incident – EasyVote Reaction & Timeline

- Notification of breach – 1/31/22
- Internal assessment and correction – 1/31 – 2/2
- Reached out to insurance (Early first step, to alert them to a possible breach) – 2/1
- Reached out to law enforcement and Ei-ISAC – 2/1
- Started communication with customer base – 2/2
- Initial discussions with law firm specializing in breaches/ransomware & cyber forensics firm to dive into breach (based on insurance recommendation/process) – 2/3
- Worked with PR firm on communication with press – February – May
- Completed notifications to affected customers and individuals – May
- Full Penetration testing performed – May - June
Lessons Learned

Don’t think it can’t happen to you Smaller vendors need to understand resources available to keep risks at a minimumPut processes in place to ensure constant security checks – (resources, software, services)Communicate continually and with the right peopleHave comprehensive cyber insurance
Thank You!

CEO, EasyVote Solutions
Working Group Updates

- Supply Chain Risk Management Working Group
- Joint Subsector-Specific Plan Working Group
- Training Working Group
- Mis/Disinformation Working Group
New Business and Open Discussion

- Vendor Outreach
Thank you for joining us!
cisa.gov/election-security
Please email @cisa.dhs.gov to register your attendance.
Questions?
Email: @cisa.dhs.gov
Subject: SAVE THE DATE: SCC Full Council Meeting
Date: 2022/09/12 16:28:50
Start Date: 2022/09/13 09:00:00
End Date: 2022/09/13 12:00:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Schedule, Meeting, Request
Location: Microsoft Teams Meeting

Election Infrastructure SSA

Attendees:

(b)(6)
Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app
Click here to join the meeting

Meeting ID: [b](6)
Passcode: [b](6)
Download Teams | Join on the web

Or call in (audio only)
(b)(6)
Phone Conference ID
United States, Washington DC
Find a local number | Reset PIN
**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**

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Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council
Meeting Agenda

Tuesday, September 13, 2022
9:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. ET

Microsoft Teams
Dial-in: [redacted]
PIN: [redacted]

9:00 a.m. Welcome & Introductions
Executive Committee Opening Comments
SCC ExCom Members

9:15 a.m. CISA Update
ESR Team

9:45 a.m. Runbeck Physical Security Update
[redacted]

10:15 a.m. EI-ISAC 2022 Best Practices
[redacted]

10:45 a.m. Working Group Updates
- SCRM [redacted] and [redacted]
- MDM [redacted]

11:15 a.m. New Business and Open Discussion
- Incident Response Working Group
- New Member Application
- 2023 SCC Winter Meeting
- November Preparation and Concerns

11:45 a.m. ExCom Closing Comments
ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE SUBSECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING:
SEPTEMBER 13, 2022
Welcome & Housekeeping
EI SRMA Team

- Microsoft Teams Meeting Link: Click here to join the meeting
  - Audio only
  - Phone Conference ID: ____________________________
  - Please keep teams or phone muted when not speaking.
Agenda Overview

SCC Chair, Smartmatic

- Welcome
- Executive Committee Opening
- Comments
- DHS Program Updates
- Runbeck Physical Security Update
- EI-ISAC 2022 Best Practices
- Working Group Updates
- New Business and Open Discussion
- Adjourn
Executive Committee Opening Comments

El SCC ExCom Members

- Chair (Smartmatic)
- Vice Chair (Enhanced Voting)
- Member-at-large (ES&S)
- Member-at-large (BPro)
- Immediate Past Chair
CISA UPDATES
ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR
COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING
Highlighted Activities Through November

9/22 - Unclassified – CISA Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative on Protecting Your Critical Online Assets 3:30 PM – 4:30 PM (EDT) Discussion with Cloudflare and Google
9/29 - Classified (Secret) Election Security Briefing for the Election Infrastructure Structure 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM (EDT) Additional details

forthcoming

10/13 – Unclassified- JCDC Threat Briefing Industry partners TBD
10/25 – EI-ISAC Virtual Situational Awareness Room Opens
Like prior election cycles, we’ll continue to make the awareness room to election partners to collaborate and share real-time information

11/8 – Election Day Operations Room

DHS-1255000530 03/29/2023
Voluntary Reporting Guidance

GCC Incident Response Protocols Election officials are encouraged to report incidents to: CISA EI-ISAC FBI field office Local jurisdictions should contact their state election official State jurisdictions should contact their local jurisdictions State Fusion Centers DOJ Threats to Election Workers Task Force To report suspected threats or violent acts, election officials should contact their FBI Election Crimes Coordinator (or FBI hotline: 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324) or online: tips.fbi.gov). If in imminent danger or risk of harm, call 9-1-1 Complaints submitted will be reviewed by the task force and referred for investigation or response accordingly.
Incident Response

What is an incident?

The CISA Cybersecurity Division (CSD) Threat Hunting team defines an individual incident as a distinct, potentially malicious event, perpetrated by a single threat actor, using a single tactic, technique, or procedure (TTP); or series of related TTPs, against a single victim.

Contact CISAResponse cybersecurity incidents and vulnerabilities: 888-282-0870 Central@cisa.gov

Threat Hunting Services

Provides incident response, management and coordination activities for cyber incidents occurring in the critical infrastructure sectors as well as government entities at the Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial levels.
De-Escalation

Power of Hello Provides information on how to identify and respond to potentially dangerous confrontations

De-Escalation Series Contains guidance on recognizing threats, assessing, de-escalating, and reporting
Geoff HaleDirector
Election Security and Resilience (ESR)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency

Contact CISA:
electionsecurity@cisa.dhs.gov
Runbeck Election Services Security discussion for SCC 9 13 2022
Runbeck provides election solutions in 23 states and the District of Columbia
Security

Known environments

✓ Cybersecurity
Physical security
Combination
Physical Security

What

- Protesters on site
- Unauthorized entry
- Insufficient safety for all team members
- Safety for our elections
Physical Security

Steps

- Reached out to our PSA (Protective Security Advisor) through CISA/DHS Physical Assessment - produced a comprehensive SAFE report (Security Assessment at First Entry)First responders
- Security Management
- Continuity
- Emergency Action
- Plan
- Security Force
- Perimeter/Entry Controls
- It is Free
Physical Security

Steps

- Partner with our PSA (Protective Security Advisor)
- Partner with our local TLO (Threat Liaison Officer)
- Established renewed contacts with our State Fusion Center
- Partnered with PHX PDLayers of LE after that
Physical Security

People – Security - Culture

✓ ‘Guardian’ mentality We know ALL the people on our campus Runbeck Team members and Temporary Team members are KNOWN Managers handle employee behavior – not security’s role Balance between Culture, Human Resources, Safety and Security
Physical Security

Recent items
Physical Security

Recent Accomplishments

✓ Handheld detectors (for mobile phones) Communications
✓ Adding more “No Trespassing” signs Protecting hinges
✓ New cameras added

Internal lockers
Physical Security

On “The List”

✓ Personnel railing for driveway

Company personnel – Baseline for normal

“see something, say something”

Training – De-escalation Training – Active

shooter training (ALICE Training)
Physical Security

Outcomes

- Physical review of campus
- Re-establish our PSA relationship
- Establish our TLO relationship
- Completed our Federal paperwork
- Established relationships with local LE
- Developed Incident Response Plan
- Continued Training
Questions?
EI-ISAC Update

Sr. Director of the EI-ISAC

September 13, 2022