- DHS consider requiring an online threat tracking entity at Fusion Centers to facilitate communication between faith-based communities and SLTT law enforcement.

Community Approach to Radicalization Identification and Intervention

Finding:

That there is need for a comprehensive, community-based intervention framework to identify individuals exhibiting behaviors that are indicative of radicalization toward domestic terror ideologies and to engage these individuals for the purpose of deradicalization.

Background:

One pastor of a rural, predominately African American church recounted an instance in which an unknown white male entered the church and took photos of the floor plan. When the pastor contacted his local police department, they were dismissive and apparently took no further action. It is necessary for local police to understand the threat landscape for houses of worship, and to respond to potentially hostile actions against FBO communities.

Recommendations:

- DHS support efforts at the state and local level to address the rise of domestic terrorism. Such DHS support should include cooperative efforts to include police, prosecutors, social services, mental health, and education officials, in order to provide a whole community intervention approach.
- There be ongoing efforts by the U.S. Secret Service and others to build awareness about behavior indicators of radicalization and recruitment for the purpose of educating parents, teachers, and mental health providers should be continued.
- DHS provide training to intelligence analysts, local law enforcement, Fusion Center personnel, and PSAs on threats from groups seeking to attack others who oppose their ideologies, religions, or race. See the discussion above in Tasking Two.

This page is intentionally left blank.

Concluding Thoughts. It was an honor for the members of the Subcommittee to engage in this study. In the process we met hundreds of earnest and dedicated government employees from the national to the local level; all of them committed utterly to the matter of preventing targeted violence against faith-based communities. We also had the honor, as well as the sobering and humbling experience of meeting members of communities who had directly experienced the terror and violence of targeted attacks. Without exception, as they worked through their grief, they were eager and committed to helping the members of the Subcommittee with our work. It would be difficult to overstate our respect for these brave and noble citizens who've come through these horrific trials. Their testimonies and advice on best practices heavily influenced our work. Finally, we feel compelled to acknowledge the courage of former Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan for initiating this effort and for setting the example for the Department and more broadly the U.S. Government in committing to combating the forces of hatred, and hateful ideologies, that have directly attacked the social fabric of America as represented by our faith-based communities. He is joined by innumerable employees within the Department, and specifically the staff of the HSAC, who were deeply committed to and supportive of our efforts. We offer them all our sincere thanks.

The broader purpose of our Subcommittee was to provide a framework for building trust between FBOs and law enforcement. We as a society can fortify an environment of enhanced cooperation between our citizenry and our government when we serve the needs of communities, especially those who feel vulnerable to targeted violence against their houses of worship. FBOs contain sacred spaces for many and are invaluable in representing American values to our country and to the rest of the world. We must defend houses of worship with might and wisdom as a matter of a primary and fundamental American interest. We hope that FBOs can strengthen their ties with one another to bind together mutual security.

What follows are specific conclusions that draw from our personal experiences and field research completed as a Subcommittee.

Implement the plan. As we conclude and submit our work, and as pointed out in the introduction, this report finds significant duplication with similar reports tasked to subcommittees of the HSAC in 2012 and 2014. We inquired as to the status and outcomes of the recommendations of those reports. For us, the Subcommittee, while we have offered some new and unique recommendations that recognize organizational and technological changes since 2014, we found substantial overlap with previous work where we then reaffirmed the previous recommendations. If the report is not rendered expeditiously into an implementation plan, with a requirement that the Department periodically report implementation actions to Congress, then this 2019 report will join the 2012 and 2014 reports on the shelf.

Organizational coherence. We found that there has been and continues to be significant positive evolution within the Department's efforts to facilitate ground-level prevention of targeted violence against and protection of our faith-based communities and organizations. That said, we conclude that the overall governmental effort still suffers from significant duplication of efforts at the Federal and state levels as well as substantial gaps of coverage. We conclude that the President should reinvigorate the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism on the National Security Council Staff, to coordinate interagency policy formulation on these matters. Under the current Administration, these functions have been allowed to atrophy or have been disestablished. As the President reinvigorates the NSC-level position, he should reinvigorate the manning and the roles and functions of the National Counterterrorism Center to adequately monitor domestic terror as a component of targeted violence against faith-based communities.

Subnational coherence. The Subcommittee was impressed with its site visit to New Jersey and strongly believes that the State's organizational approach provides examples of both preventive and protective support and provides for an excellent template for organizational coherence on these matters. While States will organize uniquely based on their specific governments and laws, resources will inevitably play both the facilitating and the limiting roles in the effectiveness of States to organize and to support local governments, including local law enforcement entities and other first responders. Again, we return to New Jersey, where the system of State government, the commitment of State resources, and the capacity for funding through grants has optimized State-wide organization and created the capacity to extend resources down to the ground level municipalities and associated police departments. In the context of models and organizational lessons learned the Department would be well served to hold up New Jersey as organizationally representative of the needed coherence in these matters. Recognizing that while not every other State can or will be willing or capable of organizing in the same manner, New Jersey's principles for organization are coherent and are worthy of emulation where possible.

Resources. Wherever we studied the problem of targeted violence against faith-based communities, solutions invariably revolved around resources, and these typically took the form of increases in Protective Security Advisors (PSAs), standardization among Fusion Centers, standardization and/or creation of information platforms, and the availability of grants. The Subcommittee found that many communities were relatively well-informed on the various resources available to them. There were also segments of America's faith community that were uninformed on some or all of these resources, which led us to conclude the Department should consider "a national day of preparedness." This would be a day each year that all levels of government involved in dealing with targeted violence against faith-based communities conduct a concerted outreach for education and capacity building within their community. This day could coincide with annual 9/11 remembrance activities and would be an opportunity for FBOs to learn about all the resources available to them. This would include developing an understanding of the roles and functions of PSAs, Fusion Centers, what two-way communications and informational channels exist, and how to participate in the grant preparation and approval process.

PSAs and Fusion Centers. We have concluded that the current numbers of PSAs and Fusion Centers are inadequate to the tasks of adequately preparing and ultimately protecting our faith-based communities. We have concluded that the current nation-wide number of PSAs, 119, is insufficient. While we did not attempt a detailed analysis to determine the actual requirement, this analysis should nonetheless occur. We also found that the Fusion Centers across the United States are vital to helping to prevent and to provide for the protection of faith-based communities from targeted violence. We found that Fusion Centers' outreach programs for FBOs are generally unlevel in their individual capabilities across States. We concluded there is a need for the Department to lead an effort to standardize the organization, manning, training, and equipping of the Fusion Centers and to emphasize partnership with PSAs to work closely with FBOs. We offer no conclusion with respect to the adequacy of the numbers of current Fusion Centers.

Information. Information is one of the most important resources available to faith-based communities and provides extensively for the preparation of the communities, as well as specific for preventive measures. In an emergency, the rapid movement of threat information and the passing of specific emergency information is critical. From our work, we have concluded that the information platforms available for the two-way passage of information are inadequate to the need. Our conversations and travels revealed a vast discrepancy between and among the various information platforms for the dissemination of information to FBO. This is further complicated by a general absence of awareness of any information platforms by substantial segments of the faith-based community. As reflected in our recommendations, we conclude there is a need for a single, national web-based portal, with an accompanying application for mobile devices, that should be resourced and operated by the Department on behalf of the entire faith-based community. This single platform should be modified as necessary to serve as the "one-stop shop" for every entity involved in dealing with violence against faith-based communities. We noted with some concern that the faith-based portal on the Homeland Security Information Network has been shut down.

Grants. From our many interactions within the Department and across the faith-based communities it is clear the grant programs are working, but much more needs to be done. In particular, significant segments of the faith-based communities are unaware of the grant process, or if they are aware, are incapable of adequately engaging in the process, and actually writing the grant proposals. This is an awareness and capacity development challenge. We have concluded that additional outreach, down to the community level, must occur, which is directly related to the conclusion about the coherence of organization. Where we found high levels of organizational coherence, the grant process was well understood. The idea of a "national day of preparedness" could create the outreach of education and capacity building needed to create an understanding of the process to acquire the resources available to the communities (including two-way informational channels, preparation and approval process).

Technological opportunities and solutions. We have concluded that the Department can play an important role, along with State governments, local governments, and law enforcement entities, in spreading the word on the value of technology in protecting faith-based organizations. In the context

of existing and emerging technologies, there have been enormous advances in electro-optical and motion detection systems as well as other sensors and defensive/protective technologies. In our conversations with faith-based communities, we often found a low level of awareness as to the existence of these sensors and defenses. And if they knew about them at all, they didn't know how to procure and install them. Of course, this is covered to some extent through the grant awareness process. Beyond the sensor packages, we also found a low level of understanding for the creation of or participation in the web-based networks and platforms that can link the surveillance data from individual houses of worship to local police and other first responders.

We have concluded that there are important trends in big data analytics of social media and in artificial intelligence (AI) that can provide highly focused intelligence and threat analysis and warning; in some cases providing this capacity for real-time, autonomous warning of communities, thus substantially accelerating the speed with which faith-based communities can be warned and prepared and first responders can react. Several new companies and non-profit organizations are using AI to cull through masses of information to find specific potential threat streams. Given the speed of this kind of collection and analysis coupled with web-based information networks, warning speeds FBOs can be enormously accelerated. We encourage the Department to explore the state of this technology as other intelligence-based organizations are beginning to embrace AI-powered intelligence analysis warning while assessing the impact on civil liberties and privacy.

White supremacy and white supremacist movements as causal factors of targeted violence. The former Acting Secretary specifically charged the Subcommittee with examining issues associated with white supremacy, white supremacist extremist movements, and domestic terror. We have concluded that white supremacy and white supremacist extremist movements that espouse violent ideologies of terrorism toward segments of the American population are a direct threat to the national security of the United States. We have further concluded that while more remains to be determined, there are sufficient indications of international and domestic white supremacist links that the U.S. Intelligence Community should be tasked with collection, analysis, and production responsibilities. Specifically, the Intelligence Community should examine these potential international links to establish known linkages between foreign and domestic violent ideologies, terrorists, and terrorism.

Legislative approaches. Inherent in defending our faith-based communities is possessing the body of law necessary for full legal recourse and to hold the terrorists and attackers of our faith-based communities fully accountable. While the debate continues about the need for a specific Federal statute addressing Domestic Terrorism, the Subcommittee did conclude the need for a statute requiring DHS and the FBI to track incidents of domestic terrorism and report annually on their incidence in the uniform crime reports.



May 20, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge William Webster

Chair, Homeland Security Advisory Council

FROM: Kevin K. McAleenan

Acting Secretary, Department of Homeland Security

SUBJECT: New Tasking for the Homeland Security Advisory Council's

Subcommittee on Faith-based Organization Security

In light of recent attacks against synagogues, churches, temples and mosques, I request you swiftly re-establish a Subcommittee under the Homeland Security Advisory Council

(HSAC) focused on the security of faith-based organizations across the country. Houses of worship and faith-based nonprofit organizations dedicate resources to local communities and often serve as the social and moral beacons people rely on in times of trouble. The right to practice our respective religions free of interference or fear is one of our nation's most fundamental and indelible rights. Therefore, the targeting of houses of worship by violent extremists of any ideology is particularly abhorrent and must be presented.

While the Department of Justice is responsible for investigating and prosecuting attacks against faith-based institutions, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) missions include preparedness, prevention and mitigation for such attacks. In support of these missions DHS pro ides information, training, exercises and expertise on protective security measures to faith-based organizations. Despite past growth in this area, I recognize that these efforts must be strengthened and expanded, particularly in light of the changing nature of the threat and the recent uptick in attacks.

I believe this subcommittee can assist DHS in identifying additional lines of effort needed, validating the Department's prevention framework that is under development, and examining whether the Department 's capabilities need to be adjusted to account for the threat posed by domestic violent extremists. We are seeking the Subcommittee' s feedback on how DHS can best support state and local governments' and faith-based organizations' efforts to keep houses of worship safe, secure, and resilient.

In addition to the HSAC members you select, the Subcommittee should include representatives of the associations that work on security-related matters for faith communities such as the Secure Community Network, Christian Emergency Network, The Sikh Coalition or American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, and other major associations representing faith communities. The subcommittee should also consider organizations that can assist in further conveying information to faith-based communities writ large, such as the Faith-Based Information Sharing and Analysis Organization. The Subcommittee should consider building off the work done by a prior Subcommittee on

Countering Violent Extremism.

Specifically, the Subcommittee should focus their efforts on addressing the following issues:

- Ensuring two-way information flows between DHS and faith-based organizations (e.g.
 Do faith-based organizations have routine access to information and assessments about
 domestic violent extremist movements and the threats they espouse against faith-based
 organizations? What additional information wouldbe of assistance in their security
 efforts? Do faith-based organizations receive timely notification of specific and credible
 threats to their organizations?).
- 2. Evaluating preparedness and protective efforts for the faith community. (e.g., Do faith-based organizations have the resources and training needed to ensure protective measures are put in place and exercised on a routine basis? If not, what is the best way to close the gap? Are there additional measures beyond traditional protective efforts- such as enhanced understanding of behavioral indicators, knowing the simple steps that can be taken during an incident to increase the chances of survival, and actions that should be considered following an incident to quickly reconstitute services- that can be better conveyed to the community to enhance security in a
 - manner that maintains the integrity of places of worship while sustaining a welcoming environment that allows for peaceful congregation?)
- 3. Evaluating the role the faith-community could/should have in locally-based prevention efforts. (e.g., Are there aspects of the current trend of the racially-motivated violence, which the faith community can address more effectively than the government or other parts of society?)
- 4. Evaluate the adverse impacts that violent extremists and domestic terrorists, including those inspired by violent white supremacy ideologies, have on faith-based and other vulnerable communities. Explore the key factors (such as social media and other influencers) that violent extremists are exploiting to promote, promulgate, and in some cases, galvanize violent attacks against faith-based organizations. What more can be done by the Department to prevent these attacks and increase community resistance to mobilization to violence, and what are the best practices and lessons learned for consideration?

I look forward to reviewing the subcommittee's strong recommendations via HSAC approval and request an interim report from the HSAC regarding the above issues within 90 days of the Subcommittee's formation. I have directed the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention the Office of Intelligence and Analysis the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to support this Subcommittee in its work. Thank you in advance for your work on these recommendations.

APPENDIX 2: SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED VIOLENCE AGAINST FAITH-BASED COMMUNITIES BIOGRAPHIES

John R. Allen (Co-Chair) President, The Brookings Institution

John Rutherford Allen assumed the presidency of the Brookings Institution in November 2017, having most recently served as chair of security and strategy and a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. Allen is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.

He led the security dialogue for the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. President Barack Obama then appointed Allen as special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, a position he held for 15 months. Allen's diplomatic efforts grew the coalition to 65 members, effectively halting the expansion of ISIL. In recognition of this work, he was presented the Department of State Distinguished Honor Award by Secretary John Kerry and the Director of National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Award by Director James Clapper.

During his nearly four-decade military career, Allen served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. He commanded 150,000 U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from July 2011 to February 2013. Allen is the first Marine to command a theater of war. During his tenure as ISAF commander, he recovered the 33,000 U.S. surge forces, moved the Afghan National Security Forces into the lead for combat operations, and pivoted NATO forces from being a conventional combat force into an advisory command.

Allen's first tour as a general officer was as the principal director of Asia-Pacific policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a position he held for nearly three years. In this assignment, he was involved extensively with policy initiatives involving China, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia. Allen also participated in the Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and played a major role in organizing the relief effort during the South Asian tsunami from 2004 to 2005.

Beyond his operational and diplomatic credentials, Allen has led professional military educational programs, including as director of the Marine Infantry Officer Program and commanding officer of the Marine Corps Basic School. He twice served at the United States Naval Academy, first as a military instructor, where he was named instructor of the year in 1990, and later as commandant of midshipmen; the first Marine Corps officer to hold this position.

Allen was the Marine Corps fellow to the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the first Marine officer to serve as a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where today he is a permanent member.

Among his other affiliations, Allen is a senior fellow at the Merrill Center of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. He is an "Ancien" of the NATO Defense College in Rome, and a frequent lecturer there. Allen is the recipient of numerous U.S. and foreign awards. He holds a Bachelor of Science in

operations analysis from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Master of Arts in national security studies from Georgetown University, a Master of Science in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College, and a Master of Science in national security strategy from the National Defense University.

Paul Goldenberg (Co-Chair) President, Cardinal Point Strategies, Senior Fellow Rutgers University Miller Center

Paul Goldenberg is the President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies (CPS), a strategic advisory and business intelligence consulting firm. In 2015 Goldenberg was designated as Rutgers University Senior Fellow to the university's Miller Center for Community Protection and Resilience program focused on global community policing and resiliency.

Goldenberg is a recognized transnational security expert providing the U.S. government and private sector strategic counseling and governance on a full array of national security-related issues at the nexus of terrorism, technology, national security, community engagement and policing.

Goldenberg's public career includes more than two decades as New Jersey's Chief of the nation's first full-time statewide agency focusing on domestic terrorism, hate crimes, community engagement, and targeted violence. Director of the nation's 6th largest county social service and juvenile justice system, and as a law enforcement official leading investigation efforts for cases in domestic terrorism, political corruption, and organized crime.

Goldenberg has received numerous tributes while working as a law enforcement officer in urban Essex County, New Jersey. He also served four years as a deep undercover agent for the South Florida Strike Force, for his efforts Goldenberg was bestowed with Florida's most distinguished law enforcement honor for valor: Officer of the Year. His undercover works ultimately led to over 100 arrests and the recovery of nearly a million dollars in stolen property.

In 1986 Goldenberg returned to New Jersey as part of the Organized Crime and Narcotic Task Force where he headed major investigations targeting members of one of New Jersey's most notorious crime families. In 2004, Goldenberg spearheaded an international law enforcement mission for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the world's largest government security initiative, during which he worked in over eight European nations including Ukraine, Hungary, Kosovo and Croatia advising government and NGO groups on topics such as community conflict and the advent of transnational extremism.

Salam Al-Marayati (Co-Vice Chair) Founder and President, The Muslim Public Affairs Council

Salam Al-Marayati is President of the Muslim Public Affairs Council. He is an expert on Islam in the West, Muslim reform movements, human rights, democracy, and national security. He has spoken at the White House and Capitol Hill, and he has represented the United States at international human

rights and religious freedom conferences. He also testified on Capitol Hill on American Muslim charities and counterterrorism. He delivered a lecture on the Rising Voice of Moderate Muslims to the Secretary of State's Open Forum immediately after 9/11.

Mary Marr (Co-Vice Chair) Founder and President, Christian Emergency Network

Mary Marr, Founder and President of the Christian Emergency Network (CEN), established the CEN ministry after 911. Her background as a public school teacher, career education administrator, author of the State of Michigan Guidelines for Career Education, national radio broadcaster and her experience serving with the staff of a mega-church in Michigan helped lay the foundation for the national CEN ministry.

Marr has led the charge for the Church to be 'Aware' of the times; to be 'Ready' spiritually, emotionally, mentally, and physically; and to be 'There' as Christ followers with the Gospel in emergencies.

She initiated the CEN ministry with ten national ministries who understood the urgent need for a unified all hazards Christian response to crisis which includes readiness education, crisis communications, and a local biblical response to crises large and small. In her role as CEN Administrator Marr works closely with an all-volunteer team of CEN national field and security advisors who provide ministry direction during CEN national and local activations.

While serving in Michigan, she was approached to host a Christian radio program, *Outreach Alert*, produced by the Family Life Radio Network, which later became a nationally syndicated daily radio program on over 1,000 radio outlets for ten years. Marr continues to use her voice and passion for biblical readiness education to rally the Church nationwide through training, speaking, and as a frequent guest on national Christian radio networks during national incidents.

Marr is the author of *Lighting the Way*, *ReadyChristian*, *ReadyChurch*, and *ReadyCity* and the national report for Rutgers University titled: "*The State of Christian Security - Global and Domestic*" used by law enforcement officials worldwide.

As CEN President, Marr is active in the Mission America Coalition, National Religious Broadcasters, and has been appointed to several U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Committees for over two decades.

Reverend Cassandra Bledsoe National Chaplain, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives

Cassandra A. Bledsoe has been the Community Liaison to the Chief of Police for the past 5 years. In this role, she supports an ongoing commitment to maintain open and accessible relationships with all

the members of the community and the Cleveland Division of Police. As well as, develop and maintain operating protocols for the faith-based collaboration.

In 2008, she was approved by Cleveland Mayor Frank G. Jackson as the Administrator of the Office of Professional Standards. Her responsibilities were to oversee the Civilian Police Review Board process and ensure that all complaints regarding alleged improper police conduct are thoroughly investigated. In 2010, Mayor Jackson approved the recommendations from his Commission on Missing Persons and Sex Crimes and expanded the duties of the Office of Professional Standards to include the oversight of Missing Persons and Sex Crimes/Child Abuse Unit Investigations.

In her previous position as Lead Project Director, Civil Rights, Bledsoe was charged with monitoring hate crimes and overseeing relations with Cleveland's 117 ethnic communities and the City's crisis intervention team. She remains dedicated to the field of Civil Rights as a member of the Northeast Ohio Civil Rights Working Group sponsored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Cleveland Division and the U.S. Attorney's Office Northern District of Ohio.

Bledsoe is a member of Greater Abyssinia Baptist Church where she faithfully serves as the Chief Adjutant to the Senior Pastor. Bledsoe has served five terms to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Ohio State Advisory Committee. She is also a graduate of the Simon Wiesenthal National Institute Against Hate Crime and Terrorism, a 2001 Graduate of the FBI Citizens Academy, a 2002 recipient of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Director's Community Leadership Award and a 2018 Graduate of the ATF Citizens Academy. She has received numerous other proclamations and recognitions from local, state and Federal officials.

Mark Dannels Sheriff, Cochise County Arizona

Mark J. Dannels is a 35-year veteran of law enforcement. Dannels has over 3,000 hours of law enforcement training in his portfolio. He began his law enforcement career in 1984 after serving a successful tour in the United States Army. He progressed through the ranks with the Cochise County Sheriff's Office to the position of Deputy Commander after working numerous specialty assignments and leadership roles to include an appointment by the Arizona Governor for his dedicated efforts directed toward highway and community safety.

Dannels is a long-time member of the Fraternal Order of Police, appointed member of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council, current member of the National Sheriffs Association where he serves as the Immigration and Border Security Chairman, Southwest Border Sheriffs where he serves on the Board of Directors, Western Sheriffs Association Arizona Homeland Security-Regional Advisory Council, Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, Border Security Advisory Council, High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, 88-Cime, and serves on several community service groups; San Pedro Kiwanis, Just Kids Inc., CASA, Sierra Vista Elks, the Boys and Girls Club of Sierra Vista, the Varsity Wrestling Coach at Buena High School, and teaches at Wayland Baptist University and Cochise College.

Dannels has been recognized and awarded the Medal of Valor, Western States Sheriff of the Year, Sheriff's Medal, Deputy of the Year, Distinguished Service Award, Unit Citation Award, National Police Hall of Fame, Lifesaving Award and dozens of community-service awards from service groups and governmental organizations.

Nathan Diament Executive Director for Public Policy, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America

Nathan J. Diament is the Executive Director for Public Policy for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America – the nation's largest Orthodox Jewish umbrella organization representing more than one-thousand synagogues and hundreds of parochial schools across America.

Diament has worked for more than 20 years in Washington, DC, on a bipartisan basis, to craft and pass legislation addressing an array of policy issues including those related to religious liberty, the security of religious and nonprofit organizations, combating anti-Semitism, education reform, the U.S.-Israel relationship and more. Diament is one of the leaders of the coalition of organizations that spearheaded the creation of the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (administered by DHS/FEMA) and advocates to Congress for its annual funding.

In 2009, Diament was appointed by President Obama to serve as one of twenty-five members of the President's Faith Advisory Council which helped shape current policies under which Federal agencies partner with faith-based organizations across scores of Federal programs.

Diament has also served as an advocate and analyst in major outlets. His writing has been featured in law journals as well as publications including the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, and New York Times, and he has been a guest on CNN, FOX News, NPR, and other broadcast media.

Diament is an honors graduate of Yeshiva University and the Harvard Law School.

John J. Farmer Jr. University Professor at Rutgers University

John Farmer is currently University Professor of Law at Rutgers University and has served in this capacity since July 2014. He also served as special counsel to the President of Rutgers University from 2014-2017. His legal career prior to his current position has spanned service in high-profile government appointments, private practice in diverse areas of criminal law, and teaching and law school administration.

Farmer joined the administration of New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman in 1994, serving as assistant counsel, deputy chief counsel, and then chief counsel. From 1999-2002 he was New Jersey's

Attorney General.

From 2003-2004, as senior counsel and team leader for the 9/11 Commission, Farmer led the investigation of the country's preparedness for and response to the terrorist attacks and was a principal author of the Commission's final report. His book, *The Ground Truth: The Story Behind America's Defense on 9/11*, was named a New York Times notable book

He was recruited to become Dean of Rutgers School of Law—Newark in 2009, and served in that capacity until April 2013, when he was asked to complete his Deanship contract by serving as Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Rutgers University.

Farmer is responsible for establishing the Rutgers Center for Critical Intelligence Studies (which has been named an Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence) and the Miller Center for Community Protection and Resilience, where he serves as executive director. He served as the principal investigator on a \$1.95 million-dollar grant to develop programs that prepare students to work in intelligence and national security positions.

In 2012, he received the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Award from the Association of the Federal Bar of New Jersey and the Distinguished Public Service Award from Leadership New Jersey. In 2014, he received the Thurgood Marshall Award from the Thurgood Marshall College Fund. In 2015, he received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the New Jersey Law Journal.

Kiran Kaur Gill Executive Director, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund (SALDEF)

Kiran Gill is the Executive Director of the Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund (SALDEF). SALDEF is a national Sikh American media, policy, and educational organization. SALDEF's mission is to empower Sikh Americans by building dialogue, deepening understanding, promoting civic and political participation, and upholding social justice and religious freedom for all Americans. Gill has been doing advocacy work for over 10 years including providing Sikh Awareness training to over 2000 law enforcement officers and helping to establish the SikhLEAD New Jersey program which encourages civic engagement among Sikh students. Prior to her role as Executive Director, Gill was president and CEO of PARS Environmental, Inc. a full service environmental consulting firm based in Robbinsville, NJ. In 2014, Gill was selected as "Small Business Person of the Year" by the U.S. Small Business Administration. Gill was also selected among the Best 50 Women in Business by NJBiz and listed among the top 40 Entrepreneurs under 40 by NJBiz the same year. Additionally, Gill serves as a board member of The ONE Project, an interfaith and community coalition organized to address social needs through education and volunteerism and is president and a founding member of Inspiring South Asian American Women (ISAAW) an organization dedicated to promoting civic and community engagement among South Asian American women. In 2018, Gill was named among the top 50 most influential people of color in New Jersey by ROI-NJ.

Keith Manley Executive Director, Office of General Services USCCB

Keith Manley is the Executive Director, Office of General services for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). For the past 17 years, he has been responsible for security at USCCB's headquarters building. He is also responsible for security at the spring and fall General Assembly of all catholic bishops in the United States. Manley was part of the Secret Service security planning team for Pope Benedict XVI's visit to Washington in 2008.

Todd Richins Director, Field Operations Division, Church Security Department The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Todd Richins has worked for the Church Security Department since 1997. During that time, he's worked as a security officer, control center operator, in property and visitor protection, dispatch, in personal protection providing security for Church leaders, and in many management positions. Richins served 7 years as the security director over Church headquarters and event security. Todd is currently the director of their Field Operations Division, which is responsible for security throughout the United States and Canada with a focus on the Church's temples. The division trains security staff, performs risk assessments, makes staffing recommendations, and supports traveling leadership.

In addition to his professional career Richins has served in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in many ecclesiastical positions to including as a bishop presiding over a local congregation. He also served a mission for his Church in Ireland. Richins is a Utah native and graduated from the University of Utah. Todd and his wife, Kim, have four children.

Suhag Shukla Executive Director, Co-Founder of the Hindu American Foundation

Suhag Shukla, Esq., Executive Director, is a co-founder of HAF. She holds a BA in Religion and a JD from the University of Florida. Shukla has helped steer the Foundation to being recognized as a leading voice for civil rights, human rights, and religious freedom. She's been instrumental in the development of a broad range of educational materials and position papers and blogs for a variety of platforms.

Shukla has served on the Boards of the Nirvana Center, Main Line Indian Association, and YWCA of Minneapolis. She was also a member of the Department of Homeland Security Faith-Based Security and Communications Subcommittee.

Shukla is actively involved with Chinmaya Mission, serves on the board of the Bhutanese American

Organization of Philadelphia, and is a thought partner for the Interfaith Center of Greater Philadelphia's Paths to Understanding Public Art Initiative. Shukla is a member of the board for the National Museum of American Religion and serves on religious advisory committees for the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Humane Society of the United States, and is a member of the First Amendment Center's Committee on Religious Liberty and the United Nations Women's Gender Equality and Religion platform. Shukla was named one of twelve "faith leaders to watch in 2017" by the Center for American Progress.

Dr. Randy Vaughn Senior Pastor, Mount Sinai Missionary Baptist Church Port Arthur

Randy G. Vaughn is the current Sr. Pastor of Mount Sinai Missionary Baptist Church, Port Arthur, Texas. He has been pastoring the Mount Sinai church for over 28 years and has been in ministry for over 35 years. Vaughn presented the need for an office of disaster management following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Office of Disaster Management was then created with Vaughn as its director. This disaster service is provided to 62 states conventions, over 30,000 churches affiliates and encompass over 7.5 million individual members.

In September 2009, Vaughn orchestrated the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the American Red Cross at the National Convention. He serves as the Convention's representative to the White House of Faith-Based Organizations, consulting with the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. Vaughn is also the Founder and President of the Succor Foundation and the Help, I'm Hurting Inc. non-profit organization.

Vaughn was awarded "The Ten People Who Made a Difference Award" in 1991 by the Jefferson County. Vaughn also received an Outstanding Service award from the Religious Advisory Committee for the Texas Department of Human Services in 1996 alongside numerous "Keys to the City."

APPENDIX 3: REFERENCED REPORTS

Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Target Violence Report of 2012 Faith-Based Committee Report of 2014 Faith-Based Committee

APPENDIX 4: SITE VISITS

Salt Lake City, Utah: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Church Security Department August 1, 2019

Whitefish, Montana: Glacier Jewish Community/B'nai Shalom August 2, 2019

Minneapolis/Bloomington, Minnesota: Dar al Farooq Mosque August 6-7, 2019

Opelousas, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi: Little Zion Baptist Church and the Black Missionary Baptist Church August 9-12, 2019

San Diego, California: Tri-City Islamic Center, Escondido Mosque, and the Poway Synagogue August 21-22, 2019

Oak Creek, Wisconsin: The Sikh Temple of Wisconsin September 27, 2019

New Jersey: Rutgers Miller Center, NJ Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and the NJ Regional Operations and Intelligence Center October 18, 2019

APPENDIX 5: SITE VIST KEY FINDINGS

Overview

During the months of August, September, and October of 2019, this Subcommittee conducted seven site visits across eight different states. Subcommittee members met with leaders and members of the faith-based community, state and local law enforcement and government officials, and Federal agency personnel based in each area. The goal, as the Subcommittee members explained to those they met with, was to hear communities' concerns, and to learn what actions DHS can take to facilitate effective, proactive, and community-based information-sharing and protection efforts at all levels of government.

From the Dar Al Farooq mosque in Bloomington, Minnesota, to the Poway Synagogue in San Diego, California, to the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin in Oak Creek, the Subcommittee members were welcomed into communities of Latter-day Saints, Jews, Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs. Subcommittee members bore witness to the trauma suffered by all members of the American faith-based community, but also to the great capacity of the multi-faith community to support each other when confronted by hate.

Communities shared frankly their concerns, best practices, triumphs, and suggestions, and the Subcommittee crafted this report based directly upon the valuable insights gained during these site visits.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints: Church Security Department

Logistics:

• Location: Salt Lake City, Utah

• Date: August 1, 2019

Background:

Subcommittee members observed best practices and security measures taken by this faith community to secure itself. Members learned about the community's work to provide training and resources with other faiths.

Key Findings

- This faith community leads in church security services domestically and internationally.
- The community is active in the multi-faith community and shares resources and best practices
 to all faith-based communities. The Church Security Department offers training for FBOs as
 well as law enforcement and offers FBO resources including risk assessments and
 information about security guidelines.

• The Church Security Department continuously issues and updates safety guidelines on current threats regarding faith-based communities

Glacier Jewish Community/B'nai Shalom

Logistics:

• Location: Whitefish, Montana

• Date: August 2, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee visited with the Jewish community, which has been targeted by white supremacists with online and physical threats. Neo-Nazi and white supremacist Richard Spencer lives in Whitefish and has actively organized opposition to the Jewish community here. The Subcommittee sought to observe how the faith community, law enforcement, and local government responded to this threat.

Key Findings:

- A local rabbi expressed that the congregation was being afraid of being Jewish in public. As a result, the Jewish community meets in various locations to avoid being targeted.
- Security measures were implemented in the rabbi's home, and the community began to meet privately in the home for religious practices. There is armed security employed at large gatherings to enhance safety measures.
- Community leaders described the emotional distress of being constantly threatened but added that the struggle gave them a sense of pride in their heritage and religion.

Dar al Farooq Mosque

Logistics:

• Location: Minneapolis/Bloomington, Minnesota

• Date: August 6-7, 2019

Background:

Subcommittee members met with faith community leaders and members of the Dar al Farooq mosque, as well as local law enforcement. In 2017, this mosque was the target of a firebomb attack by a militia group from Illinois. The perpetrators were motivated by anti-Muslim sentiments. Because the attack occurred before morning prayers, no one was injured or killed, but the building was seriously damaged.

Key Findings:

Local religious leaders from the Muslim community expressed concerns that the threat of
white supremacy is not taken seriously by government, and that in the aftermath of the
bombing in 2017, the Federal government treated him and his congregants "as suspects, not
victims."

- Faith-based communities can do a lot on their own, for example, by leveraging the work
 already done by the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) to host trainings and
 conduct their own preparations. The multi-faith community is willing to assist members of
 the faith community in the prevention and the response aspects; multi-faith platforms are a
 valuable but underutilized tool.
- The faith-based community in this area harbors great mistrust of Federal government; this was recognized by the U.S. Attorney's Office as a "huge hurdle" in providing timely threat information and the resources to respond. Among the Muslim community particularly, individuals are afraid to report threat information because they are viewed with suspicion.

Little Zion Baptist Church and the Black's Missionary Baptist Church

Logistics:

• Locations: Opelousas, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi

• Date: August 9-12, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee held meetings with local pastors and the faith community affected by racism and the 2019 church burnings, along with local, state, and Federal law enforcement officials. Over ten days in March and April 2019, a man conducted arson attacks on three historically African American churches in rural Louisiana, resulting in severe damage to the churches. Officials indicated that the attacks were motivated by racial bias.

Key Findings:

- Particularly in rural areas, there is limited infrastructure in place to alert religious institutions
 about local suspicious activity or threats. As one faith-based community leader in Opelousas,
 Louisiana said, "there is a sense of paranoia that information is not being shared with the
 churches." Religious communities in this area are also largely unaware of Federal resources
 such as Protective Security Advisors and FEMA grants.
- There is a gap between suspicious activity and criminal behavior. Law enforcement lacks the
 preventative tools to effectively respond to suspicious activity. Certain behaviors are not
 criminal but are indicative of radicalization or pre-attack preparation. One pastor of a rural,
 predominately African American church recounted an instance in which an unknown white
 male entered the church and took photos of the floor plan. When the pastor called the police,
 they were dismissive.
- There is no one-size-fits-all security plan. Faith-based communities need to develop their
 own customized security plan that suits their own needs, culture, and resources. For example,
 in the rural south, religious congregations tend to be very community-oriented; informal,
 relationship-based security plans have proven to be effective here.
- African American churches in this area are effective in leveraging the expertise of active and retired law enforcement, military, and security personnel to help protect their places of worship.

The Chabad of Poway synagogue, Tri-City Islamic Center, and the Escondido Mosque

Logistics:

Location: San Diego, CaliforniaDate: August 21-22, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee met with members of the local Jewish and Muslim communities and local law enforcement. In March 2019, a white supremacist conducted an arson attack against the Escondido Mosque. No one was hurt, but the mosque suffered damage. One month later, the same individual opened fire inside the Chabad of Poway synagogue during Passover, fatally shooting one person and injuring three.

Key Findings:

- As in every other place the Subcommittee conducted site visits in, the faith-based community generally had a better relationship with local law enforcement than with Federal entities.
- The confusion and lack of awareness about Federal resources extends to local law enforcement as well as faith-based communities. This is problematic because local law enforcement can leverage their positive relationship and access to the community to convey threat information and educate FBOs about available state and Federal resources.
- The San Diego Sheriff's Office holds cultural classes for law enforcement officers taught by community members. When law enforcement officers are culturally competent, they are more effective in protecting the community, and the community is more comfortable seeking help and sharing information.

The Sikh Temple of Wisconsin

Logistics:

Location: Oak Creek, Wisconsin

• Date: September 27, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee visited the leadership and congregants of the Sikh temple and local law enforcement. In 2012, a white supremacist entered the temple and fatally shot six congregants. Four individuals were injured, including a police officer responding to the attack. According to the temple leaders, the perpetrator mistook the temple for a Muslim mosque.

• This temple was targeted because the gunman wrongly believed it was a Muslim mosque. The gunman had called a neighboring religious institution to find the temple's start times

before the day of the attack. There was no communication between the temple and this institution.

- Religious institutions, and the Sikh community in particular, struggle with achieving a
 balance between being welcoming and maintaining security. The nature of the Sikh religion
 is to welcome all without questions, even complete strangers. The Wisconsin temple has
 implemented security measures since 2012, but leaders expressed concern that visitor security
 is not stringent enough.
- Members of the temple leadership indicated that prior to the attack, there was no information sharing infrastructure in place, but today, information and threat alerts are shared between religious institutions in the area.

Rutgers Miller Center, NJ Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and the NJ Regional Operations and Intelligence Center

Logistics:

Location: New Brunswick, Hamilton, and West Trenton, New Jersey

Date: October 18, 2019

Background:

At this location, the Subcommittee observed best practices for Fusion Centers and law enforcement. The NJ Fusion Center is considered one of the best in the country due to its coordination with local law enforcement and Federal partners and its engagement with the private sector and faith community.

Key Findings:

- Since 2012, the NJ Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJOHSP) has practiced proactive engagement with the New Jersey faith-based community through its Interfaith Advisory Council (IAC). The IAC is chaired by NJOHSP Director Jared Maples and maintains 3,000 members across all religions. The Council holds quarterly meetings between faith community leaders and members and representatives from the Office of the Attorney General, NJ State Police, FBI, local law enforcement, and other entities.
- NJOHSP regularly shares timely information with the faith-based community. The office
 develops unclassified "interfaith intelligence resources" which are developed in response to
 emerging threats or incidents occurring in NJ, nationally, or abroad. The intelligence reports
 are disseminated to the 3,000 members of the IAC.
- On a ranking system of low, moderate, and high, NJOHSP indicated in its 2019 Terrorism
 Threat Assessment that "white supremacist extremists" posed a moderate threat to New
 Jersey. Officials indicated to the Subcommittee that this threat is increasing.

APPENDIX 6: SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS AND OTHER WITNESSES

- Scott Breor, Associate Director for Security Programs, Infrastructure Security Division, CISA
- 2. **Michelle Flores**, Deputy Branch Chief, Active Shooter and Insider Threat Mitigation Branch, Security
- 3. Brian Harrell, Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security Division, CISA
- 4. Andy Jabbour, The Faith-Based Information Sharing and Analysis Organization
- 5. **John Jimenez**, Supervisory Special Agent, Section Chief, Public Corruption and Civil Rights Section, Criminal Investigations Division, FBI
- 6. Kathleen Kooiman, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center Fusion Center
- 7. **Brian Murphy**, Principal Deputy Under Secretary Intelligence and Analysis
- 8. **Elizabeth Neumann**, Assistant Secretary, Threat Prevention and Security Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans, DHS
- 9. **Tom Plofchan**, Counselor to the Secretary
- 10. Taylor Price, Campaign Manager, "If You See Something, SaySomething®" Campaign
- 11. Cameron Quinn, Officer, Office for CRCL DHS
- 12. Calvin A. Shivers, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI
- 13. **Kareem W. Shora**, JD, LL.M., Section Chief, Community Engagement Section, Office for CRCL, DHS
- 14. **Mark S. Silveira**, Incumbent Executive Officer, FEMA, Grant Programs Directorate, DHS
- 15. Jennifer Sultan, Programs Branch Director, Office for CRCL, DHS
- 16. **Jonathan Thompson**, Executive Director, National Sheriffs' Association
- 17. **Linda Townsend Solheim**, Director, Soft Targets and Crowded Places Task Force, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure, CISA
- 18. **Eric W. Treene**, Special Counsel for Religious Discrimination, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
- 19. **Chad Wolf**, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
- 20. Stephen N. Xenakis, MD, Psychiatrist, Brigadier General(Ret), U.S. Army

APPENDIX 7: FAITH-BASED LEGISLATION

Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act - HR4192

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for an offense for acts of terrorism occurring in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and for other purposes.

Domestic Terrorism Documentation and Analysis of Threats Act - HR3106

To authorize research within the Department of Homeland Security on current trends in domestic terrorism, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act - HR1931

To authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.

Protecting Faith-Based and Nonprofit Organizations From Terrorism Act – S. 1593

To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide funding to secure nonprofit facilities from terrorist attacks, and for other purposes. There is authorized to be appropriated \$75,000,000 for each fiscal years 2020-2024 to carry out this section. Of the authorized amounts, \$50,000,000 is authorized for eligible nonprofit organizations located in jurisdictions that receive funding under section 2003, and \$25,000,000 is authorized for eligible nonprofit organizations located in jurisdictions not receiving funding under section 2003.

The "Disarm Hate Act" - HR2708

To prevent a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor hate crime or received an enhanced sentence for a misdemeanor because of hate or bias in its commission, from obtaining a firearm.

The "No Hate Act" - HR3545

To provide incentives for hate crime reporting, provide grants for State-run hate crime hotlines, and establish additional penalties for individuals convicted under the Matthew Shephard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING DOMESTIC TERRORISM

JUNE 2021





Too often over the past several years, American communities have felt the wrenching pain of domestic terrorism. Black church members slaughtered during their bible study in Charleston. A synagogue in Pittsburgh targeted for supporting immigrants. A gunman spraying bullets at an El Paso Walmart to target Latinos. It goes against everything our country strives to stand for in the world, and it poses a direct challenge to America's national security, our democracy, and our national unity. This National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism lays out a comprehensive approach to addressing the threat while safeguarding bedrock American civil rights and civil liberties – values that make us who we are as a nation.

Americans hold a wide array of beliefs. That is part of what makes the United States such a diverse and extraordinary nation. Preserving and safeguarding constitutionally protected expression and freedom of association are national security priorities. Our rights and our historic liberties are an intrinsic part of what makes America strong. So this Strategy is narrowly tailored to focus

specifically on addressing violence and the factors that lead to violence – violence that violates the law, threatens public safety, and infringes on the free expression of ideas.

We cannot ignore this threat or wish it away. Preventing domestic terrorism and reducing the factors that fuel it demand a multifaceted response across the Federal Government and beyond. That includes working with our critical partners in state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and in civil society, the private sector, academia, and local communities, as well as with our allies and foreign partners. We have to take both short–term steps to counter the very real threats of today and longer–term measures to diminish the emerging threats of tomorrow.

This is a project that should unite all Americans.

Together we must affirm that domestic terrorism has no place in our society. We must work to root out the hatreds that can too often drive violence. And we must recommit to defend and protect those basic freedoms, which belong to all Americans in equal measure, and which are not only the foundation of our democracy—they are our enduring advantage in the world.


/ Joseph R. Biden Jr.



THIS IS A PROJECT THAT SHOULD UNITE ALL AMERICANS

TOGETHER
WE MUST
AFFIRM THAT

DOMESTIC
TERRORISM
HAS NO
PLACE IN
OUR SOCIETY



\star \star \star \star \star

Introduction

Domestic terrorism is not a new threat in the United States. It has, over centuries, taken many American lives and spilled much American blood – especially in communities deliberately and viciously targeted on the basis of hatred and bigotry. After the Civil War, for example, the Ku Klux Klan waged a campaign of terror to intimidate Black voters and their white supporters and deprive them of political power, killing and injuring untold numbers of Americans. The Klan and other white supremacists continued to terrorize Black Americans and other minorities in the decades that followed. In recent years, we have seen a resurgence of this and related threats in one horrific incident after another: the shooting and killing of 23 people at a retail store in El Paso; the vehicular killing of a peaceful protestor in Charlottesville; the shooting and killing of three people at a garlic festival in Gilroy; the arson committed at a mosque in Victoria, Texas; the appalling rise in violence and xenophobia directed against Asian Americans; the surge in anti–Semitism; and more.

Domestic terrorist attacks in the United States also have been committed frequently by those opposing our government institutions. In 1995, in the largest single act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, an anti–government violent extremist detonated a bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people – including 19 children – and injuring hundreds of others. In 2016, an anti–authority violent extremist ambushed, shot, and killed five police officers in Dallas. In 2017, a lone gunman wounded four people at a congressional baseball practice. And just months ago, on January 6, 2021, Americans witnessed an unprecedented attack against a core institution of our democracy: the U.S. Congress.

Some aspects of the Federal Government's response also are not new. During Reconstruction, the U.S. Department of Justice was created and immediately focused on prosecuting and convicting hundreds of Klan members in connection with their vicious campaign of domestic terrorism. In the 1980s, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, now a nationwide staple of Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement cooperation against all forms of terrorism, were created to maximize information sharing and address the full range of terrorism threats, both domestic and international. While domestic terrorism's roots and elements of our response may be longstanding, domestic terrorism is both persistent and evolving – and, according to



the U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement, "elevated" in the threat it now poses. This National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism provides an overarching approach to address today's manifestation of the domestic terrorism threat as well as the evolving forms that the threat may take in the years ahead.

The intelligence and law enforcement communities have articulated publicly the threat posed by domestic terrorism today. That articulation draws on the comprehensive assessment of the threat that President Biden requested on his first full day in office. That assessment was conducted by appropriate elements of the U.S. Government and provided to the President. It was also released publicly in summary form on March 17, 2021 (see page 10). Today's domestic terrorists espouse a range of violent ideological motivations, including racial or ethnic bigotry



DOMESTIC TERRORISM IS BOTH PERSISTENT AND EVOLVING.

and hatred as well as anti–government or anti–authority sentiment. They also take on a variety of forms, from lone actors and small groups of informally aligned individuals, to networks exhorting and targeting violence toward specific communities, to violent self–proclaimed "militias" who, despite legal prohibitions in all fifty states against certain private militia activity, assert a baseless right to take the law into their own hands. Across violent ideologies, individuals and small groups – both formal and informal – have been galvanized by recent political and societal events in the United States to carry out violent attacks. Among that wide range of animating ideologies, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (principally those who promote the superiority of the white race) and militia violent extremists are assessed as presenting the most persistent and lethal threats.

We are taking on this complex and evolving domestic terrorism threat landscape with an approach that honors and protects both America's security and America's values, especially our cherished civil rights and civil liberties. Addressing domestic terrorism effectively, responsibly, and sustainably demands forging a government—wide effort while protecting the rule of law and distinctive law enforcement prerogatives. That involves policies that protect the independence and integrity of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; bolstering efforts that address domestic terrorism across the Federal Government and renewing partnerships with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as civil society, the private sector, and beyond; and focusing specifically on terrorist



violence and the factors that contribute to it while safeguarding constitutionally protected activity. Doing so will propel the United States toward the ultimate goal of stopping acts of domestic terrorism. It will also help us to reduce the factors contributing to incitement to domestic terrorism online that exacerbate the spread of calls to violence. It will, moreover, guide the United States toward achieving the resilience that can prevent domestic terrorists from gaining traction and adherents in the first place.

This Strategy is organized around four pillars – the core elements of how the U.S. Government will tackle the threat posed by domestic terrorism today. First are efforts to understand and share information regarding the full range of domestic terrorism threats. Second are efforts to prevent domestic terrorists from successfully recruiting, inciting, and mobilizing Americans to violence. Third are efforts to deter and disrupt domestic terrorist activity before it yields violence. Finally, the long–term issues that contribute to domestic terrorism in our country must be addressed to ensure that this threat diminishes over generations to come.

We must be clear-eyed about this challenge: the unlawful violence that constitutes domestic terrorism is the result of a complex, multi-layered set of societal dynamics. We cannot – and



OUR APPROACH HONORS
AND PROTECTS BOTH
AMERICA'S SECURITY
AND AMERICA'S
CHERISHED CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES.

will not – ignore those dynamics, such as racism and bigotry that perpetuate the domestic terrorism threat. That is why this Strategy's fourth pillar lays out long-term visions for addressing them. At the same time, this is a Strategy specifically focused on the terrorist violence that, all too often, turns those broad dynamics into particular loss and heartache. Even

as we look to address these underlying dynamics over the long term, we must focus intensely – as this Strategy does – on the threat of violence that faces us right now.

All told, today's domestic terrorism threat poses a danger to Americans, our democratic society, and our national security that we must counter aggressively, comprehensively, and responsibly. Doing so will make America not just safer, but also stronger – and more unified. What follows is America's first government–wide national Strategy to do so.

* * * * * *

TODAY'S THREAT

Domestic terrorism poses a serious and evolving threat. A provision of Federal law defines "domestic terrorism" as "activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Over time, domestic terrorism threats in the United States have ebbed and flowed, reflected different motivating ideologies, and demanded varying governmental responses. Today's domestic terrorism threat, as assessed comprehensively by America's intelligence and law enforcement professionals in early 2021, involves a complex mix of elements.

According to this assessment, one key aspect of today's domestic terrorism threat emerges from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists and networks whose racial, ethnic, or religious hatred leads them toward violence, as well as those whom they encourage to take violent action. These actors have different motivations, but many focus their violence towards the same segment or segments of the American community, whether persons of color, immigrants, Jews, Muslims, other religious minorities, women and girls, LGBTQI+ individuals, or others. Their insistence on violence can, at times, be explicit. It also can, at times, be less explicit, lurking in ideologies rooted in a perception of the superiority of the white race that call for violence in furtherance of perverse and abhorrent notions of racial "purity" or "cleansing."

Another key component of the threat comes from anti–government or anti–authority violent extremists. This significant component of today's threat includes self–proclaimed "militias" and militia violent extremists who take steps to violently resist government authority or facilitate the overthrow of the U.S. Government based on perceived overreach; anarchist violent extremists, who violently oppose all forms of capitalism, corporate globalization, and governing institutions, which they perceive as harmful to society; sovereign citizen violent extremists, who believe they are immune from government authority and laws; or any other



individual or group who engages in violence – or incites imminent violence – in opposition to legislative, regulatory, or other actions taken by the government. Other domestic terrorists may be motivated to violence by single–issue ideologies related to abortion–, animal rights–, environmental–, or involuntary celibate–violent extremism, as well as other grievances – or a combination of ideological influences. In some cases, individuals may develop their own idiosyncratic justifications for violence that defy ready categorization.



DOMESTIC TERRORISTS HAVE OFTEN BEEN LONE ACTORS OR SMALL GROUPS OF INFORMALLY ALIGNED INDIVIDUALS.

Domestic terrorists have – particularly in recent years – often been lone actors or small groups of informally aligned individuals who mobilize to violence with little or no clear organizational structure or direction. These individuals often consume material deliberately disseminated to recruit individuals to causes that attempt to provide a sense of belonging and fulfillment, however false that sense might be. Their ideologies can be fluid, evolving, and overlapping. And they can, in some instances, connect and intersect with conspiracy theories and other forms of disinformation and misinformation. The often solitary and, at times, rapid nature of such mobilization to violence poses a particularly acute challenge to law enforcement and others seeking to prevent, disrupt, and deter domestic terrorism.

These elements combine to form a complex and shifting domestic terrorism threat landscape and create significant challenges for law enforcement. Especially on Internet-based communications platforms such as social media, file-upload sites, and end-to-end encrypted platforms, all of these elements can combine and amplify threats to public safety. This is the domestic terrorism threat America faces today – one with the distinctive imprint of today's digital age as well as longstanding roots in domestic terrorism challenges throughout our country's history. Tackling that threat comprehensively and persistently demands appreciating both its historical lineage and its distinctively modern form.

ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM THREAT

March 2021

The Intelligence Community (IC) assesses that domestic violent extremists (DVEs) who are motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by recent political and societal events in the United States pose an elevated threat to the Homeland in 2021. Enduring DVE motivations pertaining to biases against minority populations and perceived government overreach will almost certainly continue to drive DVE radicalization and mobilization to violence. Newer sociopolitical developments—such as narratives of fraud in the recent general election, the emboldening impact of the violent breach of the U.S. Capitol, conditions related to the COVID—19 pandemic, and conspiracy theories promoting violence—will almost certainly spur some DVEs to try to engage in violence this year.

The IC assesses that lone offenders or small cells of DVEs adhering to a diverse set of violent extremist ideologies are more likely to carry out violent attacks in the Homeland than organizations that allegedly advocate a DVE ideology. DVE attackers often radicalize independently by consuming violent extremist material online and mobilize without direction from a violent extremist organization, making detection and disruption difficult.

The IC assesses that racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and militia violent extremists (MVEs) present the most lethal DVE threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct mass-casualty attacks against civilians and MVEs typically targeting law enforcement and government

March 2021 Threat Assessment

personnel and facilities. The IC assesses that the MVE threat increased last year and that it will almost certainly continue to be elevated throughout 2021 because of contentious sociopolitical factors that motivate MVEs to commit violence.

The IC assesses that U.S. RMVEs who promote the superiority of the white race are the DVE actors with the most persistent and concerning transnational connections because individuals with similar ideological beliefs exist outside of the United States and these RMVEs frequently communicate with and seek to influence each other. We assess that a small number of US RMVEs have traveled abroad to network with like-minded individuals.

The IC assesses that DVEs exploit a variety of popular social media platforms, smaller websites with targeted audiences, and encrypted chat applications to recruit new adherents, plan and rally support for inperson actions, and disseminate materials that contribute to radicalization and mobilization to violence.

The IC assesses that several factors could increase the likelihood or lethality of DVE attacks in 2021 and beyond, including escalating support from persons in the United States or abroad, growing perceptions of government overreach related to legal or policy changes and disruptions, and high-profile attacks spurring follow-on attacks and innovations in targeting and attack tactics.

DVE lone offenders will continue to pose significant detection and disruption challenges because of their capacity for independent radicalization to violence, ability to mobilize discretely, and access to firearms.

March 2021 Threat Assessment

\star \star \star \star \star

OUR APPROACH

Addressing domestic terrorism effectively, responsibly, and enduringly requires moving swiftly but sustainably; creatively but carefully; and decisively but deftly. Our approach will protect both the nation and the civil liberties of its citizens.

We will forge a government—wide effort while safeguarding distinctive law enforcement prerogatives, such as those that belong to the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and safeguarding critical patient provider relationships like those maintained by the Department of Veterans Affairs providers with veterans. Particular investigatory and prosecutorial decisions are for law enforcement alone, unaffected by and insulated from any political influence or bias. At the policy level, this Strategy demands that the broader Federal Government coordinate and collaborate on programmatic aspects of countering domestic terrorism, such as information sharing, training, prevention, and intervention efforts. It thus sets a pathway for a unity of effort at the policy level, while protecting the specific work of law enforcement that must be left wholly to appropriate law enforcement entities, whether Federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial.

We will also build a community to address domestic terrorism that extends not only across the Federal Government but also to critical partners. That includes state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well as foreign allies and partners, civil society, the technology sector, academia, and more. Domestic terrorism and the factors that contribute to it pose a challenge best tackled by a set of interlocking communities that can contribute information, expertise, analysis, and more to addressing this multifaceted threat. With the right orientation and partnerships, the Federal Government can energize, connect, and empower those communities – communities whose input was critical to the formulation of this Strategy itself.

Furthermore, we will focus specifically on violence and factors which contribute to it while respecting civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy protections, and while recognizing and maximizing the positive benefits of modern communications technologies such as the Internet. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as other U.S. law, protects a wide range



of expression – even expression that many might disagree with or find abhorrent, and even expression that certain foreign allies and partners of the United States prohibit and criminalize under their own laws. Ours is a distinctively American tradition of robust speech; and it is a tradition we cherish. Violence and its incitement, however, are generally neither tolerated nor protected; indeed, violence is generally criminal, as are incitement to imminent violence and true threats of violence. This Strategy focuses specifically on unlawful violence that poses a threat to public safety, to national security, and to the genuine free expression of ideas – indeed, to our democracy. Our country and its laws leave wide open the space for political and ideological views and their articulation, including through peaceful protest. But they leave no room for unlawful violence. This Strategy is designed to preserve the former while preventing the latter.

It is critical that we condemn and confront domestic terrorism regardless of the particular ideology that motivates individuals to violence. The definition of "domestic terrorism" in our law makes no distinction based on political views – left, right, or center – and neither should we. We must disrupt and deter those who use violence to intimidate racial or religious



THAT WE
CONDEMN AND
CONFRONT
DOMESTIC
TERRORISM
REGARDLESS OF
THE PARTICULAR
IDEOLOGY THAT
MOTIVATES
INDIVIDUALS TO
VIOLENCE.

minorities, who have so often been the victims of hateful extremists. So too must we disrupt and deter those who launch violent attacks in a misguided effort to force change in government policies that they view as unjust. In a democracy, there is no justification for resorting to violence to resolve political differences.

We will do all of this with a singular goal: stopping acts of domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism has taken the lives of too many Americans in recent years, injuring still more and leaving behind grieving families and friends. The overarching goal of this Strategy is preventing, disrupting, and deterring that violence. Pursuing that goal

includes reducing the factors contributing to domestic terrorism. Those factors have multiple dimensions, including incitement to imminent violence online, some transnational linkages, and certain self–proclaimed private "militia" activity that, to varying degrees, is prohibited by the laws of all 50 states. Addressing these factors contributing to domestic terrorism is, in part, a means to achieving the first objective of preventing the violence itself and handling the threats we face today; but it must also be its own objective, as reducing the contributing factors can make a difference in diminishing the threat we might otherwise face tomorrow.



Additionally, pursuing the goal of preventing, disrupting, and deterring acts of domestic terrorism means achieving the type of resilience that can prevent domestic terrorists from gaining traction and adherents in the first place. Resilience can take many forms. It can mean raising public awareness of how terrorists deliberately seek overreaction, which can help to avoid precisely that overreaction and instead thwart terrorists' own strategies. And it can mean, broader still, cultivating the type of digital literacy that can empower the American public to resist those who would use online communications platforms and other venues to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize to violence. Fostering and ultimately attaining these and other forms of resilience is a third goal, and one whose achievement would strengthen the United States against domestic terrorism as well as other threats to U.S. national security.



STRATEGIC PILLARS

Today's domestic terrorism threat is complex, multifaceted, and evolving. There is no single action or single part of the U.S. Government that can address the entirety of that threat. The following four pillars, implemented in an integrated manner across relevant parts of the Federal Government and in close coordination with non–Federal partners, will guide the U.S. Government's response to the threat summarized above. As noted above, implementation of this Strategy will proceed in parallel with, and be complementary to, the work of law enforcement to investigate suspected criminal activity and prosecute those who break our laws.

PILLAR ONE | UNDERSTAND AND SHARE DOMESTIC TERRORISM-RELATED INFORMATION

STRATEGIC GOAL 1.1: ENHANCE DOMESTIC TERRORISM-RELATED RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS.

Addressing any threat effectively requires understanding it thoroughly. For today's shifting and diverse domestic terrorism threat, that task is imperative. The Federal Government continues to augment and improve how the domestic terrorism threat is analyzed and understood. Analyses of key trends and trajectories are now regularly generated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, with support from the National Counterterrorism Center and others as appropriate, and then shared widely across the Federal Government. These analyses benefit from the continued tracking of domestic terrorism-related investigations and prosecutions across Federal law enforcement and nationwide and, moreover, will benefit from increased exploration of publicly available, threat-related information, consistent with applicable law and guidelines. Additionally, a comprehensive understanding of the domestic terrorism threat landscape requires facilitating a systematic provision of information and data to the appropriate parts of the Federal Government from state, local, tribal, and territorial partners who often identify and disrupt manifestations of the domestic





THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO AUGMENT AND IMPROVE HOW THE DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT IS ANALYZED AND UNDERSTOOD.

terrorism threat, even if they do not always use the same labels to describe it. That is why the Federal Government is enhancing its ability to receive and analyze domestic terrorism threat information provided by state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as improving its coordinated dissemination of that information. Doing so will inform more fully not only executive branch officials, but also the Congress and the American people as they seek to understand the domestic terrorism threat facing the nation today.

Maximizing the Federal Government's understanding of this particular threat also means supporting and making appropriate use of the analysis performed by entities outside the government that bring to bear relevant expertise and doing so in a structured way that provides a channel for such analysis while also avoiding bias or improper influence – or even the appearance of it. To that end, and consistent with civil liberties and privacy protections, the Department of Homeland Security will introduce a new systematic approach for utilizing pertinent external, non–governmental analysis and information that will provide enhanced situational awareness of today's domestic terrorism threat. That includes, where appropriate, specialized areas and types of analysis, including ways in which gender–motivated violence can have implications for domestic terrorist threats.

STRATEGIC GOAL 1.2: IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING ACROSS ALL LEVELS WITHIN, AS WELL AS OUTSIDE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

With this enhanced domestic terrorism–related research and analysis, the Federal Government must continue to improve information sharing on domestic terrorism threats across the government to ensure that all relevant Federal partners are equipped to take appropriate measures with this knowledge. Consistent with legal and policy limitations on the sharing of sensitive law enforcement information, we will continue sharing information widely across the Federal enterprise, including, as noted above, through new efforts focused specifically on the domestic terrorism threats that can be identified from open–source information.




In addition, the Federal Government must constantly update and advance its efforts to share relevant information externally, as some of the first to identify a potential threat of domestic terrorism are often state, local, tribal, or territorial partners, or those in their communities. That is why we have already increased our focus on information sharing with those partners, providing, at the unclassified level, more information, with more details, more quickly. This includes publishing and disseminating intelligence products that provide our partners with greater insight into the evolving threat, as well as situational awareness notifications to inform public safety and security planning efforts in advance of potential violence. That emphasis on fuller, faster information sharing will continue and expand, as we are committed to ensuring that state, local, tribal, and territorial partners receive not just warnings of specific, credible threats of violence but also, where appropriate, broader indicators and warnings that can inform our partners' level and type of preparation for potential violence.

As discussed further below, we are also developing new resources as part of our broader effort to boost support to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement in tackling domestic terrorism, including resources that will cover relevant iconography, symbology, and phraseology used by many domestic terrorists as well as data-driven guidance on how to recognize potential indicators of mobilization to domestic terrorism.

STRATEGIC GOAL 1.3: ILLUMINATE TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

In today's interconnected world, very little remains wholly within a single country's borders, and domestic terrorism is no exception. Terrorists and their supporters increasingly connect with each other via Internet-based communications platforms, recruit and encourage mobilization to violence across international boundaries, and point to ideologically similar foreigners as inspiration for their acts of violence. Some domestic violent extremists have sought ties and connections to individual violent extremists overseas. Aspects of the domestic terrorism threat we face in the United States, and in particular those related to racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, have an international dimension. Identifying, confronting, and addressing that international dimension must be part of a comprehensive approach to tackling the domestic terrorism challenge.

The Department of State, in consultation with the Department of the Treasury, is working with other components of the Federal Government and with our foreign allies to assess whether additional foreign entities linked to domestic terrorism can, under the relevant statutory criteria, be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations or Specially Designated Global



Terrorists. That includes analyzing the latest intelligence to inform those considerations through a process that will continue as more foreign intelligence is collected and disseminated by various agencies. Doing so would bar U.S. persons from supporting these foreign entities or receiving training from them. Moreover, the Department of the Treasury, in coordination with law enforcement and other interagency partners, is exploring ways to enhance the identification and analysis of financial activity associated with domestic terrorists and their foreign counterparts, as well as enhancing engagement with financial institutions on domestic terrorist financing, including through existing provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act. Appropriate elements of the intelligence and law enforcement communities have already identified, and are now implementing, more robust information exchanges with foreign partners regarding the foreign connections to the U.S. domestic terrorism threat and those partners' own experiences addressing any comparable threats within their countries. The U.S. Government has thus prioritized obtaining from foreign partners credible intelligence and law enforcement information regarding international support for domestic terrorism in the United States, capturing it in written reporting, and sharing that intelligence and information appropriately across the Federal Government. That effort complements an increased emphasis on the sharing of relevant information with foreign partners, where appropriate, on aspects of the domestic terrorism threat of international relevance. We can also learn from our international partners' challenges and successes in disrupting plots and responding to attacks, integrating that expertise into our own planning and operations.



WE HAVE ALREADY INCREASED OUR FOCUS ON INFORMATION SHARING WITH STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND TERRITORIAL PARTNERS BY **PROVIDING MORE INFORMATION, WITH MORE DETAILS, MORE QUICKLY.**

Additionally, the intelligence and law enforcement communities will enhance the government's understanding of how foreign malign influence operations and the dissemination of disinformation, including by foreign governments, relate to the domestic terrorism threat we face. These efforts complement the U.S. Government's coordinated activities to recognize, understand, and counter terrorist propaganda and disinformation. In addition, the Department of State will leverage public diplomacy programs and messaging to serve as a preventative measure to raise awareness in the short–term and shift sentiments over the long–term. Such efforts can also be used to counter messages from adversaries who use racially motivated violent incidents in America to attempt to erode U.S. credibility.



Finally, illuminating the transnational context relevant to aspects of today's domestic terrorism threat can, in appropriate circumstances, allow us to bring to bear relevant authorities and tools specifically focused on international terrorism. When domestic terrorism threats become international through connectivity to foreign actors or otherwise, the full range of tools applicable to understanding international terrorism threats become potentially available, such as intelligence collection tools. We will apply such tools, where the facts and law support their use, in an ideologically neutral, threat–driven manner.

All told, a better, more holistic, and coordinated understanding of and information sharing on today's threat will allow a more effective and comprehensive response. That response will address not just current and imminent incarnations of the domestic terrorism threat but also its contributing factors before they can generate still more violence in the future.

PILLAR TWO | PREVENT DOMESTIC TERRORISM RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION TO VIOLENCE

STRATEGIC GOAL 2.1: STRENGTHEN DOMESTIC TERRORISM PREVENTION RESOURCES AND SERVICES.

While those who break the law in furtherance of domestic terrorism must face investigation and prosecution for their crimes, it is equally important that the Federal Government engage in efforts to prevent individuals from being drawn into the grip of domestic terrorism in the first instance. That means reducing both supply and demand of recruitment materials by limiting widespread availability online and bolstering resilience to it by those who nonetheless encounter it, among other measures. It also means reducing access to assault weapons and high–capacity magazines and enforcing legal prohibitions that keep firearms out of dangerous hands. Such prevention efforts must be pursued while safeguarding civil rights and civil liberties, including privacy protections, and while avoiding discrimination, bias, and stereotyping.



WE CAN LEARN FROM OUR INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS' CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES IN DISRUPTING PLOTS AND RESPONDING TO ATTACKS, INTEGRATING THAT EXPERTISE INTO OUR OWN PLANNING.



Past U.S. Government prevention efforts have had a mixed record. We need to do better – better at protecting rights and freedoms while still pursuing the goal of preventing individuals from harming their fellow Americans through terrorism or other criminal activity. We have already begun this work: the White House and relevant departments and agencies are consulting extensively with stakeholders nationwide to understand what support and resources stakeholders are looking for from the Federal Government and what lessons can be learned from past prevention efforts. We will continue that engagement, including through the process of implementing this Strategy.

Grounded in existing evidence and best practices in public health–focused violence prevention, our approach to domestic terrorism prevention draws on the expertise, experience, and efforts of the entire government. A number of departments and agencies are already pursuing efforts to enhance community–level and individual–level resilience to violence, many of which help to advance the prevention of domestic terrorism. For example, the Department of Homeland Security and others are either currently funding and implementing or planning evidence–based digital programming, including enhancing media literacy and critical thinking skills, as a mechanism for strengthening user resilience to disinformation and misinformation online for domestic audiences. The Department of State and United States Agency for International Development are doing similar work globally.



GROUNDED IN EXISTING EVIDENCE AND BEST PRACTICES IN PUBLIC HEALTH-FOCUSED VIOLENCE PREVENTION, OUR APPROACH TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM PREVENTION DRAWS ON THE EXPERTISE, EXPERIENCE, AND EFFORTS OF THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT.

The Department of Homeland Security has expanded its efforts to provide financial, educational, and technical assistance to those well placed to recognize and address possible domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilization to violence and will ensure that its counterdomestic terrorism prevention efforts are driven by data and informed by community-based partners. The Department of Homeland Security also has increased the grant funding available in this area in support of evidence-based programs and with transparency regarding their use. The Department of Defense, in addition, is incorporating training for service members separating or retiring from the military on potential targeting of those with military training by violent extremist actors. The U.S. Government is also developing a mechanism by which veterans can report recruitment attempts by violent extremist actors.



The U.S. Government often is not best placed to identify or address issues that will first emerge at the local level. Our approach to domestic terrorism prevention will also work to better equip individuals, families, and local communities with resources to reduce the risk from individuals who may pose a danger to themselves or others, thus assisting them and preventing potential violence. The Federal Government will make available resources and training regarding how to respond to behavior threatening an act of domestic terrorism or targeted violence and, moreover, will work to boost public awareness of such resources. We will also ensure that resources and training specifically regarding how to respond to behavior threatening an act of domestic terrorism or targeted violence are included in the Federal Government's planning and preparation for the upcoming launch of additional resources.

Our law enforcement agencies also play a critical role in responding to reports of criminal and otherwise concerning activity. That is why the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security are working to enhance public understanding of the full range of assistance that can be provided to those in need, including how mental health experts are complementing traditional law enforcement response. Additionally, the National Counterterrorism Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security will release publicly a new edition of the Federal Government's Mobilization Indicators booklet that will include for the first time potential indicators of domestic terrorism–related mobilization. These agencies are also working toward including a range of resources that the public may consult in the event of possible domestic terrorist recruitment or mobilization.

We intend to launch a new approach to aggregating, synthesizing, and publicizing information on research, grants, technical assistance and training, and other Federal resources that can help to advance domestic terrorism prevention, among other aspects of violence prevention. Led by the research and community–facing components of the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Education, and Homeland Security, departments and agencies are working to develop an easily accessible and navigable one–stop website to increase the transparency and accessibility of such resources to a broad range of stakeholders, including community–based organizations, state and local partners, academics and researchers, and the broader public.

STRATEGIC GOAL 2.2: ADDRESS ONLINE TERRORIST RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION TO VIOLENCE BY DOMESTIC TERRORISTS.

Recruiting and mobilizing individuals to domestic terrorism occurs in many settings, both in-person and online. These activities are increasingly happening on Internet-based



communications platforms, including social media, online gaming platforms, file-upload sites, and end-to-end encrypted chat platforms, even as those products and services frequently offer other important benefits. The widespread availability of domestic terrorist recruitment material online is a national security threat whose front lines are overwhelmingly private-sector online platforms, and we are committed to informing more effectively the escalating efforts by those platforms to secure those front lines.

We are addressing domestic terrorism-related online recruitment and mobilization to terrorism while respecting foundational constitutional protections for free speech and association. The U.S. Government already provides information to the private sector and other non-governmental entities in a wide array of contexts, such as cybersecurity, international terrorism, and critical infrastructure defense. Likewise, the U.S. Government provides information to assist online platforms with their own initiatives to enforce their own terms of service that prohibit the use of their platforms for domestic terrorist activities. Continuing to enhance the domestic terrorism-related information offered to the private sector, especially the technology sector, will facilitate more robust efforts outside the government to counter terrorists' abuse of Internet-based communications platforms to recruit others to engage in violence.

Availability of domestic terrorism-related recruitment material online is almost certain to persist at some level. That is especially true on the platforms that explicitly encourage or tacitly condone such material, as well as on end-to-end encrypted platforms where such material can be harder to identify, even by those operating such platforms. Dealing with the supply is therefore necessary but not sufficient: we must address the demand too. Today's digital age requires an American population that can utilize essential aspects of Internet-based communications platforms while avoiding vulnerability to domestic terrorist recruitment and other harmful content deliberately disseminated by malicious actors online, such as international terrorist groups like al-Qa'ida trying to incite imminent violence or hostile foreign powers seeking to undermine American democracy. Consequently, we will pursue innovative ways to foster and cultivate digital literacy and related programs, including educational materials and interactive online resources such as skills-enhancing online games. This can prove a useful component to forging the resilience that may help to stem domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilization to violence.

We will do all of this in a global, multi-stakeholder setting in which we can collaborate on addressing terrorist content online with partner governments similarly committed to freedom of expression as well as with technology companies and civil society organizations. Therefore



the United States endorses the *Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online*. We applaud language in the Christchurch Call emphasizing the importance of tackling the very real threat posed by online terrorist content while respecting human rights and freedom of expression. And we look forward to joining key global governmental and non–governmental partners in this important international forum as well as other fora to help shape the agenda for the continuing transnational conversation while remaining a zealous advocate for freedom of expression on the Internet.

PILLAR THREE | DISRUPT AND DETER DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACTIVITY

STRATEGIC GOAL 3.1: ENABLE APPROPRIATE ENHANCED INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM CRIMES.

The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has long been central to the U.S. Government's efforts to address the threat of domestic terrorism, including by conducting investigations and prosecutions where the law and the facts make those steps appropriate, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation remains the lead Federal law enforcement and intelligence agency for investigating all forms of terrorism, including domestic terrorism. Beyond particular intelligence, investigatory, and prosecutorial work, Federal law enforcement serves as a critical resource for countering domestic terrorism nationwide.

Federal law enforcement is enhancing its efforts to ensure that Federal investigators and prosecutors nationwide are well positioned to tackle this escalating threat, and both the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation are receiving additional resources to support this enhanced effort. The President's Fiscal Year 2022 Budget includes significant additional resources for the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation to ensure that they have the analysts, investigators, and prosecutors they need to thwart domestic terrorism and do justice when the law has been broken. In the meantime, Federal law enforcement is working to identify interim measures that will allow the necessary flexibility in movement of human resources to ensure that the domestic terrorism threat is addressed not only thoroughly but also aggressively. Moreover, the Department of Justice plans to augment its provision of training and other resources to U.S. Attorney's Offices across the country to match the heightened priority already being assigned by the Department to domestic terrorism investigations and prosecutions. Furthermore, the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau




of Investigation will sustain the already robust collaboration between counterterrorism investigators and prosecutors and hate crimes investigators and prosecutors. The Department of Justice will strengthen and expand the use of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to ensure nationwide interagency collaboration on countering domestic terrorism and ensure that Anti–Terrorism Advisory Councils across the country focus on the elevated domestic terrorism threat, ensuring that every U.S. Attorney's Office has the expertise, training, and guidance needed to identify and address domestic terrorism to the fullest extent of the law. The Department of the Treasury, in coordination with interagency partners, will continue to support law enforcement action against domestic terrorists and their foreign supporters through the provision of financial intelligence, information, and analysis.

Even as Federal law enforcement does critical work to protect Americans from domestic terrorism threats and a wide range of other challenges, it is often state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement that serve as the first line of defense against domestic terrorism in communities across the United States, much as they do for many other threats to public safety. Therefore, it is essential that we empower these vital non–Federal partners to effectively address today's domestic terrorism threat and to anticipate tomorrow's evolution of that threat.



THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PLANS TO AUGMENT ITS PROVISION OF TRAINING AND RESOURCES ACROSS THE COUNTRY TO MATCH THE HEIGHTENED PRIORITY ALREADY BEING ASSIGNED TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

Federal law enforcement is augmenting its existing information sharing to ensure that state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement receives up—to—date intelligence and analysis regarding the current domestic terrorism threat picture. The Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security, with support from the National Counterterrorism Center, are incorporating an increased focus on domestic terrorism into current intelligence products and leveraging current mechanisms of information and intelligence sharing to improve the sharing of domestic terrorism—related content and indicators with non–Federal partners. These agencies are also improving the usability of their existing information—sharing platforms, including through the development of mobile applications designed to provide a broader reach to non–Federal law enforcement partners, while simultaneously refining that support based on partner feedback.



In addition to increased information sharing, Federal law enforcement is offering enhanced domestic terrorism-related resources and training to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and Department of Homeland Security, for example, are developing strategies to provide enhanced training on domestic terrorism iconography, symbology, and phraseology, and information on how to recognize potential indicators of mobilization to domestic terrorism, including through the existing Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team First Responder's Toolbox resources and the forthcoming edition of the Mobilization Indicators booklet. The Department of Justice is updating its State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training and Handbook on Law Enforcement Intelligence and determining how most effectively to support state, local, tribal, and territorial partners in ensuring their awareness of certain prosecutorial tools already available to them. We are also exploring ways to convene non-Federal partners to have open, robust exchanges of ideas on novel approaches for collaboration in addressing domestic terrorism, such as how to make better use of laws that already exist in all fifty states prohibiting certain private "militia" activity, including state constitutional provisions requiring the subordination of the military to civil authorities, state statutes prohibiting groups of people from organizing as private military units without the authorization of the state government, and state statutes that criminalize certain paramilitary activity. All of this support will increase these non-Federal partners' capacity to identify, investigate, disrupt, and prosecute domestic terrorists who break the law.

STRATEGIC GOAL 3.2: ASSESS POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE REFORMS.

The threat posed by domestic terrorism is an urgent priority, and this Strategy explains how we are already addressing it aggressively using existing legal authorities. It also lays out how we plan to continue to improve our response while relying on those authorities.

At the same time, in grappling with today's evolving domestic terrorism threat, we must ask the question of whether legislative reforms could meaningfully and materially increase our ability to protect Americans from acts of domestic terrorism while simultaneously guarding against potential abuse of overreach. New criminal laws, in particular, should be sought only after careful consideration of whether and how they are needed to assist the government in tackling complex, multifaceted challenges like the one posed by domestic terrorism and only while ensuring the protection of civil rights and civil liberties.

Therefore, even as we augment our approach to domestic terrorism under existing authorities, the Department of Justice is examining carefully what new authorities might be necessary and appropriate. As with the rest of this Strategy, we are ensuring that such examination is driven



by the facts and informed by the analysis of the experts who can guide our understanding of both the current authorities for addressing domestic terrorism threats and the implications for civil rights and civil liberties of pursuing any changes to those authorities. Duly informed by their analysis and by the recommendations of Federal law enforcement leadership, we will, in consultation with the Congress, consider whether seeking legislative reforms is appropriate and, if so, which to pursue.

STRATEGIC GOAL 3.3: ENSURE THAT SCREENING AND VETTING PROCESSES CONSIDER THE FULL RANGE OF TERRORISM THREATS.

The U.S. Government has a robust system for determining which individuals seeking sensitive accesses or employment, and which passengers seeking certain forms of travel, require, for the safety of others, additional scrutiny. That system has been refined and calibrated over time to ensure increased protections for civil rights and civil liberties as well as enhanced accuracy. To the extent that individual known or suspected terrorists meet the thresholds under that system for additional screening measures or, where appropriate, exclusion from certain activities, that system is being fully utilized. We are, moreover, ensuring that existing watchlisting mechanisms and systems are applied in appropriate cases to known or suspected international terrorists with connections to domestic terrorist threats in an ideologically neutral manner. That work includes making available the improved, robust mechanisms that are available in appropriate circumstances to those who believe that they have been improperly listed.

Pre-employment background checks and re-investigations for government employees is a critical screening process that must account for all possible terrorist threats. The United States is well served by a diverse workforce, including in the military and Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement. Those who protect and defend this nation should reflect the nation, including its vast spectrum of experiences and viewpoints. Consistent with that, no one should be allowed to abuse or exploit the trust and responsibility or the often sensitive accesses and resources that are a part of such professions. We are working to augment the screening process for those who join the military and Federal law enforcement as well as any government employee who receives a security clearance or holds a position of trust by considering changes to the Standard Form (SF)–85, SF–85P, and SF–86 Federal employee background questionnaires, along with applicable military screening questionnaires. This effort can help to ensure that new applicants and employees undergoing re–investigations are abiding by legal obligations, including in providing candid and forthright representations, and to prevent individuals who pose domestic terrorism threats from being placed in positions of trust.



We are also improving our systems and mechanisms for identifying anyone who has already been granted a sensitive position of trust within the Federal workforce who would misuse that position in violation of law, including domestic terrorism–related activities. The Department of Defense, for example, is reviewing and updating its definition of prohibited extremist activities among uniformed military personnel, and will consider appropriate policy recommendations and options to address such activity by and among civilian employees and contractors.

Moreover, the Federal Government is developing threat assessments, resources, and training for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners aimed at enabling them to enhance their employee screening programs and prevent violence. This includes facilitating their consistent use of Federal Government databases already available to them for screening purposes. Finally, we are enhancing existing training programs and resources for those in the private sector to prevent sensitive positions – such as those at airports, seaports, chemical facilities, and other critical infrastructure sites – from being exploited by domestic terrorists.

PILLAR FOUR | CONFRONT LONG-TERM CONTRIBUTORS TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Domestic terrorism can take many forms, inspired by a wide range of violent ideologies whose common, dangerous feature is the resort to violence rather than the peaceful expression of views and resolution of differences. Individuals subscribing to violent ideologies such as violent white supremacy, which are grounded in racial, ethnic, and religious hatred and the dehumanizing of portions of the American community, as well as violent anti–government ideologies, are responsible for a substantial portion of today's domestic terrorism. Tackling the long–term contributors to this challenge demands addressing the sources of that mobilization to violence – with leadership from relevant domestic–facing agencies, coordinated by the White House's Domestic Policy Council and in close partnership with civil society.

That means tackling racism in America. It means protecting Americans from gun violence and mass murders. It means ensuring that we provide early intervention and appropriate care for those who pose a danger to themselves or others. It means ensuring that Americans receive the type of civics education that promotes tolerance and respect for all and investing in policies and programs that foster civic engagement and inspire a shared commitment to American democracy, all the while acknowledging when racism and bigotry have meant that the country fell short of living up to its founding principles. It means setting a tone from the highest ranks



of government that every American deserves the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness that our Declaration of Independence recognizes as unalienable rights. And it means ensuring that there is simply no governmental tolerance – and instead denunciation and rejection – of violence as an acceptable mode of seeking political or social change.

Although the U.S. Government must do everything it can to address enduring challenges like racism and bigotry in America, the Federal Government alone cannot simply "solve" these challenges quickly or on its own. On the other hand, tackling the threat posed by domestic terrorism over the long term demands substantial efforts to confront the racism that feeds into aspects of that threat. We are, therefore, prioritizing efforts to ensure that every component of the government has a role to play in rooting out racism and advancing equity for under–served communities that have far too often been the targets of discrimination and violence. This approach must apply to our efforts to counter domestic terrorism by addressing underlying racism and bigotry.

That imperative includes ensuring that domestic terrorism threats are properly identified and categorized as such and addressed accordingly. That is a determination that must be made free of all forms of bias. All Americans deserve Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement that approach their critical tasks without any racial bias or any other biases and in strict adherence to the law. That is why we are working to bolster efforts to ensure that law enforcement operates without bias as it identifies and responds to domestic terrorism threats and, in turn, that law enforcement provides for the public safety of all Americans.



ALL AMERICANS DESERVE FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT THAT APPROACH THEIR CRITICAL TASKS WITHOUT ANY RACIAL BIAS OR ANY OTHER BIASES.

We are also prioritizing efforts to improve the well-being and safety of everyone who calls America their home. We have worked with the Congress to deliver immediate financial relief to millions of Americans, thus contributing to an equitable economic recovery that can counter the economic dislocation and even despair felt by many Americans. Our continued efforts will augment and accelerate the essential work of economic recovery and sustainable development, alleviating over time the sentiments that some domestic terrorists deliberately use to recruit and mobilize. Demonstrating that our government can deliver for all Americans is crucial to restoring confidence in our democracy.

These efforts speak to a broader priority: enhancing faith in government and addressing the extreme polarization, fueled by a crisis of disinformation and misinformation often channeled through social media platforms, which can tear Americans apart and lead some to violence. A hallmark of this democracy is that political change must be pursued through nonviolent means grounded in the principles upon which the United States was founded. Enhancing faith in American democracy demands accelerating work to contend with an information environment that challenges healthy democratic discourse. We will work toward finding ways to counter the influence and impact of dangerous conspiracy theories that can provide a gateway to terrorist violence.


\star \star \star \star \star

THE WAY AHEAD

America has seen the face of domestic terrorism before. Our country has struggled against groups and individuals who refused to accept that, as a democracy, we must settle our differences peacefully and according to the rule of law. Victims of the 1921 Tulsa massacre bore the terrible brutality of domestic terrorists of their era. Victims of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing suffered the awful inhumanity of domestic terrorists of their time. Victims in Charleston, El Paso, Pittsburgh, Poway, and even the U.S. Capitol now join this tragic history. We have seen certain communities among our diverse nation – including racial, ethnic, and religious minorities; immigrants; LGBTQI+ individuals; women and girls, as well as law enforcement officers, public servants, and government officials – who have been deliberately and most often targeted by domestic terrorists and who, in turn, often have paid the steepest price.

Today's domestic terrorism threat will not fade if we simply hope for its disappearance, let alone if we ignore it. Addressing this threat demands concerted action, coordinated implementation, and careful respect for civil rights and civil liberties. It demands synchronization with broader counterterrorism efforts that include effective responses to a continuing and dynamic threat posed by international terrorism. It also demands a strategy to unite the different elements involved in responding to this challenge.

This document represents that Strategy – a Strategy whose implementation is, already, well underway. We will be steered by it as we forge a community across the Federal Government and beyond to counter today's domestic terrorism threat and thus to make everyone in America safer and the country and our democracy stronger and more secure. We will continue to evaluate implementation of this Strategy to ensure our response evolves as the threat evolves. We will also ensure consistent and rigorous oversight and accountability. Together, we will reaffirm our country's core commitment to the peaceful expression and exchange of ideas, to equal justice under the rule of law, and to equality for all.









NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

DOMESTIC TERRORISM

CONFERENCE REPORT



The National Counterterrorism Center, together with FBI and DHS, held a conference from 23 to 24 September 2019 to examine the US Government's approach to confronting the threat of domestic terrorism (DT) and to inform future DT policy. The conference convened stakeholders from academia, the private sector, and across the Federal Government, including intelligence and Non-Title 50 agencies, to explore four themes: Terminology, Authorities, Operations, and Expanding Partnerships. This report is intended to capture the content of the conversations held at the conference, and does not represent the views of any particular department, agency, panelist, or participant.

Key Takeaways

The following themes emerged from all four sessions:

- Although the threat from DT is not new, radicalization and communication of DT actors has evolved in recent years and remains potent.
- Because an increasingly larger part of the activity related to DT occurs online and is constitutionally protected, increased collaboration among partners—including academia, NGOs, and state,

local, and federal law enforcement—will help combat this evolving threat.

- Most conference participants agreed that current federal criminal statutes do not include a distinct law criminalizing acts of DT, leaving prosecutors to rely on existing criminal statutes to address DT-related offenses, indicating a need for legislative review.
- Most conference participants agreed that a domestic terrorist organization designation, similar to the current process for designating foreign terrorist organizations, could be useful in combating DT; however, DT actors in the Homeland and abroad are aware of the activities that merit designation and adjust accordingly to avoid prosecution.
- Noting the legal challenges to enacting a domestic terrorist organization designation, there was support for using the foreign terrorist designation process to proscribe DT analogues overseas.
- Legal mechanisms available to some foreign partners, e.g., to ban DT groups, are at odds with US civil liberties. Creating a DT designation in the United States could be perceived as government overreach and/or unconstitutional.
- Conference participants noted the significance of the role of terminology in DT, as definitions laid out in statute are used to determine the allocation of tools and resources to departments and agencies. Using terminology solely derived from authorities can be restrictive, proscribing which departments/agencies participate in DT efforts, and lacks the flexibility to be useful for all US Government DT efforts. This impacts how the US Government responds to DT threats, requiring changes in existing practices among the interagency.
- There is no whole-of-government DT threat picture, largely because the US Government does not have a common terminology to describe the threat. The absence of a common understanding of how threat departments/agencies prioritize DT issues differently results in a lack of analytic research and production on DT threats, and in turn reinforces the lack of policymaker prioritization.

"This conference is really a workshop, a call to action, and we are here to determine how to better inform policymaking on DT and determine the 'so what' and the way ahead." -Acting DNI, Joseph Maguire

Conference Panel Presentations and Working Groups

For each theme, a panel of experts provided introductory remarks and then facilitated working group discussions with conference attendees. The below summarizes the content of panel presentations and working group discussions and is not intended to represent the views of any particular department, agency, panelist, or participant.

Terminology

The terminology panel was led by experts from academia and FBI who discussed the implications of distinguishing between DT, homegrown violent extremism, hate crimes, and targeted violence. Key takeaways included:

- The US Government lacks a common definition and set of terms to describe DT; the current
 definitions derive from analysis of the criminal and violent actions of DT actors and are
 useful for departments and agencies with DT investigative missions, but are not easily
 adapted to those with intelligence or prevention missions;
- Terminology needs to be appropriate for applicable agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, create a common understanding of the threat, and must accurately depict an ideology or ideologies linked with criminal activity or violence;
- The US Government needs to find a way to increase public trust by being transparent with the public about how DT definitions are derived, defined, and used;
- DT and hate crimes are not mutually exclusive.

Terminology Working Group:

Obstacles & Solutions

Obstacles:

- Interagency, IC, and local authorities lack awareness of how they each use terms differently based on their distinct mission roles.
- Departments/agencies differ on their understanding, descriptions, and prioritization of the DT threat, which may inhibit analytic research and production. With limited or fewer analytic products, policymakers may conclude that DT is not a priority issue.

Solution:

- Convene the IC, state, and local law enforcement, academic, NGO, community service
 organizations, and foreign-partner communities to generate a comprehensive list of relevant
 DT terms and an explanation of how those terms are used.
 - Generate consolidated, consistent talking points for use with both policymakers and the public to better explain the DT threat and secure the resources required to address it.
- Apply relevant lessons learned from international terrorism; provide policymakers with more
 IC products that put DT threats within the Homeland in the global political context.

What would derail US Government efforts against domestic terrorists?

• We can require all agencies to use the same terms and definitions despite each agency's need for different terms to fulfill their unique missions.

- We can undermine the public trust by failing to be transparent or clear about terms—how the US Government uses terms, what we mean by them, and how that may differ from the public's intuitive understanding of DT.
- We can face data challenges resulting from using terms that do not accurately/adequately capture the threat.
- We can fail to effectively explain to the public that the DT-IT distinction is largely a legal/authorities/bureaucratic one.

Authorities

The authorities panel included academic and civil liberties experts who discussed whether current DT authorities should be expanded, how, and against whom; the merits of applying terrorism designations in the domestic realm; and lessons that can be drawn from historical and foreign-partner case studies. Key takeaways included:

- Federal statutes designate many terrorism-related activities as criminal, but membership in groups with violent or extremist ideologies is protected until espousing violence crosses a threshold of intending to incite—or actually inciting—such violence;
- From a law enforcement perspective, a criminal DT statute could provide additional authority to open investigations, bolster information sharing, and may aid in securing DT resources;
- From the civil rights community's perspective, existing authorities sufficiently address DT;
 DT is a policy problem that requires better alignment of resources to the threat, not a law problem; most NGO representatives that attended the conference did not support designation.

Authorities Working Group:

Obstacles & Solutions

Obstacles:

- · Difficulty of differentiating extremist speech from mobilization-to-violence indicators.
- Lone actors know how to operate without triggering law enforcement actions.
- Ingesting and sharing US person(s) data constrained; government access to private sector data (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) is bound by collection authorities.

Solutions:

- Explore creating a DT criminal statute and/or designating DT organizations for deterrence purposes and provide additional federal violation to authorize predication of an investigation.
- Legislation/litigation that defines research of publicly available information in the DT space; revise how to share Title III¹ information within the IC.

What would derail US Government efforts against domestic terrorists?

¹Title III proscribes the interception of oral and wire communications collected under law enforcement authorities, "while making provision for law enforcement to intercept these communications for use in criminal investigations." 18 U.S.C. § 2510

- We can fail to fully understand the breadth of our own authorities or choose to narrowly interpret them out of risk aversion.
- Our criteria for publicly labeling attacks as DT is opaque and inconsistent.
- We can continue to charge DT actions as criminal rather than terrorism.

Operations

Experts from FBI and DHS discussed how different federal agencies approach DT and how we might shape future approaches. Key takeaways included:

- DHS is working to create a better understanding of the social ecology that drives radicalization and mobilization to violence to determine how and with whom to partner in the existing prevention arena;
- The US Government needs to improve on publicly communicating success and better involve communities in prevention efforts;
- Speech activities protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution should be viewed as a factor, not a constraint;
- Panelists noted that federal law enforcement's goal is to prosecute <u>actors</u>, rather than <u>groups</u>, that commit violations of federal criminal law. While a very narrow situation may permit state or local prosecution of DT cases in the absence of a federal criminal violation, all DT cases regardless of jurisdiction begin with a suspected violation of criminal law.

Operations Working Group:

Obstacles & Solutions

Obstacles:

• Department/agency efforts to enable early identification of all types of terrorism, build effective community partnerships, and broaden information sharing are rarely integrated.

Solutions:

• Create a cohesive and coordinated US Government effort to publish, engage, and communicate among ourselves, with the private sector, and to the public.

What could derail US Government efforts against domestic terrorists?

- We can fail to resource DT efforts in proportion to the evolving threat.
- We can fail to build an infrastructure for collection and sharing of DT information vertically among law enforcement and laterally with the private sector, civil society, and NGOs.

Expanding Partnerships

Experts from academia and industry led the final panel on expanding partnerships and addressed ways to enhance whole-of-government and public efforts to counter DT. Key takeaways included:

- Analysis of open-source information can help us identify DT trends. We need to build public-private partnerships in that space. <u>Counties</u> with the greatest amount of internet searches related to white supremacy are not located in <u>states</u>, indicating that DT is a localized, county problem that differs vastly across and within states;
- Tech companies are emerging as the dominant funder of research on violent extremism;

- US Government agencies with the responsibilities and authorities to do so should focus on expanding existing countering-violent-extremism tools to address DT rather than developing separate programs;
- The US Government should work with European allies to identify and apply lessons learned and best practices in countering DT;
- We need to determine what information private companies have that could enhance broader prevention efforts or specific investigations, examine the barriers to obtaining the information, and build trust with these companies to establish processes to do so; people share info on tech platforms that they do not share with school, friends, or family.

Expanding Partnerships Working Sessions Output:

Obstacles & Solutions

Obstacles:

- When the US Government and its partners do not understand their distinct goals, they may work at cross-purposes and degrade support.
- The US Government is a small player in the information environment, relying heavily on civil society and the private sector.
- Law enforcement organizations, private sector, and civil society organizations, have different threat perceptions and absorptive capacities.
- Institutional impediments to information sharing are broader than DT.

Solutions:

- Establish a clearer picture of what the US Government does and needs that is easier for civil society, NGO, and private sector partners to understand.
- Apply lessons learned from state, local, and foreign-partner experiences in countering recruitment and radicalization.

What could derail US Government efforts against domestic terrorists?

• We can fail to provide sufficient support to civil society and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners as the primary actors in the DT space.

A Way Forward: Senior-level and US Government Experts

To conclude the conference, senior-level executives and experts from across the US Government met separately to begin shaping a way forward in the DT arena. Both groups recognized the need for a common DT terminology, as well as a common understanding of the DT threat throughout the Federal Government. To that end, both groups agreed to continue these conversations to address the evolving DT threat. In addition to NCTC's forthcoming DT assessment, NCTC will host working groups to continue these discussions and develop an interagency action plan for the DT mission space.